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ABSTRACT 
Within the range of literary reviews in Twentieth-Century 
France, none has a more highly-esteemed reputation than la Nouvelle 
Revue Francaise, originally founded in 1909 by Andre Gide and his 
friends. Resuming in 1919 in a world profoundly shaken by the 
upheaval and consequences of the First World War, the NRF, 
at first under Jacques Riviere and then, from 1925 (for the rest 
of the Inter-War period), under the editorial control of 
Jean Paulhan, re-established itself at the forefront of literary 
and critical creativity. 
Informed by much of the unpublished correspondence of Paulhan, 
this thesis shows that the NRF was not exclusively literary. An 
examination of Paulhan's role, and of his editorial policy 
(Chapter One) precedes the identification of a number of themes. 
Already sensitive to topical questions, the NRF debated the role 
and responsibilities of the intellectuals (Chapter Two), whose 
attitudes tended to become more politicized as they grew more 
aware of the deficiencies of the Third Republic (Chapter Three). 
Their preoccupations reflected major themes, in particular 
Franco-German relations (Chapter Four), Franco-Soviet relations 
(Chapter Five), and the Jewish question (Chapter Six). Of course 
the writers involved with the NRF continued to consider political 
and international issues in the light of their own preferences 
and prejudices.; yet their reactions and 
interpretations show that 
they were ever-more conscious of the crucial, historical importance 
of the period. Indeed its nature was such that 
History forced the 
NRF, eventually, into adopting a partisan position which was 
Antifascist, anti-Munich, and which even prefigured the Resistance 
(Chapter Seven). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Writing in 1940 of la Nouvelle Revue Fran aise and its 
development and influence during its first thirty years, the 
American critic Justin O'Brien paid the review the following 
compliment: 
"No other single periodical will afford 
historians of the future such a vast 
panorama of literary activity in France 
during the years 1909 to 1939"(1). 
Indeed, as early as 1920, the Nationalist periodical La Revue 
Critique des Idees et des Livres, welcoming the reappearance 
of the youthful Nouvelle Revue FranSaise after the four years' 
interruption of the war, printed, with uncharacteristic generosity, 
a veritable eulogy of its rival: 
"Vers 1950, l' his torien des lettres, Stil 
cherche '[ se faire une idee des mouvements 
profonds qui orientaient celles-ci aux 
alentours de la guerre, n' aura fait qu'un 
vain travail tant qu'il n' aura pris 
connaissance des collections de La Nouvelle 
Revue Franrýaise (... ) Nulle part il ne 
trouvera aussi concentre cet appetit 
d' invention et d'originalite qui es t un 
des plus remarquables merites de La Nouvelle 
Revue Frangaise" (2). 
Subsequent literary history has more than proved the accuracy of 
these two predictions, for it is now a commonplace in both literary 
and general histories to quote the Nouvelle Revue Fran raise 
(hereafter NRF) as the exemplar of a successful review in Twentieth- 
Century France 
(3) 
. More than this, the NRF has, 
in retrospect, 
been regarded as the most influential literary monthly of the 
century, a judgement corroborated by personalities connected 
with it, as well as by outsiders and enemies(4) 0 
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It would be incorrect, however, to view the NRF as an 
exclusively literary review. Although admired for its ability 
to sustain "un etat de tension entre un "mouvement" qu'elle 
entendait favoriser et une "resistance", voire des 
intolerances "(5) , and in spite of its recognition of "l'esprit 
critique comme l'un des ingredients essentiels ä 1'origine 
de la creation "(6) , the NRF did not shy away 
from the historical 
and political realities of the two Inter-War decades. The 
nature of the period and the coincidence of a number of 
historicälly-derived factors ensured that issues came to the 
fore which had not been hitherto a source of interest or anxiety 
in the public domain, and still less so in the hallowed pages 
of high-quality literary reviews. The fact that the NRF opened 
its pages to discuss the implications of historical events is 
of great significance and deserves detailed attention. These 
considerations are, indeed, of such importance that the two 
recommendations to future historians already mentioned above 
should be extended to the domain of intellectual history. The 
events of the 1920's and 1930's were so inescapable that the 
NRF should be viewed in a perspective which gives as much 
emphasis to its status as a forum or platform 
for intellectual 
debate as to its predominant role in nurturing literary creativity. 
The essential point is that any picture of the intellectual 
history of Inter-War Europe would be incomplete without reference 
to the pages of the NRF 
7ý 
. 
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The editor from 1925 to 1940, Jean Paulhan, took control 
of a review which was becoming increasingly subjected to the 
forces of History: far from expunging it entirely of "non- 
literary" content, Paulhan, sometimes willingly and sometimes 
under coercion, opened the NRF to the debates of the day. 
Inevitably this raises the problem of identifying the nature 
of the issues in question, a problem which, here, is most 
usefully solved by examining the debates thematically, with, 
of course, an historical emphasis. The issues reflect an 
interest not only in domestic politics, but are also largely 
determined by international relations and events. Thus it is as 
essential to examine the political attitudes of the review's 
contributors towards the character of the Third Republic as it 
is to assess the influence upon them of the revolutionary 
upheavals in Germany and Russia. More simply, the NRF may 
be said to show increasing concern for the way events' impinged 
upon France and the international community. 
It was partly inevitable that Paulhan should allow the 
review to reflect the preoccupation of his contributors; yet, 
later on, and depending upon the quality and type of debate, 
he encouraged "engagement". And, when it was perceived that 
peace should not and could not be bought at any price, Paulhan 
steered the review towards an identifiably partisan position, 
even making clear his own views on the matter in its pages. 
This was not done merely in order to introduce new content, 
but out of sheer conviction. 
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All this raises a number of further questions not only 
regarding the nature of the issues themselves, but also in 
connection with the way in which it was advisable - or even 
possible - to respond to them in the NRF. The temperament 
and background of the personalities involved, among them 
Andre Gide, Jean Schlumberger, Julien Benda, Ramon Fernandez 
and Roger Martin du Gard, to name only the most important, 
further helped to ensure that intellectual and political 
questions of international scope were treated. It is true to 
say that, thanks to such personalities (and, in addition, thanks to 
Jacques Riviere, Paulhan's predecessor), the NRF was already 
sensitive or alerted to questions which were not entirely 
"literary". It is also, however, true that after Paulhan 
took over in 1925, he found it increasingly difficult to 
avoid the politicization of intellectual or historical debate: 
paradoxically enough, this was a corollary of (or a factor of) 
his own policy towards the review. 
Moreover it should not be forgotten that writersi. and 
intellectuals (particularly those in the NRF) did not adopt 
committed points of view without much prior reflection, nor 
did they do so in haste or in a vacuum. Indeed their own 
status during these years lent weight to their pronouncements 
and invested them with a conviction which they might not 
otherwise have had; nor could they be treated 
lightly. In the 
same way the NRF - grouping as it did so many luminaries of 
the intellectual world - stood out as a particularly 
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authoritative tribune for the expression of opinion. 
With all this in mind it is necessary to reflect upon 
P aulhan's role at the heart of the review. Beyond his 
organizing its monthly numbers, he was constantly obliged 
to act as an intermediary between the numerous members of 
an "equipe" of contributors whose political views were 
often more extremely polarized than their literary ones. 
In fact one of the most fascinating aspects of Paulhan' s 
direction of the NRF is, precisely, the manner in which 
he balanced the review, both aesthetically and politically, 
around what might be called a Radicalist pivot. At the 
same time, he encouraged a critical consciousness which did 
not hesitate to concentrate its attention upon the very 
ideology which had produced it. Clashes were, of course, 
inevitable, but the NRF never truly suffered from the occasional 
release of internal tensions. It is of paramount importance 
to see how Paulhan managed, rather, to exploit these tensions 
both for his own ends, and to the commercial benefit of the 
review. 
Despite the late Auguste Angles' work covering the 
pre-1914 review, and despite a number of other studies 
dealing 
with specific topics, a comprehensive view over all 
the themes 
in the NRF, set in the full context of Inter-War history, 
has 
not hitherto been provided. Thus, in order to produce as 
complete an answer as possible to these questions, 
it is 
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essential to adopt a multiple perspective. The NRF itself 
is, of course, both the subject and the primary source of this 
assessment 
(8) 
. Even a rapid scan through the covers of the 
review over the years 1920 to-1940 reveals a great deal 
regarding the questions of the day. Yet closer inspection 
of each number reveals still more. As the period progresses, 
contemporary preoccupations penetrate ever more deeply, and 
their traces are detectable in every type of text - articles, 
serialized novels, regular features, book reviews and 
topical items. However, considering the pages of the NRF 
alone would have resulted in a restricted, monocular view 
which is, of necessity, broadened by examining the pages of 
the other periodicals it engaged in debate, including its 
life-long enemy L'Action fran9aise and its satellites, and 
friendlier rivals such as Europe. 
It has, moreover, been possible to complete the picture 
by consulting an "inside" source in the shape of Paulhan's 
'9) 
unpublished correspondence . As editor of the 
NRF Paulhan 
wrote unceasingly to a wide range of contributors and associates. 
Inspection of these thousands of letters provides a privileged 
insight into the way Paulhan conceived and shaped his editorial 
policy, as well as into his motives for including or excluding 
material which might have been or was politically sensitive, 
and therefore unacceptable. Furthermore these 
letters stand 
as one of the last great collections of literary correspondence 
in France, in the tradition of Diderot. Not only do they provide 
-7- 
evidence of the day-to-day tasks of arguably the century's 
most influential literary editor, they are also testimony in 
their own right to the rapidly evolving sequence of events 
during the years 1919 to 1940: the long process of preparing 
. their publication has now begun to come to fruition 
(10) 
As suggested above Paulhan's role was, eventually, more 
than simply editor of a monthly review. Yet at the beginning, 
his responsibilities at the NRF were primarily organizational 
and as such he, as much as his contributors, were very much 
subjected to its regular "mechanics". Paulhan relished his 
(ll) 
task as editor. However, any appreciation of his 
undertaking would not be complete without a detailed, prior 
discussion of the various elements of the organization, aspect 
and policy of the NRF. This is an essential prelude to the 
ensuing thematic study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
"Jean Paulhan and the Nouvelle Revue Franpise:,. Continuity and 
Renewal, 1925 to 1940". 
"Tout ce qui a paru depuis vingt cinq ans dans les 
lettres de neuf et de puissant sortait de la NRF. 
(... ) La NRF continue et vous verrez se former 
en eile tout ce qui comptera dans la litterature 
de demain". (Jean Paulhan, "Presentation de la 
NRF ä Radio-37", Oeuvres IV, p. 363) 
"Dans une revue, c'est tout different. On y voit la 
lit terature qui se forme et s'invente et tätonne 
entre mille dangers. On y prend part. On s'y 
reprend 'L plusieurs fofs. C'est qu'une revue 
n1 a de prix que si l' on y voit, 'd cbte de 
quelques auteurs cons acres (comme on di t) de 
jeunes ecrivains qui recommencent la litterature 
leurs risques et perils. On y voit les lettres 
la 1' etat naissant". (Jean Paulhan, "Presentation 
de la NRF au Club du Faubourg", Oeuvres IV, p. 377) 
"Un des charmes de la NRF, un des secrets de sa 
persistante jeunesse fut de s' accorder de temps 
en temps une fugue dans les vignes du Seigneur. 
Elle tituba quelque peu, ýL la suite de Gide, 
sous l' effet de la vodka communiste, et j amais 
eile ne sut refuser les elixirs que lui faisait 
goüter 1'Ange du Bizarre. L' inf luence qu' elle 
a eue sur la vie des lettres pendant l' entre- 
deux-guerres, impliquait qu'elle enträt dans 
la jeu de son epoque et ne naget pas 'A contre- 
courant". (Jean Schlumberger, Oeuvres II, p203). 
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The exalted reputation of the NRF was only achieved 
through the application of the considerable skills and talent- 
seeking activities of its editors, first Jacques Riviere; 
then Jean Paulhan. Of course it was impossible for them to 
ignore the preferences and tastes of the remaining founders 
of the review, particularly Andre Gide and Jean Schlumberger. 
Still less could they operate editorial choice in a vacuum, 
separated from the commercial exigencies of Gaston Gallimard, 
the publisher both of the review and the "maison d' edition" . 
Yet equally importantly, it should not be forgotten that the 
editors' selections of material, both literary and non-literary, 
were ultimately determined by the intrinsic logic of the review, 
by its periodicity, by what might be called its "mechanics". 
To some extent, the choice of material was subordinated to the 
nature of the review itself; in this way, although it could never 
hope to chronide or report the sometimes rapid progress of 
events throughout the period, it could - and did - reflect 
seriously upon the issues raised by those events. Before 
examining in detail the issues raised and treated by the review, 
it is necessary to outline the particular nature of Jean Paulhan's 
relationship with the review, with the personalities involved 
in it and attracted to it, as well as to examine the evolution 
of his editorial responsibilities and policy. 
Jean Paulhan only officially assumed the direction of the 
NRF on January ist 1935. He had, however, already been the 
Secretary of Riviere's review from 1920 to 1925, and editor- 
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in-chief from 1926 to 1935, with Gaston Gallimard as nominal 
director. As for the NRF, by the time Paulhan came to the 
review in 1920, it already had an established reputation, thanks 
primarily to its rapid initial success in the years 1909 and 
1910, a success which had enabled the review to grow in stature 
until war interrupted it in 1914. With the resumption in 1919, 
Jacques Riviere further exploited and consolidated the status 
of the NRF, and its considerable attraction as a focus, or 
tribune, for intellectual debate was established and grew(l) . 
Paulhan's background and intellectual formation were to 
prove invaluable to him in his eventual function as Secretary 
to Riviere, and ultimately as director of the NRF. The Paulhan 
family had moved from Nimes to Paris in 1894, when Jean was 
ten. His father, the philosopher Frederic Paulhan, _ 
had 
"beaucoup d' influence sur son fils qui parvint difficilement 
se degager de son emprise intellectuelle" 
(2). 
This 
philosophical and psychological predominance led Jean to begin 
preparing his "agreg ation de philosophie" in 1907, 
just 
prior to his departure for Madagascar in December of that year 
on a teaching appointment. He remained there from January 
1908 
to November 1910, when he returned to France3ý . The correspondence 
with Guillaume de Tarde shows how closely Paulhan 
kept in touch 
. with Paris, from where he received a steady stream of reviews 
(4) 
Already in 1908 Paulhan and his friend were responsible for 
the "Psychologie" rubric of Alfred de Tarde's review 
La Vie 4ontemporaine 
(5) 
. Still more crucial was 
the role 
- 11 - 
Paulhan played in the foundation of Le Spectateur in April 
1909(6) . This was "une revue de culture critique" 
ýýý 
and, 
according to Paulhan: 
"il s' agissait d' une enterprise, une sorte 
de logique app liqu6e : une grammai re des 
ides qui cherche patiemment ä mener 
quelques observations coherentes et 
degager quelques lois. Le Spectateur 
a courageusement vecu j usqu en 1914"(8). 
This enterprise provided Paulhan with an apprenticeship in 
running .a review; after the war, he widened this experience 
when he became the "redacteur-gerant" of La Vie from December 
1919 until August 1920, by which time he was officially 
Secretary of the NRF(9) . 
Another early but lasting influence was anarchism. Between 
1894 and 1904, the latter year being that of Jean's military 
service, the Paulhan. household, for financial reasons, was forced 
to take in boarders; among these were "des jeunes filles russes, 
quelquefois anarchistes" 
(10) 
. Moreover Jean 
"ira jusqu'h 
militer activement au sQi, n d'un mouvement anarchis te" 
(11) 
Paulhaa himself remembered that, in 1904, "j'hesitais entre 
le socialisme et 1' anarchie. L' anarchie, c' &tait Jean Grave 
qui m. e it enseignait dans sa _peti to 
boutique de la rue 
Mouffetard... "( 
12) 
" This experience 
in his formative years 
helps explain his later, sometimes idiosyncratic and paradoxical 
approach to events and issues in the 1930's. Moreover it 
imbued him with a streak of antimilitarism which was to 
temper his later sense of respect for authority and order. 
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Just prior to the war in 1914, Paulhan took the entrance 
examination for the "Minis tyre de 1' Ins truction publique" in 
which he would become a "redacteur", a post which proved very 
useful, for not only did he manage to disseminate favourable 
propaganda through the educational administration on behalf 
of the NRF, he was also able to pass on information about 
vacant teaching posts to various contributors 
( 13) 
. During 
the early phase of the war Paulhan was severely wounded. By 
1916 he had still not fully recovered, and it was only in 
1917 that he was able to assume the duties of interpreter 
and driving instructor for Madagas can troops 
( 14) 
. The same 
year Paulhan began to write in earnest and, indeed, contacted 
Andre Gide indicating that he wishes. to dedicate an early 
version of the narrative Progres en amour assez lents to 
(him15 
. Paulhan's 
interest in and admiration for Gide are 
traceable at least to 1914, when he published a study on 
Souvenirs deýCour. d`Assises 
(16) 
During the period leading up to and of ter his 
demobilization on 21st March 1919, Paulhan was becoming 
increasingly involved in the literary "avant-garde"; in 1917, 
the review Nord-Sud was launched, and Paulhan had a text 
published there in May 1918(17) . He also became 
involved 
with the group of writers who founded Litterature and had a 
text published in its first issue(18). As far as his direct 
relationship with the NRF itself is concerned, Paulhan had 
offered Jean Schlunberger an extract of Les Hain-Tenys Merinas 
for the review as early as 1912(19) and, although this did not 
- 13 - 
appear, Paulhan was not discouraged from submitting a "note" 
in 19 13 
(20) 
0 The same year, Paulhan noted the importance of 
the newly-born "Theätre du Vieux-Colombier" in that it 
represented a challenging and logical extension to the NRF 
and the publishing-house(21) . Wishing to exploit his valuable 
position as "redacteur" in the "Minis tyre de 1' Ins truction 
publique" he wrote again to Gide before the reappearance of 
the NRF in 1919 to offer his services; Gide replied: 
"Votre lettre m'emplit de joie. Je crois 
que vows `fites parfaitement dans le vrai 
en pensant que la NRF est loin d'avoir 
trouve tous se s lecteurs, en estimant 
qu'une saine propagande pourrait faire 
beaucoup et je ne puis vous dire avec 
quelle satisfaction je vous vois soucieux 
d'y travailler"(22). 
It therefore appears that Paulhan was already engaged in 
a temporary or non-official capacity during this time, for 
Gide also asked'Paulhan to tell Gaston Gallimard that he 
wished to receive details of some publishing plans 
(23). 
Paulhan's primary task, however, was to help in organizing 
the "propaganda effort" for the NRF. By February 1920, 
. Paulhan also had his first contribution appear in the review(24) 
During the first half of 1920, Riviere's family circumstances 
helped bring Paulhan much closer to the review. On February 2nd 
that year, Riviere urged Paulhan to he patient: 
- 14 - 
"Je suis prof ondement touche par votre 
gentillesse. Je vais etudier la Question 
de s avoi r quel travail je p ouv ai s vous 
confier. Et si je ne me decidais pas 
tout de suite 1 vous appeler a mon secours, 
je profiterais certainement de votre off re 
amicale au moment des couches de ma femme, 
c' es tI dire dans un mois d' ici" 
(25), 
Thus, starting in March 1920, Paulhan was engaged to take charge 
of organizing material for the review: Riviere, not only forced 
to withdraw temporarily due to the imminent birth of his son 
Alain, was also exhausted from his exertions in restarting the 
NRF, made worse by the long-lasting effects of his extended 
captivity during the war. Paulhan kept in touch with Riviere 
by corresponding regularly. He enumerated his tasks and action 
taken on the left-hand side of his letters, and Riviere replied 
with the appropriate remarks opposite: in this way, Riviare was 
able to take a much-needed rest while keeping a finger on the 
pulse of the NRF. Discussing the make-up of the issue for 
June 1920, Paulhan and Riviere exchanged ideas: 
"- l' article de M. Arnauld ne m' es t ) 
parvenu que ce mati. n, 6 mai. Je 
) Bien 
l' ai envoye aussitöt (ä l' imprimerie) ... 
) 
- jai envoye d Paillart les notes, 
)- puisque nous avons 
sauf Mac Orlan, qui nest pas arrive, ) tant fait de la 
lui 
Breton, Allard et Larbaad (... ) ) (A Breton) demander, 
prenons-la. Mais je ne 
souhaite pas voir 
s' agrandir dans la NRF 
le champ reserve d la 
"critique synthetique" 
II. Allard: Tres bref et tres simple, ,. 
X26) 
n' a pas de portee, et d' ailleurs, pas 
) Faire passer 
de pr6tension... 
) 
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A further, still more detailed exchange occurred a few days 
later, in which Paulhan wrote on May 12th and Riviere returned 
his instructions on the 15th. Paulhan was worried this time 
that Paillart, the printer, was late in sending back the 
"placards" for two forthcoming texts; Riviere calmed his 
assistant: 
"Vous avez encore du temps devant vous. 
Si d'ailleurs 1e numdro paraissait, cette 
fois encore, quelques jours en retard 
il ne f audrai t pas vous desesperer" 
(2"). 
Evidently Paulhan's efforts were deeply appreciated at the 
NRF during this trying time, for he told Riviere that none other 
than Gaston Gallimard had advanced a provisional offer to make 
his employment more permanent. He took advantage of this vote 
of confidence by suggesting improvements in the review's 
administrative organization(28) . Riviere too praised 
Paulhan, 
stressing how their different approaches would only benefit the 
review(29) ; he agreed that Paulha. n should be engaged more 
permanently: 
"I1 faut que noire collaboration t{evienne 
r6guli; -hre; eile peut nous 
etre infiniment 
profitable d tous deux, je crois; et je 
suis convaincu qu'en tous cas eile aura 
pour la revue les effets extr'mement 
precieux. J' examinerai, en rentrant, 
avec Gaston Gallimard, les moyens de 
l' organiser pour ains i dire l6-galement. 
I1 y aura biers quelques petites difficultes 
materielles ýi vaincre; mais nous les 
vain cr on s' 
(30) 
Not long after this, in the NRF for July 1920, the name of 
Jean Paulhan appeared for the first time as "Secretaire". 
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Indeed by June 22nd, the news of the appointment had reached 
Paul Valery, who wrote to congratulate the NRF's new secretary: 
"Je suis trýs heureux pour la NRF de vous 
y voir:: definitivement attache. Un, homme 
de votre conscience et de votre precision 
d' esprit es t une acquisition trýs precieuse 
pour une revue. Et quant ýd vous, quart ä 
la reaction sur vous-meme de cette occupation, 
je suis stir qu'elle ne sera pas sans consequence 
pour votre oeuvre a venir. L' exerci ce presque 
perpetuel et aiguise de responsabilites, du 
senss critique (qui est, quoi qu'on di. e (sic) 
et quoi d' on croie, la chose la plus rare de 
ce monde), vous servira certainement"(31). 
Valery's comments here are extremely astute, for both Paulhan 
himself and subsequent critical appraisal of his role (both as 
author in his own right and as editor of the NRF) concur that 
it is difficult to evaluate which of Paulhan's functions depended 
more heavily on the other. Not enough weight has been attached 
to Paulham's role as editor at the NRF when assessing either 
his own work and ideas on literature, or the powerful influence 
wielded by the NRF in the literary world. Robert Kanters, 
however, has justly written: 
"Son (i. e. Paulhan's) oeuvre, au sens. large, 
c' es t la collection des quarante enormes 
recueils de la NRF depuis 1925, anthologie 
in vivo d'h eu pros tout ce qui compte et 
a compte" 
(32ý. 
Having been officially appointed as Secretary, Paulha. n's 
expertise and editorial talents began to mature. He was able 
to influence his director by introducing young authors from 
the "avant-garde"; Aragon and Breton were among those invited 
to contribute. This interest in the modernist movement evidently 
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attracted Riviere too, for he was anxious to prevent the 
review from becoming too staid, a worry shared even by 
(33) 
Andre Gide . In the early weeks of 1922, preparations 
were under way for the "Congras de Paris", whose object was to 
"opposer ä un esprit etroitement traditionnaliste 
un autre esprit qui, niant qu'on puisse concevoir 
1"'ordre" autrement quh posteriori, court de mille 
11 (34) manures ce que nous appelons l'aventure moderne... . 
This venture was partially patronised by the NRF, for Paulhan's 
name appears among those on the organizing committee as "secretaire 
general de la NRF". Paulhan's manuscript alterations to the draft 
proposals, and his letter to Breton 
(35) 
, show clearly that the 
NRF was lending much support to this "Congrýs". It transpired, 
however, that some within the NRF felt that their adherence to 
such an exhibition of "i' esprit moderne" was too dangerous to 
pursue, for Riviere later wrote apologetically to Breton 
withdrawing their support 
(36) 
Apart from his occasional involvement with projects of this 
nature on behalf of the NRF, Paulhan's tasks as secretary were, 
by and large, no different from those which had fallen to Riviere 
(37) 
In 
when he had occupied the post from 1911 to 1914 
addition Paulhan helped organize the NRF's propaganda effort, 
(38) 
a task which had already met with Gitie's full approval . 
Furthermore Paulhan was instrumental in augmenting the stock 
of material for the "notes" section of the review. 
Here he 
carried out his duties with exemplary efficiency often earning 
high praise from Riviere, who granted him an 
increasingly free 
hand 
(39) 
. Paulhan easily satisfied 
Riviere' s strict prescriptions 
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in regard to the critical section of the review(40), and 
although usually the final choice lay with Riviere, the 
evidence shows that often Paulhan held an equal responsibility 
for requesting book reviews not only from regular contributors, 
but also from new recruits to the NRF(41) . Thus Paulhan became 
established at the centre of Riviere's review; he knew how he 
should help his editor and was fully aware of the sacrifices 
Riviý-re was willing to make. He did not hesitate to make it 
clear that he could ease the burden and even had the confidence 
to evaluate Riviý-re's performance: 
"C'est par faiblesse, aussi, Jacques, que vous 
acceptez aussi facilement tout nouveau travail 
qui s'offre, et le plus etranger ä vous. Ce 
double mouvement d' inf luen ce sur vos 
collaborateurs, de recherche int6rieure, ä 
quoi vous obligent la direction de la revue, 
la composition de votre oeuvre: ce mouvement 
en deux sens opposes, vows ne pouvez, vous ne 
pourrez 1'accomplir qu'en vous vidant de tout 
votre souci 
2). 
j( As secretary and later, as editor, Paulha: n had frequent dealings 
with Gide at the NRF. Clarification is necessary 
here, since 
some confusion persists regarding Gide's role within the review, 
especially as there has always been a tendency among 
literary 
historians to see the NRF as exclusively Gide's review. 
At 
the time of its foundation in 1908-1909, Gide was 
listed 
among the members of the 
"comite de redaction", along with 
(43) 
the other founders Yet Jean Schlumberger clearly 
saw 
himself as the director responsible for composition 
(with 
Riviý-re as his secretary from 1911) 
(44) 
, whilst 
Gide, 
though enthusiastic 
(45) 
, was too peripatetic to assist with 
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the day-to-day running. He was certainly never nominally 
director or editor(46) . It is however undeniable that Gide 
inspired much of what came to be known as "1' esprit de la NRF" - 
in other words he brought the literary inspiration to the 
review 
(47) 
Literary historian Robert Kanters is rightly 
careful to distinguish between Gide as the "moving spirit" 
and Riviere and Paulhan as editors: 
"(tide) a ete l' äme du mouvement littercxire 
le plus important de l' epoque, celui de la 
NRF, mais meine une pers onnalite aussi complexe 
que la sienne ne peut exprimer toute la 
complexite d'une telle entreprise... 
Elle n'eut que deux directeui'J, Jacques Riviere 
et Jean Paulhan"(48). 
In 1921, Gide himself complained in the pages of the NRF 
that "plus je me retire de la NRF, plus on croit que c' es t 
showing that he already wished to moi qui la dirige"(49) 9 
disassociate himself from the misconception that the review 
(50 
was solely in his charge' Yet it is true that on occasion 
Gide had come close to assuming the role of director. Just 
prior to the reappearance of the NRF in 1918-1919, Gide 
had 
contemplated taking over; Claudel, however, 
informed R. iviý-re 
that if such a step were taken he would immediately cease 
his 
(51) 
contributions . Gide himself made 
it known that he thought 
Riviere had made a grave error in not consulting other members 
of the review regarding approbation of 
his June 1919 "Manifesto"; 
Gide wrote that "p e. u. s' en fallut que ce premier numero 
d' apres- 
" 
(52) 
The aftermath of guerre ne füt aussi bien le dernier 
(53) 
after Riviere's this dispute lasted well into 1920 Later, 
death in 1925, there could be no question that Gide should 
be 
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appointed director 
(54) 
, for from February till April 1925 
Gide was in the Midi finishing Les Faux-rnonnayeurs, whose 
(pre-publication had already begun in the NRFSSý . He left 
the manuscript of his novel in the charge of Roger Martin du Gard 
and departed for Africa on July 14th 1925(56) . On his return, 
his preoccupations had changed. He found he disliked the NRF 
and even had the idea of publishing his own periodical(57) 
His criticisms led in part to the eventual campaign to renew 
and expand the review in 1927, yet the evidence suggests that 
Paulhari and Gide maintained a frosty relationship and kept at 
a distance from one another 
(58) 
. 
Viewed one way, the NRF was only a small, loss-making 
part of Gallimard's publishing empire; this also tended to 
underline the distance between Gide and the review, for he 
felt that literature and commercialism were incompatible. 
From 1927-8, Gallimard expanded his publishing ventures, 
above all by buying Detective, a lurid weekly with a far 
greater lucrative potential than the NRF. Gide displayed 
an intense dislike for the magazine, to such an extent that 
during 1930 rumours were rife that he was about to break with 
the NRF over what Leautaud characterized as an "af f aire d` argent" 
X59) 
Yet like it or not, Gide, in the long term, had to accept that 
one of the consequences of founding the publishing house, partly 
funded by Gallimard's capital(60), was the increasing 
commercialization of the NRF. For all this, however, the 
misapprehension that Gide directed affairs at the NRF persisted 
well into the 1930's and is well illustrated by an episode 
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concerning Andre Suarýs. Paulhan had been trying for some time 
to lure Suarýs back to the NRF(61) and negotiations to recommence 
the "Chroniques de Caerdal" had almost come to fruition when 
Montf ort' s Les Marges (always willing, jealously, to attack 
the NRF) published an interview with Suarýs in which he saw 
Paulhan's review as a 
"pitoyable cenacle (... ) dinge avec une 
incroyable etroitesse d'esprit par ce 
Goethe des mouches, ce pasteur de Sodome 
quest Andre Gide, oligarchie dont -, _ 
les dirigeants mettent leur puissance 
pecunibre au service de leurs petites 
idees"(62). 
The publication of this interview caused Paulhan considerable 
embarrassment: he told Suarts as much on 15th June 1933: "votre 
interview des Marges me met daps la situation la plus fausse 
et la plus genee qui soit" 
(63) 
. Gallimard preferred that 
Suarýs ` resumed contribution should be delayed, but Paulhau, 
seeking clarification later in another matter, clearly 
indicated 
the source of the problem: 
"s' il semble aux critiques que Particle de 
Jean Schl. 6tait sp6cialement dirig6 contre 
Gide, c' es t que Gide passe pour diriger la 
NRF" (6 4) . 
Finally, the fact that Gide's inspirational role had little 
bearing upon the month to month running of the review 
is 
underlined by the fact that both Riviere and 
Paulhan, whether 
as secretary or editor, looked to Jean Schlumberger and not 
to Gide as their mentor and editorial advisor, for, as 
he 
emphasised himself, Schlumberger 
had had all the experience 
of composing and balancing each 
issue. Schlumberger's role, 
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so little appreciated, was highly important, and Paulhan 
paid him this compliment: " vous etes ä la NRF comme le tao, 
qui inspire sans se montrer, qui ordonne sans intervenir , 
(65) 
All this helps explain that when Riviere died unexpectedly 
on February 14th 1925, there was some confusion over who should 
become "directeur". Although Gide was mentioned, it was out 
of the question he should become director for the reasons 
already given(66) , Charles du Bos dreamt of succeeding Riviýre, 
(67) but Schlumberger and Gide quashed this idea . Rumours spread 
that Riviýre` s widow Isabelle might covet "une situation 
importante (et) une influence personnelle" 
(68) 
, but this 
too was not feasible. Although Benjamin Cremieux was also a 
candidate 
(69) 
, Gallimard himself assumed the title, a shrewd 
move indeed, for he at once quickly ended the speculation, 
avoided offending unsuitable candidates, and passed the reins 
of the editorship to Paulhan, as "redacteur en chef". As 
Claude Martin has so aptly written, Paulhan "devint progressivement 
l' äme de la NRF; neuf ans et demi aprý-s, sa nomination comme 
Directeur ne devait gub-re faire plus que consacrer un etat 
de fait"(7°). If further justification were needed for the 
choice, Paulhan himself provided it in his preparation of a 
special number in honour of Riviýre which remains a model of 
the genre, and powerfully illustrates his powers of organisation(71). 
This is not to ignore, however, the fact that Paulhan sought 
advice elsewhere. Gallimard was his link with the publishing 
house, but he also corresponded with Schlumberger; the dating 
and frequency of Paulhants letters show that 
initially he relied 
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heavily on Schlumberger(72) . Schlumberger could not only 
wield his influence over potential contributors (such as 
" 
Henry de Montherlant 
(73)) 
, his name also carried more weight 
with such as Isabelle Rivitre(74) . Furthermore he provided 
a "control" over his close friend Gide. Detective and 
Gallimard's commercialism had disillusioned Gide and caused 
him to seek publication elsewhere, leaving Paulhan potentially 
embarrassed and deprived of material(75) . Yet Paulhan did not 
hesitate to use Schlumberger as a supporter for his intentions, 
given that Paulhan had already complained to Gide of a lack of 
authority: Schlumberger's weight enabled him to operate 
efficiently with the proviso that he did not always have to 
accept sole responsibility. It was only in December 1934 
that Gallimard nominally handed the directorship to Paulhan, 
(76) 
who accepted somewhat begrudgingly . Thus from January 1st 
1935, Paulhan was officially "directeur" of the NRF. As the 
1930's progressed inevitably toward war, the review itself 
was forced more and more to react to political and historical 
events(77) . This made Paulhan's task no easier, and on several 
occasions he felt driven to expressing his frustrations as 
editor(78) . By 
1936, Paulhari's mood led him towards occasional 
expressions of indifference: he seemed to have accepted the 
inevitable and he often shared his feeling of impotence with 
his closest contributors 
(75) 
. Indeed, as the war came nearer, 
Paulhan felt more and more isolated: he complained to his 
former mentor Schlumberger that "Gide et vous etes veritablement 
trop absents, ces temps-ci, de la revue "(80) . So 
isolated did 
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he become throughout 1939 and until May and June 1940 that 
he and his letters became an invaluable source of news as 
to the whereabouts of many NRF contributors; his letters to 
Gide, Schlumberger, Caillois, Etiemble, Guehenno and many 
more earnt him the nick-name "la marraine des ecrivains de 
la NRF mobilises (qui) lui va ä merveille", as Sartre quipped 
at Christmas 1939 . 
(81) 
As editor Paulhan fulfilled two mutually-dependent tasks: 
he prepared the review and acted as intermediary between it and 
his often temperamental (if not refractory) contributors, 
attempting to protect the interests of both to the detriment 
of neither. As Lina Morino puts its, Paulhan was a 
"conciliateur" 
(82) 
. He demonstrated his exemplary skill, 
tact and patience in managing to reconcile the review and such 
"difficult" personalities as Suarts 
(83) 
, Claude1(84) and 
Leautaud(85) , but only after expending much time and effort 
in behind - the - scenes manoeuvring, usually by correspondence. 
Even a superficial acquaintance with this correspondence gives 
. an idea of the range and type of contributors he dealt with 
(86) 
Part and parcel of these negotiations with potential and existing 
NRF - authors was fixing their payments 
(87) 
, but 
by far his 
most important duty was to plan and compose each issue of the 
review. 
When he became editor in April 1925, the NRF, a monthly 
88) 
subscription review, appeared in 128-page issues . What 
helped to establish the uniqueness of the NRF was the self- 
conscious, non-dogmatic but selective approach applied 
in 
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composing each issue. Whatever material it published, 
Paulhan insisted that literary criteria should be applied 
in the selection. Moreover, due to its mechanical nature, 
a further key to imposing order on an apparently eclectic 
monthly lay in planning ahead and in having the completed 
number printed and distributed on time. Thus, in order 
to fulfil the promise of all publicity material that the 
review appeared by the first of each month, Paulhan was 
assisted in his task by applying the "tableau d' ordre", 
or working schedule, established under Riviýre and adhered 
to with even more rigour by Paulhan.. Copy had to be received 
so that, in normal circumstances, the layout of the review and 
the first proofs could be checked in time for the "bon tirer" 
on the 20th of the month. The second proofs were then checked 
and the final printing and binding took place between the 25th 
and 28th or 29th, when the review was distributed through. the 
post. Late submissions could delay the issuing of the "bon I 
titer", much to Paulhan's distress; he would sometimes even be 
obliged to travel to Abbeville to correct the final proofs 
at the printer's, Paillart, as shown in this important letter 
to Schlumberger: 
M 1) Je ne me souviens pas que Jacques ait 
jamais accept o une note plus tard que le 15. 
J'ai conserve son "tableau d' ordre", suivant 
lequel les derniers bons 'd tirer doivent etre 
donnes le 20. I1 s'enL suit necessairement que , 
((SLc) 
les dernieres pages ä composer ont et¬ envoyees 
l'imprimerie le 15 le plus tard. 
Le tableau d'ordre est suivi present plus 
s trictement que j amais . Aucun num6ro, 
depuis 
un an, n' a paru avec un jour de retard. Mais 
je n'ai pu obtenir de Paillart l' organisation, 
et quand il ya lieu, les coups de collier 
n6cessaires qu' en prenant de mon cOtd (et en 
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tenant) les engagements qu' aucun manus cri t 
nouveau ne soit envoye apres le 15. Un retard 
d'un jour (... ) ma oblige l' annee derniere, 
en Aoüt, a aller passer une j ourn6e ä Abbeville 
pour corriger les epreuves sur place. A quoi 
s' ajoute: 1) qu'avril n' a que 30 j ours - 
2) que Paillart m' a averti, il ya un mois, que 
tout retard de ma part entrainerait pour le 
numero un retard de quelques jours (A cause 
d'une nouvelle application des lois du travail: 
interdiction des heures suppldmentaires, etc. ). 
(89) 
. 
One or two days' delay could therefore detemine whether an item 
would be included or not, for later on in the 1930's, events 
tended to move with a rapidity which often excluded the holding- 
over of material until the next issue; on August 25th 1937, 
Paulhan thanked Grenier for his text, saying that "le Congrýs 
(another text) es t arrive trop tard (avant-hier seulement, 
quand tous les bons ä tirer etaient donn6s)"(90). 
Most importantly, regarding the treatment of politically - 
and historically - related questions in the NRF, Paulhan was 
often forced against his will to alter the content of any 
given mcnth's issue at short notice. Thus, replying to a 
complaint from Grenier, who was mystified by the non-inclusion 
of his "notes", Paulhan explained: 
"I1 m'est difficile d' arreter chaque mois tout 
mon numero par avance parce que la dimension 
des articles peut varier au dernier moment 
dans d' assez grandes proportions. De sorte 
qu'il me faut souvent retirer de la mise en 
pages les notes qui sont le moins "d' actuality"" 
91) 
. 
Balancing each number had, indeed, always been an almost obsessive 
concern at the NRF and, as he had worked so closely with Riviere, 
(92) 
Paulhan continued the tradition himself even more obsessively . 
_27_ 
Paulhan, however, in questions of selection and presentation, 
by no means had sole responsibility; this was a change from the 
more authoritarian style of control under Riviýre to the more 
collegiate approach which had characterized the very first 
review. As eaxly as January 1926 Paulhan outlined his idea 
for an editorial committee 
(93) 
, revising it during 1927 to a 
more manageable caucus. A wide range of topics was covered 
at these editorial meetings and Paulhan reported the success 
of one such meeting to Schlumberger: 
"nous avons decide de nous reunir un jour 
chaque mois - Arland, Cremieux, Fernandez 
et moi - le matin un de nous fera une 
communication, l' aprý-s-midi on discutera 
de la NRF. C' etait hier la premitre reunion; 
tout s' es t fort bien passe, et le soir nous 
etions ravis. Je crois que cette fois nous 
tenons notre comite - mais je voudrais bien 
que de longtemps on ne songeät lui donner 
d' autres membres que Gide, Gaston, vous et 
nous quatre. Le prochaine reunion aura 
lieu le 5 octobre. Cremieux doit lire 
un essai, peut-etre une pi? -Ice ... 
"(94). 
Much of the success of Paulhan. 's early phase at the NRF is owed 
to the committee-structure, but as the years passed, Paulhan 
gradually became more authoritarian himself. On the eve of the 
war, after Munich, Paulhan felt confident enough at times to 
ignore the strongly-voiced objections of such as Jean Schlumberger, 
and steered the NRF very much according to his own firm 
(95) 
convictions 
As editor, Paulhan was also obliged to take account of a 
commercially - if not sociologically - determined factor: 
that is, that more new subscriptions could be gained at certain 
times of the year. The covers and the "cahiers publicitaires" 
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of the NRF show that the review was targeted specifically at 
the "etrennes" market. Special offers of books were an 
inducement for resubscription and for the purchase of gift 
subscriptions; the same was offered for introducing new 
subscribers. As far as Paulhan was concerned, he too had to 
select material with this in mind. Thus new serials began in 
January; moreover, an attractive author such as Suarýs could 
bring a promotional advantage 
(96) 
. Very often the November, 
December and January numbers carried more pages, making the 
review appear more substantial(97) . Not only was the Christmas 
and New Year market an important one for the NRF, considerable 
care also went into preparing the "rentree" issues. This 
explains why some serials or other important texts started in 
August, September or October, and could then run through until 
Christmas in time for resubscriptions(98) . With these commercial 
factors in mind, Paulhan and his committee then proceeded to 
select and order their material. If there was a risk of discord 
between certain articles, Paulhan would postpone one in favour 
(99) 
of another 
Pre-pub li cation in review form was then a normal f act of 
literary life: a good serialization could, in certain circumstances, 
(100) 
double the printing of the review Sometimes reviews would 
outbid or out-manoeuvre one another in order to print the latest 
novel by the newest celebrity: the case of Jean Giono 
is 
illuminating. Daniel Halevy, responsible at Grasset for Les 
Cahiers verts , wrote to Paulhan offering 
him the chance to 
publish Colline in the NRF, but in the event, 
it was passed 
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on to Commerce 
(101) 
; the NRF took Giono's "Champs" for its 
August 1928 number and pre-published Un de Baumugnes in 1929 
from August to November. The rush to publish Giono led to his 
having a contract with both Grasset and Gallimard, a fact 
which appealed to Paulhaa's wry sense of humour 
(102) 
. Despite 
this cut-throat competitiveness, Paulhan attempted to adhere 
to certain principles, as illustrated by the criticism levelled 
at the NRF for pre-publishing novels in incomplete or fragmentary 
form, particularly Les Faux-r! onnayeurs. Conscious of the storm 
of protest provoked in 1925 over the part-publication of Gide's 
novel 
(103) 
, Paulhan made 
it a matter of policy never to repeat 
the same mistake - this was also a useful pretext to invoke 
(104) 
refusal of contributions might be awkward104) , In reality, 
however, Paulhan was forced to accept the sometimes compromising 
link between the review and the publishing house(105) . The 
monthly serialization was, indeed, a major selling-point, and 
Paulhan was aware that the sometimes large leaps in new 
subscriptions were linked to specific serials: 
in 1926, for 
instance, the NRF gained 1100 new subscriptions precisely 
because of the choice of serials 
(106) 
. 
Among the most memorable works serialized in the NRF are 
Giraudoux's Bella (1925), Gide's Voyage an Congo 
(1927), 
Proust s Le Temps retrouve (1927), Malraux's Les Conquerants 
(1928) and La Condition kumaine (1933), Chanson's Les 
Hommes 
de la Route (1937), Giono's Un de Baumugnes (1929), Drieu's 
Reveuse Bourgeoisie (1927), Limbour's Les Vanilliers 
(1938) 
and Aragon's Les Voyageurs 
de 1'r. mperiale (1940, but incomplete). 
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The aesthetic problem of cutting a novel into extracts of 
more or less the same length without necessarily following the 
author's chapter structure was one which Paulhan constantly 
faced. Gide, for one, commented that Malraux's La Condition 
kumaine 
was ill suited to publication in review-form, that it 
cohered much better as a book 
(107) 
, and objected to Aragon's 
seemingly interminable work Les Voyageurs de L' Imperiale 
(108) 
. 
In Aragon's case, however, political factors (Aragon's 
communism) over-ruled the aesthetic, even though Paulhan 
defended his decision in literary terms 
(109) 
Indeed the 
, reading of a novel 
in monthly instalments is problematic 
(110) 
. and becomes more so the longer the novel in question 
(111) 
Yet the key to balancing the NRF was to find the "centre of 
gravity" of each segment which, for Paulhan, became a challenging 
and rigorous principle. As a last resort, Paulhan would palliate 
his rejections by insisting that he was acting in the best 
interests of the NRF(112) 
Authors themselves often expressed profound dissatisfaction 
with serial publication, but, due to pressing financial anxieties, 
they were forced to accept it: nowhere is this better illustrated 
than in the case of Roger Martin du Gard, who exchanged a number 
of letters with Paulhan over the protracted negotiations regarding 
his play La Gonfle 
(113) 
For all the problems and complaints, 
however, Paulhan managed to satisfy the needs of both authors 
and readers-; the continuing success of the review was proof 
enough that his choices were judicious and his skills matched 
the "balancing act" of the review 
114) 
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The continuity of any review, however, derives from its 
regular features, and in the adaptation of their presentation 
to a variety of needs including, in particular, readers' 
expectations and changes in editorial policy. Paulhan's 
further duty to the NRF was to nurture and promote interest 
in the highly important regular, critical section of the review, 
a section which had always had a solid reputation(115) 
Schlumberger has confirmed that "L' important, 'A nos yeux, 
c' etait nos derniýres pages, celles qui contenaient notre 
appareil critique" 
(116) 
. Literary history has also tended 
to view the NRF as largely a critics' review, and that it was 
critical innovation there which produced a bolder and more 
exploratory approach to literature 
(117) 
. Albert Thibaudet, 
the longest-serving of the NRF `s critical team, identified 
two strands within the review. Gide represented all that was 
best of a "critique essayiste" but, equally important, was the 
philosophical leaning of the review: he singled out Gabriel Marcel, 
Jacques Rivitre, Ramon Fernandez and Pau11an himself 
(118) 
The "chroniques" (or regular feature articles) expanded under 
the editorship of Paulhan.. Out of the entire review, it was the 
part which assumed the most mechanical character, providing what 
sometimes became a tribune for expressing and exchanging the 
ideas of the most regular contributors. Moreover the "chroniques" 
provided subscribers with a sense of security - each month they 
could rely on reading Thibaudet or Benda whatever the rest of 
(119) 
For the contributors, the the review had to offer 
"chroniques" offered a prestigious monthly outlet for their 
.. ý 
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essays and a (relatively) reliable source of income. As 
far as the most important "chroniques" are concerned, Alain's 
"Propos" and Thibaudet's "Reflexions" provided the backbone 
of the Inter-War NRF; not only this, they also accounted for 
the largely and identifiably Radicalist orientation of the NRF 
during the first half of the period, and helped bring about the 
(120) introduction of essays of political analysis . The 
contribution of philosophy-teacher Alain began in April 1927, 
although the NRF had been attempting to secure his regular 
contribution since 1920121) 
( 
. Initially Alain's presence met 
with tacit approval; moreover, in January 1928, in the event 
of his 60th year, the monthly Europe produced a glowing tribute 
by reputed NRF regulars, seeming to underline the fact that the 
. renowned "philosopher of Radicalism" was NRF property 
(122) 
By 1930, however, Alain's "Propos" had begun to attract 
some highly uncomplimentary remarks, particularly from 
Roger Martin du Gard 
(123) 
and from Jean Grenier, who noticed 
perceptively that the reason for Alain's presence was to attract 
(124) 
. Alain had large number of subscriptions from teachers 
124ý 
indeed taught a new generation of teachers who perpetuated his 
thinking in the Inter-War years, including Raymond Aron and 
Sartre, the latter being a good example of a "contre-61; ve" 
125) 
During 1936, Alain's monthly "propos" ceased, although he still 
continued to submit material. From 1934 Alain lent his valued 
support to the Comite de vigilance des 
tntellectuels antifascistes 
(126) 
(the CVIA) and wrote for the pacifist periodical Vigilance . 
As the appeal of Radicalism waned as the 1930's progressed, so 
I 
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Alain's association with the cause of integral pacifism grew; 
127) on the eve of war, he was interrogated about his writings 
Albert Thibaudet, a teacher at the University of Geneva 
from 1924, was widely admired by the same audience as 
(128) 
Alain , Thibaudet's greatest influence was perhaps over 
the post-war generation of critics; his expositions of 
Bergsonism, Barris and Maurras won him respect in the early 
1920's(129). The title of his rubric "Reflexions sur la 
Litterature" was significantly shortened to"Reflexions" in 
early 1928, indicating an important change of emphasis 
(130) 
Thibaudet's partial deflection away from literary matters 
did not please everyone at the review, notably Jean Prevost(131) 
and Andre Gide(132); yet Paulhan admired him and praised 
several of the "non-literary" essays, including the October 
1930 "Appel au Concile" 
(133). 
After Thibaudet's death Paulhan 
was appointed literary executor(134) , at the review, such an 
assidious presence meant that it would be difficult to 
replace Thibaudet, although Nizan and Schlumberger were 
considered 
(135) 
. In the event Arland broadened 
his "chronique" 
into "Essais critiques" from 1937: despite this, Thibaudet was 
profoundly missed at the heart of the NRF. 
Although he wrote less regularly in the "chroniques", 
Ramon Fernandez, introduced by Riviere in 1923, would occupy 
more controversial ground136) . Fernandez, the archetypal 
( 
"philosophical" critic whose profession of critical faith 
had his first 
was ideally-suited to that of the NRF 
(137) 
,h 
(138) 
essay-length book review appear 
in October 1926 , and 
m 
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took over the more regular "Essais" rubric: by November 1933, 
he had submitted some thirty essays(139)_ By 1931 he had 
established a solid reputation 
(140) 
, drawing support in 
particular from Martin du Gard(141), Yet as the 1930's 
progressed Fernandez became more and more committed politically, 
moving from a position of liberalism to support for and 
involvement in the anti-fascist organisation l'Association des 
(142) 
'crivains et artistes revolutionnaires (the AEAR Soon 
afterwards, however, following a bitter exchange between 
(l43) 
Aragon and Drieu , Fernandez veered further and 
further 
across to the extreme Right; by 1938, he was writing regularly 
for Doriot's newspaper Emancipation nationale, freely attacking 
his former NRF colleagues 
(144) 
. Under the Occupation 
he 
regularly submitted material to Drieu's NRF, as well as 
continuing his work for Doriot's Parti populaire 
crancjais 
(145) 
During his most constant (PPF) as intellectual advisor 
period at the NRF, Fernandez was undoubtedly a great asset, 
his intellectual rigour and powerful, clear argumentation 
finding favour among many, both inside and outside the review. 
The "chronicp-ur" of perhaps the greatest importance and 
value regarding the NRF as a focus of 
intellectual debate was 
(146) 
Here was the great defender of Republican Julien Benda 
idealism, a fact which, once again, enriched the Radicalist 
tint of the NRF, particularly in the debate 
(partly pursued 
in the review) following the publication of La Trahison 
de. s 
(147) 
Clercs, serialised in 1927 . Not only this, 
but the 
v 
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widespread repercussions of the debate on intellectuals' 
responsibilities directly prepared the way for the "politicization" 
of the NRF after 1932148) 
( 
. Paulhan granted Benda a regular 
"chronique" called "Scholies" in addition to the many articles, 
serials and book-reviews he submitted(149) . This intense activity 
was the fulfilment of an ambition; he confided to Louis Guilloux, 
then working at the publishing-house, that "Je voudrais bien 
devenir une eminence grise de la NRF , 
(150) 
, an ambition whose 
effects were felt by the younger generation: "Dans ces annees 
proches encore de La Trahision des Clercs (Benda) faisait figure 
d' eminence grise, presque du redacteur en chef de la revue, 
(151) 
. 
Such prolixity was not possible without considerable support: 
this support came almost uniquely from Jean Paulhan himself. 
Paulhan deeply admired Benda's apparently disinterested 
rationalism, especially as it was embodied in his earlier 
essays: his admiration is well-defined in a remark Paulhan 
made to Benda in the company of Francis Ponge: 
"Un jour, s' adress ant I Julien Benda, 
Paulhan a declare: "il est un 
intellectualisme qui sen tient a 
l' observation patiente et I 1' experience 
methodique, tente de degager quelques lois, 
evite les partis-pris, si seduisants soient- 
ils, et se garde le plus longtemps possible 
de conclure. Je voudrais que ce füt le 
mien. '.. (152). 
Benda reciprocated Paulhan's admi. ration(153) and has confirmed 
that his support was maintained in the face of much opposition 
(15 4) 
from both within and outside the review , although, 
for a 
time, Gide backed Paulhan, thus approving of the opening-up of 
(155) 
the NRF to current debate . Some within the 
NRF disliked 
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Benda' s presence, considering him to be a philosophical 
vulgarizer, if not a charlatan 
(156), 
yet it was equally 
recognised that he drew an audience(157) 
The period of the most inimical tensions regarding Benda's 
position came during the year following the Munich crisis in 
1938: Benda's unflagging anti-Germanism became increasingly 
entrenched as the 1930's progressed, and as the dangers of 
(158) 
Nazism became more apparent In a long, very important 
letter of 1939, Benda, answering the criticisms of such as 
Schlumberger(159) , defended his own position, clarifying his 
status at the review: 
"Voir moins frequemment mon nom dans la NRF, 
titre absent des "Airs du Mois" sont des choses 
que j' accep to sans aucune peine (... ) . J' aimerai s 
que S (chlumberger) At que je ne me suis jamais 
"donne des gants" (n'ayant, d'ailleurs, aucun droit) 
"d' Betre directeur de la revue". Que de f ois , solli ci to 
par un jeune homme de faire passer un article dans la 
maison, j' ai r6-pondu que je n'y avais aucun pouvoir, 
y etais un simple collaborateur(... )"(160). 
Thus, by the end of the 1930's, Benda's contributions, although 
initially intended to sustain a rationalist neutrality at the 
NRF, had paradoxically forced the review to contend with the 
most controversial issues of the day, a fact clearly recognised 
by Benda himself: 
"I1 est clair que si la direction veut ma 
pears., non pas seulement en raison de mon 
attitude dans la NRF, mais ai l leurs , et en 
raison de la tendance politique generale, 
ma cause, notre cause, - puisque vous voulez 
bien me defendre -, devient singuliýrement 
menacee' 
(161) 
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For all this, Benda was a valued regular contributor who 
found favour among the review's Radicalist-teacher readership: 
the NRF would certainly have been different without him. 
Finally, Paulhan managed to bring Andre Suares back to the 
NRF in 1939 in order to resume his "Chronique de Caerdal". 
His unmistakeable polemical töne, which would have been familiar 
to his earlier followers 
(162) 
, suited the review when he began 
again in January 1939: indeed his texts led to problems with the 
censorship 
(163) 
. Even 
if Suarýs was widely regarded as eccentric, 
he was valued by Paulhan, for it was equally widely recognised 
that Suarýs detested the tendency for intellectuals to divide 
into factions with political allegiances; however, his abhorrence 
of Nazi racism ultimately outweighed his distate for Soviet 
. totalitarianism, since he was of Jewish origin 
(164) 
Further components of the critical section organised by 
Paulhan were the book-reviews - or "Notes" and "Notules" - 
and the important "Revue des revues". Paulhan's apprenticeship 
under Riviere had provided valuable experience in compiling 
and balancing the "Notes", some of which became review-articles 
(165) 
. 
Paulhan's correspondence abounds in instances of his commissioning 
"notes" from a wide range of contributors, especially Schlumberger, 
(166) 
Grenier and Prevost . Moreover Paulhan relied on criticism 
from such as Grenier and Martin du Gard regarding the "notes" 
section: timely warnings could alert him to the greatest danger, 
(167) 
paulhan also that of slipping into fatuity or banality 
re-instituted the "Notules", a compendium of very short reviews, 
in 
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to deal with the less important part of an ever-increasing 
book production: he conferred this upon Rene Lalou in November 
1925(168) 
, To Lalou's distress, Paulhan decided to transform 
this rubric into the broader "Revue des" Livres" section in 
February 1928 
(169) 
; Paulhan himself delighted in these summary 
(l7() 
executions, but Martin du Gard disliked them. They were, 
however, indispensible, and later Paulhan, writing under his 
pseudonym Jean Guerin, incorporated them into his "Bulletin" 
rubric. 
The "Revue des revues" was another essential rubric which 
conformed to the widely-accepted practice of reprinting and 
commenting upon extracts from interesting or significant articles 
in competitors' reviews. Thus "house-authors" appearing elsewhere 
could be quoted, as well as material from reviews which Paulhan 
supported or wished to promote, particularly those close to 
the NRF(171) . Not only this, mention could also 
be made of 
writers who otherwise would never (or rarely) appear in the NRF, 
such as Henri Massis or Charles Maurras. Extracts from periodicals 
such as L'Action franraise or Candide could be inserted as 
documentation or supplementary material to fuel the debates 
engaged in the NRF 
172 
Paulhan, for whom this rubric was of 
particular fascination 
(173) 
, provided most of the material and 
later inccr orated the "Revue de Mois" into his "Bulletin" 
section. All these rubrics provided the basic structure or 
framework for organising the monthly contributions to the 
review: regardless of their presentation, they were a constant 
feature. Periodically, however, given the nature of the historical 
ýu 
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evolution of the 1930's, the review was forced to adapt and 
to refresh itself: here, Paulhan was particularly successful. 
Indeed during 1927 Martin du Gard and Gide had already 
praised Paulhan for the positive impetus he had given the 
review(174) . In March 1927 a 
"Lettre ý nos Abonn6s" was 
inserted in the publicity brochure at the front of the review. 
It confidently announced that the NRF had had a "succes rapide, 
inattendu, qui a fait en trieze annees de la NRF la premiere 
revue 1itt6raire en France , 
(175) 
. Promises were made to expand 
the critical section and, indeed, in August the pagination 
increased from 128 to 144 pages; at last Paulhan's "projects" 
for the presentation of the review could be put into practice: 
Alain's "Propos" began in April, "Jean Guerin" began the expanded 
"Revue des Revues" section in July and the critical section 
expanded and consolidated after August. Gallimard's choice 
had been vindicated: under Paulhan, advised as he was by Gide, 
Martin du Gard, Schlumberger and Grenier, the NRF had entered 
its most successful phase. 
One way of measuring the success of the review 
is to examine 
certain data regarding subscriptions. As 
is normal with the 
publishers of most literary reviews, official 
figures are rarely 
divulged; indeed in the case of the NRF, they are a jealously- 
guarded secret, as is the subscription-list 
itself. However there 
is sufficient data in Paulhan's correspondence and elsewhere 
to 
permit a relatively accurate estimate 
to be made. It is 
important to emphasise that the subscription figures of any 
review are well below the total printing 
for each month and, 
IN 
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in the case of the NRF, this figure often fluctuated dramatically, 
usually upwards, especially on publication of special numbers 
or tributes 
176ý 
. The question is made more complex by the 
fact that with many of the NRF's subscriptions, each issue 
would reach more than one reader, for, as a literary review, 
the NRF was indispensible material in railway waiting-rooms, 
drawing-rooms on the "Messageries Maritimes" and, of course, 
in libraries 
(177) 
. 
The NRF had quickly attracted a substantial readership 
from the very beginning, whereas some periodicals were fortunate 
if they had four or five hundred readers, let alone subscribers. 
Within the first year alone, 1909 to 1910, the NRF was printing 
1,400 numbers a month, and on the eve_ of war in 1914, the 
subscription figure had risen to 1,400(178) . These and other 
data show that the overall printing (tirage) figure was normally 
double that of the regular subscription list, meaning that by 
mid-1914 the average printing would have been between 2,500 and 
3,000 a month. After the resumption in June 1919 the same 
figure was quickly re-established, particularly by Christmas 
that year, for the review had, once again, become very sought 
of ter 
(179) 
. Entering the 
New Year 1920 with some 1,500 
subscribers, the NRF thereafter steadily built upon 
its 
success. In the course of a study on 
its rival Europe , 
founded in 1923, Joseph Kvapil notes that the NRF had 2,000 
subscribers 
(180) 
By 1925 when Paulhan took over, the figures 
become clearer, for the newly-appointed editor kept 
Schlumberger 
informed of the progress made: in June 1925 Schlumberger learnt 
- 41 - 
of some of Paulhan's projects 
(181) 
and that the review had 
gained "200 abonnes nouveaux" 
(182). 
"Tout de meme", continued 
Paulhan, "nous sommes bien loin encore des 8,000 ahonnes que 
nous devrions avoir"(183). 
By 1927, the year of expansion, Paulhan could celebrate 
by tabulating all the nett-gains in "abonnements" over an eight- 
year period: 
"I1 y a, dans les progres de la NRF, un cote 
presque mec-anique, qui est assez etonnant. 
Ainsi la NRF a gaged: 
en 1920 : 100 abonnds 
1921 : 150 abonnes 
1922 : 140 abonnes 
1923 750 abonnes 
1924 : 450 abonnes 
1925 : 875 abonnes 
1926 : 1100 abonnes 
(1927 : 900 abonnes) . Or ces 
"bonds" sont 
regulitrement dus une oeuvre particulitre(184). 
A calculation may be made to show an estimated (but honest) 
figure of subscriptions for the end of Paulhan's first seven 
months as editor. Adding the gains for the years 1923 to 
1925 (2,075) to the 1923 base-figure of 2,000, a total of 
4,075 subscribers is reached. By the end of 1927 he could 
expect a further 900 which, combined with the 1926 figure of 
1,100, constituted a remarkable success, thus increasing the 
regular subscription sale to some 6,000 per month; by 
1928, 
(185) 
the NRF was printing over 12,000 numbers a month Further 
evidence suggests that as the Inter-War years progressed, the 
(186) 
NRF continued to expand its printing ; this, 
interestingly 
enough, was not only due to the changing 
fortunes of other 
reviews 
(187) 
but is also explained by the fact that the NRF's 
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treatment of historical events gained readers. In March 1939, 
after Munich, Paulhan wrote to tell Schlumberger that: 
"La "montee" continue: 100 ahonnes de plus 
en de cemb re -j anvier, 260 en j anvier - 
fevrier, 140 en fevrier - mars. Je crois 
que le numero de novembre (1938) es tä 
l' on gin e de tout" 
(188). 
Its stance against Munich drew an extra 500 subscribers in three 
months showing that the success of the NRF cannot be solely 
attributed to its literary standing: even during the war 
itself, the review continued to gain readers 
(189) 
. 
The year 1927 did indeed represent a turning-point, not 
only for the NRF itself, but also for Gallimard's empire- 
building: by 1928, Gallimard had added Detective and Du Cinema 
to his domains under the umbrella company "ZED" publications 
(190). 
In 1932 Gallimard also entered the high-circulation political 
weeklies market with the founding of Marianne, edited by 
(191) 
Emmanuel Berl Paulhan and Berl harboured suspicions 
of one another(192), but worst of all, Paulhan felt that most 
of the regular contributors to the NRF would be tempted 
by 
(193) 
Marianne, including Gide In the event, Gide contributed 
little. Politically, Berl's proximity to Herriot and the 
"quai d'Orsay" placed Marianne close to government circles 
and, although sympathetic to the 
"Front populaire", it was 
never fanatical. It faced competition 
from Vendredi in 1935 
and after falling circulation hit 
it in 1937, Gallimard sold it 
(194) 
to Radicalist Politician Raymond Pätenötre . 
The whole 
episode of the founding of Marianne, the commercialization 
of Gallimard's and 
intensifying political pressures brought any 
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. 
rancorousness between Paulhan and Gallimard to a head 
(195) 
Indeed, as the 1930's went on, and in particular, j us t 
prior to the "Front populaire" victory of June 1936, pressures 
to politicize the NRF itself were building up. Paulhan confided 
to Jouhandeau that "ils ne peuvent pas souffrir, daps la NRF, 
qu'elle soit si peu politique... je me sens assez seul, dans 
(196) 
cette maison" 
Accompanying these pressures came suggestions that Gallimard 
should either take over Europe or set up a new political review 
under Guehenno, removed recently from Europe 
(197) 
; in the event, 
neither of these possible moves was made. In 1938, however, 
the "Librairie Gallimard" took over the fortnightly review 
Les Nouveaux Cahiers 
(198) 
; Paulhan himself contributed 
articles to the "Analyse des Mots" section, articles close 
(199) 
to the field of interest of Les Fleurs de Tarbes . Finally, 
in 1938, Gallimard expanded into the new medium of radio by 
arranging for front-line NRF authors to give talks on their 
work. Although presentations by Paulhan, Gide, Suarýs and 
Claudel were scheduled or envisaged, the "Quart d'Heure de la 
NRF", broadcast by Radio-37, was doomed to failure when a talk 
on Claudel's poetry over-ran by two minutes and was cut-off by 
a concert(200) . Early 
in 1939, the short-lived experiment came 
. to an end by mutual consent 
(201) 
Against this background of commercial expansionism, the NRF 
itself continued to prolong its success. However, there was no 
guarantee that the NRF could persist 
in adhering to the same 
formula and succeed indefinitely. From time to time certain 
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risks had to be taken to infuse new strength into the review: 
this covered two important areas, content (and editorial policy) 
and the format of the review itself. Regarding the content 
and the direction taken by Paulhan, two of the most persistent 
critics from within were Gide and Martin du Gard. Partly due to 
Martin du Gard' s interests in Franco-German relations, and to 
Gide's increasing interest in the Soviet Union, the year 1932 
saw increasing pressures being applied to Paulhan, pressures 
which eventually were to lead to the instigation of new priorities 
in policy, as well as to changes in the aspect of the NRF itself. 
Not only was Gide disaffected by Gallimard's commercialism, by 
1932 he was also very distracted from literary concerns; for 
instance, he confessed to Louis Martin-Chauffier that "je pense 
tout le temps que des evenements si importants se preparent qu'on 
a presque honte de s' occuper de la litterature" 
(202) 
. 
One direct result of these preoccupations was that Gide decided 
to publish extracts from his Journal in the NRF. On March 12th 1932, 
he told Paulhan that "cette publication est (pour moi du moins) 
fort importante" 
(203) 
. Plans were even mooted 
for a new rubric - 
"Discussions et Controverses", and later, although this idea was 
not instituted, in January 1933 a selection of 
documents on Russian 
(204) 
Not surprisingly, when Gide's pro-Soviet youth appeared 
statements appeared in June and July, the reaction was widespread 
and sometimes polemical. Franjois Mauriac 
for one went on to 
the offensive, and Gide agreed that Paulhan should 
insert extracts 
,ý 
(205) 
in the "Revue des Revues Gide's remarks to 
his editor are 
extremely valuable for they show that 
he was fully conscious of 
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the risks he was taking in publishing such potentially explosive 
material in a literary review like the NRF; he still considered 
balance to be the paramount consideration: 
"I1 importe que la NRF se maintienne le plus 
possible non-tendancieuse et... arbitrale. 
Je ne me fais point d'illusion sur le peril 
que mes pages du Journal lui font courir. I1 
importe aussi que vows la preserviez de tomber 
tout dans un sens, de verser de cote. 
Roger Martin du Gard me communique ä ce 
sujet vos reflexions, qui sont parfaites. 
Vous me connaissez assez pour bien penser que 
tout cela se livre de terribles debats et combats 
dans ma cervelle, oü jai souvent grand mal d'y 
voir clair" 
(206) 
. 
There is little doubt that Gide was genuinely troubled by the effect 
his increasingly committed stance would have on the NRF, especially 
. as the review began to receive a number of cancelled subscriptions 
(207) 
This concern was translated by the fact that he was very keen to 
underline and maintain the demarcation between his own "engagement", 
and the "raison d' etre" of the NRF: in spite of his recent 
declarations, he was insistent that the NRF must remain independent. 
Yet this might have been perfectly clear within the NRF circle; 
outside it was an entirely different matter. Indeed both 
Schlumberger and Martin du Gard expressed increasingly forceful 
reservations about the public effect of Gide's political orientation, 
and how it was noticeably steering the NRF 
into danger. This 
question is absolutely crucial 
in any explanation of the policy 
underlying the success of the 
"phenomýne NRF" ; it certainly 
remained central in editorial policy at any period 
in the history 
of the review in the Inter War years. 
If Paulhan disagreed with 
Gide in other matters, including the publication of 
his Journal, 
he was in complete accord with the principle 
informing this 
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fundamental issue of policy 
(208) 
NRF policy was pre-eminently self-conscious to the extent 
that the "orthodoxy" of the review was constantly tested by 
newer "non-conformist" elements or forces to which it gave birth 
and then nurtured within itself . This policy was also an 
extension of the care applied in balancing the review, whether 
in the presentation of the Contents or in counter-balancing 
political views. Here Paulhan always attempted to place the 
NRF at the centre of an oscillation between what he called the 
"saugrenu" - texts (not necessarily literary) challenging the 
status quo - and the "orthodoxe". To illustrate this, in 1935 
Jean Grenier innocently reported that a Raymond Roussel text and a 
criticism of it had "epate tous les bourgeois qui lisent la NRF" 
(209) 
He perhaps did not know that he was referring to an issue which 
would preoccupy the newly-appointed director of the NRF for some 
months ahead in a defence of his policy aimed primarily at 
Jean Schlumberger. In two long letters of July 1935, Paulhan 
vigorously defended his own approach and, if his initial remarks 
were predominantly literary in scope and content 
(210) 
, his defence 
was applicable to the motivating principle underlying his broader 
conception of the NRF: 
"Cette orthodoxie, songez aux dangers contre 
lesquels il a fallu la defendre: apres tout, 
la NRF a infiniment risque de devenir trop 
moralisante ä la suite de Pontigny, trop 
communis ante la suite de Gide , trop 
metaphysicienne d la suite de Benda; eile aurait 
pu glisser avec Maurois et Morand vers un 
conformisme assez plat; avec Kessel vers un 
romanesque assez vulgaire et tapageur. Et je ne 
dis pas qu'elle soit parfaite: du moins a-t-elle 
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conserve, Id la faveur j us tement du saugrenu 
et de l' experience lit teraire, une ouverture 
vers les jeunes gens et cette sorte de faculte 
de renouvellement continu qui fait que lorsqu'il 
se fonde, aujourd'hui encore, un pamphlet ou un 
journal des jeunes - La Bete Noire ou le Minotaure 
- c'est h des collaborateurs de la NRF que Von 
fait appel. Lisez les derniers numdros de ces 
deux revues (Le Minotaure, notamment, admirable). 
J' ai fait le compte: plus de la moitie du texte 
y es t donn6- par des e crivains de la NRF. C' es t 
la preuve, il me semble, que l' orthodoxie - que 
vous aviez du premier coup formde - n' a pas cesse 
de demeurer valable. Avouez qu'elle implique 
aussi n6cessairement aujourd'hui Roussel (etant 
donn6- surtout l' admiration que Gide eprouve pour 
son oeuvre) et Audiberti, qu'en 1912 Lager et 
Fargue" (211 
j. 
One of the key sentences here is the following: "Du moins a-t-elle 
conserve (... ) une ouverture vers les jeunes gens et cette sorte de 
faculte de renouvellement continu". Underlying the impetus toward 
renewal is implanted a "pointe de saugrenu", within the long- 
standing orthodoxy of the NRF. Unlike many other unadventurous 
reviews, Paulhan's NRF was not afraid to offer material which 
could displease its readers. The particular position the NRF 
occupied within the range of literary periodicals allowed 
it 
to bend both ways: for instance, a review like the Revue des 
deux Mondes was produced by and for Academicians, civil servants 
and the upper-bourgeoisie who expected it to print 
''conservative' 
texts. A review sheltering so many Academicians would never 
have published heterodox texts which might threaten established, 
even institutionalized, norms of literary or 
intellectual 
acceptability. Readership expectation and tolerance were 
evidently important, for the obverse of the same coin 
is 
pertinent here: the NRF was strong enough commercially 
to 
- 48 - 
be able to risk printing Artaud, Roussel and Audiberti (or 
even Leautaud from the older generation) without losing too 
much. If some subscriptions were lost, others might then 
be gained from different quarters. 
Furthermore there was the connection with the 'avant-garde' 
reviews, some of which were extremely ephemeral, but, as Paulhan 
rightly pointed out, were often founded by erstwhile or future 
contributors to the NRF. Paulhan's astuteness as editor and 
talent-spotter resided, in large part, in exploiting his 
seemingly endless network of contacts, form the Academy 
(occasionally via Daniel Halgvy) to the surrealists and communists 
(via either Andre Rolland de Reneville or Aragon), with the more 
liberal sector of the teaching profession occupying the middle- 
ground. Such a self-conscious policy enabled the NRF to include 
enough mainstream material to appeal to its liberal-minded 
audience, but it did not exclude texts which might only have a 
limited appeal. Paulhan knew that some would cause a stir and 
would take some time to be recuperated into the broader spectrum 
of literary taste. It is certain that publication 
in the NRF 
conferred an aura of (sometimes fashionable) acceptability. 
Once again, in the specific context of the letter cited above, 
it was the public stances and statements adopted and pronounced 
by such as Gide and Malraux which gave rise to 
Schlumberger's 
anxiety; like it or not, their literary merits and 
talents 
were widely approved during this time. 
Schlumberger had no 
doubt become more conservative than he realized since the start 
of the review in 1908-9; this, too, 
partly explains Paulhan's 
admonitory tone. 
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The controversy continued: after a meeting at the NRF 
in April 1937, Gide and Schlumberger were still discussing 
Paulhan's predilection for the "saugrenu" "genre" as Gide put 
(212) 
it, a "genre" which Gide himself claimed to have revived 
As for Paulhan, he was nothing if not consistent; he continued 
to express similar ideas in a variety of texts even until eight 
years before his death(213) . Once again, because of the sometimes 
widely differing views on the direction taken by the NRF, Paulhan 
had his defenders within the review. Martin du Gard could write 
in 1936 of the unique position the review occupied in the world 
of letters: 
"La NRF est dune qualite si particuliere, 
eile occupe aujourd'hui parmi les revues une 
place si isolee, si "differente", que je n'ai 
eu aucune difficulte ä trouver de quoi satisfaire, 
ä peu pros Europe, Commune, Vendredi et tutti 
quanti" 
(21ý+) 
. 
There was one fundamental difference between the two remaining 
founders of the original NRF and Paulhan: Gide and Schlumberger 
considered it unavoidable (if not essential) to-include material 
on historical, political or social matters. Their great 
friend- 
in-common, Martin du Gard shared their concerns although he was 
not a contributor of such material. It 
is of significance too 
that Paulhan felt it necessary to remind his radio audience 
in 
1938 of a principle he considered paramount: 
IV 
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"Laissez-moi vous rappeler d'abord ce quest 
la NRF. C'est une revue litteraire. On 
aurait. tort de 1' acheter pour se faire une 
opinion sur la politique, ou sur 1'economie 
sociale. (... ) Il est un point sur lequel 
eile ne varie pas: c'est la valeur litteraire 
(... ) . La litterature a, entre autres, ce 
merite: c'est qu'elle depasse les modes et 
les partis, 1'histoire et 1'actualite"(215). 
Yet despite this insistence, and because of the pressures from 
Gide and Martin du Gard brought to bear since 1932, the NRF 
underwent considerable changes as the 1930's progressed; 
indeed, the ground was being prepared for these transformations 
as early as 1927 with the publication of Benda's La Trahison des 
Clercs and the subsequent debate 
(216) 
Also in 1927 the NRF had embarked upon its programme of 
expansion and renewal, a process which was pursued into the 
19301 s 
(217) 
. By 1933, however, clearly 
Paulhan felt that the 
review was too restricted, too inflexible. In fact he was 
thinking of 
"une refonte totale de la partie notes de la 
NRF: quelq-ue chose de plus complet et de bien 
plus bref (Aussi, peut-etre des notes politiques 
- mais les faire intelligentes et sans parti, 
c'est terriblement difficile)"(218). 
After much thought, Paulhan finally struck upon the 
formula he was 
seeking to enlarge the scope of the review 
in order both to deflect 
criticism and to ease the political pressures 
being applied by 
Gide and Martin du Gard. On November 7th 1933, 
he shared his 
scheme with Grenier: 
'M 
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"Je voudrais donner chaque mois dan s la NRF 
une rubrique d'Actualite (si Von peut dire) 
(... ) 
. Le tout trait o en notes braves, d'une 
demi-page chacune. Je t' en prie, songes-y 
serieusement et donne-moi avant dix fours 
deux ou trois notes. Aprýs tout, pourquoi 
ne parlerions-nous pas de ce qui "se passe" 
aussi bier ue n'importe quelle Marianne 
ou 1933? " `219) . 
Thus in December 1933 the first "Air du Mois" section appeared 
covering seventeen pages at the end of the review; the longest 
of the contributions were one and a half pages, and the shortest 
four lines(220) . Thereafter the format changed little. At the 
beginning, as Claude Martin has said, the "Airs du Mois" offered 
"une suite d'echos, de pages d'humour ou de menus textes librement 
concus, qui donnaient en effect "de l' air" dans la construction 
de chaque fascicule" 
(221) 
. Once again reactions were swift and, 
on the whole, they were favourable, although both Martin du Gard 
(222) 
and Grenier(223) expressed reservations about the 
"journalistic" 
nature of the material. Having made a relatively successful 
start, the new section came into its own after February 
1934 
when Paulhan used it to present a selection of views on the 
(224) 
February 6th riots in Paris 
By 1937, the director of the NRF began to find that there was 
a growing demand for comments on recent events, as well as 
for 
indications of forthcoming events. Paulhan told Grenier: 
"nous allons publier dans chaque numero 
(I la demande generale) quatre pages 
des tinees 'd mettre le lecteur au courant 
de tout: evenements lit teraires , livres, 
theatre, cinema, etc. Je t' en prie, envoie- 
moi huit ou dix notes de 2ä3 1' es sur ce que ýý'ý 22 5 
tu voudras (surtout des livres) . 
11 
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Thus the "Bulletin" was inaugurated in March 1937 as a complement 
to the "Airs du Mois". It later assumed a place of its own and 
incorporated brief notes on "Evenements-Les Livres-Spectacles", 
the best of which Paulhan thought were provided by Armand Petitjean, 
of whom he wrote " c' es t un homme de g6-nie que nous tenons 
(226) 
lä" 
From February 1938 Paulhan himself prepared the "Bulletin", 
using his pseudonym Jean Guerin; in particular, in the "evenements" 
page, he achieved a sometimes ironical, even thought-provoking, 
effect in his juxtapositions and elliptical notations. From 
October 1939, the "evenements" disappeared; Paulhan evidently 
believed that it was no longer appropriate to continue his 
. commentary given the gravity of the 
international situation 
(227) 
From early 1938 Paulhan became increasingly embattled at the 
review; moreover, signs of a decline in the quality of the NRF 
had begun to manifest themselves, for attempts during 1937 to 
inject new life had not been overwhelmingly successful. A, number 
of contributory factors led Paulhan to dispatch a circular letter 
to several writers on March 31st 1938, soliciting their opinion 
on the review, and ways in which they thought its performance 
might be improved. The circular began: 
"Jamais onnä reproche la NRF d' etre glaciale 
et morne avec plus de violence que depuis 
quelques semaines. Brasillach (entre autres) 
nous appelle des diplodocus; et Jean Marteau, 
des pedants" 
(228) 
. 
According to Paulhan, the "notes" were most at fault. He felt that 
(229) "elles vont un peu dans tous les sens ; moreover he felt that 
the "äme de la revue" was somehow no longer present or tangible, 
'9« 
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at least not in the sense that it was present in Esprit or 
Europe, in spite of the fact that these two periodicals were 
subordinated to "un catechisme politique ou moral" 
(230) 
. For 
all this Paulhan felt that the unity of the NRF group still 
thrived, but perhaps it could be more prominently exposed in 
the review itself. Ironically enough at the same time, Gide 
was again ruminating to Martin du Gard that he shared his 
regrets "de ne voir point la NRF se faire plus ouverte aux 
preoccupations du jour" 
(231) 
. Jean Grenier, one of the 
recipients of the letter, wrote back at length in a fashion 
(232) 
which must have given Paulhan some encouragement 
Moreover he considered that if contributors other than Paulhan 
criticised or even monitored the "notes" of their colleagues, 
then the director might lose his authority, and the priority 
would shift from judging talent to judging ideas, a step which 
would only infringe the independence of the contributors. In 
conclusion Grenier suggested that the "chroniques" section 
should perhaps be more unified 
(233) 
By late summer 1938 Paulhan still felt uneasy about the 
critical section of the review and (as he had done several times 
during the 1930s) invited Grenier to contribute a regular 
"chronique" and "notes" for the forthcoming year. This time, 
however, contemporary events provided the 
"redressement" he was 
looking for: the Munich crisis of September led directly to the 
NRF adopting a partisan (anti-Munich) stance with 
its November 
issue 
(234) 
.A year 
later, at the time of the declaration of 
war in September 1939, many of the 
NRF writers were mobilized 
'W 
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and sent to the front: Arland, Sartre and Petitjean, among 
the regulars of the review's critical section, could no longer 
be relied upon to submit copy. Moreover Etiemble and Caillois 
were in the Americas. Paulhan, therefore, had to seek elsewhere 
for material. In September he wrote that "il me semble qu'il 
faut ä la guerre une revue un peu elargie (et d'autant plus je 
vais avoir moins de notes et d'Airs du Mois)" 
(235) 
. Paulhan 
resorted to some "general interest" texts and complemented them 
(236) 
with some short, unpublished material 
Before too long however, Paulhan's worries as editor regarding 
the aspect of the NRF and the fulfilment of any given editorial 
policy became increasingly subordinated to and overshadowed by 
his attempts to provide a realistic- or at least unequivocal- 
representation of the "Dröle de Guerre". In June 1940 Paulhan 
and his review were literally overtaken by events: the Nazi 
Occupation prevented the appearance of the periodical which had 
dominated the French intellectual and literary scene over the 
(237) 
last twenty years 
By no means always successful, Paulhan contributed to and 
consolidated the reputation of the NRF, which 
had been established 
by the time he took over as editor in 1925. Fully supported and 
advised by a range of correspondents, he maintained and even 
augmented the vitality and status of the review, and changed 
the 
emphases of his editorial policy to suit the exigencies of 
the 
time. What is more, he did not shy away from altering 
its aspect 
and structure if, as a result, 
it could be refreshed. Despite 
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his reservations and his principles Paulhan found that to 
ignore the preoccupations of the day would have made the NRF 
less arresting. 
The treatment of such questions followed in the wake of a 
prolonged debate conducted both inside and outside the NRF on 
the nature and role of the intellectual and his responsibilities 
within society: this debate found its catalyst, if not its very 
centre of gravity, in a work published by Paulhan in the NRF. 
This work, Julien Benda's La Trahison des Cleres, marked the 
beginning of a phase whereby French intellectuals in general- 
not merely those circulating at the NRF- defined their stance 
relative to Benda's own apparently haughty position. It is 
highly significant that a supposedly exclusive literary review 
should: npen itself up as a forum to discuss topical and social 
issues, even if the periodical did not harbour writers of any 
one, predominant or identifiable, political persuasion, or 
even if many of these same writers declined to descend into 
the public arena. Furthermore, Benda's text contained references 
not only to issues relevant since the Dreyfus Affair and even 
before, it also presaged those questions which, during the 
1930's, would become paramount. 
144 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"Between Idealism and Commitment: La Trahison des Cleres and 
Intellectual Debate in the NRF, 1927 to 1932". 
"Peu d' articles de la NRF ont souleve plus 
d' emotion, de l' enthousiasme de Gide 'd 
l'horreur de Marsan, que La,. Trahison' des 
Clercs. I1 va y avoir des ripostes assez 
dures" (Jean Paulhan to Schlumberger, 
BD. 25066, November 1927). 
"Qu' es t-ce que devient la NRF? Quelle dröle 
d' epoque, hein? Tout ennoblie par la politique 
(au grand sens), tout avilie et compromise par 
l'autre (helas! la plus active)" (Ramuz to 
Jean Paulhan, Lettres II, 1919-1947, Grasset, 
1959, p256,25/3/32). 
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Since Jean Paulhan had taken over the editorship of the NRF 
in 1925 nothing had been published in it which might have been 
politically or even socially sensitive. Paulhan's own attitude 
and the review's committee structure prevented any possible 
repetition of Riviere's occasional imperiousness in selecting 
material, literary or otherwise. Yet Paulhan's admiration for 
Julien Benda attracted him to a new text, La Trahison des Clercs, 
particularly as the work's central argument was against any form 
of what would come to be known as intellectual "engagement"; 
ostensibly Benda was attacking all forms of intellectual treason. 
Paulhan could not know, however, that the effect of publishing 
this work would be the reverse: it coincided with the time when 
solutions to the apparent impasse it implied were beginning to be 
considered. Instead of preventing "engagement", the debates it 
nurtured prepared the way for the public "prises de position" 
of various individuals such as Malraux and Gide within moves 
toward a collective mobilization of intellectuals, in 1932. 
Thus, situated in the intellectual history of Inter-War France, 
La Trahison des Clercs, in spite of itself, worked as a catalyst 
in an intense period of self-questioning culminating in 
Paul Nizan's essay Les Chiens de garde, a violent harangue not 
only against Benda's position, but also against the political 
quietism of university philosophers. 
Under the direction of Riviere, Benda had been kept at a 
distance from the NRF despite their common antipathy for the 
Nationalist Right, with whom Rivigre crossed swords after the 
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resumption of the review in June 1919( 
1ý 
. It was also possibly 
the influence of Thibaudet, Bergsonist as he was, who advised 
Riviere to exclude this inveterate attacker of Bergson(2) . 
Equally it may have been Benda' s rather ignominious literary 
career and his idiosyncratic views on literary creativity 
which displeased Riviere 
(3) 
. Paulhan, however, had a deep 
admiration for Benda and felt that it was time he should have 
access to the review: thus from August to November 1927, 
La Trahison des Clercs appeared in four eagerly-read instalments. 
Yet Benda's text did not receive unanimous approval when it was 
proposed as a serial. Writing much later, Benda himself 
remembered that Thibaudet, at least, had opposed its 
pub lication: 
"Quand la NRF decide de publier ma 
Trahison des Clercs, Thibaudet, qui 
faisait partie du jury, s'insurgea 
contre cette decision, declarant que 
ma forme d' esprit f-tait absolument 
ddsutte, denuee de tout inter@t. 
L'ouvrage p arai t, et je crois pouvoir 
dire sans outrecuidance qu'il es t l' objet 
dune certaine attention. Lh-dessus 
Thibaudet lui consacre trois grands 
articles, estimant que l' oeuvre etai"t 
de valeur, puisque le public le 
retetºýait" (4) . 
To say that it was "1' objet dune certaine attention" is a 
considerable understatement, for the debates it sparked off 
and the vocabulary it employed and made current - 
"les clercs", 
"la clericature, " etc., persisted long afterwards. 
Viewed in one respect Benda's text was tangential to the 
question of "inqui6tude"(5) , and 
it served to remind especially 
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those writers of the younger generation that they should not 
lose sight of eternal principles such as Truth and Justice, that 
these should remain sacrosanct and respected above all else, and 
that political commitment was at least dangerous if not treasonable. 
One to of young writers grouped around Les Cahiers du Mois 
had already published their Examens de Conscience 
(6) 
in 1926, 
some two years after Marcel Arland's seminal essay "Sur un 
Nouveau Mal du Siecle" 
(7) 
; Thibaudet clearly saw these Examens 
as a significant contribution to the problem although, interestingly 
enough, he noted that "la politique ne tente (malheureusement) 
personne" 
(8) 
. Eight months 
later, reflecting on the young 
"6crivains philosophes" in the Cahiers verts volume Ecrits, 
Thib aude t commended: 
"Une critique philosophe, qut, ne manque 
pas d' aines, qui est riche en jeunes, et 
qui est ou sera chez eile dans plusieurs 
organes, v6 tlä une r6 ali t6 d' au ourd' hui 
et une Possibilite de demain" 
(9) 
. 
Among the "ain6s" referred to was Julien Benda, and Thibaudet 
then proceeded to forge an interesting and important link with 
Riviere's review: 
"Dans le manifeste vivant et charmant qu'il 
e crivi tl ors de la reprise de la NRF en 
juin 1919, Jacques Riviere declarait que 
l' opinion attendait de notre organe des 
explications sur Marcel Proust, le cubisme 
et Julien Benda (... ). Nous lirons bientöt 
un important ouvrage de cet ecrivain philosophe, 
La Trahison des Clercs, qui, je crois bien, nous 
fournira 1' occasion de remplir cette partie du 
programme de Riviýre"(10) . 
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Although many connections may be made between La Trahison 
des Clercs of previous intellectual history, the most important 
issue, at least within the parameters defining Riviere's 
"programme", was the lasting effect of the war. The central 
concern in 1919 had been that the review should, before all 
else, be re-established as "un terrain propice A la creation 
(11)11 
31 
with a solid critical base. However, the war and its consequences 
should not (or could not) be ignored: 
"Nous voulons refaire une revue desinteressee, 
une revue oü Von continuera de j uger et de 
creer en toute liberte d' esprit, non pas 
"comme si rien ne s'etait passe", mais en 
continuant de n' obeir, dans cha ue ordre, 
qu''L des principes specifiques'R 12) . 
The very wording of this text implies a paradox, for if the war 
was to be taken fully account of, it was impossible to adopt 
a completely objective position without ignoring the fact that 
the war had taken place. The war had changed the world, so 
drastically that R. iviýre's primary task was to "faire cesser 
cette contraint$ que la guerre exerce encore sur les 
(13) 
intelligences... " . Plainly Riviere's target was the 
Action franraise- inspired Parti de 1'Intelligence, and his 
opposition to the war forced him to oppose Charles Maurras 
and his satellites(14) . In one 
important sense this is where 
Benda's connection with Riviere's "manifesto" derives, for one 
principal target of La Trahison des Clercs was Nationalism(15) 
It is true that Riviere rejected ivory-tower detachment and 
claimed political neutrality 
(16) 
; but, in the next page, he 
insisted that although reflection on current events and on the 
war would not be excluded from the review, 
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"Ce ne seront j amais tout ä fait des 
professions de foi politiques: plutöt 
une sorte de critique et d' interpretation 
de 1'histoire contemporaine, mais ýL travers 
lesquelles forcement S'entreverra une couleur 
politique"(17). 
Benda's text is dated 1924-1927, thus indicating that the 
book was the result of considerable meditation; an interview 
with Frederic Lefývre, published in 1925, usefully summarizes 
his preoccupations and intentions. In response to a question 
from Lefývre on what he called a moral decline in France, 
Benda stated: 
"Ce que je puis vous dire 
que la moralite generale 
semble extremement basse 
directement ä des entret 
que 1'histoire n'en aura 
parei l les" 
(18). 
en gros, c' es t 
actue l le me 
et mener 
aeries telles 
jamais vu de 
The basic cause of this decline was, according to Benda, an 
obsession with "le pur temporel", as well as a distaste for 
"Toute valeur proprement ideale et desinteressee" 
(lg) 
. There 
were, now, only two concerns, Nation and Class. Not only this, 
but writers and philosophers -or "les clercs" - compounded the 
problemby sanctifying these "religions du terrestre"; Barres, 
Bourget, Nietzsche, Marx, Peguy and Sorel preached and glorified 
temporal realisins. "C' es t ce que j' appe lle La Trahison des Cleres", 
continued Benda, and he quoted Renouvier's phrase "la Monde perit 
du manque de foi dans ur verite transcend ante", a phrase he used 
(20) 
as the epigraph to _his 
book 
The first two parts of the book examined the "perfectionnement 
moderne des passions politiques", and outlined the 
definitions of 
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these passions; the third part, "Les Clercs", contained the 
main polemical thrust of the work, and exposed the treason in 
the light of the political passions. Here Benda's thesis was 
that "les clercs" had betrayed their secular functions by 
preaching action. The force of this argument derived partly 
from the plethora of examples cited to illustrate his case, 
however contestable some of them are. Their treason was 
attributable to three main factors. Firstly, "les clercs 
adoptent les passions politiques" 
(21) 
. Instead of restraining 
the spread of political interests, they were now the very agents 
of their spread. The "cleres" had adopted, in particular, 
"la passion nationale", whereby the national was preferred to 
the universal. Here Benda fully paraded his unflagging anti- 
Germanism: "I1 convient de reconnaitre que, daps cette adhesion 
du clerc moderne au fanatisme national, ce sont les clercs 
allemands qui ont commenc6" 
(22) 
0 
Secondly this nationalistic fervour had been fully absorbed 
into their works: "les clercs font le jeu des passions politiques 
par leurs doctrines" 
(23) 
. In exalting the particular and 
the 
national, the "cleres" had betrayed humanism. 
This is the first 
major issue informing the debates pursued thereafter 
in the NRF. 
In flouting the universal, humanism was only good 
insofar as it 
promoted the interests of either 
National or Class. Using 
culture to exalt, actively or passively, the national good 
was 
the only process acceptable to 
"les clercs modernes"4ý . When 
such passions motivated the writing of 
history, the treason 
reached perhaps its most 
dangerous state. This was the second 
Iq 
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area of interest to be developed in the review, in particular 
regarding Action £ranjaise historians. Finally in this section 
came Benda's attacks on intellectuals' glorification of 
pragmatism, which he found had been promoted by their 
glorification of courage, honour and what Benda called "la 
durete"ý25ý, or lack of human compassion. 
The November issue carried the remainder of the book's 
third part, entitled "Les Causes". Benda considered that "le 
monde moderne a fait du clerc un citoyen" 
(26) 
, an emphasis on 
modern social conditions which heralded his views in the final 
section. He continued: 
"La nouvelle foi du clerc est, en grande 
part, une suite des conditions sociales 
qui lui sont imposees et le vrai mal ä 
dep lorer de nos j ours nest peut-ttre pas 
la trahison des clercs, mais la disparition 
des clercs, l' impossibilite de mener dans le 
monde actuel une existence de clerc"(27). 
The paradox behind this view is that since the historical separation 
of Church and State and the institution of ek secularized 
"clericature", 
it was simply no longer possible to maintain "une classe d'hommes 
"(28) This line of thinking led Benda exempts des devoirs civiques 
to attack the subservience of "1' ecrivain pratique" to the 
,, 
(29) 
bourgeoisie, "laquelle fait les renommdes et dispense les honneurs . 
To Benda, the modern writer did no more than uphold and perpetuate 
the bourgeois order 
(30) 
,a line of attack subsequently 
adopted and 
discussed in the NRF by Jean Guehenno and Emmanuel -Berl. 
This fourth instalment ended with the "Vue d' ensemb le- 
Pronostics , 
(31) 
. Benda's tone 
here changed considerably: he 
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pursued his point that "le r4alisme politique des clercs" was 
linked to the very essence of the modern world. The idealism 
of a "clericature pure" was no longer possible. Finally, 
and to great effect, Benda raised the spectre of war, both 
the 1914-1918 war and the coming conflagration. The most 
central of these prognoses was the following: 
"Si, en effet, on se demande oü vaUnp, knumanite 
dont chaque groupe s'enfonce plus äprement 
que jamais dans la conscience de son interet 
particulier en tant que particulier et se 
fait dire par ses moralistes qu'il est sublime 
dans la mesure oü il ne connait pas d'autre 
loi que cet interet, un enfant trouverait la 
reponse: eile va 'A la guerre la plus totale 
et lac plus parfaite que le monde aura vue, 
soit qu'elle ait lieu entre nations, soit 
entre classes"(32). 
The corollary of this was that peace should be re-established 
as "une principe abstrait et sup4rieur (aux) egoismes 
(33) 
, and 
"la paix, si jamais eile existe, ne reposera pas sur la crainte 
de la guerre mais sur l' amour de la paix; eile sera 1' avýnement 
d'un etat d' äme" 
(34) 
. Here in embryo is an expression of the 
thinking which came to underpin the adherence of intellectuals 
and writers such a Guehenno, Gide and Martin du Gard to the 
nascent Peace Movement in 1932. However much La Trahison des 
Clercs bears witness to Benda's idealism and to his calls for 
the maintenance of eternal values, it had evidently become 
impossible to resist the forces of history. Indeed, earlier 
(35) 
that same year, the NRF had published Gide's Voyage au Congo , 
a text which made it only too clear that current social, 
historically-derived issues had to be confronted. Ironically 
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Benda's book arrived on the scene at a particularly topical 
time some months after the Vatican had condemned the Action 
francaise for its (36) political bias . The Action 
franýaise 
never fully recovered from this ban, which provoked a number 
of dissidences. Moreover Benda forced the Action (ranaise 
and Maurras on to the defensive, a reversal of the situation 
in 1919 when the NRF had had to defend itself against the 
Nationalist-inspired Parti de L' Intelligence . 
Within the NRF Gide and Paulhan welcomed and acclaimed 
La Trahison des Clercs 
(37) 
it and in December 1927 reactions 
to Benda' s work began to appear. In his "Reflexions" rubric 
(38) 
1 
Thibaudet's opening comments emphasized once again that Riviere 
attached great importance to.. Benda's critical ideas, and that 
he would have been happy to see them published; indeed, continued 
Thib aude t, 
"il eilt et6 plus heureux encore de les voir 
dis cuter, de les dis cuter lui-meme. El les 
appellent en effet la discussion et les 
reserves comme une terre stche appelle la 
pluie"(39) . 
Taking issue wi, i his "besoin de logique nue", Thibaudet found 
that Benda was essentially "en lutte contre son temps" 
(40) 
. 
The overriding criticism was the general one applicable to 
any of the theses in the book that Benda tended to be a victim 
of his own prejudices. For instance, his anti-Bergsonism 
had 
led him into dismissing all pragmatism. "I1 pense sous la 
categorie du Non! ", said Bergsonist Thibaudet; 
"Bergson, 
Maurras, Barris, ayant ete les trois grandes influences qu'ait 
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subies sa generation, il a employe sa dialectique ýt les 
combattre. (... "(41) . Thibaudet continued: "Et il n' a 
pas eu de peine 'a leur trouver une tete commune. Cette tete, 
' (42) cest le pragmatisme" . La Trahison des Cleres was 
flawed inasmuch as its critical perspective was too narrow; 
Benda' s method was too inflexible for Thib audet, who was far 
more optimistic. He concluded that if that human spirit could 
survive far less enlightened phases of history, then surely 
it would not allow itself to be crushed in the modern world: 
"Je pense bien que, pour M. Benda comme 
pour nous, tout le mal, si mal il y a, 
reside dans le suffixe: isme, car les 
nationalites ont fait la richesse, la 
variete, la complexite de 1'Europe 
moderne. (... ) Je suis extremement 
sensible (... ) au grand style interieur 
du desespoir de M. Benda, au beau style 
(... ) 
. Ma pensee, ou ma nature, se Oi. ), refusent f en partager la substance" 
C43) 
. 
Moreover Thibaudet went on to defend Germany against Benda' s 
attacks 
(44) 
The same month another dissenting view came in the NRF, 
this time from Gabriel Marcel(45). His objections were 
metaphysical; he considered that Benda had misunderstood the 
vital point that, far from operating in a vacuum, modern 
metaphysics functioned in direct relation to reality: 
"la religion de 1' abstrait telle que la pratique M. Benda est e, rt 
(46) 
un sens aux antipodes du rationalisme historique v6ritable" . 
Indeed Marcel argued that metaphysics is of utterly no use at 
all unless it is applied to reality. The 
"clerc" of necessity 
is a pragmatist, otherwise he should remain silent. 
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These were not the only objections to Benda's essay. 
Ramon Fernandez wrote in late 1927 to Paulhan: 
"Le Benda vaut par les principes ou les 
questions soulevees, mais peche par les 
exemples et 1' esprit de la dialectique. 
I1 ne marque aucune distinction entre, 
et donc confond perpetuellement, les 
idees qui ressemblent ä l'intelligence, 
et qui peuvent ne pas lui ressembler. 
Que diriez-vous d'une chronique lui 
repondant dans ce sens? "(47). 
Paulhan evidently agreed to this idea for "Sur La Trahison des 
Cleres" duly appeared in the January number, 1928 
(48) 
. Fernandez 
was ready to agree when Benda objected that "la confusion du 
pratique et de l' ideal depasse toutes les bornes permises"(49) 
With his multiple perspectives, from metaphysics to literature 
to history, Benda had produced a new outlook on the problem 
of the intellectual. However, for Fernandez, Benda seemed 
unaware that, due to the development of science, and due to the 
decline in religious beliefs, ideas were no longer tenable in 
a void: "ces idees n'ont d' existence, en tant qu' idees, que 
"(50) si elles se determinent et se justifient dans 1' experience 
Fernandez was clearly taking the step which Benda had refused 
to take or would not acknowledge: he was arguing from a more 
modern philosophical perspective than Benda: "c'est par l' acte 
meme de l' intelligence que 1'homme per9oit le reel dans son 
(51) 
ductib i li te" 
1ý 
Although he was arguing within philosophical 
parameters, Fernandez contended that it was quite untenable for 
"les clercs" to survive in the modern world without applying 
their talents to reality: he inverted Benda's thesis, whilst 
agreeing wholeheartedly that 
"la täche la plus urgente du clerc est de 
-N 
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sauver 1'esprit"(52) . By way of conclusion, he affirmed that 
"il ne le sauvera pas en se retirant dans le 
royaume des v6-rites abs traites . Le clerc 
ne sauvera 1' esprit qu'en retrouvant l' esprit 
dans chaque experience particuliere, qu' en 
montrant comment celui-ci dessine et soutient 
la moindre reali td" 
(53) 
. 
And, finally, Fernandez urged Benda himself towards "engagement": 
"Julien Benda est le philosophe aristocrate, 
le philosophe aux mains propres. Je crois 
qu'il faut se salir un peu, et meme beaucoup, 
pour sauver ce qu'il revere avec une 
intransigeance qui lui fait honneur" 
(54) 
. 
Very soon after the publication of these objections, Benda was 
able to openly clarify the position he had adopted, and the discussions 
which took place permitted him to begin assembling the material for 
the sequel to La Trahison des Clercs, La Fin de 1'Eternel. On 
January 26th, 1928, the Union pour la Verite held a colloquium 
05) 
entitled "Autour de La Trahison des Cleres 
5ý 
which brought 
together an audience of distinguished philosophers. It was here 
that Benda made the first of many re-iterations of his important 
concession that it was quite permissible for the 
"clerc" to 
enter the public arena, so long as he did so 
in the name of 
an eternal value such as Justice. In fact he re-defined 
two 
categories of "cleres" : 
"Le clerc peut, et je l' ai di t, descendre 
sur la place publique sans cesser d'exercer 
sa fonction. Mais il a une maniýre meilleure 
de l'exercer, c'est d'etre par sa vie meme une 
constante protestation. C'est ainsi qu'il 
sera, en realite, le plus actif" 
(56) 
. 
For Benda this should provoke shame in those who 
did not renounce 
"1'egoisme de classe ou de nation". 
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During the early weeks of 1928 the reaction to La Trahison 
des Clercs from the Nationalist Right continued unabated(57) 
Paulhan reprinted a selection of extracts in the "Revue des 
Revues" for March. One extract contained a reply from 
Charles Maurras himself: 
"La veritable trahison des clercs es t celle 
qui fraude, falsifie et ment avec cette 
impudence tranquille. On peut assigner ä 
ceux que M. Benda appelle, aprýs moi, des 
clercs, bien des devoirs. Le premier est 
de transcrire loyalement les textes qu' i is 
rapportent, le second de les comprendre, le 
troisieme de n`en point tirer ce qu'ils ne 
contiennent pas. Quand M. Benda aura satisfait 
ä ces obligations 6lementaires, on lui fera 
l'honneur de her le fer avec lui" (58) . 
Benda replied to this in the same issue in "les Accusations de 
M. Maurras" 
(59) 
; here he showed that, in his attack, Maurras had 
falsified his own line of thinking by quoting at cross-purposes. 
This type of exchange provided Benda with much ammunition in 
his future invectives against Nationalist dishonesty. 
In June, Thibaudet again devoted his "Reflexions, 
(60) 
to 
"Les Archives de La Trahison des Clercs". Unable to avoid almost 
daily reference to and discussion of Benda's book, he declared 
that "le livre a prouve son contenu par son succes: pour 
p as s ioner les hommes il faut un aliment pur. Its exigent des 
essences, un absolu, un aliment qui soit un element. Benda 
apporte 1 ' idee de clerc 
(61) 
pur" In spite of its success and 
its purity, Thibaudet upheld his conviction that, reduced to 
their basic thesis, Bendas ideas were only suitable for ascetics. 
Thibaudet pared down the conception of "le clerc pur" to 
its 
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most sterile form: 
"Le clerc trahit dans la mesure ou il sort 
de la representation pure. Mais le monde 
est representation et volonte. Donc le 
clerc trahit en tant qu'il ne dit pas non 
'A la volonte, c' es t-l-dire au monde, I la 
duree. Le clerc trahit en existant, et 
l'existence est injustice. Conclusion: 
le bouddhisme" (62) . 
This was not the last time Thibaudet took issue with Benda; 
the opportunity arose again during the publication of La Fin de 
l'Eternel published from August to October 1928(63) , The first 
part assembled Benda's objections to the "Reaction du clerc de 
"droite"". Here Benda did little more than refute the idea 
that "il n'y avait 11A nulle trahison de leur part, mais entire 
fidelite ä leur essence et que tout mon proces contre eux portait 
I fauxt' 
(64). 
In essence his case re-iterated the accusations 
made in La Trahison des Clercs - he was just as unrelenting in 
his continuing attack on the Nationalists. 
Where La Fin de 1'Eternel took a new turn was in its treatment, 
in the second part, of the "clerc de gauche". Benda repeated his 
conviction that "la passion de la justice, plus encore celle de 
la verite, ne sont point des passions politiques et que ceux 
qui descendent au forum mus par elles ne me paraissent trahir 
aucune noble fonction"(65) . Here Benda considered the view, 
apparently held by both left intellectuals as well as by those 
of the right, that "le contemplatif" was somehow less worthy 
(66) 
of respect than "1' actif" Modern "cleres" were 
insisting 
that "la supreme fonction du clerc est d' agir, et le cultivateur 
' "(67) Likewise solitaire de 1'esprit est un clerc 
inferieur 
Im 
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another source of irritation for the modern "clerc" was 
Benda's insistence on separating thought and action: thought 
was deemed worthless unless it led directly to action, or had 
practical results(68) . For Benda's adversaries, including 
Fernandez, this line of thinking had become an attractive one 
and any "thinking in the void" was of no human consequence. 
The next series of objections concerned the question of 
responsibilities for the First World War. For Benda, the shrill 
reaction of some left intellectuals to his refusal to jointly 
condemn both German and French responsibilities for the war 
were very illuminating, and indicated the basis of a leftist 
"trahison" whereby pacifism was interpreted as a type of intellectual 
Nationalism. Benda's riposte was based upon considering not only 
the will of national governments, but also on including the 
"will of the people" of the nation concerned. For him the 
German national psychology had been in a bellicose state in the 
fifty years preceding the outbreak of war; the governments of 
. Germany- had only been reflecting the will of the people 
(69) 
The German nation, across all class barriers, had wanted the 
war and had welcomed acts of provocation, whereas belligerent 
policies of the French government had not been welcomed by the 
people 
(70) 
. Benda's anti-Germanism 
did not find much favour 
among those in the NRF who backed "rapprochement" with Germany: 
indeed, curiously enough, his opinions in this respect aligned 
him with the Maurrassians. 
The final part of this text dealt with the finer points of 
the charges levelled at his attacks on the philosophers, for 
'In 
- 72 - 
Benda the most important. Once more he referred back to the 
articles published on his work by Thibaudet, Marcel and 
Fernandez 
(71) 
and used them to repeat his stance against 
putting philosophy at the service of particular interests, 
and against the exaltation of irrationalism 
(72) 
. For Benda 
the worst betrayal of all of the philosophers he attacked was 
the rejection of the Eternal, the repudiation of a fixed 
(73) 
Ideal . Willing to admit that the modern thinker could 
reflect on the conditions governing his own time, he should, 
however, only contemplate the universal: 
"Le clerc moderne proclameune fois de plus 
qu'il ne se veut pas homme de pensee et 
refuse d'honorer celui qui le demeure"(74). 
The extent of the reactions to Benda's works, even considering 
only those from within the NRF, clearly reflects a lively interest 
in the problems it raised. However, the whole debate risked 
floundering in sterility as the monthly readjustments to the 
definitions of abstract concepts became ever more minute: 
La Trahison des Clercs had served its purpose by galvanizing 
intellectual opinion 
(75) 
. Plainly the time 
had come to re- 
orientate the debate and elaborate on the problems thrown up 
by Benda, to transform his critique into a more positive impetus. 
Within the NRF the focus of attention deflected to the question 
of Humanism. 
In November 1928 Paulhan printed Jean Guehenno's essay 
"L'Humanite et les Humanites", a shrewd choice indeed, for 
Guehenno's argument provided the basis of much subsequent 
14% 
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thinking about the Humanities and Culture in general in the 
coming decade 
(76) 
. The crux of Guehenno' s argument was the 
burning question: "Can the Humanities help Humanity? ". His 
premise was, given that "le peuple" had come of age, kthe work 
of the Eighteenth-Century ideologues was finished; furthermore, 
could it still be maintained that intellectuals held sway over 
the development of ideas in the social arena?. "Le. peuple 
se mefie de la 
(77) 
claimed Guehenno, and he went 
on to examine this problem in the light of a new phenomemon 
which Benda had only hinted at, Communism. Seen from the 
Leninist perspective, culture, said Guehenno, "etait suspecte, 
78) 
instrument de domination aux mains des maltres, inhumaine" . 
The problem of culture needed re-assessment in the light of 
the new (Russian) Revolution; in parallel with Benda, Guehenno 
agreed that after the initial optimism of the early Nineteenth- 
Century, after the hopes placed in the great legacy of the 
French Revolution, "la maj orite des intellectuels avaient verse 
ä droite" 
ý79ý 
. With the advent of world war and 
its universal 
barbarism, the central challenge was now clear: 
"Comment 1'humanite n' eüt-elle pas desespere 
de la culture, des "humanites", si la culture 
ne menait plus qu' d de tolles catastrophes 
et en prenait meine avec une sorte de fierte 
la responsabilite? " 
(80) 
. 
Again, Guehenno took up the point made by Benda that the 
Humanities, once used as a source of wisdom, the fountain-head 
of education, had now become debased, 
for their acquisition 
bolstered class-interests: 
'"94 
- 74 - 
"Benda nous parlait de la trahison des clercs; 
ce n'est pas assez dire peut-titre. Peut-titre 
faut-il parler d'une trahison de la cult re re 
el le-meme, d'une t rahis on des Humanites "c 
In order to prevent any action which might provoke an even 
greater clash of interests, Guehenno proclaimed: "il faut 
qu'un esprit nouveau intervienne" 
(82) 
. This new 
"spirit" 
should aim to include all Humanity, for the exclusivity of 
culture only underlined the class-differences he referred to 
earlier. If society was beginning to make concessions to "le 
peuple", then it was high time education also took account of 
these changes: "Jamais encore on n' a enseigne le peuple au 
peuple , 
(83) 
, 
insisted Guehenno. Finally, culture should move 
with and adapt to the shifts and changes in an evolving 
humanity; it should no longer merely comfort the bastions of 
the privileged. 
Writing to Paulhan on reading this essay, Fernandez, already 
engaged in the discussion on new approaches to humanism since 
(early 
1927s4ý , found 
Guehenno's article "bien insuffisant" 
ý85ý 
Moreover Romain Rolland, mentor of Guehenno during his 
editorship of the NRF's rival Europe, pointed out that 
in his 
opinion, in spite of the worthy sentiments expressed 
in Guehenno's 
essay, their place of publication, the NRF, threatened to 
devalue 
them: 
"Puisque vous ecrivez ä la NRF, vous devez vous 
rendre compte que, malgre sa haute tenue 
de 
pensee "intellectuelle", 1es"humanites" 
1' emportent chez eile sur 1'humanite... 
" 86ý 
As for Fernandez, he made his reservations clear 
in a review- 
(87) 
He considered article on Caliban Carle 
in February 1929 
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that Guehenno's book illustrated in detail the gap, highlighted 
in the November essay, between Humanism and Humanity 
(88) 
; for 
Fernandez, Guehenno was too timid. In his approach to Communism, 
Guehenno had not pushed his arguments far enough, although 
Fernandez did not necessarily concur with the direction in 
which Guehenno's thinking was propelling him: 
"Les reserves lud, M. Guehenno, avec une pudeur 
charmante, ne marchande pas au communisme, et 
qui sont bien les reserves de l'esprit, ne 
l'eXposent-elles pas h l' indignation de ceux 
qui ne veulent en rieh se laisser distraire 
du sort des Calibans? " (89) . 
Fernandez, applying Benda's recommendations, enlarged the scope 
of the problem and argued that Guehenno's intellectual faced a choice: 
"Tout ce quo n demandera ý 1' intellectuel 
sorti du peuple c'est de choisir, aprts 
avoir fait son examen de conscience, d'etre 
un serviteur de sa classe ou d'etre un 
serviteur d¬sint6-resse de 1' esprit" 
(90) 
. 
Fernandez saw no reason why the "intellectuel sorti du peuple" 
should have to serve the interests of a class to which he did not 
belong; after all, the spirit was the spirit. He went on to 
identify the same need for choice as in Guehenno's critique of 
the Catholic (i. e. Thomist) Renaissance: 
"Elle os ci lle entre un jugement pragmatique f onde 
sur une sorte de patriotisme de la sensibilite 
populaire, et un appel aux lois pures et libres 
de 1'esprit. Encore une . 
fois il faut choisir"(91). 
The significance of this standpoint is that where Benda allowed 
no choice, Fernandez, although critical of certain weaknesses 
in Gu6-henno, positively encouraged the choice. 
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Next month, Paulhan, writing as Jean Guerin, ironized on 
the discussion of Caliban parle at the Union pour la Verite. 
"M. Guehenno, fils de proletaire, a le physique laforguien, 
(92) 
le regard et la moustache tristes", remarked Paulhan . 
He characterized Guehenno's book as "une plainte timide, 
c' es t une suite de cris de coeur touchants" 
(93) 
. Instead of 
the expected reaction from the Right, Guehenno's position was 
attacked by "trois revolutionnaires", according to Paulhan: 
M. Emmanuel Berl, qui s'est fait recemment 
pamphletaire aprýs quelques tentatives dans 
fordre de la metaphysique et du roman: 
M. Brice Parain, plus subtil (... ) enfin, 
M. Andre Malraux, courtois et mephisto- 
phelique" 
(94) 
. 
Paulhan's account showed that there were younger writers who 
were willing to take the arguments about culture and humanism 
further than Benda and Guehenno. Guehenno had agonized about 
the difficulty of making bourgeois culture available to the 
masses; yet Paulhan identified a distinction which went 
unchallenged in the rue Visconti meeting. Berl, Parain and 
Malraux countered Guehenno by insisting that "nous voulons 
une culture proletarienne sans accointance avec la culture 
(95) 
bourgeoise" . Guehenno, though, 
for Paulhan, had failed to 
notice that "prol6tarienne" did not mean 
"populaire". The 
debate was to take an interesting turn for Paulhan ended 
his 
commentary by alluding to the intervention, at the 
discussion, 
of "un representant des syndicats ouvriers" who made some 
remarks which were 
"pleines de. bon sens et de mepris pour les 
ýý 
C96) 
intellectuels, auquellýS on fit peu d attention . 
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Reflecting the fact that among certain readers of the NRF 
the debate was taken a good deal more seriously than Paulhan 
had anticipated, the review published a letter in the next issue 
from the "secr6taire du syndicat des jardiniers"(97). Here a 
M. Hod6e objected to the fact that Paulhan-Guerin had misrepresented 
his comments; he had not taken all intellectuals to task, only 
those "clercs faux" like Georges Sorel who exploited the working 
classes as a testing-ground for their doctrines(98). Furthermore 
he denied that his class displayed any desire to establish "une 
culture de masse", and yet "le proletaire (sic) E. Berl etait 
d'un avis contraire" 
(99) 
. However much Paulhan had wanted to 
deflate the serious intent behind it, the debate sparked off 
by Guehenno's book is further evidence of a continuing desire 
within the WIRF to assess the crisis in humanism, and'to develop 
the premises upon which the debate was founded. As early as 
February 6th 1929, Gide had been present at a lively discussion 
with Berl and Malraux on modern literature, during which Gide 
"100). "s'efforce de nourrir le debat, sans vraiment prendre position 
Clearly Gide was living through a period of confusion and self- 
doubt about the validity of his own role, and the NRF itself 
helped to fuel Gide's uncertainty. By July the review-article 
of Berl's essay La Mort de la Pensee 
bourgeoise (101) helped 
Gide define and focus his own position. 
Like Guehenno's book, La Mort de la Pensee 
bourgeoise was 
another "cri de coeur"; however, Berl's 
book was a much more 
forthright attack on quietist. attitudes. Dedicating his text 
to Mairaux's character in Les Conquerants 
(1929), Garine, Berl 
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accused all other modern writers of conformism and of being 
afraid of the new Revolution(102) . Once again, where Benda 
had argued that writers and intellectuals were subservient to 
and cowed by a dominant, bourgeois cultural system, Berl 
adapted the argument in the light of an awareness of the full, 
active potential of the Revolution. "Trahison ou peur? ", asked 
Berl 
(103) 
; for him, the 'clerc' committed treason by not acting, 
and this fear of action had to be overcome. Thought and action 
had to be co-existent. By the same token, Benda was guilty of 
dilIttantism; for Berl, Benda' s "nostalgie du cloi tre" was 
. artificial and sterile 
in the post-Revolutionary world 
(104) 
Thus, "une idee ne devient trahison que si elle est maintenue 
par la carence ou par la peur"(105) The basic thrust of 
Berl's argument was that in spite of efforts to conceal the 
fact (i. e., through conformism, through dilettantism), since 
. the Revolution "la pensee est r6volutionnaire ou n'est pas 
, 
(106) 
As with Guehenno, the position of the intellectual within the 
modern world was a "un drame": the tension being that the 
intellectual was a product of capitalism and yet, at the same 
time, found it anathema to subscribe to a rigid (communist) 
(107) 
programme 
Reviewing the book for July's number Jean Prevost considered 
that Berl's study was only worthy of attention for its faults: 
in this way it was in the same lineage as La Trahison des Cleres 
(los) 
. 
After listing a number of inaccuracies in the test, Prevost 
proceeded to undermine Berl's argument by 
insisting that 
"il n' ya pas de pensee bourgeoise" 
(109) 
, for 
"toute la 
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I 
bourgeoise est puissance, acquisition, manoeuvre; pouvoir 
tout temporel, et meme (... ) pouvoir cache" 
(110) 
. Prevost 
did not believe LPs Conquerants could solve the revolutionary 
problem since, in the French context, it was not possible or 
viable to provoke or sustain a revolution either by armed 
insurrection or by strikes. Prevos t' s claim, in fact, was that 
Berl's analysis was unrealistic, for, although Prevost professed 
to being no more a friend of the contemporary regime than Berl, 
"il ne faut vouloir que ce que Von peut" 
(111) 
. The roots of 
Prevost's misgivings are traceable to the assertion at the 
beginning of the book that "il sait se qu'il veut detruire, 
mais il ne sait pas of il va, 
(112), 
and, furthermore, Berl did 
not admit that the well-being of the proletariat was the sole 
aim of revolution. Prevost contended that "cette legýrete 
d'informations, cette lourdeur de style, cette confusion d'esprit 
semblent passees en habitude, et presque autorisees par les 
moeurs 
113) 
. In the end 
Prevost dismissed Berl as "le type 
de 1' amateur distingu6", and found that he was far from 
. representing "une image du revolutionnaire 
, (114) 
Not surprisingly Berl wrote to the NRF to complain that this 
account of his book had left him mystified, all the more so since 
Malraux was helping Berl transfer from Grasset's to Gallimard: 
a potential Gallimard author should not be attacked 
in the 
(115) "house" review Given the animosity between the editor 
of the NRF and Berl, it is permissible to detect 
Paulhan's 
support of Prevost in this affair, especially considering 
Gi de' s vacillating position at this time. Initially Gide 
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(and Martin du Gard) were perplexed by the Malraux-Berl 
a 
onslaught; in fact, Berl recalled that Gide "m'ý. engueule", 
particularly since Berl had defended Zola(116) . The important 
fact is that Gide was showing signs of seeking a cause worthy 
of support at home having investigated European injustice in 
Africa; such an interest could, in the long run, only reflect 
upon the review for, in June 1929, Gide read Prevost's article 
in proof-form before publication in July and even wrote to 
express his objections: 
"J'ai lu avec interet votre article... 
Vous eclairez fort bien certain points 
de la these de Berl sur lesquels mon 
incomp6tence parfaite me laissait me 
meprendre (... ) . Vous m' etonnez un peu 
en parlant de "lourdeur de style"... 
Malgre tous ses defauts, Berl nous 
entraine et. nous force ýä le suivre, 
füt-ce pour le combat tre" 7). 
Gide stressed that in spite of its stylistic infelicities, 
Berl's "pauvret6s" "retiennen't ä ce point 1' attention de 
nombre de nos amis communs, meine les plus pr&venus contre 
Berl" 
(118) 
. Gide felt that Martin 
du Gard was even more 
attracted to Berl's thesis, and consequently sent him a copy 
of Prevost's review; replying to Gide, Martin du Gard indeed 
(119) 
admitted that Thus an "ce livre nest pas rien" 
important stage had been reached: the social and historical 
fact of the Revolution, even if it was discussed in tentative 
or exploratory terms, had reached the pages of the NRF 
in a 
prolonged internal debate. 
This episode was not yet concluded: in September the NRF 
(120) 
printed a contribution from Benda to the 
discussion The 
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experience of reading Berl's book allowed Benda to sharpen 
his own critique of the bourgeoisie he had outlined in 
La Trahison des Clercs 
121 
. Using a combination of his own 
terminology and Berl's, Benda now asserted that bourgeois thought, 
by virtue of being bourgeois, was condemned in advance; more 
precisely: 
"La pensee qui est decidee 'd l' avance 'a 
respecter, et au besoin ä fortifier, les 
idees sur lesquelles repose Vordre social 
qui profite ä. la bourgeoisie. Ces idees 
reviennent au fond *d une seule, d savoir 
que la direction politique de la societe 
doit appartentir ä la classe bourgeoise" 
(122). 
As it was a "une pensee "conformiste"", bourgeois thought was 
not free (it was decided in advance), therefore it was dead 
thought. Benda went on to make the point that if the 
established order were communist, then the same thinking 
would apply. Moreover, Malraux and others, "des r6volutionnaires 
. intelligents", according to Benda, were well aware of this fact 
(123) 
Indeed Benda inverted Bezl's line of argument and used it to 
re-iterate and re-inforce his own position; summing up Berl, 
he posited the following equation: 
"1. La pensee bourgeoise est de pensee morte; 
2. Cette mort, en France du moins, na jamais 
ete plus vivante" 
(124) 
. 
Evidently Berl's pamphlet was as provocative and almost as much 
discussed as Benda's had been in 1928; the questions of the 
role of the intellectual and his attitude towards the 
Revolution 
had been openly articulated and considered in the NRF. Before 
very long the debate was to become more complex and was 
to 
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spill over into the pages of other reviews. 
As the discussion of Berl's ideas subsided, the NRF 
printed a very long "Note sur la Reaction" 
(125) 
; Benda, once 
again, went on to the offensive against the Nationalists. In 
this important article, he analysed how the "reaction ideologique" 
exploited the vacuum created by the "reaction sentimentale", 
the latter having no doctrinal basis, being simply nourished and 
perpetuated by sentiment and prejudice. Benda's argument clearly 
demonstrated his thinking on democracy, and how the forces of 
anti-democratic reaction militated against the Republic. His 
argument was that the "sentimental" reaction, as embodied by 
the rancours of the aristocracy, the Church, the "petit peuple", 
the bourgeoisie and "les mondains", had, in itself, posed no 
real or lasting threat to the well-being of Republican democracy 
in France; what was dangerous was the "opposition de formation 
savante , 
(126) 
, where the sentimental reaction , was underpinned 
by ideology. Benda's target was the doctrine of the Action 
franýaise in its "forme simpliste, la seule sous laquelle ils 
ont chance d'atteindre les masses... "(127) . After examining 
the nature of Action 
f rancaise doctrine and the reasons why it 
was of such appeal to students and intellectuals, Benda 
proceeded to identify and describe the two poles of Action 
frangaise thought, the negative (anti-democra, ic) and the 
positive (pro-monarchy). The negative 
ingredient departed 
from the belief that due to its very nature (i. e. through weight 
of numbers), democracy inevitably led to 
defeats abroad, 
decomposition at home and bankruptcy in general. Such thinking, 
- 83 - 
argued Benda, had little appeal for the masses but was 
successful among writers and "mondains"(128) . The positive 
part held that France could only be saved by the restoration 
of the monarchy; this, while being of great appeal to the 
aristocracy, was worrying for the bourgeoisie who saw their 
interests threatened. Benda' s point was that with so many 
conflicting interests in the anti-democratic camp, democracy 
was safe so long as the bourgeoisie did not forge any damaging 
alliances: 
"Le vrai danger pour la democratie demeure 
touj ours la bourgeoisie inqui? -&te 
des progrýs 
de la classe ouvri'ý-re, et son alliance toujours 
possible avec le petit peu le antiparlementaire 
et desireux d' un chef" (129). 
The reaction to this article centred upon one of Benda's 
footnotes 
130) 
. The main adversary on this occasion was 
Jacques Bainville, writing in La Revue universe. lleý131) 
Bainville accused Benda of "un maniement elementaire de la 
matiere historique, une faible reflexion sur le developpement 
des faits historiques", and went on: 
"le parti radical et radical-socialiste 
possede, en plusieurs de nos chefs- 
lieux, des polemistes qui ne sont pas 
inferieurs ýL M. Julien Benda (... ) J' ai 
besoin d'un clerc qui soit vraiment pur" 
(132) 
. 
Bainville's point is important here: it is true that Benda's 
defence of French democracy was Radicalist in tone and 
vocabulary, and was in harmony with the 
fundamentally 
(133) 
RadiFor Benda, Bainville calis t nature of the NRF 
had not answered the charge that Action 
f rancaise historiography 
distorted the truth. Moreover Benda analysed Bainville's 
- 84 - 
condenscending tone . and converted 
it into a renewed attack 
on the nature of Nationalist betrayal: 
"Ce ton hautain", continued Benda, "(... ) lui 
est en quelque Sorte fourni par sa doctrine 
elle-meme: il est evident que, lorsqu'on 
pretend parler au nom de la tradition 
franpise, on se trouve, de ce seul fait 
et avant de di e un mot, toiser son 
contradicteur"134) 
The second point was that even though it was obvious Bainville had 
not replied to his accuser, he would not be criticized for this 
omission by those within his own camp. This was the central 
point of Benda's argument, and his comments introduced other 
adversaries into the debate. Although what he was saying 
might be self-evident, Benda went on, it was essential to 
challenge the generally-held belief that 
"l'ecrivain de droite s'adresse ä-un public 
dpris d' obeissance et celui de gauche ýL 
un monde qui pratique la liberte de 
1' esprit; que le premier ecrit pour des 
moutons et le second pour des loups"(135). 
If this definition was to be universally-applicable, then surely 
some left-wing writers should be considered as right-wing; for, 
claimed Benda, turning his attention towards another adversary, 
"il est clair que M. Romain Rolland dcrit pour des moutons tout 
comme M. Maurras" 
(136) 
. The only reason 
for calling the writer 
for free men "left-wing" was in order to distinguish him from 
the Right; perhaps he should more properly be labelled 
"de milieu 
( 
"137ý 
. In a 
footnote, Benda clarified his point 
that "les moutons de M. Rolland" had attacked him from the 
left in the review Europe 
(138) 
Still adhering to the same 
ýq 
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line of thought as expressed in La Trahison des Clercs, 
Benda contended that the "moutons de Rolland" did not 
consider the "clerc" as 
"1' homme qui exerce la vie de l' esprit, 
mais 1'homme qui se bat pour obtenir, 
les conditions sociales necessaires a 
la vie de 1` esprit . C' es t en somme la 
meme these que ce le de 1' Acti on 
Franaise... " (139)1. 
Benda believed that whatever Bainville chose to say, so long as 
he attacked all opponents of the Action francaise, no-one from 
their side would challenge Bainville's accuracy or veracity. 
"L' avantage de 1' ecrivain de droite es t ecrasante", concluded 
Bend 
140) a 
Gide was so pleased with January's "Scholie" that he 
wrote a short letter to Benda to congratulate him( 
141) 
Benda's attack on Bainville's "mauvaise foi" did not, however, 
meet with universal approval. On 31st January 1930 Gide 
reported that Fernandez had reacted so violently against 
this attack that he threatened to leave the NRF: evidently 
Benda's contribution to the debate was beginning to highlight 
(142) 
any polarities which were developing within the review . 
Paulhan's correspondence with Jean Guehenno, the editor 
of Europe, shows how close the two reviews' editors were 
at this time; they often amicably exchanged opinions and 
judgements on their respective publications. Benda' s 
unflattering comments 
in the NRF on the "moutons de M. Rolland" 
did not, however, help relations between the two, and very 
-MR 
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quickly drew fire from Europe; this exchange lasted well 
into the summer of 1930. Guehenno wrote a "lettre ouverte 
ä M. Julien Benda" referring specifically to January's 
NF 
(143) 
. This text is extremely important in that it 
helped to clarify Europe's position regarding Benda's 
definition of "les clercs". After an aside where he wondered 
11 si(... ) on nest t pas toujours le mouton de que lqu' un, füt-ce 
de Spinoza" 
(144) 
, Guehenno 
insisted that "notre berger" had 
always promoted "1' independance de l' esprit", and he cited 
the following text by Rolland: 
"De libres ämes, de fermes caracteres, 
c' es t ce dont le monde manque le plus 
auj ourd' hui . Par tous le s chemins 
divers (... ) nous retournons ä la vie 
gregaire. L' Humanitg a besoin que 
ceux qui l' aiment lui tiennent ttte 
et se rdvoltent contre eile quand il 
le faut" (145), 
The priority for Guehenno, as his earlier article in the NRF 
had shown, was humanity itself, not the humanities nor the 
"cleres"; yet this said, he confessed to owing a debt to 
La Trahison des cleres: 
"Ce petit livre, ses propositions nettes, 
son impitoyable clarte me paraissait 
op6rer comme un grand travail 
d` ass ainiss ement" 
(146 ) 
Guehenno admitted that he hardly noticed Benda's intention to 
attack the "clercs de gauche". Using Benda's principles, 
Guehenno insisted, even if naively, that he believed Benda' s 
and his own apprehension of the Truth were one and 
the same: 
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"I1 me suffisait qu'en denonjant la traitrise 
des clercs vous denonciez dans son principe 
meme le pharisaisme du monde moderne et portiez 
ainsi de 1'eau au moulin de la Revolution"(147). 
All this had been three years before; now, Benda no longer 
seemed interested in "les vrais combats de la terre", only 
in skirmishing with Bainville and Maurras, whom Guehenno 
characterized as "dead" thinkers. In a further important 
point, Guehenno, arguing with forceful earnestness, referred 
to Benda's hesitation between positioning himself with writers 
on the Left and those in the Centre; Guehenno firmly placed 
Benda with all those who profess that they belonged to no camp: 
"Que dites-vous que vous n'avez point de 
troupes, point de camp derriere vous? 
Je crains que vous n' ayez tous ceux que 
peut bien interesser sans doute la 
recherche de la verite, mais h la 
condition qu'elle demeure un jeu 
(... ), qu'elle ne soit pas de la 
terre, mais de l'eternite. (... ) Le 
camp des esprits 'libres? Non pas. 
Mais tous les salons des dilettantes"(148). 
Here Guehenno joined Berl in a condemnation of cant and dilettantism 
and then returned to the essence of his thinking, that "la verite 
n' appartient plus aux cleres , 
(149) 
, but to men 
in general. 
Guehenno believed that Benda's vocabularly underlined "un 
150) 
dangereux mep-ris pour les innombrables laics que nous sommes" 
At Europe, concluded Gudhenno, if Rolland were to be seen as a 
"clerc", it was because "il porte en lui toujours l'immense 
esperance du XIXe siecle (... ) . Il ne se 
fait pas de la raison 
un privilege. I1 a häte de la oraler comme un 
levain 'd la pate 
humaine"; his final point was that "nous n'avons ici nulle 
-lq 
pretention ä etre clercs. 
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Etre des hommes nous suffirait"(151). 
Rolland wrote to Guehenno to tell him that he had been 
impressed by his "lettre ouverte", and that he was pleased 
by the stress laid upon the independence of Europel52) 
By the last week of March, Guehenno knew that Paulhan was 
about to print a riposte to his letter from Benda himself; 
. this "Scholie" duly appeared in the NRF for April 
(153) 
Here Benda mounted a defence of his position which, once 
again, met with Gide's approval at the heart of the NRF(154) . 
Moreover Benda's attack on Rolland deeply influenced Paulhan's 
attitude when the latter came to criticize the adherence of 
NRF personalities to the "Amsterdam-Pleyel Peace Movement"' 
in two years' time. The essence of Benda's objections to 
Rolland's stance (as it had been defended by Gudhenno) was to 
be found once again in the question of the responsibilities 
for the First World War. Listing several examples taken from 
the text of Au dessus de la melee, Benda charged Rolland with 
using exactly the same dangerous, sentimental 
(not to say 
irrational) vocabular .y as the 
Nationalists: 
"En un mot de to is mouvements denotent ou 
une incroyable 1egý-rete d' esprit ou une 
odieuse f lagornerie nation alis te" 
(155) 
Secondly he denied that he had only been skirmishing with 
Maurras and Bainville, "dead" thinkers 
in any case; in fact, 
the aim of La Fin de 1`Eternel had been precisely 
to throw the 
cant and hypocrisy of these thinkers 
into even higher relief 
by using their own most recent ripostes as raw material. 
Benda 
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could accuse Guehenno, too, of only waging "la petite guerre"; 
as far as he was concerned, against the likes of Barris, this 
could only be "la bonne guerre" 
(156) 
. In a remarkable (albeit 
mild) foretaste of Nizan, Benda attacked Guehenno' s colleagues 
for not being more outspoken: 
"... Combien j' aimerais que vos collegues 
d'Universite fissent de temps en temps, 
comme vous, la petite guerre, cornbien je 
suis confondu de la quietude avec laquelle 
ils laissent l' impunite aux malfaiteurs 
publics"(157). 
However, claimed Benda, most of Guehenno's rancour was aimed at 
his definition of "le clerc", that "le clerc" had nothing to do 
with humanity in general. Adhering still to the precepts of 
his first book on the subject, Benda highlighted the distinctions 
to be made between "les laics" and "les clercs": 
"Je pose qu'etre clerc c'est, par definition, 
ne vivre que pour la verite, tandis qu'etre 
laic, c'est, egalement par definition, avoir 
des interets temporels h defendre, ce qui 
exigera toujours qu''d un certain moment on 
estropie la veritd, laquelle est par essence 
non pratique, non interessde; d' oü il suit 
que la malhonnetete fait en, (partie de la 
/ 2fFit 
definition du laic, qu'il soit individu ou 
gouvernement" 
(158) 
Benda's point was that Guehenno had confused definitions, that 
it was illogical to "devenir clerc en restant 
laic", which 
Guehenno had insisted was his aim. Moreover Benda might agree 
if only those in power were to adhere to non-temporal values; 
but, by definition, this was impossible to achieve. In the 
,. , end, affirmed Benda, le conflit qui nous 
divise est eternel , 
(159) 
precisely because Guehenno, arguing as an atheist, 
rejected the 
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precept so dear to Benda that "il faut unt corporation qui 
entretienne la notion de 1'Idee abstraite et eternelle"(160) 
Once more Benda's conclusion only frustrated his adversary 
by leading him back to a sterile negativity; repeating the 
analysis of La Fin de 1'Eternel, the article ended: 
"L' actif (i. e. "le laic", Guehenno, or 
Maurras) ne peut pas comprendre que le 
contemplatif soit la plus haute incarnation 
de la foi, et meme (... ) la forme supreme de 
l'efficace. Mais le contemplatif (i. e. Benda, 
"le clerc", etc. ), s' il es t vraiment celui qui 
voit les choses dans leur necessit6, doit 
comprendre cette incomprehension de l' actif, 
comprendre qu'elle est son essence meme et, 
puisqu' il connai t, lui, le valeur de l' actif , 
respecter cette incompr6hension. C'est ce que 
je ne fais pas assez pour vous et vos amis. 
Croyez-le, mon cher Guehenno; nul men blame 
plus que moi-meme" 
(161) 
. 
However much Benda's reasoning may have impressed some, 
like Gide and Paulhan, for others, like Jean Grenier, he was 
a "penseur de s albn" ; for Rolland, he was guilty of 
"une 
abominable et consciente mauvaise foi" 
162) 
. One further 
"S cho lie" in July's NR 
(163) 
dealt with the debate on the 
responsibility for the war; thereafter, Benda began preparing 
the pre-publication text of his book on the metaphysical 
questions raised by La Fin de 1'Eternel 
(164) 
This series of debates, professions of faith and ripostes 
in the NRF was being pursued against an increasingly 
lively 
national and. international background. 
The Wall Street Crash 
of October 1929 caused great anxiety, although 
the effects 
of this crisis in capitalism 
did not reach France until 1931. 
14% 
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At home, governmental instability was the major preoccupation 
(165) 
, 
while on the international scene early 1930 was characterized 
by renewed speculation concerning Germany, particularly the 
apparent impasse caused by the consequences of the Versailles 
Treaty. On March 29th 1930, the ratification of the Young Plan, 
re-negotiating reparations to France, raised again the whole 
(l66) 
question of the responsibilities for the war . Bendas 
exchanges formed only part of the intellectuals' preoccupation 
in the historical context; their major effect was to concentrate 
the attention of the NRF's readers on such matters, whether they 
were avowedly or unconsciously "laics" or "clercs". The fact 
that a turning point had been reached did not go unnoticed, 
least of all in the NRF. In July 1930 Paulhan inserted an 
essay by Marcel Arland 
(167) 
which is of central importance in 
the evolution of the NRF's attitude to historical or political 
questions. 
Arland's essay began by reflecting upon his first days 
in Riviýre's NRF - "l' un des centres de la France 
intellectuelle" 
- when his editor asked him to describe the state of 
"la jeune 
litt&rature' 
(168) 
0 The result of this request 
had been "le 
Nouveau Mal du siede": its influence had been widely felt. 
However, the difference in 1930 was that it was no longer 
"inquietude" or the "Nouveau Mal dtk siecle" which threatened 
to dominate literature: it was politics. Arland explained: 
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"Les attaques de M. Julien Benda n'y ont 
rien change. Un ecrivain, qu' il le veui l le 
ou non, est contraint de compter aujou@'hui 
avec les partis politiques. I1 ne peut ecrire 
un livre qui ne soit aussitot juge de droite 
ou de gauche. Ce sont les partis de gauche 
qui ont assure le succes de La Trahison des 
Clercs; ces memes partis, comme M. Benda 
repondait insuffisamment ä leurs avances, 
se tiennent aujourd'hui sur la reserve... "169) 
An intense interest for politics among young writers of his 
generation was perfectly comprehensible to Arland, the reason 
being that "ils y trouvent ou croient y trouver un moyen d' action 
immediate" 
( 17() 
. For Arland, the principle cause for concern was 
literature, -_ the same conception of literature which Riviere had 
defended just six years before 
(171): 
"C' es t de lui que j 'attends les oeuvres les 
plus pr6 cieus es . Un e crivain qui nest t pas 
un artiste me touche peu; n' es t-i 1 qu' artis te, 
il me touche moires encore" 
(172) 
. 
Arland desired most of all 
"une perpetuelle justice de la pensee, entre 
le coeur et 1' esprit la balance la plus 
sensible et la volonte de ne rien avancer 
oü Von ne s'engage tout entier"(173). 
Moreover he had observed that "ce que le public reclame, c' es t 
une formule, une etiquette, nette, frappante, sonore ... 
(174); 
in his own concluding sentence, he produced a striking 
"formula" 
which truly set the tone for the coming decade, the 
`Thirties: 
"C' es t 1' heure oti ceux qui ne croient pas 
s'etre trahis prennent envers eux-memes 
un n ouve 1 engagement" 
(175) 
. 
This statement bore hidden resonances which 
became clearer as the 
months went on into 1931. For all 
Arland's reservations, and for 
ým 
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all his commitment to literature, there was a tone of acceptance, 
or at least of inevitability, in his remarks concerning the 
writer and politics . 
Three months later, Fernandez re-appraised the relationship 
of the intellectual and Revolution in a long, complex article 
"La Pensee et la R6volution , 
(176) 
. In the first part Fernandez 
asked the question "Que faut-il faire de 1' indivi du? " , against 
the background of a crisis in those beliefs which bolstered 
humanism: "Nous constatons, dans beaucoup de milieux differents, 
la faillite des croyances dont les deux siýcles pr6cý-dents 
ont v6cü`(177). These beliefs had been shaken by the development 
of the modern world, above all by "la vie economique" and 
"1' argument formidable de la guerre" 
(178) 
. Fernandez drew an 
important and topical distinction between the previous war, and 
"la paix actuelle, qui n'est qu'une guerre 
delayee dans l'eau saumätre des parlottes 
diplomatiques, ä la guerre latente qui 
couve sous les traitgs (... )"(179). 
The central concern of Fernandez' essay was to place the problem 
of individualism against this context, and he proceeded to show 
that philosophers of history, whether from the extreme Right 
or from the extreme Left, were in agreement: the 
individual 
(180) 
In a line of argument which ran should be suppressed 
directly counter to Benda's in essays such as 
"Note sur la 
Reaction"(181), Fernandez insisted that right-wing doctrine, 
wishing to subordinate the individual to the national 
interest, 
"ne vaut ni plus ni moins que la doctrine 
democratique et que 
(182) la doctrine r6volutionnaire 
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For the Nationalists, the suppression of the individual was a 
bitter but necessary pill to swallow, rendered unavoidable by 
the errors of democracy. For the revolutionaries, however, 
"la suppression de l' individu est une articulation de leur 
183) logique" 
The second part of this essay went on to analyse the 
dialectic of Marxist thinking; for the first time in the pages 
of the NRF, a serious and very competent exposition of dialectical 
materialism revealed the philosophy underlying revolutionary 
thought. For Fernandez, Marxism was a formidable doctrinal 
tool and one which would tempt those who might be victims of 
"un etat d'esprit plus läche e 
qui pousse nos intellectuels 
l' his torien ä la mode afin de 
qu'ils ont le droit de faire, 
de penser" (184) . 
t plus mou, 
ä consulter 
savoir ce 
de sentir, 
Like Arland 
(185) 
, Fernandez concluded by referring to the 
transitional nature of the period, and, bearing in mind his 
recommendation for " une philosophie virile" 
(186) 
, ended with 
a rhetorical question: 
"Est-il besoin d'ajouter que la defense de 
1'individu (... ) est pour 1'intollectue1 
non seulement un devoir, mais une necessite 
ineluctable? " (187) . 
The question of Franco-German relations was, from this 
time, becoming the principle preoccupation of writers such as 
Gide, Schlumberger and Martin du Gard 
(lss) 
, and predominated 
during 1931. Writing in Les Nouvelles 
titteraires in December 
1930, Louis Martin-Chauffier, very close to Malraux and Gide 
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at the NRF, noted that "depuis un peu de temps, on constate une 
grande nouveaute: la descente des cleres sur le pre" 
(189) 
Martin-Chauffier insisted that no betrayal was involved, for 
the issue which had motivated this burst of interest was Peace, 
and, by extension, Civilization. The primary source of anxiety 
was that "les clercs voient la paix instable et menacee" 
(190) 
and he continued: 
"Ils savent que, cette fois, c'est une question 
de vie et de mort, et que le. civilisation 
sombrerait dans une nouvelle guerre, dans un 
nouveau desordre" ( 191) 
It was necessary for the intellectuals to become involved precisely 
because politicians were acting too precipitately and without due 
regard for future consequences. Martin-Chauffier was convinced 
that the intellectuals, by reflecting upon and commenting upon 
events, would help stabilize the situation by exerting their 
appreciable influence upon those in authority. The opportunity 
for intellectuals - including all those important figures in 
the NRF - was immediately within reach. Some three weeks after 
the publication of Martin-Chauffier's article, Notre Temps 
published a highly important manifesto entitled 
"Contre les 
exces du nationalisme, pour 1'Europe et pour 1'Entente 
franco- 
allemande"(192) Signed at first by 186 writers and artists, 
the most significant names were closely associated with 
both 
Europe and the NRF(193) . The only notable absence 
from the NRF 
roll-call was Gide; even Benda and Paulhan 
had signed. Worried 
by rumours of war and disorder, the 
intellectuals who had signed 
were attracted by the neutral wording of the manifesto; 
Benda 
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would have evidently approved of any text which placed 
Civilization before any specific national interest. It was 
the international flavour of the manifesto which was uppermost 
in the intellectuals' minds: 
"ils n'ignorent tout Ce qui menace la paix 
en d' autres pays et ils comptent que les 
intellectuels etrangers sauront mener contre 
les excýs de leurs nationalismes 1' action qu' eux- 
memes sont resolus ä soutenir contre ceux du 
nationalisme franjais. Its affirment que le 
vrai visage de la France nest t pas de haine 
et de uerre, mais de justice et de p. aix 
(... ) ,, 
(194) 
Throughout 1931 various texts and surveys reflected the feeling 
already described the year before by Arland and Fernandez that 
a new era had begun, that a more positive, constructive attitude 
was necessary 
(195) 
. Others examined the present in terms of the 
previous decade and concluded that "la fin de 1' aprýs-guerre" 
had been reached and overtaken(196) 
At the same time the activity of pacifist movements was 
infuriating militant sections of the Right. The Action francaise 
and, in particular, the Camelots du Roi had, for some months, 
taken increasingly to direct action. On 27th November 1931, 
the pacifists' meeting at the Trocadero, presided by 
Edouard Herriot, was broken up by the Action frangaise(197) . 
This brawl set off a chain of events which, once and for all, 
changed the direction of the NRF-, against Paulhan's wishes. 
On ist December Gide met Andre Chamson who, close to important 
figures in the Radical Party, felt that some form of protest 
was necessary against the Action 
f rancaise in order to attenuate 
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"le deplorable effet que cela peut avoir en Allemagne"(198) 
Chamson persuaded Gide that a group of intellectuals should 
head the protest, not in Europe, "une revue trop coloree", 
but, precisely because it was seen as a review with no 
particular political affiliations, in the NRF. Gide thought 
of Schlumberger, who should 
"prendre la parole dans un article que tous 
pourraient signer du reste, mais (Gide es t 
un peu incertain sur l' opportunite de cette 
manifestation"(199) . 
This episode is extremely important in understanding how Gide, 
although still unsure of his own stance, was willing, eventually, 
to exercise his powerful influence over the policy of the review. 
In this case Schlumberger thought that the mechanism of the NRF 
forbad such a move since three weeks later, reference to the 
event in question would have had to be made in such strong terms 
that it would no longer be an article, but a "protestation de 
principe" 
(200) 
. Paulhan soon 
learnt of the proposal and, in 
a letter to Grenier, was able to freely express how ill-advised 
he believed such a protest would be: 
"Gide voudrait que noes protestions dans 
la NRF contre les incidents du Trocadero 
(... ) et Marcel contre la carence du 
gouvernement... I1 y aurait beaucoup ä 
dire sur ce besoin d' etre ridicule, qui 
est commun ä tant d'intellectuels. Je 
crois que je les apaiserai" 
(201) 
. 
In the event no appeal appeared in the NRF for January 1932. 
However, Gide and Martin du Gard were both thinking that the 
NRF could and should do more in providing a platform 
for 
discussion. 
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Another cause possibly worthy of support offered itself 
in the New Year: the so-called "Aragon affair" 
(202) 
. This 
"affair" centred upon the charges laid against Aragon on 
January 16th 1932 for the publication of the poem "Front 
Rouge"; the courts had held this to be an incitement to 
murder. At the instigation of the Surrealists a petition was 
drawn up and signatories were sought in Aragon's defence. By 
February 2nd, Gide and Martin du Gard had been solicited for 
support; Gide was against signing, but Martin du Gard hesitated 
and, although he did not like either Aragon or his poem, he 
thought he might sign: "J' incline d penser qu'il faut touj ours 
(203) 
protester contre ce genre de chosest' . Meanwhile Paulhan 
did all he could to dissuade Gide from mobilizing NRF support 
in favour of Aragon: on February 18th Gide reported two very 
important conversations, one with Rene Crevel, who had tried 
again to enlist Gide's support, the other with Paulhan, who 
had forcefully indicated all the dangers inherent in espousing 
this cause. Gide reported his refusal in terms which make it 
quite clear that he had absorbed Paulhan's arguments to such an 
extent that he used them against Crevel. Paulhan moreover, 
writing that same day to both Gide and Martin du Gard, repeated 
not only his strong reservations, but also pronounced his feelings 
(204) 
on the dangers of signing petitions (as he had done to Grenier) 
Once again, albeit temporarily, Paulhan had managed to 
deflect the pressure being brought to bear on the review 
(205) 
. 
Yet Gide confessed to Martin de Gard that he still felt frustrated: 
(2o6) "Je suis comme vows: j' ai envie de signer quelque chose . 
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With Gide in this mood it was rapidly becoming inevitable 
that the NRF would find itself under closer scrutiny. Already 
on February 10th 1932, Martin du Gard wrote to Gide saying that 
the NRF was, for him, unsatisfactory: 
"Je vous dis tout bas une pensee qui m' es t 
venue: c'est que, en cas de chambardements 
et d'ebranlements sociaux, je crois que je 
me d'e¬acherais tout net de la NRF pour me 
rallier 4a Europe (... ) . J' entends par "NRF" un certain dilettantisme dans la 
hardiesse de pensee, mitige de beaucoup de 
raison et de prudence (trý-s justifiee) ; 
j' entends par Europe un groupe de gens 
g6n6reux, d'esprits moins avises mais 
agissants, capables d'erreurs mais aussi 
d' action positive" 
(207). 
Given that Gide was already meditating upon the publication of 
his Journal, it is not surprising that, in a crucial discussion 
of March 6th 1932, the politicization of the NRF's editorial 
policy was being contemplated: 
"I1 es t beaucoup question de la NRF", 
wrote la Petite Dame. "Gide trouve qu'il 
serait grand temps qu'elle ref lhte les 
preoccupations du moment, que la qualite 
ne suffit plus, que cette qualite devrait 
s' allier, et meine se laisser submerger par 
ces preoccupations. Martin (du Gard) trouve 
qu'en effet eile devient un peu viei l le dame, 
et que ceux-lä mimes qui pourraient la vivif ier 
sont tentes de porter ailleurs leur tribut. 
Je fais remarquer que pourtant avec une equipe 
comme Jean (Schlumberger), Fernandez, Malraux, 
eux, etc., ils sont beaucoup d pouvoir toucher 
ä autre chose que l' art. (Gide) pense qu'il 
faudrait peut-ttre se grouper... faire une 
tentative avec aussi des apports de 1'etranger... 
I1 a une Idee assez amusante: creer dans la NRF 
meine une partie qui s'intitulerait 
"Ring" et ob 
on serait invite ä se battre au nom des 
idees 
du jour, des idees vivantes" 
(208) 
. 
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These opinions and projects represent a remarkable departure 
the intent of the original NRF. More importantly they diverged 
significantly from the ideas Riviere had expressed in June 1919, 
and which Thibaudet believed had been vindicated by publishing 
La Trahison des Clercs. 
One further debate, lasting from April to August 1932, was 
played out against this desire to politicize the review. Paulhan 
himself was finally drawn into the arena to argue publicly against 
what he saw as intellectual hypocrisy in the Europe camp, and 
what he thought of privately as betraying the conception of 
the NRF itself. In the "Revues des revues" section of the NRF 
for April 1932, Paulhan printed two extracts from a letter written 
by Guehenno and published in Europe entitled "Les Intellectuels 
et le Desarmenent"(209) . In a short commentary Paulhan accused 
Gu6henno of intellectual bad faith for having judged "par 
avance d' un evenement qu 'i1 ne connait pas" . Yet the 
(210) 
gravest omission was that Guehenno refused to condemn all war; 
in other words, for those at Europe, armed violence was acceptable 
and inevitable in Revolution: 
"Vows en voulez moires aux canons et aux 
mitrailleuses qu'aux patries et aux 
nations (... ) . Je voisýý viii)que vous 
posez mal la question . 
Paulhan was clearly following Benda here: if intellectuals 
were to protest in the name of principles based upon reason, 
(212) 
then that reason should be applicable universally . 
Jean Guehenno wrote back to the editor of the NRF on April 
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12th(213) . He argued that even if he had posed it badly, the 
important thing was to have posed the question of war.. He 
dismissed Paulhan's objections to having avoided a condemnation of 
revolutionary violence: his justification, he said, would tax 
the readers' patience. His basic premise was that the writers 
of their generation had lived the experience of the 1914-1918 
War and that it was therefore essential to know what intellectuals' 
attitudes would be "devant de nouvelles violences nationales" 
(214) 
For Guehenno, the crucial point was that past and future wars 
were all bad, and Paulhan should not distinguish between them. 
The real issue, repeated Guehenno, was that of "les violences 
nationales", and argued that as far as revolutionary violence 
was concerned, "prenons garde que rien ne saurait la justifier 
(215) 
mieux que la lachete et 1' avilissement des intellectuels" 
Finally intellectuals now had to face these problems: "ce monde 
est si plein de misfires que beaucoup d'entre nous se refugient 
dans les magnifiques domaines du songe"(216) . In his reply, 
Paulhan insisted upon method and precision in these arguments; 
self-deception was too high a price to pay, even for 
"la cause 
de la paix"(217) . The 
free association of principles and 
politics would only lead to the worst type of cant: 
"cet engagement que vous nous demandez de prendre, 
etes-vous sür de la tenir vous-meme? Ne lirions- 
nous pas en tete d'Europe, le 
jour ob Paris 
serait menace par quelque arme hitlerienne 
ou fasciste, un appel aux armes signg 
Jean Guehenno? Et croyez-vous donc qu' il 
soit toujours aise de ý lcci der si une guerre es t 
nationale ou civile. 
(. 
- 102 - 
These comments mystified Martin du Gard, who asked for 
some clarification: Paulhan repeated his point that the true 
nature of the next war was likely to be civil, or "revolutionary", 
and that it was not at all easy to distinguish between them, 
. according to what principles motivated the war 
(219) 
Martin du Gard was not convinced: although he had reservations 
about Guehenno' s presentation, " c' est un homme qui s' engage; 
qui s'engage ä fond, avec armes et bagages"(220) . In essence, 
Martin du Gard preferred Guehenno's attitude; he preferred not 
only Gu6-henno's "emotion" and "sincerity", but also the commitment 
of Europe to the burning issues of the day: 
"Je preftre sa "Lettre ä Paulhatt" ä votre 
reponse. I1 s'y engage une fois de plus, 
il se decouvre genereusement; le fond du 
debat lui Importe plus que ce qu'on pourra 
penser de son attitude, ou ce qu'on pourra 
critiquer dans le detail. Votre reponse 
est dune fine plume, mais habile ä se 
reserver (... ). Vous avez pour vous les 
rieurs de 1"'elite" (. ) , mais 
l' accent de 
Guehenno touche au coeur. Et il se peut 
que les temps ne soient plus ä eborgner les 
mouches, et u'il ait plus urgent 
ä 
faire" 221 . 
Martin du Gard made a case for Fernandez to refresh the approach 
of the NRF to these matters: 
"Le ton d'un Fernandez me semble illustrer 
precis6ment ce que voudrais savoir 
dire. 
Rien nest plus loin 4u ton d'Europe; mais 
rien nest plus loin aussi des subtilites 
intellectuelles de la pure litterature" 
(222) 
Martin du Gard concluded: "Les fenetres sont ouvertes; 
1` air 
(223) 
du temps est entre et circule" 
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Paulhan wrote back to clarify his thinking still further: 
"Reconnaissez", he pleaded, "que l'engagement importe moins 
que le choix des idees suivant lesquelles on s' engage" 
(224) 
. 
He repeated his conviction that the next war would, sooner 
or later, become a civil rather than a national war, and that 
Guehenno was remiss not to condemn it equally. He argued that 
the great danger was intellectual inconsistency and, in a 
remarkably strong rebuke, warned Martin du Gard of falling 
into the same trap 
(225) 
. As Benda had argued, Paulhan firmly 
believed that by usurping pacifism, by adopting its defence as 
their sole prerogative, Rolland and his followers on the Left 
were guilty of their own betrayal, or, as he put it, "bourrage 
de crane" 
(226) 
Guehenno reprinted his own letter to Paulhan in Europe 
(227) 
. Paulhan, in turn, wrote back to make June 1932227ý 
public the sentiments he had been spelling out privately to 
Martin du Gard 
(228) 
: "Oubliez-vous donc que les "violences 
nationales" de 1914 paraissaient civiles h tous ceux qui 
partaient pour defendre le droit? 
(229). 
11 
, Meanwhile 
Gide 
and Martin du Gard were in the process of submitting their 
(Z3U) 
own declarations against war to Felicien Challaye . 
Moreover Gide insisted that the NRF should reproduce Rolland's 
call for a World Peace Congress, though not without considerable 
resistance from Paulhan, who objected to the poor quality of 
Rolland's text 
(231) 
. Furthermore the 
hypocrisy underlying 
the declaration was grotesque to Paulhan: he pointed out to 
both Gide and Martin du Gard that the Pacifist Congress was 
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to be organized by Barbusse, 
"qui n' es t pas du tout pacifiste, qui 
meme, etant communis te, es t "contre 
tous les pacifismes", et pret ýt 
substituer aux guerre5 imp6rialistes 
it X232 la guerre civile 
Martin du Gard told Paulhan that the failure of the Lausanne 
Conference had persuaded him to sign, and that he thought the 
wording of the declaration left no room for equivocation 
(23-3) 
. 
At last, by publishing Rolland's communist-inspired declaration 
with the explicit and public backing of Gide and Martin du Gard, 
the NRF had followed Europe into the broader Left, anti-fascist 
camp. 
If, at first, the inclusion of La Trahison des Clercs 
seemed to fulfil and perpetuate Riviere's conception of the 
NRF, Paulhan subsequently found that the debate it engendered 
forced him to accept material which was not only non-literary 
but of a marked political colouring. This was directly due 
to the movement of events both abroad and at home, events which 
awakened intellectuals' fears and stirred them to action. 
Paulhan wrote to Guehenno: 
"Quant ä Gide, je crois qu'il accepte nettement 
aujourd'hui, et souhaite peut-etre, la guerre 
civile. D' ailleurs, avouez qu'il ya maintenant 
un elan vers cette guerre civile, exactement 
pareil ä l' e lan de 1910-1913 vers la guerre 
nationale. Rolland a remplace Bartes. A-t-on 
beaucoup gagng ou change? " 
(234) 
. 
Paulhan might be justifiably sceptical, even 
bitter, in expressing 
himself thus, given the pressures Gide and Martin 
du Gard had 
exerted upon the NRF literally to move with 
the times; he had 
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not succeeded in deflecting them for long. Indeed, after 
1932 in particular, the NRF continued to consider political 
questions, concentrating first of all upon the decline of 
Radicalism as an effective force within the Third Republic. 
The review also examined some of the remedies and alternatives 
being considered, among them, ideas and plans proposed by 
various small factions and groupings of "non-conformist" 
intellectuals. Moreover several NRF writers, including 
Malraux and Benda, began to look favourably upon the prospect 
of a Popular Front. Once Blum's government was in power, 
however, Paulhan resisted continuing attempts to politicize 
the NRF, and strove to restore balance by criticizing Marxist 
orthodoxy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"From Radicalism to Popular Front: Attitudes to Politics in the 
NRF from 1932 to 1938". 
"l'antifascisme nest pas seulement le vaste champ 
oü les liberaux se melent aux communistes, comme 
le montrera la guerre d'Espagne (... ) , c'est un 
sentiment; c'est une attitude; c'est aussi une 
politique". (Andre Malraux, preface to 
Romain Rolland-Jean Guehenno Correspondance, 
1975, p7) 
"I1 n'y a plus d'innocents, de nos jours. Et je 
crains que le manicheisme du fascisme et de 
l' antifascisme ne trahisse qu'une assez grande 
paresse d' espri t: mais c' es t une paresse qui se 
traine Bans le sang" (Jean Paulhan to 
Andre Suarýs, BD 4966/8, dated 1918/36). 
"La politique a discredite le mot "centre" en lui 
faisant 6voquer des idees d' indecision, de 
neutralitd, de lieu vague oü se massent tous 
ceux du troupeau qu'effraient les aventures". 
(Jean Schlumberger, NRF August 1936, p382). 
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Jean Touchard, in his book fauche en France depuis 1900, 
writes: 
"Vous ne trouvez pas de revues de gauche de quelque 
importance dans les annees 1930. I1 ya Europe, 
qui es t fort loin de l'univers radical, la NRF, 
mais la NRF est essentiellement une revue 
lit teraire" (1). 
-It is not only simplistic but also, strictly speaking, inaccurate to 
think of the NRF in the 1930's as a neutral review, or as a review 
which was purely literary. Touchard made this comment while 
discussing the Radical Party in the 1930's; but, despite Riviere's 
and others' claims of neutrality, and of Paulhan's attempt to 
maintain that stance by publishing La Trahison des Clercs, 
the NRF did have political tendencies, and these were indeed 
Radicalist. A close examination of the personnel it gathered, 
of the texts it published and of the policy underlying editorial 
decisions, bears this out. As the Radical Party gradually 
became more sympathetic to the idea of a Popular Front 
government, so the NRF itself gained a more partisan reputation 
than Paulhan might otherwise have wished. Far from seeing the 
Popular Front as uniquely the result of a consensus of political 
parties, most historians have also tended to trace its origins 
back to the action and influence of intellectuals, writers and 
their front-organizations, in particular to the founding of the 
pacifist "Amsterdam-Pleyel" movement, and of the 
"Association 
des ecrivains et artistes revolutionnaires" (or AEAR) 
in 1932(2) . 
Indeed the rise of Nazism in Germany and Hitler's coming to 
power in January 1933 further 
increased the pressure upon 
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political parties to rally together in a broad, antifascist 
front; as Malraux has put it, 
"1' appel au "Front populaire" nest pas ne avec 
confusion, de la seule conjoncture; il a ete 
s us cite avec precision, par les Sovietiques, 
contre la menace hitlerienne" (3) . 
It would be inaccurate too, however, to insist that intellectuals 
were simply for or against fascism: within each "camp" there were 
many factions and splinter-groups which reflected the general 
political confusion of the time and, in the confusion, intellectuals 
jostled for position. The NRF was not immune to this phenomenon, 
so aptly described by Claude Roy: 
"Quand on les (i. e. "les intellectuels") considýre 
auj ourd' hui, leurs allees et venues, leurs marches 
et contremarches, la premiere image es t celle du 
film "comique", ou de la fourmiliýre ecrasee. Its 
entrent et sortent, vont et viennent, s'agitent 
entre le communisme, le fascism socialiste, le 
maurrassisme, le radicalisme d'Alain, comme si la 
tarentule les piquait" (4) . 
Against this background Paulhan had to steer the NRF through 
dangerous waters, managing as he went to avoid lurching dramatically 
one way or another, and manoeuvring skilfully to maintain as much 
political poise as he achieved in composing the review. 
Until 1932, although the NRF approached politics and political 
writing in a relatively even-handed, non-controversial manner, the 
review was identifiably Radicalist in tone. As early as 1923 
Henri Beraud had called the NRF "caillautiste"(5) . Not only the 
founders Gide (born 1869) and Schlumberger (born 1877), but also 
its three regular "chroniqueurs" Alain (born 1868), Benda 
(born 
1867) and Thibaudet (born 1974), had all grown up 
in and been 
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educated by the early Third Republic, the so-called "Republique 
des professeurs". In particular, they had all been profoundly 
marked by the Dreyf us Affair and the subsequent Radical-led 
"Defense de la Republique" 
ý6ý 
. By 1930 these "elders" of the 
NRF had almost if not already passed their 60th year, a significant 
factor in considering the political attitudes of the review, for, 
if Radicalism was "plus profondement enracine en tant qu' ideologie 
dans la societo franSaise de 1930 qu'il ne pouvait 1'etre dans la 
societe f ranýaise des annees 1900" 
(7) 
, 
its effectiveness as a 
political party had truly begun to stagnate by the end of the 
1920' s 
(8) 
. Clearly the disastrous economic performance of 
Herriot's "Cartel des Gauches" government in 1926 had undermined 
the credibility of the Radicals, so, from 1927-1928, vigorous 
attempts were made to renew and improve the Party's image 
ý9 
. 
Furthermore, though both Touchard and Mayeur have included the 
Radicals within the Left in France, there was a very noticeable 
shift from the moderate Left towards the Centre (if not the 
Centre-Right) as the 1930's progressed: 
"Si l' inf luence du parti (radical) recule ä la 
Chambre, eile s' accrof t toujours au Senat, ob 
le nombre de radicaux passe de la cinquantaine 
'd la centaine de 1922 . 1938, indice de ce que le 
parti devient un parti de notables, que la force 
des choses conduit d une evolution conservatrice, 
et ä passer de la gauche au centre"(10). 
In spite of the efforts of Edouard Daladier and the 
"j eures turcs" 
(such as Jacques Kayser and Jean Zay) who wished to return 
"aux 
sources du radicalisme", reality had to be confronted: 
"le parti 
se veut ä gauche, il est eL fait, desormais, au centre 
de la vie 
(11) politique 
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In the Inter-War period the strength of the Radical Party 
lay principally in its appeal to the lower middle-classes, in 
(l2) 
particular to teachers, small businessmen and professionals. 
The primary characteristic of its appeal to teachers was what 
Touchard has called "une Sorte de tres grande n6-buleuse 
radicalisante, (... ) ce que Jacques Kayser appelle "le radicalisme 
sans frontirres". C' es t le radicalisme de 1' Universite humaniste, 
rationaliste, tolerante et gidienne"(13) . The political ineffective- 
ness of the Party was compensated by its supporters' influence and 
enthusiasm within this "radicalism sans frontirres", and they 
looked back nostalgically to the 1900's upon what came to be seen 
as a "golden age" of Radicalism. The most influential survivor 
of this age, regarded as such by both himself and his disciples 
was Alain; for instance, in his Citoyen Contre les Pouvoirs (1926) 
he called himself the only remaining "combis te" 
(14) 
,a point 
. remembered by Paulhan much later 
(15) 
The first mention of Alain came in the pre-1914 NRF, in the 
(16) 
form of a book review by none other than Gaston Gallimard 
Auguste Angles, too, has pointed out that Gide regularly read 
(17) 
early "Propos" in La Depeche de Rouenlýý . By the time 
Paulhan took over Alain had already been asked to join the regular 
. contributors to the review, and eventually did so 
in 1927 
(18) 
In 1925 Gallirnard collected and published a number of texts by 
Alain dating from before 1914, Elements dune doctrine t`adica1. 
Q19) 
. 
This publication was exploited by Gallimard's commercial 
director 
Hirsch, who distributed complimentary copies at a ministerial 
meeting during Herriot's cabinet 
in 1925. Thibaudet retold the episode: 
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"Deux Lafuma pour les deux Pr6sidents, des 
ordinaires pour les ministres, et des services 
de presse pour les sous-secr6taires d'Etat. Ces 
messieurs retournýrent soupionneusement le 
"document bleu", eurent des sourires, et l'un 
d'eux redigea 1' impression genorale en ce mot: 
"S' il y avait vraiment une doctrine radicale, 
est-ce que nous ne serions pas les premiers 
ä le savoir? "" (20). 
In spite of its humour, this judgement of Radicalist "doctrine" is 
largely true 
(Z l) 
. Alain's Radicalism, reduced to 
its basic 
principle, extolled the virtues of the "citoyen", who, whilst 
in complete obedience to the Republic and to its ideals, should 
exercise the rights of the individual "contre les pouvoirs"; 
it intended to support and protect the "little man" against the 
State 
(22) 
. Alain' s true 
influence lay in his role as teacher at 
the Lycee Henri-IV and the Ecole Normale Superieure; here his 
philosophy or, more accurately, his moralism, had a lasting 
(23) 
effect on a number of pupils and students . For some, 
it was 
his personality which predominated. Raymond Aron admired 
Alain's 
anti-war views more than his doctrine; as he recalled, 
"si la 
politique d'Alain me tentait, c' est qu' elle m' 
epargnait la peine 
de connaitre la realiter and most importantly, 
"le citoyen contre 
(24) 
les you., voirs s'arroge immediatement 1' 
irresponsabilite" . 
This anarchistic trait in Alain certainly appealed to 
Paulhan, 
whose formative years had, indeed, been open to 
the influence 
. of anarchism 
(25) 
The greatest appeal of Alain's thinking 
lay precisely in the 
glorification of the individual's rights within 
the Republican 
state: Raymond Aron confessed to 
being 
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"pour le peuple contre les privil6gies, pour le 
progr; -ýs contre la tradition, pour la reconstruction 
rationnelle de la societe contre les traditions 
tradi tionne l les . Les symboles repub li cains ou 
revolutionnaires me touchaient plus que les syuboles 
conservateurs" (26) . 
Thus Alain, in the forefront of the NRF's "chroniques", was viewed 
as a standard-bearer for a certain idealistic conception of the 
humanist, Radical;, Republic. The teachers and academics who gave 
the NRF much valued support found in Alain "le miroir ideal qui 
rgf lgchit 1' image embellie de la republique provinciale, fami liale 
(27) 
et pacifique, la Republique d' avant 1914" 
In the NRF very rarely were any of the "Propos" directly 
political: out of over one hundred to appear between 1927 and 1936, 
only those of April and September 1934 referred to current events, 
and even then Alain's conclusion, in April, was typically oblique 
and non-committal: "La politique est un jeu de finesse et de 
precaution, auquel tout citoyen doit etre initie Coming 
only weeks after the February riots it was clear that Alain's 
Radicalism had little to do with forceful or strident political 
action. This state of affairs could well be partly explained by 
the fact Paulhan was able to choose which "Propos" appeared, 
as he informed Martin du Gard(29) . Although privately some within 
the NRF tired easily of Alain 
(30) 
, he received eulogies 
from former 
pupils in essays and reviews. Denis Saurat, for example, classed 
Alain with Montaigne in a paean of praise published in the NRF 
in November 193231) 
Outside the NRF, Alain's thought was despised equally at both 
extremes of the political spectrum. Leautaud noticed an all-out 
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attack on the review in December 1928 
(32) 
, delivered by 
1'Action f ranýaise. The anonymous critic wrote that if the 
NRF had once been a "lieu d'asile", it was now "envahie par les 
pires passions partisanes"(33) . Having chastized Leautaud, 
Montherlant and Pr6vost, the author then took Alain to task 
for being "le professeur de philosophie dont se reclament 
les jeunes revoltes de Normale, qui (... ) poursuit son dangereux 
enseigr rent par de pesantes ironies" 
(34) 
. Then 
in 1934, replying 
to a survey organized by Aragon in Commune 
(35), 
Alain answered 
the question "pour qui ecrivez-vous? "; his response was savaged 
by Aragon: 
"(Alain) es t 1' ideologue du radicalisme (... ) 
I1 est le grand pourrisseur de gauche des ecoles 
normales. Alain fait appel ä ses eleves pour 
prouver qu'il na jamais cherche qu' ä enseigner 
soi-meme. Nous voudrions esperer (... ) qu'ils 
oublieront les le Bons dun. des plus dangereux 
maitres que la bourgeoisie donne ä la jeunesse 
(... )it(36). 
Thus if Alain drew criticism towards the NRF, it was more due 
to his status as a "figurehead" than as a rigorous or dogmatic 
political theorist. 
As for Julien Benda, the language and references of his 
La Trahison des Clercs were distinctly Radicalist, or at least 
Republican. His impassioned crusade against "la r6action" 
and his idealism led him to defend the ideals of the 1789 
Revolution and to reject both political extremes, which he 
saw as endangering the Republic. Writing specifically and 
very succintly of Benda's achievement, Pierre Chambat 
has 
summed up: 
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"Le rejet des extremes, comme la reactivation de 
1' ideologie republicaine definissent l' espace de ce 
consensus national dont la traduction politique 
serait assez bien (... ) un gouvernement de 
concentration republicaine, nationale et laique, 
ä tendance radicale dont le modele fut donne par le 
gouvernement de Waldeck-Rousseau de 1899 h 1902"(37). 
It should not be forgotten that second to his constant presence 
in the NRF, Benda also wrote 131 articles for La Depeche de Toulouse 
between 1933 and 1940; this newspaper was one of the most prominent 
Radical dailies 
38) 
Thibaudet too, though severe on certain aspects of Radicalism, 
was highly admired in the period, and reflected all that was best 
in the R6-püb-iique des professeurs 
(39) 
. He showed a particular 
propensity for writing analyses of the Third Republic, which often 
drew replies both from within and outside the NRF(40) . Fundamentally, 
Thibaudet was a Radical, but showed such openness of spirit that he 
was able to express sympathy for writers as opposed as Drumont and 
Nizan . His approach 
is perhaps best summed up by Jean Grenier, 
(41) 
who wrote: 
"I1 6tait impartial parce que pour lui etre partial 
signifiait etre partiel. Personne de moires moniste: 
1'humanito ne lui apparaissait pas comme une armee en 
marche mais comme une societe des esprits. 
I1 n'aurait 
pas concu meme la possibilite 
dune unification des 
idees et des volont6s (... ) C' &tait un p luralis to 
convaincu . 
Sometimes, within the same issue of the NRF, Benda and Thibaudet 
would combine forces in defence of the Republic. 
For instance in 
1935, if Thibaudet adopted a gentle admonitory tone 
in pointing 
out the deficiencies of the 
latest views of the Third Republic, 
including Bainville's, then Benda spared nothing 
in his execution of 
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La Troisiýme Republique, a work "rempli de roueries, quelquefois 
un peu grosses" 
(43) 
Among the younger generation of contributors, even Marcel Arland, 
so often seen subsequently as a-political, expressed his beliefs in 
identifiably Radicalist vocabulary in reply to a little-known 
survey in 1926(44). Both Berl and Chamson were avid Radical 
supporters; Berl's admiration was strongest for Herriot, while 
Chamson worked closely with Kayser and Daladier(45) . Grenier 
certainly saw L'Annee des Vaincus, serialized in 1934, as the work 
of a Radical. He told Paulhan: 
"Le Chamson est interessant, bien mgme- philosophie un 
peu courte: (... ) on ne peut pas inventer une nouvelle 
fajon de vivre: mais si! Enfin cela fait partie d'un 
radical-socialism primaire ý}ui fait le fonds et la 
philosophie de notre temps" 
(`+6) 
. 
Moreover, Paulhan reported Benda's comments: 
"Benda lisant L'Annee des Vaincus ce soir ma table 
disait: "Si c' etait moi qui avais ecrit vous 
l'auriez ref use" .I1 ajoute tris tement : 
"C' es t 
1' age de Chamson que vows accep tez"" 
(47). 
Benda was probably not wrong in drawing attention to this 
distinction: 
Chamson, close as he was to Daladier, was a prime example of the 
"jeunes radicaux" patronized by the new Radical leader 
from the late 
1920's onwards . 
As for the political preferences of Jean Paulhan 
himself, any 
judgement must be subordinated to the overriding 
fact that he was, 
first and foremost, the editor of the 
NRF. Some, such as Leautaud 
and Sartre, looked upon Paulhan as a 
Socialist, or at least as a 
sympathizer with, if not a supporter of, 
the "Front populaire", 
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while others have called him "un homme de droite" 
(48) 
. Most 
of the time when writing in the review as editor, Paulhan adopted 
the pseudonym Jean Guerin, clearly underlining the distinction. 
However, his political writings in the later 1930's bore his own 
name, emphasizing the fact that the views expressed were his own 
and not necessarily the review's. The assessment of Paulhan as 
Socialist probably derived from his selection as municipal councillor 
in Chätenay-Malabry in May 1935, on the list of Jean Longuet. 
"Imaginez que je suis candidat au conseil municipal, Longuet m`ayant 
porte sur la liste", wrote Paulhan to Martin du Card. He added, 
modestly, that "la confiance des gens depasse les bornes raison- 
nables" 
(49) 
. In a personal capacity, Paulhan at this time 
(1935) 
was willing to admit to Martin du Gard that 
"je n'aime ni les revolutions, ni les revolutionnaires 
et je me sens tout pros, pour bien marquer la confiance 
que je porte ä la societe actuelle (... ) d'adherer au 
parti SF 10 ou communis te" 
(50) 
. 
Paulhan's politics, by nature as well as by choice, were kaleidoscopic 
to the extent that Jacques Debü-Bridel was able to write: 
"Jean Paulhan echappe au clivage classique mais facile de notre 
terminologie politique: il ne s'est laissd accaparer par aucun 
clan(51) . Yet this ability to sustain a multiple 
perspective is 
indicative of the same liberal pluralism as Thib audet' s; no 
doubt 
the vocabularly and the rhetoric of pre-Second World 
War Radicalism 
have been too swiftly forgotten. Paulhan sympathized with Alain's 
opinion of the NRF : 
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"Alain (disait) que c' etait une revue "toujours 
moderee et toujours hardie". Eh bien, peut-etre tenons-nous maintenant la raison de cette 
moderation et de cette hardiesse: c' es t que la NRF ressemble ä toutes les revues et h tous les livres, et ä tous les hommes"(52). 
Such "moderation" and "hardiesse" were not only the same as those 
qualities exalted in Alain's "doctrine", "le citoyen contre les 
pouvoirs", they were also fundamental to the nature and policy of 
Paulhan's NRF. These comments were in fact originally made by 
Paulhan (using his own name, not Guerin) in the NRF for July 1938. 
Paulhan was referring to a critique by Robert Brasillach of a 
volume of Thibaudet's 
(53) 
Reflexions . Having explained the 
inaccuracies of the account, Paulhan conceded that Brasillach had 
a point in stating that Thibaudet had been well-suited to the review, 
because "on reconnalt bien lä 1' esprit scolaire et anarchique ä 
la fois de la NRF"(54). Paulhan concluded: 
"I1 faut avouer que (Brasillach) a garde un sens 
admirable de la formule, et du raccourci. Anarchique 
et scolaire, pouvait-on mieux dire? C' es tä la fois 
l' extreme independance, l' extrgme discipline; la 
hardiesse, mais la mod6ration; la libertd, mais 
l' obeissance. Si la NRF n'est pas encore digne 
d'un tel eloge, eile s'efforcera de le meriter"(55). 
At about the same time, Paulhan implied that even-handedness was the 
principal ingredient in the editorial policy of his review, and that 
it extended into the political domain: 
"La NRF, c'est une revue litteraire (... ) . 
I1 lui arrive de parler politique, mais c'est, 
en general :, en des sens contradictoires. Et le 
lecteur qui la suivrait fidýlement devrait se 
resigner ä etre reactionnaire un mois, et 
revolutionnaire le mois suivant; fasciste en 
janvier et antifasciste en mars"(56). 
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At first sight, on glancing through the contents pages, this 
statement may have some justification 
(57) 
and it certainly holds 
true in the literary perspective, as the ability to compile such a 
heterogeneous author-list has of ten been advanced as one of the 
keys to the success of Paulhan's NRF(58) . Yet the constant presence 
of Alain, Benda and Thibaudet, in varying degrees of concentration, 
gave the NRF an inevitable Radicalist bias, and perpetuated its 
appeal to its strong academic audience, traditionally Radicalist. 
However, if the values still lingered, electorally the Radicals 
weakened in the political stasis of 1930-32, qualified as "extremement 
morne et plat" by Touchard(59) . Radicalism was viewed with 
disdain, 
even by those who had been sympathetic: it was a "passeisme"(60). 
Renewal became a priority for the Party. As early as 1928, Thibaudet, 
in his extremely perspicacious essay "Reflexions sur la Politique", 
published as a leading article on the eve of thelegislative elections 
in late April, detected that "en France, les elections de 1928 se 
font ou vont se faire dans la crise, le marasme ou la d(ýmission des 
partis" 
(61) 
. The parties would 
be the major victims of the lack 
(62) 
of political ideas, said Thibaudet . He constantly stressed 
the need for "un redressement general", particularly 
in the face 
of an ever-increasing class-consciousness: 
"Je crois que le probleme des partis, partis qui, 
daps 
une republique parlementaire, sont unis par une 
certaine rigle63d u jeu, s' efface devant 
le prob lime 
des classes . 
This was evidently troubling Thibaudet 
deeply; he considered that 
since the Russian Revolution, the most urgent 
task for the Parties 
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in France was to assimilate class-awareness, for by doing so, they 
might resolve their own problems: 
"On est engage dans un parti par des opinions 
et des interets. On est engage dans une classe 
par une maniýre d'etre. Le radicalisme prete son 
"(suffixe ä un parti, le socialisme ä. une classe64) 
Thibaudet's article offered an acute insight into one of the reasons 
for political stagnation in France. In October 1932, Paulhan printed 
another illuminating article by Thibaudet, this time the conclusion 
from his book Les Ldees politiques de la France(65) . Here Thibaudet's 
tone was more anxious; although intending to defend liberalism, he 
was forced to admit that "la France est en somme le seule grande 
nation continentale (... ) oü se soient maintenues les conditions 
d'un liberalisme moyen. La dictature est devenue 1'gtat normal 
de 1'Europe et de 1'Asie... "(66) . Contrasting 
liberalism and 
traditionalism in France with the newer ideologies he identified, 
he highlighted once more the major shortcoming of French politics: 
"Le liberalisme est un systeme de coexistences dans 
l' espace. Le tradition4alisme est une systýme de 
continuite dans le temps. L' un et 1' autre, s'ils 
etaient depourvus de fermete et de 1'esprit de 
dialogue, donneraient ses dimensions ä une critique 
politique passive, miroir, ref let. L'un et 
l' autre 
imp liquen t en somme la meme nature de pas s ivi t6i" 
7) 
. 
Passivity: this was the key-word in Thibaudet's analysis. He 
had 
warned of the need for renewal in his April 
1928 article; now, 
even with the victory of Herriot 
in June 1932, the long-awaited 
(68) 
opportunity to close ranks with the 
Socialists had been lost 
Thibaudet went on: 
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"Le nom meme de radical-socialisme indique que 
1' ideologie radicale a besoin d'une rallonge sur 
sa gauche (... ) C' es t pourtant le socialisme qui 
cree aujourd'hui dans la vie politique Pappel 
d' air des idees, des problýmes (... ) . C' est par 
rapport au socialisme que s' 6tablissent les 
positions. C'est sur le Parti que se rýglent les 
partis" 
(69) 
. 
The article concluded by re-affirming that "un pluralisme de 
conformismes reste, du point de vue de la liberte et du liberalisme, 
preferable 'ä un conformisme monopoleur"(7°) . This pluralism resided 
in six ideas, still Radicalist in nature, which would, according to 
Thibaudet, "elever sur la civilisation politique d'une epoque le 
p laf and que cherchent nos yeux , 
(71) 
. 
Thus the main political analyses in the NRF were provided by 
an essentially pro-Radical commentator. Liberalism was still valid, 
should be maintained, while Revolution should be discouraged. In 
February 1933 Jean Prevost reviewed Thibaudet's book: his major 
criticism was that it lacked understanding concerning the extreme- 
Left(72) . Prevost 
believed Thibaudet had ignored totally that a 
Revolution led by the Socialists, and not the Marxists, could be 
achieved already "dans le syndicalisme des fonctionnaires 
(et dans) 
1' enorme force cxganisatrice qu'il possý-de" 
(73) 
. However those were 
the only drawbacks in what Prevost felt was another exemplary piece 
of political analysis. Further analysis was provided 
by Emmanuel Berl's 
book La Politique et les Partis, written in 1931 but not reviewed 
in 
book form until June 1933 by Fernandez(74). The book, 
dedicated to 
Andre Chamson, claimed that "le parti radical 
ä beaucoup d' egards, 
c' es t la France meme . In 
his account Fernandez pointed to the 
(76) 
fact that "les partis franVis poursuivent en gros une meme politique 9 
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which explained how Berl could conclude that "il retrouve I la 
fin une gran de division entre la droite et la gauche, non plus 
politique, cette fois, mais sentimentale, traditionnelle, fondee 
sur des r6-flexes, des habitudes , 
(77) 
. The most interesting part 
of Fernandez' review came in the concluding paragraph where, 
concurring with Berl that the Communists could "preserver un 
radicalism reel", he suggested that common ground should be 
sought upon which to unite all of the Left in France: 
"Qu' ily alt un minimum de choses ä changer, sur 
quoi un radical sincere, un socialiste et un 
communis to pourraient s' entendre, je ne songe 
pas un instant h le nier" (78) . 
Berl, sensitive to Marxist theory, could not however envisage its 
successful application in France; Fernandez concluded that if the 
book highlighted a vacuum in French political ideas, it was here: 
"son livre reflete une fatigue des doctrines, une mefiance vis-ä-vis 
d'elles, un d6sir de s'arranger sans elles"(79) . 
Not surprisingly the lack of new doctrine led to an explosion of 
interest in "le renouvellement de la pensee politique franjaise" as 
attempted by the groups of so-called "non-conformist" young 
(80) 
intellectuals gathered around a swarm of small reviews . Among 
the first books to reject both capitalism and communism, and to 
point the way towards a "revolution de 
la personne", was Decadence 
(81) 
de la Nation rancaise, by Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu . 
This text received favourable treatment from Fernandez when 
he 
(82) 
reviewed it in the NRF 
in June 1931 . In Fernandez' view 
Aron and Dandieu were launching a double attack upon 
traditional 
French political life in that 
it was a critique at once of reformism 
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based upon idealistic rationalism (i. e. Radicalism), and of 
traditional Nationalism. Patriotism could be recuperated, 
according to Aron and Dandieu, in a new framework of revolutionary, 
or personalist, individualism(83) , Fernandez said he would await 
the results of and reactions to this effort with great interest. 
Robert Aron was Gaston Gallimard's secretary and, as such, was 
able to wield some influence and, indeed, Paulhan found himself 
under increasing pressure during 1932 to include more "auteurs 
de jeunes equipes", as he told Schlumberger in August 
(84) 
. It 
became clear that Gallimard had reproached Paulhan for not 
accepting more material from "les jeunes equipes politiques: 
(et particuliýrement: aux jeunes 6quipes revolutionnaires)" 
(85) 
. 
Fully aware of the dangers inherent in allowing the NRF to be 
used as a platform for "revolutionary" ideas, Paulhan explained 
his misgivings to Schlumberger: 
"la verite est en effet que la mode (je ne prends 
pasdu tout le mot au sens pejoratif) revolutionnaire 
d'aujourd'hui ne me parait ni moins insensee ni moins 
dangereuse que la mode nationaliste de 1910-14, h 
laquelle eile repond si exactement; et que, s' il s' en 
suit 
üne 
guerre civile (qui ne pourrait etre 
qu'internationale) eile passera, je pense, en horreur, 
la guerre de 14. (... ) Ne faut-il pas mesurer la place - 
6-tant d'ailleurs revue litteraire - aux revolutionnaires? " 
(86) 
. 
Clearly Paulhan was still as anxious to avoid committing the 
NRF 
in a one-sided manner) to this issue as he 
had been with the "Amsterdam 
(87) 
Pleyel" movement . For all this, 
however, preparations began 
at this time for the important 
"Cahier de Revendications", which 
(88) 
It did not appear appeared in the NRF for December 1932 
unreasonable to Schlumberger to assemble a collection of 
texts, 
especially as he himself 
had lent his support to the Chantiers 
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co-operatifs plans of mid-1932, which were a major effort of 
the "nouvelles equipes" pour la construction du monde nouveau "ý89ý. 
Paulhan asked Denis de Rougemont to assemble the "Cahier"; as 
Loubet del Bayle has remarked, 
"ces textes se repartissaient en deux categories: 
d'une part, ceux des partisans d'une revolution 
"materialiste", d'inspiration plus ou moins marxiste, 
signes de Henri Lefebvre, Philippe Ldmour et Paul Nizan; 
d'autre part, ceux des tenants d'une revolution "personnaliste", 
c' es t-'d-dire (... ) pour Vordre nouveau, pour Esprit( ... 
) 
pour la Jeune Droite"(9 . 
The principle aim of de Rougemont was to attempt to define "une 
cause commune de la jeunesse franpise" 
(91), 
In what seemed a genuine 
effort to present a balanced, unified set of new doctrine, the 
"Cahier" caused Nizan to vehemently disassociate himself and the 
AEAR from this collective publication(92) . If the political 
divergences between the "personalists" were usually slight, there 
was an unbridgeable gulf between them and the materialists; the 
NRF had attempted to unite the "jeunes equipes", but it succeeded 
in splitting them over a year before the 6th February riots. 
Guehenno, )told Rolland that in the "Cahier" "le programme fasciste 
y es t au comp let (... )I1 res ulte des renseignements (... 
) que 
ce "cahier" publie par la NRF niest qu'une reaction de tous ces 
groupes ä mon article sur la "contrergvolution" qui les avait 
mis dans une grandee col-re"(93) Jean Grenier, who sympathised 
with Esprit and was present at the founding of this movement 
(94) 
found that the "Cahier" was "tres bien(... ). Cela coupe 1'herbe 
(95) 
sous le pied des jeunes revues concurrentes . 
Commercial 
motives for publishing the "Cahier" were probably 
important for 
Gallimard; yet for Paulhan balance was the essential 
factor. 
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He told Grenier that he had liked the "temoignages de Maulnier 
et de Lefebvre. C'est dej'L beaucoup" 
(96); 
moreover, he confirmed 
that Guehenno and Prevost were "trýs fäches", and suspected that 
(97) Chamson and Berl would also be "dans 1'indignation" . Yet if 
Paulhan could endorse both Maulnier and Lefebvre, Nizan, writing 
in the name of the AEAR, launched a ferocious counter-attack. upon 
these "amateurs distingu6s", as he called them, and insisted that 
"nous ne conclurons pas d' accords (... ) avec nos plus authentiques 
ennemis"(98) . For Nizan, his was the only authentic revolution, 
Marxist and proletarian; for, although the "personnalistes" 
could well diagnose the shortcomings of bourgeois political 
ideology, "ils ne peuvent aller prendre rang parmi les adversaires 
de classe de cette bourgeoisie", the reason being that their 
primary motivation was to "combattre le communisme" 
(99) 
. This 
was a new situation in France, said Nizan, for "un petit groupe 
(100) 
d' inte llectue is bourgeois revendique le pouvoir" What was 
unprecendented was their search for new political space: Nizan 
quoted de Rougemont - 
"Ni ä gauche ni a droite, il n'y a rien pour nous. 
Nous nous plaýons ýi 1' origine de quelque chose 
d'autre, dopt la realite echappe encore h ceux 
qui recitent Marx"(101). 
Despite their "rhetoric", Nizan quite clearly discerned this space 
as being fascist: drawing the analogy with Germany where the 
(102) 
fascists developed "en dehors de l' opposition formelle" 
(103) 
in France, "nos nazis naiss ent ä peine dans les revues litteraires 
As for de Rougemont, he insisted that Nizan had known of 
"la 
composition et 1'esprit du 
"Cahier" (... ) le jour meme oü nous 
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convinmes de votre collaboration" 
104) 
and pointed to what he saw as 
However, Nizan persisted, 
"le desequilibre manifeste qu'il y await Bans 1' enquete 
de la NRF entre deux revolutionnaires communis tes et 
tous les autres. Plus d'un s' es t etonne de cette 
disproportion et de la confusion qu'elle n' a pas 
manque d' entrainer. (... ) I1 s'agissait moins de 
presenter un tableau veritable des revendications 
presentes que de noyer les revendications communistes 
parmi les autres ti-moignages" (105) . 
I". The central ideological problem as hinted at previously by 
Thibaudet, was to achieve the apparently impossible reconciliation 
between bourgeois institutions, their defenders, the intellectual 
elites, and the masses. Fernandez considered this problem. In 
a collective volume of essays published in 1932, Fernandez 
conjoined "La Vie intellectuelle" and 
"La Vie politique" 
106) 
Here he argued that the true place of the intellectual was within 
society, and that the myth of the ivory tower had led to the 
misunderstanding that he was somehow a superior being 
(107) 
Although the intellectual had to subordinate himself to the 
nature of his work, Fernandez repeated that 
"Tien, dans le developpement essentiel de la 
pensee, de la sensibilite contemporaines ne 
justifie une opposition radicule entre 
l' intellectuel et la masse" 
(108) 
. 
At the basis of Fernandez' argument lay the premise that 
"1' homme 
moyen" benefitted from the society created and 
defended by 
intellectuals; therefore, their professional and political roles 
were inseparable(109) . Fernandez continued 
in this line of thinking 
(110) 
Fenandez believed in an article in the NRF in March 1933 
that any conception of a politico-intellectual 
elite had to consider 
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the masses, for the new ideologies in operation in Italy, Russia 
and Germany had manipulated the masses "en utilisant (leur) f argon 
de voir et de sentir"(111) . In France, economic development had 
altered the political charge of the masses, thought Fernandez: 
"La masse n'est plus ce qu'elle etait (... ) . Elle 
exerce une pression nouvelle et surprenante sur 
les pensees Qt sur les decisions des elites" (112) . 
The fact that "il faut agir et penser comme eile afin d'obtenir 
d'elle la delegation de pouvoir"( 
113) 
meant that parliamentarianism 
was henceforward at risk: "Je fremis", admitted Fernandez, "en 
songeant 1 tant de jeunes heros qui se ruent vers les revolutions 
de droite et de gauche pour y engloutir le peu qui leur reste 
de liberte" 
(1 14) 
. Thus intellectuels like Robert Aron and Fernandez 
both talked of decadence and of the changing character of political 
elites; as Touchard has remarked, these central themes in the early 
1930's became linked: "les jeunes intellectuels des annees 1930 
pensent que les 41ites ont une mission et que les clercs ne 
peuvent pas trahir" 
(115) 
. Eager as they were to 
denounce the 
rationalism of such as Benda, Jean Paulhan made strenuous efforts 
to prevent the NRF from further providing what would have 
been an 
extremely influential platform for the "j eures 
equipes". 
During 1933, the contents pages of the NRF remained relatively 
free of controversial material, except for the continuing 
debate 
concerning Gide's "engagement" 
(116) 
; Paulhan did not dare attempt 
to exploit the acrimony surrounding the publication of 
the "Cahier 
de Revendi cations". However, the question of revitalizing 
French 
politics continued to intrigue a range of writers 
associated with 
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the NRF. Among them, Jean Schlumberger replied to a survey launched 
by yet another new group, L'Homme nouveau(1l7) . The dominant ideology 
of this periodical was what Ster4ll has called "le planisme, ou le 
(118) 
sans proldtariat" 
118) 
The survey asked whether a new, 
"planiste", social regime would generate more than just economic 
119) liberation and lead to the creation of a New Man .. Schlumberger' s 
reply was couched in suitably vague phraseology as befitted a response 
to such a vast question. However, he implied that nothing was better 
than a shock to the system in order to produce results: 
"Ces memes francais qui sont läches devant l' impöt, 
pusillanimes devant les reformes, et qui soutiennent 
au dehors une politique d'autruche, se revýleraient 
entreprenants et courageux si on les mettait en face 
de täches plus viriles"(120) 
Yet Schlumberger did not talk of revolution, but of "grandes 
reformes*(121); it was left to Fernandez, the same month, to answer 
the question "La Revolution est-elle n6cessaire? 
(122) 
. 
This review article was based upon another book by Arnaud Dandieu 
and Robert Aron, La Revolution necessaire 
(123) 
The questions raised 
by the book invited very serious reflection, said Fernandez. He 
wasted no time in stressing that the book's great merit was 
"d' avoir voulu debarrasser le concept de revolution de ses parasites 
'd la mode" 
(124) 
. For the authors, 
the revolution "es t d' abord "an- 
archique". C' es t avant tout le besoin 
de sauver la personnalite 
(125) 
humaine et de 1' affirmer devant les cadres sociaux . 
Fernandez 
went on to examine the concept of personality and 
feared that 
"cette personne libre ne soit qu'un concept et 
(qu'ils) ne 
(126) 
substituent un conceptualisme 
du concret . Not only would 
this result in no great advance or change 
from the materialist position, 
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Fernandez felt strongly that "la tragddie des revolutionnaires 
modernes est que le personnel leur fait defaut", basically 
because "1'homme d' auj ourd' hui (na pas) le moindre penchant 
pour, -la liberte" 
(127) 
. Moreover, throughout his article, 
Fernandez reminded his reader that these "new" revolutionary 
ideas were intended primarily as exercises in faith, that the 
revolution was a spiritual one; "esprit" and its correlatives 
abound in the vocabulary of this and many other movements. 
Fernandez wanted to challenge the relevance of such spiritualism, 
when he began his conclusion by stating that 
"si je consulte les hommes, et principalement ceux 
qui. n' exercent pas le metier d' ecrire et de penser, 
je decouvre en eux une totale indifference h la 
suprematie du spirituel"(128). 
He ended by repeating, significantly, that although he could hardly 
concur with the ideas it expressed, the book highlighted the pre- 
occupations in the minds of everyone. 
If the regime needed a shock to its system to alert it to dangers 
(129) 
home and abroad, the 6th February riots of 1934 provided it 
129) 
Historians trace the immediate cause to the revelation of the 
Stavisky scandal on January 8th, and the subsequent lax attitude 
of police chief Jean Chiappe to control the marauding 
leagues. 
Serge Berstein has placed these events in the broader context 
of the "crise" and how it affected primarily the traditional 
(130) 
support of the Radical Republic ; J. M. Mayeur 
has stressed 
that for the first time in the Third Republic 
"la rue (... ) permit 
(131) le denouement de (la) situation... 
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Only a month earlier than Stavisky's "suicide", Pauliian had 
inaugurated a new rubric, "L'Air du Mois"(132). This innovation 
could not have been more timely, for it introduced into the NRF 
additional flexibility and the ability to comment on current 
events; Paulhan had called it "une rubrique d'Actualite" 
(133) 
. 
Between the 8th January and the 15th (the deadline for copy), 
he decided to comment on the scandals. Under the heading 
"Stavisky", Jean Cuerin opened by saying that "Panama avait un 
pretexte, Stavisky n' en a pas. C'est le scandale pur, et qui 
semble fait pour donner raison, -ä qui? -A Karl Marx, ä Hitler 
et 'd Charles Maurras ä la fois. C'est la maigre chance de la 
134) 
R6publique" . As though to prove him right when he stated 
that "les violents jettent aujourd'hui feu et flamme pour obtenir 
(135) 
five days after the February quelques tetes de coup ables" 
number appeared, the violence and its repression broke out bringing 
down Daladier. Once more, there was just over a week to assemble 
the March number. Benjamin Cremieux wrote eight pages for the 
"Chroniques" section, and over ten pages of "l'Air du rois" 
were devoted to the crisis. Some 20 pages of a 174-page number 
were directly concerned with the riots. 
Benjamin Cremieux considered that three-quarters of the crowd 
were "manifestants innocents", and that they were manoeuvred 
by 
extremists 
(136) 
. His analysis proceeded 
to show that any alliance 
between the Radicals and the SF1O Socialists "coalise contre eile 
toutes les forces bourgeoises et petits-bourgeoises, ainsi qu'une 
(137) 
fraction importante des electeurs radicaux, surtout les paysans ; 
here Cremieux's judgement was not at. all far from that of modern 
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historians. He quite clearly saw "la transformation du 
capitalism" in France (and abroad) as being the major root cause 
of the troubles, and the choice between "les solutions etatisantes 
et autoritaires" 
(138) 
left the French bewildered. Cremieux high- 
lighted the other factors crucial to the equation; the danger of 
a fascist take-over was defused by the disunity and lack of will 
on the extreme-Right, while in the Centre and on the Left the 
Radicals, and even some Socialists refused to unite against 
fascism because of their anticommunism, or anti-Marxism(139) . 
Not forgetting the looting of the 7th, the demonstrations of the 
9th and the strikes of the 12th February, Cremieux insisted that 
any measures taken by Doumergue would be interim ones: "ce minis tyre 
d' hommes trop vieux (... ) , dune purete dis cutee, sans une idee 
commune ne peut durer... " 
(140). 
"Ordre-libert4- je-men en - fi chi sme 
reste Vide-'al du Franjais moyen", Cr6mieux believed, and this, 
combined with the economic illiteracy of successive cabinets, 
called for "un gouvernement autoritaire" 
( 141) 
, Balancing both 
extreme-Left and extreme-Right authoritarianism however, Cremieux 
felt that either would irreparably damage France; nor did he even 
hold out much hope for a "front unique": "aucun signe precurseur 
142 
d'une large union de ce genre ne se mcntre encore" . In 
his concluding paragraph Cremieux's tone did not disguise 
continuing idealism tempered with resignation, and even a feeling 
of impotence: 
"Nous savors aujourd'hui que 1'am6nagement rationnel 
du monde ne s' es t ebauche partout qu' ä travers une 
eclipse de la liberte et de l' individu (... ) . Nous 
voudrions que le revolution necessaire se fit sans un 
sacrifice total des conquetes de l'individu(... 
) 6 
Fevrier 1934: charniýre de l' his toire franýaise ou 
mauvais cauchemar? " 
( 143) 
. 
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For a great many intellectuals, the events of 6th to 12th 
February were decisive: they felt forced into adopting a political 
position and the NRF reflected these moves. In the "Air du Mois", 
Drieu rejoiced at the Concorde riots and wished that "ce moment 
durst toujourst(144) Georges Altman, a communist provided an 
eye-witness account studded with picturesque and colloquial 
language(145); his evocation of the silence in which the 
demonstrations of the 12th took place hinted at a growing unity 
among the Left. Julien Benda. 's contribution was a series of 
meditations by his alter-ego, Eleuthýre; quite clearly, he went 
to the defence of the Republic: 
"Meditation d'un chef au matin du 6 fevrier: 
Donc je lance mes jeunes gens a 1'assaut du 
regime. S'ils gagnent, qu'importe qu'on tue 
quelque mille hommes. L'ecrasement de la gueuse 
vaut hien cela. S'ils perdent et qu'on m'en tue 
seulement un, j'ameute toute la France contre 
le regime de sang. Dans les deux cas, excellente 
affaire"(146). 
Indeed Benda saw the February riots as evidence of a new "Affaire 
Dreyf us", as he told Paulhan, who, in turn, told Grenier that 
"Benda cache assez mal le plaisir que lui ont fait les massacres 
de la semaine derniere"(147). 
Finally, Fernandez made the first of several statements 
signalling the beginning of his itinerary of commitment which 
would lead him from fellow-travelling to Doriotism; 
"Pour 1`unite 
d', action" expressed, in controlled language, Fernandez' displeasure 
at the fact that "A Paris en tout cas, les gens qui ont 
de 1'argent 
(148) forment un front commun contre ceux qui n en ont pas . 
The 
implication was that the Left should unite against the moneyed-classes: 
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"Dans la poursuite de leur unite jusqu'ici chimerique, 
que les gauches songent ä cet enorme avantage des droites 
sur eux: l'unite que creent naturellement la possession 
et 1' interet" (149) . 
This provided another instance of how the timing of events had 
coincided so well with the appearance of the NRF on the first day 
of the month; for, on March 5th, the "Comite de vigilance des 
. ntellectuels oýntifaseLstes" (CVI launched its manifesto under 
the triple patronage of Alain, Paul Langevin and Paul Rivet 
(150). 
Moreover, Fernandez' claims in March led to a bitter exchange 
of correspondence with Francois Mauriac, who could never forgive 
the publication of the letters(151). On the whole the public 
positions adopted by NRF writers and stalwarts - Alain, Benda, 
Fernandez - were on the Left. Paulhan's correspondence shows 
that be believed that "il ya trop de politique dans fair"(152), 
and that he sympathized with the right-wing Jouhandeau, who told 
Martin du Gard: 
"J'ai choisi; (... ) trop profonde connaissance des 
radicaux-socialistes de ma province pour leur 
faire conffiance. L'individu au dessus de tout. 
A aucun prix le bolchevisme. Plutöt, s'il faut 
sly resigner, une tyrannie de droite(... 
)"(153), 
"La Petite Dame" even noted how Gide wrote to Groethuysen, analysing 
the split within the Left 
(154) 
,, Gide seemed to approve of 
Fernandez' 
lurch to the Left, while Martin du Gard insisted that 
"je crois 
(155) encore au liberalisme 
Meanwhile, Cremieux returned to his political analysis 
in the 
(156) 
"Chroniques" of April 1934 . All the parties, wrote 
Cremieux, 
across the political spectrum, 
"atteignent au comble de la 
(157) 
confusion" On the Left, 
he pointed to the split between 
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the SFIO and the Communists, and to the fact that any "front 
commun proletarien" would be constantly obliged to redraw its 
right flanc(158). Cremieux went on, in a very important paragraph, 
to imagine the nature of a "Front populaire", while finding 
Radicalist dominance of it impossible; 
"La journee du 12 fevrier, 1' ira. tion de la province 
contre Paris laissent apercevoir la possibilite d'un 
vaste mouvement de gauche. Et le radicalisme devrait 
theori'quement prendre la tete, s'il etait tel que le 
definit Alain. Pratiquement, helas'. il n'en va pas 
de mgme. Et on peut estimer vain d'esp6rer une 
renovation assez rapide du parti radical pour qu'il 
redevienne digne de son cestin"(159). 
Radical ministers had been implicated in the Stavisky scandal, 
Cremieux reminded his readers, and repeated that "sans une 
epuration dans le sens (... ) de la vertu, le radicalisme est 
condamne"160). After similarly berating the SFIO and the CGT, 
Cremieux identified "un certain realisne" and "les grandes 
(161) lignes dun programme (qui) se dessine . Although 
differing 
in their details, they concurred in their essential thrust: 
"Le plan Henri de Man arrive de Belgique 
(... ). 
I1 se ren con tre avec les plans 
des groupements'- 
de jeunes et de la CGT, avec les idees "neos", 
avec l'esquisse que tracait ä la Nouvelle 
Ecole 
de la Paix Jules Romains"(162). 
Any "programme minimum" would involve the establishment of a mixed 
economy, the "socialisation" of monopolies, means of 
credit and 
banking, and the setting up of economic and 
"syndicalist" bodies 
alongside the political body. Cremieux 
favoured this approach 
above a "front unique" and concluded: 
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""Programme partout", voila le meilleur, le 
seul mot d'ordre que pourrait se donner utilement 
une coalition f evrie. riste, uniquemoyen d' echapper 
a la guerre civile s'il en est temps encore"(163). 
Crermeux's heavy emphasis on the shortcomings of Radicalism were 
echoed in the same number by Thibaudet(164). The pretext for his 
article was the publication by Rieder of Alain's Propos de Politique. 
Essentially Thibaudet's argument was based upon the "Propos" of 
Alain himself, whereby "l'esprit radical se definirait volontiers 
pour Alain comme une opposition et un refus levant les activismes, 
et que le radicalisme (... ) ou l'esprit republicain, se definirait 
presque comme un passivisme"(165). After demonstrating various 
forms of action in the Third Republic, Thibaudet confessed to 
(166) 
being struck by the 'anachronism' of Alain's Radicalism. 
Faced with the dynamism of the new ideologies, Radicalism, 
"ecrase sous son passif"ý167ý, was leading France into real peril. 
Thibaudet ended on a striking image: "... nous vivons aujourd'hui 
une heure oil il faudrait un Clemenceau: cela pendant que le Vieux 
se decompose, debout, dans sa tombe vendeenne" 
( 168) 
. Such criticism 
within the NRF of Radicalism, and calls for completely new political 
affiliations no doubt reflected the mood of some of the NRF's 
readership. Others, however, baulked at expressions of commitment, 
and cancelled their subscriptions. Paulhan told the young 
Etiemble that Fernandez' latest "Chronique" had led to "quinze 
desabonnements (dont cinq comtesses)"(169). "Lettre ouverte a 
Andre Gide"(170) ended by repeating Fernandez' conviction that 
he could no longer continue to support 
"une 
. 
ethique de droite. 
Apres le 6 fevrier cet espoir n'est definitivement plus permis. 
I1 n'y a rien, rien, 1ä-bas, derriere leurs grands mots, que 
des 
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porte-monnaie qui se degonflent. Marx avait trop raison, je 
choisis le camp des porte-monnaie vides", Paulhan was 
(171) 
evidently concerned to avoid cancelled subscriptions; yet 
his attitude was one of resignation when he informed Franz Hellens 
that 
"Je revis des lettres d'abonnes - 
"quand Fernandez sera dans un camp de 
concentration... "retc. C'est un to 17npuveau, qui ne demande qu ä se developper ). 
Thus in April 1934, all of the "Chroniques" section had been 
preoccupied with the serious side of February events, yet by no 
means were the reactions unified. This was a point noticed by 
a reviewer in Commune, who wondered why Cremieux had turned a 
blind eye to a host of germinating proto - or neo - fascist 
groupings, and had not joined "notre camarade Ramon Fernandez, 
- .. 
(173) 
(... ) qui fut un des premiers a prendre parti Paulhan 
would have been gratified to read that as yet, Commune did not 
detect a completely partisan stance at the NRF; his inclusion 
of Schlumberger's "Air du Mois" the same month attested to the 
(desire 
to retain a distanced political poise 
174ý. 
Schlumberger 
himself, commenting much later on this text, claimed that it was 
intended to introduce a humorous note into the discussion 
(175). 
Schlumberger departed from Cremieux's view, for instance, by 
stating that as soon as one passed Versailles, the people 
in 
the provinces "n'ont pas cru devoir conclure que c` en 
füt fait 
de la Republique et qu'on eüt passe, le 6 fevrier, d'un ordre 
(176) du monde dans un autre 
By the beginning of May the "engagement" of intellectuals 
was proceeding apace; Paulhan told the 
distant Grenier that 
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"ici l'on se convertit de plus en plus ä quelque chose. On fait 
aussi des manifestes "(177). The Union pour la Verite assembled 
on April 28th to discuss "Liberalisme et Corrmunisme" 
(178) 
; here, 
Fernandez defended the "interpretation communisante" with special 
reference to the 9th February, and declared himself in an even 
more forthright manner than in his "Lettre ouverte": "comme je 
suis marxiste, je dis simplement que c'. est une lutte de classes"179). 
In the NRF for May, Fernandez communicated "Un Appel aux Travailleur' 
whereby antifascist intellectuals declared themselves allies with 
"tous les travailleu. 13, nos camarades (... ), contre une dictature 
fasciste. (... ) Nous sommes prLts a tout sacrifier pour empecher 
que la France ne soit soumise ä un regime d' oppression... "(l80) . 
The NRF was, once again, bending before political pressures, and 
followed Commune and Europe into the broad Left, antifascist camp: 
the list of NRF - associated luminaries who signed the CVIA manifesto 
was impressive. Among them were Alain, Benda, Fernandez, Gide, 
(Martin 
du Gard, Dabit, Daumal, Desjardins and La1ou181) . 
No doubt deliberately, Paulhan inserted in May's issue, 
directly following the "Appel", an "Air du Mois" in which Drieu 
declared that "il ya quelque chose dans le fascisme qui repond 
ä mes tendances naturelles (... ). Ce qui me plait dans le 
P ý, 
(182) 
fascisme, c'est une certaine dis osition virile Some 
would have been shocked to read that "l'aneantissement du 
monde liberal, radical et social democrate" was due to 
"1'oubli 
(183) 
Drieu preferred the prospect of total des vertus viriles" 
"la revolution anti-parlementaire" to 
"la republique staviskienne 
(... ) ou sovietique"(184). Drieu had at last 
found a political 
ideology which suited his conception of 
"LIHomme nouveau", and 
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which had once brought him so close to Malraux(185). This 
similarity did not go unnoticed by Paulhan f or, from this time, 
he used work by both M alraux and Drieu to attempt to balance the 
contents pages. In February 1935 Drieu again made a fascist 
declaration in the form of the short story "L'Homme mir et le 
jeune homme", just before Malraux's Le Temps du Mepris began 
(186) 
serialization in March that year, However, the scales were 
plainly weighted in favour of the Left; taken with the rest of 
the Lef t-leaning writers in the contents pages, Drieu's presence, 
if viewed cynically, might well be qualified as a token one. This 
is not to deny that his influence remained important. For instance, 
at the Union pour la Verite debate, Drieu refused to believe that 
Fernandez was serious when he declared himself a communist: 
"Je crois 
mot n'es 
sure, et 
est tres 
tactique 
que tu es tres 
t pas dit, que 
que ce que tu 
grave. Tu to 
communiste"(1 
hesitant, que le dernier 
tu n' es t pas une recrue 
as dit de tes reserves 
mefies profondement de-la 
87). 
Drieu was proved right, for on June 12th, Fernandez resigned from 
the AEAR(188) , and by May 
1935, expressed sympathy with the Comte, 
de Paris 
(189) 
In the NRF, by the summer of 1934 the flood of reactions to 
February had receded, except for Benda's jibes at Daniel Halevy(190) 
The change of mood was signalled by the publication by Gallimard 
of the Plan du 9 juillet, with a preface by Jules Romains: 
Crernieux's call for a "programme minimum" seemed to have 
been 
answered(191) . The Plan, countersigned 
by 19 young "fonctionnaires" 
with an extremely diverse range of political views, 
"Obtint (... ) 
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un gros succes aupres du public (... ) et de la presse. Gallimard 
tira editions sur editions de cette petite brochure de 60 pages" 
(192). 
Romains' name helped the commercial success of the Plan, but in 
the NRF, Thibaudet gave it unusually sarcastic and severe 
treatment in September(193). His objections were that it offered 
little that was not already existent or developing in other 
contemporary institutions. Moreover, he believed it was a good 
example of how Parisian 'cadres' imposed their will upon the 
provinces. He also asked' "La France rye serait-elle pas encore 
? 
(194) 
assez scholocratique. ,a reference to the 
"normalien" 
background of Romains and his associates, as well as to characters 
in Romains' " roman-f leuve", Les Hommes de 
bonne Volonte. In short, 
Thibaudet was dimissive, saying "la foire aux plans reste ouverte 
01(195) Later, Paulhan reproduced part of an article by Romains 
in the Depeche de Toulouse in defence of the Plan, as well as a 
(196) 
Both of letter from the group's secretary, Jean Thomas 
these texts pointed to inaccuracies in Thibaudet's assessment, 
but, if Thibaudet was willing to admit errors of detail, his 
(197) 
opinion of the Plan did not change In spite of the 
reception of the Plan, its fate was similar to that of the 
other ideas which attempted to define 
"Vesprit des aries 
trente" : as J-M Mayeur has said, their implementation 
"se fit 
surtout ensuite, dans les annees de Vichy 
(... ) et jusqu' ä la 
ýº (198) cinquieme Republique . 
One major political consequence of the 
February riots was 
the phenomenon known as 
"le reclassement des partis" : gradually, 
differences were settled and alliances re-cast, and, 
following the 
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intellectuals' lead, the path was cleared towards the Popular 
Front: as Mayeur has stressed, "L'union de la gauche n'a pas 
suivi immediatement le 6 fevrier"(199). Once the communists 
had settled their internal differences and Moscow had issued 
its new directive, by the end of June the Comintern called 
(200) for "L'unite d'action "ä tout prix" avec les socialistes . 
After that, things happened more quickly. On July 27th 1934, 
the Parti communiste and the SFIO signed their pact; Thorez, 
on the eve of the Radicals' conference in October, launched the 
slogan "Pour le pain, pour la liberte et pour la paix1.11(201) 
In the NRF Thibaudet noticed these changes, and Paulhan 
included an important "Reflexion" in December 1934 intended as 
a corrective sequel to Les itdees politiques de la France, 
(202) 
"Les Partis politiques en France". Thibaudet stated that 
"La Republique est entree dans une periode nouvelle de son 
histoire , 
(203) 
, and that the 
Radical party was the sole survivor 
of the original Republic. He felt it essential to take account 
of "la coexistence des anciens partis qui se declassent et des 
nouveau partis qui ne son t pas encore classes"(204) " He then 
listed a series of consequences directly attributable to 
February 6th, the two most important of which were - 
"1. Le renversement des alliances opere par le 
parti socialiste, lequel a rompu avec les radicaux 
pour s'allier aux communistes, d' oü, comme formule 
d'un bloc de gauche, la substitution de la formule 
de Front commun. (... ) 
2. La division du parti radical, dont une fraction, 
la plus petite, entend conserver le contact avec 
les socialistes, et dopt la plus considerable, 
groupee autour de M. Herriot, est destinee ä 
grossir les rangs d'un centre parlementaire 
national" 
(205). 
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Thibaudet pointed out that the unity of the Left (even if 
superficial) was nothing new: the general elections of 1924, 
1928 and 1932 brought the L&ft to power united in a cartel. 
Yet they had f ailed time and again to govern, primarily because 
the Socialists had never really wanted to participate in a 
government where they had no majority, and because the Radicals 
had been chronically out of touch with the real needs of the 
country 
(206). 
On the new moves towards unity, however, Thibaudet 
did not mention that the Communists, the new Left party holding 
the balance of power, were under orders from Moscow to unite 
at all costs against the risk of fascism in France. 
At this time another storm was brewing inside the review. 
Some, especially Jean Schlumberger, felt that the review had 
for some time been betraying its "charte de neutralite qu'on 
suppose a la base d' un programme deliberement litteraire" 
(207) 
. 
Paulhan told Jouhandeau that 
"Jean Schl. s'explique, dans le prochain numero, 
sur les exagerations., dit-il, de Gide et de Suares. 
Mais oh serait la place de toutes les exagerations, 
sinop ä la NRF? Et puls, je penseräis volontiers 
que les choses sont telles en "realite" que Von 
ne s' approche d'elles que par exageration" 
(208) 
. 
Schlumberger felt that their original pre-1914 position had been 
justified by the proximity of the Dreyfus affair, and that Riviere's 
political bias had been unavoidable in the aftermath of the war. 
He now believed that, over the last nine months, an insidious 
change had come about: 
"I1 ya glissement d'un plan oü l' auteur essaie 
(... ) d'apporter des pensees universellement 
recevables, a un plan oü l' aute r rle 
consciemment en homme de p arti 
9. 
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Schlumberger's great fear was that the NRF might drift towards 
political orthodoxy in the Marxist camp, that it would lose 
its in-built heterogeneity. That he should express himself 
in this manner showed that he was, at this time, far removed 
from Gide's position, and even Paulhan's,, who believed the 
review could exploit such political "exaggerations", 
210). 
The question of ideological orthodoxy was to return at the 
time of the 1936 elections, when Jean Grenier's important 
essay appeared 
(211) 
. 
Meanwhile Julien Benda, inspired by support for Schlumberger's 
line in Le Temps 
(212), 
wondered whether Gide would have attracted 
so many insults if he had been ""partial" dans lautre sens", 
as he put it(213). This led Benda to clarify his own position 
regarding the signing of manifestos. He had signed the CVIA 
manifesto "parce qu' il me semblait defendre des principes 
eternels. Invite par la suite ä signer pour des actes de 
politique temporelle et concrete, j'ai ref use"(214). Benda 
was repeating essentially the reasoning he had outlined in 
La Trahison des Clercs and the ensuing debate. What was 
different was that this time, he was willing to admit that 
Peguy' s conception of a "mystique de gauche" was "recevable 
pour le clerc", but not that "toutes les mystiques sort belles" 
(215) 
. 
Benda could rationalize his support for the Left as follows: 
"La mystique de gauche honore la justice et 
la verite. Elle est belle. La mystique de 
droite - du moins celle d'aujourd'hui-honore 
la 
force, subordonne la verite ä 1' interct social, 
respecte 1'injustice "fatale". Elle est laide"(216). 
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Benda' s vocabulary and terms of reference reflected a renewal 
of interest in Peguy's thought, a fact borne out by Paulhan's 
granting Pierre Hamp a regular place in the "Air du Mois" from 
this time 
(217) 
. 
Fernandez wanted to join this debate, and an article intended 
. as a 
direct reply to Schlumberger appeared the next month(218) 
Fernandez, identifying himself with the "turbulents plumitifs" 
upbraided by Schlumberger, wrote that he wanted to generalise 
the debate 
(219). 
His first point was that no-one was surprised 
to read an author's impressions of travel in a literary review, 
so why should it be of concern to read political impressions? 
So long as literary primacy was maintained, the policy to include 
such material could be defended, and, indeed, it was: 
"Quand Jean Paulhan of f irme la priorite d' importance 
de la litterature sur la politique, je pense qu'il 
reconnait du meine coup que 1'expression litteraire 
d'un conf lit politýquee participe de l' importance 
de la litterature Z. 
"Quant a moi", continued Fernandez, "j'ahomine ce mot de 
(221) 
litterature . His central premise was that. literature. and 
politics were not mutually exclusive, that the NRF was quite the 
proper place for writers to express themselves politically; he 
added, "la sottise serait d'adjoindre, au bureau de Jean Paulhan, 
une salle de vote"(222. He had been inspired to conceive of 
the problem in this manner having read Drieu's Socialisme 
fasciste. where Fernandez saw an excellent example of a writer 
fusing a poetics and a politics, in what he characterised as 
, 
(223) 
a "document de proph. etie poetico-politique 
Likewise 
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Fernandez, at this stage in his own political itinerary, would 
have agreed wholeheartedly when Drieu declared: 
"Je ne souhaite nullement, et d'ailleurs, je 
crois impossible la neutralite. Je crois 
que de l'oeuvre d'un intellectuel et meine 
d'un artiste se degage une tendance politique 
profonde... "(224) . 
Moreover, Fernandez could see a poetical element in totalitarianism: 
mass rallies, emblems and credos all bore witness to this. At home, 
a year before, Fernandez admitted it would have been easy, after 
his declaration of support for the "porte-monnaie vides", to 
build a "communisme poetique"(225): yet he discovered that "la 
(politique 
poetique n'etait pas du tout mon fait" 
226ý. 
Experience 
had shown Fernandez that most intellectuals had been more attracted 
by political ritual than by "realisations pratiques", whereas 
"J'ai le gout des trains qui partent"(227) , as he put it. Such 
was the thinking which led Fernandez (and Drieu) towards supporting 
Doriot's Parti populaire francais(228) . 
One noticeable and lasting consequence of this debate in early 
1935 was that henceforward the NRF attempted to be much more 
critical of Marxist orthodoxy in the doctrinal sense: for instance, 
one exchange was reprinted in the "Air du Mois" section between 
Julian Benda and Pierre Herbart(229). At the same time, however, 
the NRF was favourable to the increasingly likely prospect of 
a "Front populaire". In March 1935, reflecting upon the large 
demonstration signalled by the anniversary of the riots, 
Benda mused: 
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"Donc, le 10 fevrier, les communistes ont admis dans 
leers rangs ce drapeau tricolore. Its ont comp-ris 
que leur interet est de defendre la democratie 
contre le fascisme" (230) . 
A month later, Leautaud reported the impression that: 
"la NRF est en realite un milieu de communistes, 
(... ) On y est scandalise, parait-il, sur le 
compte de R. Fernandez, qui, apres avoir ete 
anarchiste,, puls communiste, aralt tourner 
maintenant au monarchiste"(2315'. 
Moreover, the Municipal Elections of 5th and 12th May, and the 
14th July demonstration of unity, were two more important episodes 
in the preparation of the Popular Front(232) . Jean Paulhan was 
elected as a pro-"Front-populaire" candidate 
(233) 
, and Paul Rivet, 
co-patron of the CVIA, was elected in the fifth "arrondissement" 
in Paris(234). Thus, despite Schlumberger's misgivings, events 
were leading the NRF into adopting a pro-Popular Front attitude. 
To celebrate the victory of Paul Rivet, Benda's leading "Air du 
Mois" in June took the form of an open letter, in which he 
recommended the founding of a new party: "1' antifascisme 
patriotique"(235). This time, the stress was laid upon 
both 
defending democratic liberties at home, but also upon actively 
opposing Hitlerism abroad. Benda's appeal was very strongly- 
worded indeed, in spite of the fact that, 
for the sake of 
balance he advised refusing the ' support of Langevin and Guehenno, 
who might prevent more universal appeal. Benda's terms of 
reference showed once again how deeply entrenched 
his Republicanism 
was, for he could distance himself 
from the current Radical party, 
at the same time upholding the old values: 
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"Vous me dites: Ce parti, ä la fois antifasciste 
et patriote, il n' es t pas a creer: c' es t le parti 
radical. Je reponds que les radicaux ont vote ces 
mesures de sürete en marchandant, en rechignant, 
comme sous la cravache de la droite. Je veux que 
vous les votiez fierement, pleinement (... ) par 
ardeur a defendre les libertes democratiques contre 
la menace de 1' etranger, comme les eussent vote un 
Danton, un Gambetta, un Clemenceau, les vrais parrains 
du parti que je propose" 
(236) 
. 
Benda, concluded: "Dressez-vous contre le fascisme hitlerien aussi 
resolument que contre les hommes du 6 fevrier. Tout la France 
. vous suivra ! 
(237) 
In the same issue, Jean Guerin, whose "Air du Mois" "Peguysme 
pas wort" described Jacques Madaule's candidacy against Chiappe, 
found that "toujours dans la grande tradition peguyste, la bataille 
morale aboutissait (... ) a une bataille citoyenne"(238). Although 
Madaule only gained 488 votes, according to Guerin the important 
thing was that"1e p eguysme (... ) triomphait puisqu 'il avait ete 
le centre moral et intellectuel de cette bataille" 
(239) 
. Uniting 
France in a "moral" crusade had become the priority, instead of 
underlining political differences which deflected from the true 
threat, fascism abroad 
(240) 
Early that summer, NRF-associated writers were, once more, 
fully in the public eye at the impressive international 
"Congres 
pour la Defense de la culture", organised and 
"sponsored" by the 
AEAR(241) . Despite the apparent unity achieved 
by this gathering, 
the circumstances leading to the suicide of Rene 
Crevel on 
June 18th showed Paulhan. 's desire to distance the NRF 
from AEAR 
intellectuals. Lottman opens his book La Rive gauche with this 
(242) 
episode. Crevel committed suicide on the eve of the 
Congress . 
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Paulhan invited Jouhandeau, a close friend of Crevel, to write 
an obituary for the July number. By the 24th June, three days 
after the official opening of the Congress, Paulhan told Jouhandeau 
. 
that Gide was very pleased with the two-page tribute to Crevel(242) 
In his text, Jouhandeau made a clear link between Crevel's suicide 
and his agonized adherence to communism(244). Coinciding as it 
did with the Writers' Congress, and Aragon having read a speech 
there by the late Crevel to great emotional effect 
(245), 
the 
appearance of the obituary was explosive. Gide heard that Aragon 
was furious: 
"(Aragon) affirme que non seulement tout ce qu'il 
insinue est faux, mais que Jouhandeau sait que 
c'est faux, il se tourne aussi contre Paulhan 
qui accueille un semblable article"(246). 
Paulhan was evidently frightened by the power wielded by 
communist intellectuals such as Aragon and Malraux; from this 
time on (until his increasing involvement with the Spanish 
Civil War), Malraux was beginning to exercise his own influence 
at the NRF, including the support he gave Gide in preparing his 
Russian visit 
(247). 
The campaign for the Popular Front was interrupted in 
October 1935 by the news that Italy had invaded Ethiopia; this 
event provided a further opportunity for intellectuals to align 
(248) 
themselves either for or against the fascist cause . The 
"Manifeste des intellectuels franýais pour la defense de 
1' occident" appeared in Le Temps on October 
4th; Jules Romains 
led a left-inclined group which replied to Massis and the 
Academicians (in 1' Oeuvre, 5th October), and this in turn 
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was followed by a corrective manifesto drawn up by left-centre 
(249) Catholics, including Jacques Maritain (in 1' Aube, 18th October 
Although the NRF did not, this time, reprint the Left's text, nor 
list its signatories, Europe did; in addition to Romains', the 
names of Gide, Malraux, Chamson, Prevost, Schlumberger, Cremieux 
and Berl appeared alongside the usual Europe and communist roll- 
call 
(250) 
. Paulhan, writing to Adrienne Monnier, felt "navre 
que le manifeste Romains soit si faux : il n'y avait pas un mot, 
(251) 
dans le manifeste Massis, sur 1'inegalite de race . The 
one absentee from any of these declarations was Fernandez, whose 
"Remarques sur le conflit Italo-Ethöpien" appeared in November's 
(252) 
number . Here Fernandez assessed the intellectuals' responses 
to the events in Africa: he wrote, scathingly, that "1A politique 
est mal faite pour etre pensee autrement que de faýon toute 
pratique. Des que nous la mettons en idees, nous sommes atteints 
(253) In Fernandez' opinion the manifestos of d aphasie... 
both Right and Left demonstrated the "aphasia" of the intellectuals 
who had signed. He was scandalised at how lamentable the quality 
of opinion was on this affair, and accused opinion-makers of only 
having a monocular view: "Cette guerre(... ) n'a suscite chez 
, (254) Although 
nous que des reflexes de politique Interieure. . 
more vituperative than Thibaudet, Fernandez was making 
the same 
observation about " cette carence d'une opinion politique": 
in the manifestos he had referred to, 
"vous y trouverez des 
idees beaucoup moins claires et beaucoup moins valables que 
(255) 
celles que vous recueillerez au cabaret 
du coin" Since 
"les bases concretes d'une pensee politique font 
defaut", 
concluded Fernandez, 
"retrouver ces bases, en deduire. une pensee, 
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est une de nos täches les plus, urgentes . Nos intellectuels 
feraient bien de s'y employer, au lieu de gaspiller leur 
signature"(256) . Given Paulhan's distate for signing 
manifestos, he no doubt fully approved of Fernandez' stance 
on this occasion. 
Early in the New Year, the political atmosphere was as 
volatile as ever: Paulhan told Jouhandeau of an explosion in 
the offices of the NRF, one explanation of which was that a 
bomb had been laid by the "Croix de Feu" 
(257) 
. Y Moreover, on 
February 13th, 1936, Leon Blum was seriously injured in an attack 
by sympathisers of L'Action francaise and the "ligues" 
(258) 
. 
At this very time, and evidently influenced by such events, 
Paulhan was finalising arrangements with Jean Grenier to publish 
his controversial text "L'Age des Orthodoxies"ý259ý. Already 
Paulhan had made it clear that he felt Gallimard and Malraux 
wanted to politicize the NRF still further: he admitted: "Je 
me sens asset seul, dans cette maison" 
(260) 
. The correspondence 
between Paulhan and Grenier shows how concerned Grenier was to 
have the text appear as soon as possible: "il vaut mieux le faire 
paraitre le ter mars ou 1er avril au plus tard. Tu sais mieux 
que moi combien l' actualite peut varier" 
(261) 
. Paulhan acknowledged 
receipt of Grenier's proofs on February 15th confirming, very 
importantly, that "Je compte donner "l'Age des 0" en t&te de la 
NRF du 1 er avril. I1 ne sera pas trop tard, et Blum, aux dernieres 
(262) 
nouvelles, n' es t pas tout a fait mors" He wrote to 
Grenier 
again to quell his annoyance at the delay: Paulhan repeated that 
"pour une foule de raisons, il est en avril mieux 
ä sa place. Et 
- 149 - 
tu ne vas as me faire croire 
(263)" 
p que tu ecris pour 1'actualite 
Yet given the comments in their correspondence and the proximity 
of the first round of the forthcoming general election, the timing 
of Grenier's article was plainly important. Moreover, Paulhan 
was scandalized, despite the 2,000 extra subscriptions it brought, 
at the ousting of Guehenno from Europe 
(264) 
; the review was about 
. to be taken over by a committee of fellow-travellers and Marxists 
(265) 
Likewise, the recent creation of the Pro-Popular Front weekly 
Vendredi grouped several NRF-associated writers such as Gide, 
Schlumberger and Benda: as Lottman has said, Paulhan willingly 
assisted the editors of Vendredi in passing material to them 
which might be out of place in the NRF(266) . 
"L'Age des 
Orthodoxies" also provided the opportunity of distancing the 
NRF from Vendredi, as well as preventing it from succumbing to 
the same dangers of orthodoxy which beset Europe. 
Grenier's article opened: 
"C'est un trait frappant des dix dernieres annees 
que le brusque passage d'un doute absolu 
a une foi 
totale et parall-element du desespoir sans limites 
a un espoir sans limites egalement" -- 
(267). 
In much the same way as Arland and Cremieux 
had done, Grenier 
retraced the steps of the current literary generation 
from the 
First World War 
(268) 
," 
like Schlumberger too, Grenier noted that 
"ce qui est urgent n' est plus de se 
faire une foi, c' es t 
(269) By rallying to communism, intellectuals adhere ra un ap rti 
had of necessity adopted Marxist doctrine which, 
in Grenier's 
view, "n' est pas seulement une theorie 
economique, c' es t meme 
o&(2 70) 
une theologie Grenier's 
basic critique was that to 
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subordinate the intelligence to materialism, dialectical or 
not, was to betray intelligence; moreover, the fundamental 
impulsion behind the application of Marxist doctrine was 
"l'abaissement intellectual (... ) sous pretexte de repondre 
une nouvelle culture. .. 
"(271) 
. Grenier proceeded to illustrate 
his thinking by referring to a collection of Marxist essays 
covering many diverse fields from biology to astronomy 
(272) 
Grenier found that Marxism as a system was illogical: 
"C'est que le marxisme, a la suite de l'hegelianisme, 
s'appuie sur un systeme du Devenir qui justifie aussi 
bien la these que l' antithese en les conciliant dans 
une "synthese" superieure. 
Mais cet illogisme qui est erige en methode 
supreme pour juger de tout Pst compense par un 
optimisme outrancier... it 
(273) 
Still more outrageous was the f act that, for Grenier, this 
"messianisme" justified and excused the death of millions on 
the way to an earthly paradise(274) . Similarly, the 
"Congres 
pour la Defense de la Culture" had provided an illustration 
of how "deviation" from the Marxist line was frowned upon, that 
only those writers who "toed the line" would be tolerated. As 
though to compensate for this forthright assault upon Marxism, 
Grenier briefly treated Thomism as the Church's latest fashionable 
orthodoxy(275) . Grenier began his concluding remarks 
by noting 
that others had perceived this tendency to subscribe to 
orthodoxies; nothing could be more understandable "dans le 
q(276) monde de ruines et de mort ue nous habitons Yet the 
perils inherent in blind allegiance to a faith were as clear as 
ever: "qu' es t-ce qui cause la ruine d'une croyance sinon ses 
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annexes scientifi ues et temporelles? ", 
(277 
Q concluded Grenier , 
for once echoing Benda. 
The central point in Grenier's article was that there was 
a real danger in espousing communism, when its faith, Marxism, 
could justify anything in the name of progress. Coming at the 
time of the Popular Front, when not only intellectuals but 
political leaders and parties were rallying together with the 
Communists, this article was bound to be controversial. Paulhan's 
letters to Grenier reflect this: on 18th April, Paulhan wrote 
that even Le Journal des Debats: had quoted it, and, significantly, 
Malraux especially was "indigne" de la legerete (... ) avec laquelle 
ýý(278) tu executes s znon Marx, le Marxistne In May, reactions were 
still being voiced; "Lefebvre. m'a paru plus attriste que furieux. 
. Malraux m' a demande si la NRF prenait la responsabilite de... (279) 
Paulhan enclosed a cutting from Commune in which Grenier was 
attacked as a "pourfendeur du marxisme" 
(280) 
. In a letter of 
May 13th, Grenier learnt that "quelques abonnes (qui se desabonnent) 
citent ("l'Age des Orthodoxies") sans sympathie. C'est 
bizarre", 
added,. Paulhan ingenuously, "il ya des tas de gens que cja a 
exasperes"ý281ý . Grenier's article also caused a stir, 
in 
particular, with Etiemble, who sent Paulhan his own critique 
of Grenier(282) . However, 
by far the most impressive published 
rejoinder to Grenier came some weeks later in Europe, which 
had 
(283) 
moved substantially leftwards Friedmann 
had noted the 
position of "L'Age des Orthodoxies" in the 
NRF, and called it 
a "Manifesto". He set about demolishing 
Grenier's critique: 
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"Il n'est presque pas une ligne des quatre 
pages par lesquelles M. Grenier pense 
condamner l'eff ort des savants et philosophes 
marxistes, qui ne porte a faux et ne revele 
une connaissance tres superficielle des 
recherches qu'il pretend dominer... 11(284). 
In turn, Grenier based part of a further article upon Friedmann 
later that year 
(285) 
: evidently Paulhan and Grenier between them 
had managed to offend many "orthodox" sensibilities. 
Much of this debate went on against the background of the 
electoral victory of the Popular Front: after the second round 
gave the Left their victory on May 3rd., Leon Blum formed his 
(first 
cabinet on June 4th286ý. In the political "reclassement" 
which followed, many intellectuals re-aligned their own positions: 
Andre Gide, for instance, an old friend of Blum, lent the new 
President du Conseil much support(287). What is'more, the NRF 
itself was beginning to lose its Radicalist aspect: Thibaudet 
died in early 1936, Alain submitted his last "Propos" in 
November (although Paulhan still accepted his work), and, if 
Julian Benda still admired "les valeurs clericales", he 
increasingly came to feel that the Communists were the only 
party to uphold them. 
The only direct mention of the elections was made in 
"L'Air 
du Mois" in June(288) . Here Fernandez took a 
distanced view and, 
instead of commenting on the victory of the Left, preferred to 
analyse why the Right had failed. He believed that the 
Left had 
won because they had managed to link their own cause with a 
(289) 
Such 
truly national defence of sentiments and interests 
an attitude coincided well with 
Paulhan's attempt to keep his 
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review free from partisanship; yet evidence exists to show 
that Paulhan himself and others supported the cause of the 
Popular Front. Benjamin Cremieux defended the workers who 
proceeded to strike during June: he believed they had no other 
means of redress 
(290) 
. Paulhan defended the efforts of the 
Popular Front on behalf of deprived groups of workers against 
Jouhandeau's outright hostility, which was not free from anti- 
Semitism(291) . If Paulhan was worried, it was by "1'hypocrisie 
des comrnunistes, la faiblesse possible des socialistes, le role 
evident de 1'argent etranger... "(292)" these misgivings were, 
indeed, at the root of the troubles besetting the Popular Front, 
after what Lacouture has called "le bref ete du socialisme"(293). 
In another episode which is, fortunately, documented in 
Paulhan's correspondence, the NRF proved to have re-aligned, in 
the view of some, as a pro-Popular Front periodical. Alfred Fabre-Luce, 
himself for some time close to the NRF, wrote to Jean Grenier asking 
him to collaborate with his new weekly L'Assaut, offering him the 
attractive fee of 1,000 frs. per month for a literary column. 
Grenier asked Paulhan for his advice: 
"Le numero (specimen) qu'il m'envoie contient un 
article de Brasillach, bon en soi, mais mauvais 
pour 1'equipe de Vendredi. 
Extrait de la lettre de F. L.: "Peut-etre etes vous 
plus a gauche que nous le paraissons actuellement 
puisque- des evenemen is nous situent en opposition 
avec le Front populaire, alors que la NRF est 
actuellement sympathisante... 
" Mais ii dit aussi 
opposition avec conservatisme et que j'ecrirai en 
toute liberte, qu'il ya distinction entre pa es 
politiques et pages intellectuelles, etc. 
"L(Z9`*) 
.L 
iss') 
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This appropriately-named weekly was obviously mobilized against 
the Popular Front and its intellectual support: Paulhan telegraphed 
on October 20th: "Journal suspect conseille refus - Jean" 
(295) 
. 
A letter followed in which Grenier learnt that L'Assaut "est, ou 
(296) va devenir, doriotiste. (ii ya un accord F. L. - Doriot) . 
Grenier, in turn, confirmed he had refused on the grounds that, 
although he had liked Pamphlet, he could not write for a "journal 
de combat" as it had a clear political orientation(297) . But in 
the end, Grenier did contribute and Paulhan shrewdly assessed 
the motives behind Fabre-Luce's offer: 
"Ce qui me gene un peu, c'est le parti qu'il 
veut evidemmen t tirer de to presence; et c'est 
surtout ce parti qu'il to paie. (Mais peutetre 
en effet n'as-tu pas ä t'en soucier)"(298). 
Grenier said that he would write an article on Jean Blanzat's 
Septembre, stressing Blan zat's role in Europe, " revue dont les 
revendications nous paraissent souvent animees du plus pur 
esprit de justice... "(299). Indeed, in L'Assaut dated 17th 
November, Grenier's article appeared, including the passage 
he had described to Paulhan: he added - 
"Un ecrivain a le devoir de ne pas cacher ses 
preferences politiques, ses idees sociales 
ou religieuses; et il doit aussi conserver 
le droit de s'affirmer comme ecrivain dans le 
domaine oü il lui plait"(300). 
Paulhan was distressed by Grenier's presence in L'Assaut and 
told him so: but Grenier wrote two more articles before 
withdrawing 
(301) 
. 
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From October 1935, the initial successes of the Popular 
Front slowed down to what Lefranc has called "la pause implicite"302). 
Gide was on the point of publishing his Retour de 1'URSS ,a text 
which would deeply upset the Communists: yet he was still 
attempting to support Blum's efforts to hold together the Popular 
Front 
(303). 
By mid-November, Gide was worried that the Government 
was under attack from all sides, and lunched with Blum on at least 
two occasions 
(304) 
in order to underline his support. As for 
Paulhan, the news of the suicide of Blum's minister Roger Salengro 
caused him to share with Suares his feeling that "la plus grave, 
ou la plus tragique des difficultes actuelles me semble tenir 
ä la haine que se porte(t les Francais"(305). At around the same 
time he told Etiemble that "simplement je crois que Blum (... ) 
se montre aujourd'hui lamentablement faible, et sera ecrase, 
s'il ne fest par les communistes, par les puissances d'argent 
(306) 
It was from this time onwards, when Paulhan realised that 
the Popular Front and its in-built weaknesses was not much 
different from the succession of cabinets which had preceeded it, 
that he became increasingly open to Maurrassian ideas. This is 
borne out by the fact that he was constantly pressing Jean Grenier 
to write an appreciation of Charles Maurras; an article 
finally 
appeared in February 1938(307)" Yet Paulhan joined others 
in 
sending a modest sum to Vendredi when the weekly appealed 
for 
financial support in April 1937: evidently Paulhan believed 
that it was worth continuing to assist Vendredi so 
long as it 
(308) 
deflected controversial material from appearing in the NRF . 
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Indeed the review printed very little controversial material 
in 1937. Armand Petitjean was a new, young writer who, deeply 
influenced by Peguy, had an emotional article printed in the 
January number 1937(309) . The optimism of this derived from 
the fact that it was dated July 1936: in it, Petitjean called 
for a mobilization of youthful talent in France- the tasks 
were urgent. Petitjean concluded thus: 
"Puissent mes camarades savoir distribuer les 
roles entre les disponsibles et les revolutionnaires, 
entre l'esprit de rev endication et celui de sacrifice, 
entre la preparation materielle,, materialiste au 
besoin, de la Revolution, et le caractere necessairement 
ethique (... ) qu'elle prendra des qu'elle aura "accroche 
l' evenement" et ue les hommes se sentiront presses 
par 1'Histoire! "(u10). 
As though responding to the spirit of Petitjean's call, 
Paulhan published Jean Prevost's novel La Chasse du matin in 
six parts, beginning in March 1937(311). Here Prevost's characters, 
robust, intelligent and virile, after qualifying in a range of 
professions, try their hand at different jobs with little success. 
In Part 3, however, they are involved in the setting-up of a 
daily newspaper with the financial backing and political out- 
spokenness of a dynamic businessman, Crouzon, whom the narrator 
likens to Marcel Deat. The action takes place between the summer 
of 1932 and the aftermath of February 1934, and describes the 
preparation and publication of La France nouvelle, in the 
atmosphere of political lethargy in October 1933. The narrator 
writes: 
"La Chambre de 1933 
gouvernements (.. . 
rajeunissement des 
pour un ministere( 
articles fort vifs 
gouvernement" 
(312 ) 
s'amusait a renverser les 
ceux qui prechaient 
cadres parlaient de Crouzon 
... 
) Crouzon ecrivit quelques 
contre ces changements de 
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Such editorials turn out to provide the key to the newspaper's 
success, which was open to intellectuals such as Guitton, who 
had earlier told the central protagonist, the architect Dannery, 
that he had had an article accepted by the NRF, but "je ne 
pourrai rien faire paraitre lä pendant un an, 
(313). 
Dannery, 
obviously impressed, asks - 
Mais de paraitre lä, %a t'ouvrira des portes? 
- ýa m' en fermera d'autres. Toutes les chapelles 
servent des Dieux j aloux" (314) 
At the end of the novel, Guitton appears to be lukewarm in his 
optimism for the future. The final chapter, symbolically titled 
"Commencement", finds the characters enjoying the summer of 1936: 
Guitton feels that a phase of creation must follow that of 
(315) 
action 
The cautious optimism of such texts contrasted sharply with 
the reality of June 1937, when Blum's government fell, due to 
Radical opposition. Chautemps' new cabinet signalled what 
Lef ranc has called "Dix-huit mois d'agonie" for the Popular 
Front 
(316). 
By November that year, Gide was thoroughly disillusioned 
with Vendredi and the Popular Front, reflected by the 
fact that 
he switched allegiance to Gaston Bergery's La Fleche(317). 
Meanwhile, all that year, Paulhan had continued to press Grenier 
for his text on Maurras 
(318) 
. On November 
14th Grenier told 
his editor he had been very impressed with the re-publication 
(319) 
of Maurras' Mes Idees politiques This coincided with 
the 
Manifesto released by the Comte de Paris in Geneva on November 
11th, 
- 158 - 
and which was followed by a letter to L'Action franZaise on 
December 3rd: Paulhan wrote to Grenier: 
"Tu m'envoies bien ton'Maurras, nest-ce pas? 
J'en suis tres presse (cela le reconf ortera 
dans les difficultes presentes). La lettre du 
Comte de Paris n'est d'ailleurs pas sotte du 
tout" ( 320) . 
Paulhan was aware that both the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Guise, 
by severing their links with L'Action franQaise, might discredit 
Maurras; the Duc de Guise had written: 
"Si sa (i. e. de Maurras) doctrine politique postule 
le regime monarchique, les enseignements de son 
ecole, par contre, se sont reveles incompatibles 
avec les traditions de la Monarchie f raniaise" (321). 
Yet, as Weber has shown, the "excommunication of 1937 hurt . the 
Pretender more than L'Action 
francais. 
'e, which received much rallying 
. Grenier's article support from the rest of the Royalist press 
022) 
finally appeared in February 1938 amid much protest at the NRF; 
the text, surprisingly sympathetic, was intended to acknowledge 
(323) 
Maurras' influence over the last 40 years . Grenier deliberately 
concentrated upon Maurras' achievement, and played down his anti- 
government, anti-Semitic , polemical output: 
"Sa doctrine pour lui et les siens demeure 
intacte: eile tend seulement, a force de 
perdre ses points d'application, ä 
ýevenir 
une oeuvre d'art" . 
Leautaud in particular praised Paulhan for printing Grenier's 
article, in spite of all the "jeunes (... 
) tous "Front Populaire" 
en diable", and Benda, who had opposed it 
(325) 
. Leautaud thought 
that "Paulhan (... ) tient ferme pour conserver a la NRF une 
sorte de liberalisme et d' equite. Mais ce pauvre 
Benda'. I1 tourne 
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de plus en plus au partisan, a l'energumene politique. Il 
est vraiment degringole de sa colonne" 
(326) 
. 
Events began to move more quickly at home and abroad; the 
utter impotence of the French government was glaringly illustrated 
by the Anschluss, when Hitler moved into Austria the day after 
Chautemps' resignation on March 10th(327) . Two days before 
this, Paulhan sent out a circular letter to a number of NRF 
contributors, asking them for their evaluation of the failure 
of the "Front populaire" 
(328) 
. The replies were intended for 
the April number, but due to the government's fall, Paulhan 
put the project into abeyance(329) . From the wording of his 
circular, Paulhan was evidently very embittered by the 
"experiment" of the "Front populaire". If there had been 
changes, they were for the worse: the cost of living had increased; 
productivity had fallen and workers were demo'rolized; and abroad, 
the dictatorships were consolidating their position 
330). 
Moreover, 
continued Paulhan, 
"Quand Leon Blum veut former un ministere, il parle 
a present d' Union nationale. Et du minis tere 
Chautemps, Von peut tout dire, sauf qu'il es t 
de Front populaire (... ) I1 faut avouer que 
(... ) le Front o ulaire vient d'aboutir ä un 
fiasco complet" 33 
It seems that Grenier was able to read the replies to the "survey": 
he thought it had been an excellent idea, but that "les reponses 
(332) 
sont souvent decevantes par leur frivolite ou leur vague . 
The only reply to be printed in the review was de Rougemont's 
(333) 
in July Here, de Rougemont "psychoanalysed" the "Front 
populaire": the revolution of 1936 had suffered a 
""refoulement" 
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d'oü p rocedent les actes man ues" 
334) 
He q preferred to oppose 
"un pessimisme actif a tant d' esperances bernees" 
(335) 
It was by now obvious that the "Front populaire" was in 
full decline and that it was only a matter of time before it 
disintegrated for good(336) . Blum's second cabinet fell on 
April 10th, after 26 agonizing days in office. The NRF for that 
month, however, preferred to follow the clarion-call for National 
Unity: Armand Petitjean's patriotic appeal declared: "Et 
maintenant, apprenons a regarder en face la realite de 1938"(337) 
In effect, Petitjean called for military preparedness: he concluded c r1 
a manner which prefigured the anti-Munich stance of the NRF later 
that year: 
"Nous voulons 1'Union, et l'Union totale; et nous 
demandons aux communistes de declarer que leur 
premiere pätrie est la France, dont je ne doute 
pas un instant qu'ils seront les premiers et 
meilleurs soldats (... )(338). 
Nous voulons des canons pour la France, des 
avions pour la France, et un gouvernement 
national. 
Nous voulons la dictature de la France sur les 
Franýais" (339) . 
Evidently, at least for Paulhan and the NRF, the Popular Front 
could no longer be relied upon to unify France, so internally 
scarred since 1934. On April 10th, Daladier formed a new cabinet 
which, as Lefranc puts it, "'nest plus un Gouvernement de Front 
populaire" 
(340) 
. Paulhan, in 
his "Bulletin" for May 1st, 
achieved great ironical effect when commenting on the cluster 
of Manifestos calling for National Unity: desperation and panic 
seemed to have taken over: - 
- 161 - 
"Paris. Ont signe le manifeste Aragon (pour l'Union 
nationale) : Marcel Arland, Julien Benda (... ) 
Paris: Ont signe le manifeste Alain (contre 
l' union sacree) : Andre Breton, Paul Eluard, 
Jean Giono (... ) 
Paris: Ont signe lemanifeste Henri Bordeaux (pour 
la "veritable Union nationale") : Abel Bonnard, 
Drieu la Rochelle, Ramon Fernandez, Thierry Maulnier(... ) 
Paris: Bergson, Claudel, Gide et Valery n'ont j usqu' ä 
present signe aucun manifeste... "(341) . 
By May 13th, Vendredi proclaimed: "Le Front Populaire est 
pratiquement dissocie (... ) ; on ne defend plus ce qui n'existe 
plus" 
(342) 
. Guehenno declared too that he and his colleagues 
would and could no longer uphold the political purpose of the 
weekly and that they were reverting to more literary concerns, 
11 en conjugant leurs efforts avec ceux des equipes de la NRF"t343) 
Evidence of this intention to join the NRF is provided by 
the fact that Paulhan accepted and serialized Chamson's long 
novel La Gal-ere: apart from Proust's Le Temps 
ý'etrouve, this 
(344) 
was the longest work Paulhan ever serialized . Subsequently 
Chamson himself has not regarded the book very highly, calling 
it 11 une chronique romancee de notre epoque. C' es t aussi un essai 
de demonstration de 1` absurdite"(345) . Summed up very briefly, 
La Galere evokes the meeting of two former history students, 
Jean Rabaud and Louis Boulan, on the eve of the February riots 
in 1934. The two main parts of the novel relate the events of 
the 6th February and its aftermath, and how it separates the 
two families so recently brought together. An important "Epilogue", 
set in November 1934, shows the. 'newly-"engage" Rabaud haranguing 
Claire Boulan: 
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"Au 6f evrier, (... ) chacun a ete pris par son 
camp. J'ai ete pris par le mien, vous avez ete pris par le vötre. Voyez-vous, Claire, 
1' homme ne fait quelgiiee) chose qu'en luttant 
contre, l' homme ... 
". 34 
This epilogue is responsible for the "longueurs", and the "critique 
extra-litteraire" which spoilt the book for its critics(347) . 
Moreover, it appears that adding the "Epilogue" was an after- 
thought, for Chamson told Paulhan on September 8th that 
"I1 me tarde de vous parler de la fin de La Galere. 
J'ai l' ambition - peut-etre demesuree - d'avoir 
encore dix a douze pages dans la numero de de cemb re . Est-ce possible? Je voudrais en effet pouvoL, 
donner un morceau de 1'epilogue"(348). 
Apart from the epilogue, the critics agreed that Chamson's 
narrative technique, "simultaneist" in nature, helped to provide 
multiple viewpoints and objectivity 
(349) 
. Lalou, however, raised 
the very important point as to how such a book, "ni tout ä fait 
historique ni entierement fictive" 
(350) 
, would be received by 
contemporary readers, and the same question applies to those 
reading it in review-form from June to December 1938 
(351) 
. 
One thing is certain however: La Galere outlived the "Front 
populaire", and the reader of December 1938 could reflect upon 
the irony that Chamson's fictional alter-ego Rabaud, in November 
1934, had declaimed: 
"Je ne sais pas ce que l'avenir nous reserve. La 
bataille n'est pas achevee. Nous aurons peut- 
etre ä traverser des evenements plus durs que ceux 
que nous avons dejä vecus. Je ne deserterai pas 
mon combat. Je donnerai de moi-meme tout ce qu'il 
faudra donner. Mais je suis stir de rester ce que 
je suis"(352). 
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The NRF in 1938 was a different review from the one it had 
been in 1934, or in 1932. At this time it had been consistently 
reflective of the "grande nebuleuse radicalisante" 
(353) 
, idealistic, 
yet politically passive; it steered a middle course whilst upholding 
the Republican values so revered by its "chroniqueurs". After the 
trauma of February 1934, Paulhan did not fully allow it to follow 
the commitment its personnel were seeking, but he did permit it 
to move with the Radicalist "reclassement" towards the Centre, a 
drift which was characteristic of the period. Yet, while many 
contributors, including Paulhan himself for a time, militated on 
behalf of the Popular Front, the review not only recoiled from, 
but actively criticised Marxist "orthodoxy", and this at the 
very time of the victory of the Popular Front. Once this 
"political experiment" was in full decline, in a bid to re-align 
in the atmosphere of National Unity, the NRF even gave the Republic's 
worst enemy at home sympathetic treatment. By late 1938, the NRF 
had adopted the grim, new mood of political realism, and then 
backed the anti-Munich camp 
(354) 
. For Paulhan, the greatest 
danger of all for his review was partiality: it was a question 
of optics. In March 1936, he wrote: 
"La NRF (... ) depuis qu' elle existe, a regulierement 
paru reactionnaire aux homes de gauche, mais 
revolutionnaire aux hommes de droite. Elle a 
constamment ete suspecte aux royalistes, mais 
aussi aux communistes... "(355). 
And he added: 'L'oo n'est jamais tout a fait sür d' etre 
(356) 
impartial" 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"The NRF and attitudes to Franco-German relations, 1925 to 
1935". 
"L'on va recommencer ä nous appeler: 
Revue Pro-allemande" (Jean Paulhan 
BD. 25066, November 1927). 
la Nouvelle 
to Jean Schlumberger, 
"En ce moment (... ) un article sur les relations 
franco-allemandes et sur la revision des traites 
(... ) va avoir en Allemagne un retentissement 
considerable, venant de la NRF" (Roger Martin du Gard 
to Jean Paulhan, AP, 7/11/30). 
"I1 n'est pas douteux que la NRF tienne_ une place de 
premiere importance parmi les publications qui ont 
presente l'Allemagne au public franjais (... ) . Nous 
voyons se dessiner une nouvelle image de l'Allemagne" 
(Georges Pistorius, "L'Image de l'Allemagne dans 
la NRF de 1909-1943", in Connaissance de 1'Etranger, 
Melanges offerts ä la memoire de J-Marie Carre, 
Librairie Marcel Didier, 1964, p. 397). 
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It would be difficult to overstate the importance of 
Franco-German relations in the history of the Inter-War period. 
Of all the issues, historical, political or cultural, which 
confronted French intellectuals at that time, the German 
question was central. Not only did it play a determining 
part per se in the history of the period, it also underpinned 
other related issues such as pacifism, First World War 
historiography, relations with the Soviet Union and Antifascism. 
It is now fully recognised that the imposition of the Versailles 
Treaty, in particular its nature as a Diktat, planted the 
seeds of Hitler'"s success which led directly to the Second 
World War(') . Indeed the Treaty turned out to 
be Hitler's 
greater propaganda weapon 
(2). 
what is more, it has been clearly 
demonstrated that Hitler exploited both French incompetence 
and lack of understanding in foreign policy, as well as 
(3) 
intellectual-led pacifism, of such importance from 1932 
Henri Michel, writing in 1980, points to pacifism as a key- 
factor in how French confidence and competence were undermined 
from within: 
"Ce qui existait en France entre 1932 et 1936, 
c' etait un profond pacifisme, qui animait 
tout le peuple franjais, sur ce point unanime, 
et qui, par horreur de la guerre, pour en 
eviter le retour, poussait les milieux les 
plus divers ä souhaiter une entente avec 
l'Allemagne; meme devenue hitlerienne, eile 
etait, apres tout, 1' llemagne, l' ennemie de 
hier qui de devait pas redevenir l'ennemie de 
demain. Le paradoxe de cette periode est que, 
au-dehors, et parfois au-dedans, la France est 
presentee comme une puissance militariste et 
imperialiste, alors que toute la nation est 
inspiree par un pacifisme profonde, proche parfois 
du defaitisme"(4) 
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Moreover, and equally important, Michel indicates that 
"les erreurs de jugement sur la nature du nazisme 
et sur les objectifs de Hitler ne sont pas 
seulement le fait de Leon Blum et des socialistes, 
mais de l' ensemble des Franc ais. Its se trouveAt 
tout d'un coup devant un phenomene politique qui 
ne repond ä aucune des normes dont ils ont 
1'habitude" (5). 
Intellectuals too displayed the same tendency to misinterpret 
or prognosticate wrongly: even those writers and academics 
who were more perspicacious than others tended to prolong or 
invent mythical or sterotyped images of Germany thus ignoring 
the true peril of Hitler. In his examination of the cultural 
"ambiance" of the period, J-B Duroselle has written: 
"L'Allemagne vient en tete des preoccupations 
f ranýaises . On la connait tres mal, parce qu'on 
y voyage peu, parce que peu d'Allemands viennent 
en France; outre les sentiments, le controle des 
echanges, etabli en 1932, leur interdit pratiquement 
tout voyage exterieur. Au surplus, 1'Allemagne est 
1' objet de passions mal eteintes et de stereotypes 
f ondes sur la haine... " 
(6) 
The NRF itself, even from its inception in 1909, had always 
shown preoccupation with Germany. Indeed, with regard specifically 
to the review, no other non-literary issue has attracted more study 
than the way it approached this problem(7) . Writing in 
1960, 
Jean Schlumberger, Paulhan's unofficial "editorial advisor" 
from 1925 to 1927, wrote that "Les rares f ois oü nous avions, 
Jacques Riviere ou moi, cru devoir introduire dans La Nouvelle 
Revue Franaý ise des reflexions sur la politique, c' etait 
$ 
tout ours ä propos des relations franco-allemandes . 
In the "first" review it was Gide who elaborated the 
line of 
thinking which so clearly distinguished the 
NRF from other 
- 167 - 
reviews of the period. Lionel Richard has stressed the 
importance of this: 
"On constate que les premieres annees d'existence 
de la revue sont marquees, en realite, par une 
polemique perseverante contre les tendances 
s trictement "nationalis tes" en litterature. La 
culture franiaise est raise en avant, mais 
parce qu' il es t impossible de concevoir un 
art qui soft a la fois universel et denationalise, 
et non pour rejeter toute influence etrangere. 
Pour Gide, en effet, l'enracinement dans une 
culture nationale est precisement le moyen de 
parvenir ä l' universalite" (9). 
Richard goes on to point out that "la preoccupation essentielle 
de la NRF, 1' hos tilite qui se developpait alors dans les milieux 
intellectuels envers les litteratures etrangeres, parait avoir 
ete en effet de concilier la tradition nationale avec l'heritage 
litt6raire universel"(10) .. These efforts to combat the problem 
of the "nationalization" of culture were at once what distinguished 
the NRF from the Nationalists, opened it to German literature 
and culture, and laid the foundations for subsequent constant 
attacks from Maurras and his satellites. Yet for all this, 
Richard concludes that in the NRF to 1914, " le regard de 
1'observateur estrarement neutre: 1'aune est surtout franSaise. 
A travers la culture allemande, c'est generalement ä la France 
qu'on pense, ä eile qu'on revient" 
(11) 
. This was enough, 
however, for Germans such as Ernst Robert Curtius to notice 
the NRF at this time and to later join Gide in building up 
(12) 
Franco-German reconciliation 
Durosay too, has detected consistency if not continuity 
in Riviere's approach to the problem: 
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'Von peut dire que Riviere reste fidele ä 
l' esprit de la premiere NRF: nationale et 
politique, malgre eile, la NRF ne peut 
s' empgcher de l' etre par une certaine 
conception de la f rancite qu'elle annonce 
dans son titre, mais la symetrie subtile, 
menagee dans le titre meine, entre la novation 
et l'heritage empechait que son nationalisme 
liberal püt jamais rejoindre le nationalisme 
intL5gral de Maurras"(13). 
For Riviere, the war and Germany were inseparable: having 
been a prisoner of war under the Germans, this was inevitable, 
and the result was his book, L'Allemand(14). Durosay qualifies 
this book as an "ex emple (... ) de ce goüt cher aux hommes 
de la NRF pour 1' analyse, la psychologie et la generalisation 
ambitieuse appliquees aux genies nationaux"(15) . In what was 
a deeply personal view of the "national psychology" of Germany, 
Riviere purgetj his own "grande detestation que mon esprit fait 
de l'Allemagne" 
(16) 
. The book revealed what was 
for Riviere 
"1' incompatibilite radicale des deux nations" 
(17) 
, an 
incompatibility analysed in a particularly French manner. 
Secondly, Riviere' s intention was to "depeindre 1' Allemand, 
(18) 
. et indirectement le Fransais, dans leur essence eternelle" , 
this is what makes his study idealistic and a-historical. The 
most important feature of Riviere's method is what Duro say 
shows to be "la fragilite de (son) psychologisme, la persistance 
d'un recul o. u d'un refus" 
(19) 
,a feature which effectively 
devalued any political posture relative to the problem, and 
to which Paulhan was to object once he became editor. 
Not only were Gide and Riviere profoundly interested in 
Germany and its culture, Jean Schlumberger too had direct family 
(20) 
ties with Alsace, and had many German connections. 
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Alfred Grosser has stressed that Schlumberger's background and 
understanding of the problem made him evidently suitable as 
a "spokesman" on Franco-German affairs: 
"Sa naissance, le destin de sa famille qualifiaient 
Jean Schlumberger pour etre utile daps un secteur 
particulier de la vie publique: celui des relations 
franco-allemandes. Et il se trouvait que nulle part 
ailleurs la prise de position politique n' etait davantage 
liee ä des choix moraux"(21). 
If Jean Schlumberger was primarily interested in political 
moralities, then the eminent Germanist Felix Bertaux dominated 
the literary "chroniques allemandes". Already having contributed 
material from 1921 to the early review, Bertaux's penetrating 
notes and review-articles were extremely important to the NRF 
. from 1919, when Riviere brought him in more regularly 
(22) 
Apart from his long close association with Schlumberger and 
Riviere, Bertaux had dealings with the Mann brothers, Thomas 
and Heinrich 
(23) 
. Moreover, the 
German philosopher 
Bernard Groethuysen, born of a Dutch father and Russian 
mother, studied and taught philosophy in German universities, 
and was particularly conversant with contemporary German 
philosophy. Invited to contribute to the NRF under 
Riviere 
from 1920, Groethuysen became especially close to Jean Paulhan(24) . 
Often described as an 
k! 'eminence grise", Groethuysen was a 
convinced Marxist who had considerable influence over 
Gide 
and Malraux. As early as 1920, Gide remembered 
Groethuysen 
of ter his strange meeting with Walter 
Rathenau: 
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"Devant le mysticisme de certain de ses propos, 
(je songeais) ä ce que disait (... ) Groethuysen 
qui, dans le livre qu'il preparait des avant la 
guerre, sur le caract. ere allemand, cherchait ä 
moptrer que 1'Allemand est compose de deux extremes: 
une äme et un automate... "(25). 
For Malraux, Groethuysen was "pest-etre l'homme qui j'ai 
le plus admire" 
ý26ý 
. Groethu sen's y politics made it impossible 
for him to live in safety in Germany under the increasing 
influence of the Nazis, and he left for Paris for good in 1932. 
Besides the importance of his political commitment, Groethuysen 
did much to help introduce Kafka into France, and advised Paulhan 
on the quality of German writers(27) . Apart from these writers 
and teachers contributing regularly to the review, the NRF had 
close ties with the Mayrisch family of Colpach, Luxembourg. 
Mme__Mayris ch (under the pseudonyn Alain Desportes) provided 
some early articles crucial to the preliminary moves towards 
Franco-German reconciliation in 1919, and opened her home in 
Colpach with her husband Emile Mayrisch as a "neutral" meeting- 
place for French and German intellectuals, politicians and 
industrialists 
(28) 
. It was here that Gide was able to meet 
Walter Rathenau and Ernst Robert Curtius, both keen to exploit 
these early French moves towards "rapprochement"(29). 
It was against this background that Riviere in particular 
introduced his own analyses of Franco-German problems into the 
NRF: Daniel Durosay has studied these in some detail in the 
context of Riviere's political evolution(30). These articles, 
according to Durosay, "font en un raccourci frappant la 
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mutation d'un discours politique qui se deplace cette fois 
tres nettement de 1'idealisme au realisme, de la psychologie 
ä 
_' 
economie" 
(31) 
. It is important to discern that although 
Riviere was writing in his own name, the three articles in 
question were no longer wholly "psychological" in nature, 
nor were they based on Riviere's personal war experience. 
They were all written in response to current political 
developments in the negotiations over reparations 
(32) 
. In the 
second article, July 1922, for example, Durosay detects Riviere 
beginning to abandon his previous "method" 
(33) 
; by the third, 
without explicitly criticizing French policy, Riviere indicated 
"les exces, les visees annexionnistes et le danger d'enlisement" 
inherent in the Ruhr occupation(34) . At last Riviere was 
converted to co-operation and active economic collusion with 
Germany, instead of merely contending with the charade of "les 
principes moraux qui avait cours depuis Versailles" 
(35) 
Andre Gide, too, wrote an important article on the absolute 
(36) 
necessity of re-establishing contact with Germany . This was 
a direct result of the talks Gide had had with Curtius earlier 
in 1921(37), and, knowing his own personal influence, Gide 
backed the ideas of both Curtius and Thibaudet on how to restore 
communications between French and German writers. 
The essential 
thrust of their thinking was that international relations should 
be approached as humanistically and as. -non-contentiously 
as 
possible. Gide quoted T'hibaudet: 
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"I1 ya une vie internationale, dans laquelle 
les individus et is nations sont baignes (... ) . Sachons la considerer non d'un point de vue 
i. n ternationaliste, mais d'un point de vue 
international c' es t-ä-dire d'un point de 
vue humain" (3ä), 
Thibaudet underlines the importance of the fact that intellectuals 
could initiate reconciliation and, significantly enough, Gide 
added his own conclusion: "Puisse la NRF y aider'; il n' es t peut- 
etre pas auj ourd' hui de täche plus importante" 
(39) 
. This article 
had predictable repercussions; in the "Revues" section for 
February 1922, the editors reproduced extracts from various 
sections of the press 
(40) 
. Gide's article had provoked a 
debate which echoed the familiar divisions; the liberal 
conservative Paul Souday; - supporting Gide, criticized " la 
xenophobie intellectuelle", while the more nationalistic 
ý41) 
Fortunat Strowski condemned any collaboration with Germany 
In June, the NRF gave extracts from an important article on the 
subject by Jean Gtiehenno, who, writing in La Grande Revue, upheld 
the internationalists 
(42) 
. The NRF, although agreeing with 
Guehenno's 
attacks on French propagandists, did not, .. however, reproduce 
these lines on Gide's dilatoriness: 
"A quoi b. on taut de gloses et tant de reprises? 
M. Andre Gide toujours semble ecrire dans les 
urarges. (... ) I1 craint les p ensees breves 
et les mots trop rapides. (... ) Ce sont des gens 
de cenacle. Leur pensee, comme leurs livres, 
es ta tirage restreint. Its redoutent, par 
dessus tout, les collusions politiques, et 
seraient navres si on les soupýonnait d'avoir, 
un j our, voulu parler du- monde... 
" (43). 
Already Guehenno used the NRF to illustrate how, in his opinion, 
intellectuals merely pontificated in a void when they ignored or 
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denied the importance of political commitment. 
Nevertheless the Mayrisch family were persuasive enough 
in inducing the NRF to enter the fray over the Ruhr occupation. 
As Durosay has shown, "les interventions politiques de la NRF 
dans l' of f afire de la Ruhr (... ) paraissent liees ä l' inf luence 
de Mayrisch" . Moreover he quotes from an unpublished letter 
(44) 
to Mme Mayrisch where Riviere indicated the difficulty of 
commenting on events when these could change at any moment: 
what was important though, was that "nous allons tächer pouttant 
(45) 
de faire quelque cho.. S {' , With Schlumberger's article 
"Le 
sommeil de 1' esprit critique , 
(46) 
, the NRF appeared to 
be moving 
further and further towards direct political support for 
Franco-German reconciliation. If Guehenno and the "internationalists" 
saw the- NRF as ineffectual, the Nationalists, such as Camille Mauclair 
and Henri Beraud, saw it as totally pro-German. In his anti-NRF 
crusade, Beraud had accused the review of manipulating their 
diplomatic connections at the Quai d'Orsay and of obtaining 
He also believed that the NRF was 
47ý (preferential 
treatment 
unfairly biased towards Germany. In La Croisade 
des longues 
figures, Beraud reproduced extracts from a constellation of 
provincial newspapers which delighted in attacking what 
they would 
have seen as part of the Parisian 'avant-garde' . For 
instance, 
Camille Mauclair saw the root cause of the problem thus : 
"C' es t, 
pour parler net, la tendance ob. stinee 
de la NRF a pruner le 
. rapprochement intellectuel et economique avec 
les Boches" 
(48) 
Mau-clair referred directly to Riviere's latest article 
(May 
1923) and suggested that the NRF should change 
its name to 
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La. Nouvelle Revue Franco-Allemande. (49) 
. 
Thanks to Gide, Schlumberger and Riviere therefore, the 
NRF already had considerable influence in the area of Franco- 
German relations. L'Huillier has written that Riviere's approach 
had consequences of historic importance(50) . Moreover the extent 
of Riviere's interest in Germany was reflected by the NRF in 
its special tribute to the late director in April 1925; no less 
than eight "temoignages" and articles were devoted to the question, 
. and an extract of 
his war diary was also also included 
(51) 
Paulhan inherited a review which, as Claude Lesbats has said, 
"es t temoin du debat entre ceux qui s' interrogent sur le fait 
litteraire en tart que tel, et ceux qui ne voient en lui qu' un 
aspect des questions de civilisation et de politique" 
(52) 
. 
He also affirms that Paulhan continued in much the same line 
regarding the relationship between the intellectual and society. 
However, there is much evidence in his correspondence which 
conclusively demonstrates that, at the beginning of his 
editorship at least, Paulhan felt fundamentally different 
about the inclusion of material on international issues. 
He believed it was completely unsuitable material and campaigned 
strenuously to restore consistency to the review's policy, 
basically because he had observed Riviere's direction at such 
close quarters. One example is provided by a letter to 
Franz Hellens. Paulhan had had to transmit Riviere's refusal 
of a political "chronique" submitted by Hellens. To Paulhan's 
sense of logic it was, to say the least, inconsistent to invoke 
editorial policy in this refusal when it was evidently being 
- 175 - 
broken each time Riviere accepted an article on Germany(53). 
Although Paulhan had himself written an article much earlier 
on Franco-German relations, it had had cultural (if not 
semantic) implications rather than political ones 
(54) 
. With 
this in mind, he determined to prevent his review from following 
the same path as Riviere; while at first temporarily successful, 
the tide of history and events abroad swelled up again, and forced 
a policy change. 
At the time Paulhan assumed the editorship, Herriot had 
been in power since May 1924 and had placed relations with 
Germany on to a more congenial footing: this was the beginning 
of the Briand era(SS) . In what was to prove to be an historic 
speech, and one with profound significance for Paulhan's review, 
Herriot called for a national union in foreign policy on 28th 
January 1925: the speech signalled to Germany a spirit of 
"detente" which opened the way to the negotiations preceding 
the Locarno Conference of October that year(56) . Herriot's 
biographer relates: 
"Dans une peroraison pathetique, il lance un 
appel prophetique aux Etats. unis d' Europe et ä 
la reconciliation avec l'Allemagne: "La France 
n1 a pas de haine, la France garde au milieu de 
tous les perils (... ) son, sang-froid (... ) . 
Mon plus grand desir es t de voir un jour 
apparaltre les Etats-Unis d' Europe (... ) Dans 
la grande institution de la Societe des 
Nations, je voyais la(ýr miere esquisse de 
ces Etats-Unis (... ) . 
The spirit if not the letter of this speech was adopted by those 
intellectuals who were campaigning in favour of a policy of 
reconciliation, and marked the beginning of Paulhan's problems. 
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Sometime between the beginning of April and July 1925, an 
article by Pierre Vienot was submitted to the NRF for 
consideration(58) 
In his article for the Revue de Geneve, Vienot had emphasized 
how necessary it had become to change French perceptions of 
Germany, and how efforts needed to be made to understand their 
neighbour without prejudice. At the same time, Vienot approached 
Schlumberger and the Mayrisch family, and discussions began on the 
founding of the Comite d' Information franco-allemand(59) . If the 
NRF had wanted to take the lead in these initiatives, an article 
by Vienof would have presented the ideal opportunity. A succession 
of some four letters to Schlumberger, however, written from before 
July to August 6th 1925, reveals a great deal of how Paulhan was 
determined to re-establish the literary primacy of the review, 
and how he applied literary criteria to the judgement of non- 
literary texts. Gallimard, nominally director at this time, 
passed on (and apparently approved) the Vienot text, and thereupon 
Paulhan sought Schlumberger's advice: 
"Si vous dirigiez la revue, publieriez-vous 
l' article de M. Vienot? Gaston me Va remis 
ce matin... Je le trouve comme vous extremement 
interessant, juste presque toujours, aussi mal 
ecrit que possible. 
Autant enfin ii me semble propre ä amorcer 
heureusement, dans quelque revue p oli tique, 
une longue discussion, au cours de laquelle 
ses veritables traits se degageraient peu 
a 
peu-autant je lui prete difficilement ce 
caractere "definitif" que prend un article 
politique publie par une revue litteraire" 
(60) 
. 
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Obviously worried by the nature of Vienot's article, and by 
the support it was receiving within the review, Paulhan wrote 
again at about the same time to develop his reasons for refusing 
Vienot's article. Here he continued to use the pretext of 
style and form in his reasons for turning it down, and added 
that he considered it to be thoroughly unsuitable: 
"... Vraiment, un tel article est-il ä sa place 
dans une revue litteraire? - si encore il etait 
l' application dans le domaine politique d'une 
methode, d'une philosophie qui par ailleurs nous 
p ourrait toucher (comme c'etait le cas pour les 
autres articles politiques qu'a donnes la NRF), 
j' admettrais bien que Von put a la rigeur 
oublier une telle incorrection de forme - mais 
un article qui n'est et ne peut etre que politique, 
qui na point d'autre interet, ni d'autres 
ambitions, que lui reste-t-il comme excuse? Je 
serais bien desole qu'il vous parüt meriter d'etre 
retenu" (61) . 
Evidently there were some within the NRF who were willing to make 
a stand on this issue. Nonetheless Paulhan prevailed; Vienot's 
article changed destination and appeared finally in the July 
number of La Revue europeenne, as well as in a separately- 
produced off-print(62) . Anxious to avoid a repetition of 
Nationalist attacks, Paulhan was relieved that the article 
could be deflected to a periodical which was not only committed 
to, but also financed by interests belonging to the Comite 
d' ýnf ormation 
cranco-allemand (6 3) 
. However courageous and 
meritorious Vienot's stance was, and however attractive it was 
both to the German intellectuals and as a promotional exercise 
to Gallimard and Schlumberger, Paulhan felt he was right and 
explained himself yet again: 
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"Mais ignorez-vous donc quelles menaces nous ont 
valus, et meme de la part de nos abonnes les plus 
fideles, 1' article de Jacques (Riviere) sur les 
relations f ranco-allemandes, la campagne de Mauclair 
nous accusant - dans dix journaux de province - de 
toucher l'argent allemand? Combien de desabonnements 
nous sont parvenus, combien "d'amis" de province, 
qui s'o. ccup aient ä ce moment d'organiser des 
conferences de la NRF, nous ont ecrit qu'ils ne 
pouvaien t plus s'interesser a nous? Bien entendu, 
il nous etait facile de repondre: Particle etait 
de Jacques ... 
it (64) 
This letter is interesting in that it shows that although some 
within the NRF were willing to make allowances for the refractory 
Riviere, then could do nothing to prevent Nationalists such as Mauclair 
from spreading malicious allegations. Paulhan was keen to follow 
through the dispute with Schlumberger, for he insisted he only 
had the "esprit de la NRF" at heart: 
"vous me direz qu'il faut d'abord faire la revue 
selon notre coeur, et ne songer aux abonnes 
qu'ensuite. Oui, et je ne voulais que repondre a 
votre remarque sur les abonnes allemands que nous 
aurait valus l'article Vienot. Et je n'insisterais 
pas non plus, si je n' etais bien stir de def endre 
contre vous ce qui a toujours ete l' esprit de la NRF. 
je ne parle meme pas de la premiere revue, la votre, 
qui n' a jamais dit un mot de politique en un temps 
malgre tout infiniment plus dangereux, plus expose 
que le notre. Mais la seconde, celle de Jacques, 
quels obstacles ne devait pas franchir, avant d'y 
penetrer, une etude relevant d'une autre discipline 
que la discipline litteraire. Vous le savez comme 
moi, mieux que moi... "(65), 
In a passage which verges upon the sarcastic, Paulhan risked 
provoking Schlumberger's anger by indicating that the review might 
well be accused of inconsistency if it did not open itself up to 
other areas: 
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"Me direz-vous que les problemes politiques se 
p resentent avec un caractere d'urgence tel, 
qu'il faut les traiter, quitte ä les traiter 
mal. Mais il n' ya pas que les problemes de 
politique etrangere, qui soient urgents. 
Devrons-nous parler aussi, sans choix, de la 
ýý (66) depopulation, de la syphilis, de 1 alcoolisme?... 
For Paulhan, Vienot's article had risked making the NRF into a 
'revue de combat', because his ideas were so clearly opposed to 
the Nationalists that former animosities surrounding the "Parti de 
1'Intelligence" debate might be raised again: - 
"Si nous pub lions. sur la politique etrangere 
un article mediocre, un article "plein de 
bonnes citations", ce seront les disciples 
de Jean S. chlumberger que nous jetterons dans 
les bras de Maurras ou des communistes... 
Est-ce Vienot que nous opposerons ä 
Bainville? " (67) 
These letters have been quoted at length because they provide a 
unique insight into Paulhan's own thinking on editorial policy 
at the NRF; they show him attempting to be as independent as 
possible within the bounds of his role at that time in the review. 
Furthermore, they show how aware he was of the dangers inherent 
in commenting upon current affairs when, as a result, perhaps 
the review would be co-erced into areas which were, or should 
have been, foreign to a "literary" review. 
The last letter of this sequence referred once more to the 
doctrinal content of Vienot's study: implicit in Paulhan's comments 
was his criticism that simplistic or spurious psychologizing 
could only damage efforts being made to improve relations with 
Germany. On 16th August 1925, he wrote to suggest the following 
as a policy stipulation: 
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"A propos des relations franco-allemandes, ne pensez- 
vous pas que -. nous devrions refuser energetique- 
ment tout article, ou note, f onde sur le detestable 
"inieux on se connait, plus on s'aime" ou tout lieu 
commun analogue? (68) 
Paulhan's insistence kept the NRF free of any such material which 
might invite controversy for some months to come, in spite of the 
pressure being applied within the review. Yet, during the months 
after this exchange of views, indeed, throughout the period 
leading to the Locarno negotiations and Pact in October 1925, 
the NRF devoted more than the normal ratio of space to German 
literature. In September, Bertaux reported on his "lectures 
allemandes", and the following month reviewed, '-. the latest 
novels by the Mann brothers 
(69) 
. November saw the inclusion 
of an essay by Groethuysen on Hölderlin and the translation 
of a text by the German poet, and Drieu wrote a review-article 
of a work by Fritz von Unruh(70). Here Drieu rejoiced in 
von Unruh's energy and rejection of decadence in a dying Europe, 
and concluded: 
"Le Mal, c'est 1' Individu dechaine par 1' Occident; 
le Bien, c'est l'Individu ressaisi par une 
discipline que p rep arent en eux-memes les 
meilleurs hommes du monde" (71). 
Although Paulhan had succeeded in playing down the issue, 
it would be false, as Richard has claimed, to say that Franco- 
German interests received no further attention until 1933 
(72) 
In January 1926, Thomas. Mann came to Paris on a semi-official 
visit; among other functions, he was to speak at the 
"Union 
(73) 
pour la Verite" and at the "Union Intellectuelle Franiaise . 
- 181 - 
Following the ratification of the Locarno Pact only just over a 
month earlier, this visit seemed to announce a further warming 
of relations; thus Paulhan felt able to make concessions to his 
earlier hard-line. On January 21st, 1926, the very day of Mann's 
two speeches mentioned above, Paulhan wrote: "il me semble qu'il 
serait bon de donner dans la NRF le discours qu' a prononce 
Mann a l'Union Intellectuelle""(74). By February, however, 
after this idea had probably been accepted, he wrote again to 
explain that it would have to be shelved due to the fact that the 
speech had been reproduced in extracts or in full elsewhere: its 
inclusion would therefore have been superfluous(75). The Mann 
speech would have represented a considerable "coup" for the NRF, 
for both Mann brothers were seen world-wide as the "Ambassadors of 
Weimar", as Nigel Hamilton describes them(76). At the same time, 
there was a possibility that Heinrich Mann might contribute 
material for the review as well; it seems that Charles Du Bos was 
instrumental in increasing the pressure on Paulhan, who again 
asked S chlumb erger: 
"Est-il (Charles Du Bos) veritablement convaincu 
de l' urgence d'une reconciliation franco-allemande 
(dont il se moquait assez mechamment il ya deux 
ans)? Je ne sais pas trop"(77). 
Moreover, although Paulhan and Du Bos were usually on the 
best 
of terms, evidence suggests that there was some 
lingering hostility 
regarding Du Bos' exclusion from the 
direction of the NRF . 
In the same letter, Paulhan spelt out how 
he had sought advice 
from several quarters on what text by Mann to accept: apart 
from Schlumberger, Bertaux preferred a novella, but Groethuysen 
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was "violennment defavorable" to any contribution(79) . Paulhan 
himself agreed with Groethuysen, who pointed out, somewhat 
sweepingly, that Mann "a justement coule aupres de tous les 
intellectuels allemands un peu serieux" 
(80) 
. He went on: 
"cette derniere raison n'avait pas 
toucher: les reconciliations entr 
assez naturellement a devenir des 
avec la mauvaise litterature - et 
lu de Mann m' a donne le sentiment 
un peu plus "a la page""(81). 
ete sans me 
e peuples tendent 
reconciliations 
tout ce que j'ai 
d'un Georges Lecomte, 
Although Paulhan again succeeded in excluding potentially 
dangerous material from the review, the atmosphere of Franco- 
German relations was steadily improving at this time. The 
Socialists in Poincare's government supported Briand's efforts, 
and the Pope's condemnation of L'Action 
frangaise drove Maurras' 
(82) 
Catholic support behind Poincare Furthermore, the intense 
bilateral negotiations to establish the "Comite d' information 
f ranco--allemand" were coming to fruition: in July the French 
executive committee met for the first time, and offices opened 
in both Paris and Berlin in November 1926(83). Once Gide had 
returned from the Congo, he turned his attention to the problem: 
Jacques B ariety has written - 
(... ) , "Le Comte de Pange, Wladimir d'Ormesson 
Andre Gide et ses amis de la NRF poussent dans 
le meme sens. Sans oublier, bien stir, Romain Rolland. 
Au cours de ces annees nalt donc une sorte cýe84) 
mystique du rapprochment franco-allemand... 
"l 
In September 1926 Germany was admitted to the 
"Societe des Nations", 
and Briand and Stresemann continued their 
interminable negotiations 
over reparations. 
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The following April, Felix Beaux wrote a long review 
article on the latest intellectual trends in Germany'85). Bertaux 
found that in the German cultural tradition, thinkers very often 
strove energetically to identify and develop an ideology to 
explain cultural phenomena. The current trend, he felt, was 
that there was less and less about which Germans could agree. 
At the centre of the cultural situation there, Bertaux detected 
a "reapprofondissement", with two major tendencies 
(86) 
. These 
were the "reconstructors" and the "revolutionaries", with the 
"adaptors" in between; for Bertaux, the Mann brothers belonged 
to the former group, as they showed a desire to develop new 
ideas and contacts within the existing cultural tradition. 
By then proceeding to review a number of important essays on 
Germany, Bertaux perceived that a fundamental change was taking 
place. For example, Groethuysen's Introduction a la pensee 
philosophique allemande depuis Nietzsche, published by Stock, 
demonstrated how Dilthey, Simmel and Husserl, by fusing a 
metaphysics of value with an interest in the real, had advanced 
towards phenomenology 
(87) 
. Max Scheler, too, was of particular 
interest and influenced such pro-French intellectuals as 
Curtius, and Bertaux found Maurice Boucher's study of 
Heinrich Keyserling's work of special import, because Keyserling 
(88) 
was so "a. -la mode" in France Bertaux found that 
"Kealpolitik" 
was now beginning to take account of the uniqueness of the 
German spirit, and he felt justified in his optimism for the_ 
future when so many ideas were being aired in a variety of German 
periodicals. These contributed to "(le) rebrassage d' 
elements 
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tires du fonds europeen... "(89) 
If the NRF was moving very gently towards expressing 
support again for Franco-German reconciliation at this time, 
then Paulhan manifested a desire for balance by publishing 
Benda's La Trahison des Clercs from August to November 1927(90) . 
Here Benda paraded an anti-Germanism which paradoxically enough 
could have aligned him with Maurras; in September 1927, Benda 
placed the blame for the "nationalization" of culture squarely 
on "les clercs allemands" 
(91) 
. "Le clerc nationaliste", continued 
Benda, "est essentiellement une invention allemande" 
(92) 
. This 
view was central to his book, and it would not be an exaggeration 
to say that Benda saw Germany as in the process of hatching a 
conspiracy on a European scale: 
"C' es t d' alle urs un theme qui reviendra souvent 
dans cet ouvrage ; que la plupart des attitudes 
morales et politiques adoptees depuis cinquante 
ans par les cleres. en Europe so ft d'origine allemande 
et que, sous le mode du spirituel, la victoire de 
l'Allemagne dans le monde es t presentement 
compl'ete(93). 
Like the Action frannaise historian Bainville, Benda saw Germany 
historically as having been a constant threat to France, wi th the 
difference being that Benda viewed German irrationalism and its 
moralism of violence as the real menaces to French rationalism and 
Republicanism. As a true universalist, however, Benda should 
be considered as attacking Nationalism first, and Germany second: 
seen from this perspective, la Trahison des Clercs was equally 
an attack upon French Nationalist intellectuals. Against this 
background, Paulhan found himself in difficulties once more. 
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He had to make a decision on Curtius' essay "Restauration der 
Vernunft" which had been submitted to the review. Given Curt-lus' 
proximity to Schlumberger, Vienot and Gide, and his active role 
in the "Comite d' Information franco-allemand", Paulhan clearly 
believed that accepting the Curtius text might be damaging: 
"Si la "Restauration der Vernunft" entame une campagne, je crains 
que ce ne soit une campagne riche et d' idees vaguesý`ý 
} Mais 
opportune, peut-etre. En tous cas, terriblement inopportune 
(9 
a la NRF"4ý . Weighing up the advantages against the dangers, 
Paulhan ended by being highly critical of any eventual decision 
to include the essay, given that Benda's La Trahison des Clercs 
was nearing completion in serial form. Moreover, knowing how 
quickly such material could be rendered obsolete by publication 
elsewhere, Paulhan exploited this and again distanced himself 
from S chlumberger, to whom -he wrote : 
"Mais pensez-vous qu'il soit possible, dans un 
moment oü nous malmenons assez durement les 
intellectuels f ranjais (... ) de leur faire 
encore faire la leSon imperieuse et seche'. Peu 
d' articles ont_soul-eve lus d' emotion que La 
Trahison des Cleres"(9). 
Obviously Paulhan wanted to avoid what would have appeared as a 
two-pronged attack upon the Nationalists, from both Benda and 
Curtius. So, remembering Mauc; lai. r's 1923 invectives, he 
concluded by warning Schlumberger that "Von va recommencer 
ä 
nous appeler: La Nouvelle Revue Proallemande. Vraiment ce 
(96) 
moment serait mal choisi d' accueillir Curtius 
Once 
again therefore, Paulhan had prevailed: his committee refused 
the Curtius article for the NRF. It was released simultaneously 
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to Eliot's The Criterion and to Ortega y Gasset's Revista de 
Occidente(97) , and it received a brief mention in the NRF's 
"Revue des Revues" for February 1928(98) 
Meanwhile in December 1927 Thibaudet devoted a significant 
part of his "Reflexion" to reprimanding Benda for his anti- 
Germanismý99ý . Thibaudet quite rightly detected much of 
La Trahison des Clercs in Benda's "Billets de Sirius publies en 1925 
(... ) mais qui sont dates du temps de guerre, oü (... ) ils 
paraissaient dans quelque journal" 
(100) 
. In this sense Benda's 
book was "un livre de guerre, ou p lutot un livre de la guerre, 
(... ) et il Va pense d' abord comme une defense contre 1' Allemand' '(101) . 
It was a polemic in the literal sense of the-word, and as such 
would have met with Riviere's approval, at least in the immediate 
post-war period. Thibaudet, turning his attention to Benda's 
underlying assertion that Nationalism was a German invention, 
advanced the alternative opinion that "le fait general, c'est la 
creation des nationalites, non par l' imitation- . 
des clercs 
allemands, mais par la Revolution franpise11(102) . Thibaudet 
had given an historical illustration of this view:: 
"La nationalisation de l' intelligence est biers 
(... ) une consequence des guerres de la Revolution 
et de l'Empire. L'Allemagne asservie de 1813 
fut appel,,, ee ä 1'titre par ses cleres" 
(103). 
Thibaudet was implying a criticism of Benda's historiography, 
believing that Napoleon and his campaigns had forced Germany 
into belligerently establishing its own national unity and 
(104) 
identity , Paulhan 
had been proved right: la Trahison des 
Cleres, or at least one of its central and topical themes, 
had 
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attracted much criticism, even within the NRF(105). 
In early 1928, while Gide was being entertained in Berlin by, 
among others, Rathe,., nau's biographer Heinrich Kessler, Paulhan 
prepared to commemorate the third anniversary of Riviere `s 
death by publishing an extract from his War diaries 
(106) 
. By 
publishing "En Marge de L'Allemand", Paulhan risked re-opening 
wounds which had taken so much time to heal(107) . However he 
could answer his potential critics by reminding them that the 
diary was a reflection of Riviere's own deeply personal if not 
idiosyncratic reaction to his captivity. Riviere had written - 
"J'ai voulu peindre 1'etat oü cette scene 
(de prison) m'avait mis, parce qu'il me 
parait representer dune maniere excellente 
l'etat de tous ceux qui vivent sous la prise 
allemande, qui ont a subir le caractere 
allemand it (108). 
Such material was not in the purest spirit of Franco-German 
reconciliation, and it was becoming clearer that Paulhan, even 
at this relatively early stage, was showing signs of a profound 
patriotism which would only manifest itself explicitly much 
. later 
(109) 
This year also marked the beginning of the first difficulties 
in relations between France and Germany. The effect of the 
Briand-Kellogg-P. act, finally signed by fifteen signatories on 
August 27th, was to weaken France. Briand had wanted a unilateral 
pact with the United States, but Kellogg, 
by making it multilateral, 
(110) 
It 
allowed Germany to undermine France's military strength 
was against this background that 
Paulhan began publishing Benda's 
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La Fin de 1'Eternel, with the September number in particular 
placing responsibility for the First World War squarely upon 
Germany 
111) 
. Running concurrently with this was Thib audet' s 
article on "1'Affaire Demartial" and its subsequent exchange 
of correspondence. Demartial, an ex-Colonial minister, 
distinguished himself by blaming Russia and France entirely 
for the First World War(112) . The result of the ensuing scandal 
was that Demartial was suspended for five years from the "Legion 
d'Honneur"(113) . Thibaudet noted that Europe had now published 
a "dossier" on the affair, but felt that a number of facts needed 
qualification. He insisted that even level-minded Germans would 
find it difficult to agree with Demartial that it was France's 
entry into the war which provoked German aggression(114) 
Secondly it was patently not true that Germany was innocent of 
having started the war. Thirdly, and most importantly, Demartial 
was guilty of over-simplification. Thibaudet borrowed an image 
from Bergson's Matiere et Memoire and applied it to the complex 
question of responsibilities: 
"Pour ma part, j' en verrais les plans reels comme 
autant de coupes sur un cone. (... 
) Plus les 
coupes sout eloignees de la pointe du cone, 
plus le probleme se dilue, se confond avec 
la 
profondeur, les ondulation s, les rythmes de 
1' his toire europ eenne" 
(115 ). 
Turning to the vexed question of the Versailles Treaty, 
Thibaudet 
displayed his optimism; whereas Demartial devoted all 
his 
efforts to applauding those who 
"stigmatized" the Treaty, Thibaudet 
resigned himself to its existence, its evolution and 
its eventual 
death. He went on: 
- 189 - 
"I1 a commence de mourir'quand il a commence 
d'etre. (... ) La responsabilite unilaterale des 
Empires Centraux a suivi dans le tombeau la raise 
en jugement de Guillaume, celle des coupables de 
guerre, tout ce qu'implquait le diktat. L'esprit 
du diktat commence a faire place ä un esprit 
contractuel... "(116) 
As far as Thibaudet was concerned, France should continue to 
seek a fairer negotiated settlement with Germany; this was 
something which should have become more likely in the still- 
optimistic climate of mid-1928. Thibaudet concluded by 
affirming his faith in the "Societe des Nations": 
"(le traite) ä fonde la S. d. N. I1 a prepare 
des conditions du desarmement. (... ) Oublions les :. ' 
germes de guerre du traite; attachons-nous ä 
developper ses $erznes de paix, qui ne sont encore 
que des germes" 1117). 
The French obsession with retribution was holding back moves 
towards disarmament, Thibaudet believed, but he was evidently 
ignorant of the growing belligerence of the National-Socialists 
in Germany. 
In November 1928, the NRF reprinted a letter from Demartial, 
who questioned Thibaudet's optimism, particularly regarding 
his 
opinion that the article of the Versailles Treaty concerning 
(118) 
responsibility for the War was now a 
"dead letter" 
Demartial held that the "ex-enemies" of Germany should abandon 
their impossible position and consign the question of responsibility 
to history, rather than persist in making it central to 
international 
politics(119) . Predictably enough, 
this "affair" had considerable 
repercussions in the French press. 
In December 1928, Thibaudet 
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briefly examined one sample reaction. Replying to Pierre Bernus, 
who quoted Renouvin's book Les Origines de la Guerre, Thibaudet 
stressed that he had found nothing in Renouvin's very objective 
(120) 
study which totally condemned Demartial. Without being 
explicitly critical of the Nationalists, Thibaudet, drawing 
a parallel with the Dreyfus Affair, insisted that "il s' a_git 
en effet dune affaire qui nous occupe ordinairement ici (i. e. 
"La NRF") : celle de la difference et de l' incomprehension entre 
generations"(121). He concluded by maintaining his previous 
stance, and called for continuing reconciliation 
(122). 
In this way the years 1928 and 1929, ten years after the 
Armistice and the Versailles Treaty, bore witness to attempts 
at achieving anew honesty regarding the First World War. The 
War was gradually being absorbed into history, and historians 
and writers were beginning to demythologize the causes and the 
(123) 
conduct of the War" At the NRF, Gide signalled his 
continuing interest in Franco-German "rapprochement" by 
publishing a letter dated 25th June 1921 to Rathenau(124) 
This coincided with Kessler's visit to Gide in Paris in October 
(125) 
. 
Yet the prospects for the true settling of differences were 
becoming much less bright. The Young Plan, drawn up between 
February and May 1929, rescheduled the Germans' reparation 
payments over the next sixty years, with, in return, a stipulation 
that France and the Allies should withdraw from the Ruhr by mid- 
1930(126). Moreover the Plan further weakened the Weimar 
Republic, already under threat from Hitler, who scored a 
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propaganda victory by claiming that the reparations would 
enslave Germany for generations to come(127) . Y These important 
changes were observed by Pierre Vienot, then in Germany 
attempting to strengthen Franco-German understanding. However, 
he encountered so many obstacles and hesitations, and such 
reluctance by the French Press to take any lasting initiatives, 
that Vienot resigned from his post on 31st December 1929(128). 
The Second Conference on reparations in The Hague put the 
finishing touches to the Young Plan, and when the French 
withdrew from the Rhineland, there were violent Nationalist 
demonstrations in Germany(129). Finally, the Wall Street Crash 
meant that American credits backing the Young Plan would no 
longer be forthcoming, and the Nazis, as a direct result, 
scored a highly significant electoral victory(130). Indeed, 
the election of an additional 107 Nazis to the Reichstag on 
' 14th September 1930 at last spurred several German and French 
intellectuals into action, action which not only signalled the 
beginnings of an awareness of German fascism, but which also 
had direct consequences for the NRF. 
On 2nd October 1930, Leautaud noted Thibaudet's article 
in the NRF, calling it "remarquable"131), The events of two 
weeks before in Germany somewhat diluted the optimism of 
this 
(132) 
article, but it was a truly notable analysis 
Thibaudet 
highlighted the fact that as early as 1873, Renouvier had had 
the foresight to consider the Alsace-Lorraine question as a 
(133) 
European problem Renouvier had also anticipated a . 
- 192 - 
"future assembleeeuro eenne"(134) p and Thibaudet went on to 
criticize the persistent Gallocentrism of successive governments. 
France, in 1930, needed to be far more generous of spirit 
insofar as the opportunities of mollifying the Versailles 
Treaty had not been sufficiently exploited. Yet he still 
remained optimistic regarding the future role of the "Societe 
des Nations' 
(135). 
Relations between governments should be 
conducted according to the ideal principles of sincerity, 
truth, peace and freedom, but violence in particular should 
be condemned(136). Thibaudet concluded: ' 
"Ce programme ne manque pas de difficulte, 
mais moins encore de necessite. Il est reste, 
jusqu' ä present, a peu pr-es etranger a qu'on 
appelle l'esprit de Geneve(137). Le moment ne 
viendra-t-il pas de parer a cette carence de la 
clericature? " (138) 
Clearly Thibaudet believed that there was a distinct 
difference between the theory and practice of the "esprit de 
Geneve" and the "S. d. N. ". If confirmation were needed of 
such ineffectuality, it was already to hand: the electoral 
successes of the Nazis had shaken many in Germany, and the 
French press at last began to take notice. Les Nouvelles 
litteraires ran a series of statements by German intellectuals 
who all pointed to the urgency of revising the Versailles 
Treaty, and they all spelt out the danger to the future of 
(139) 
Heinrich Mann, for democracy in Germany of Hitler 
example, castigated Hitler and his National-Socialism, and 
called for renewed efforts of opposition: 
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"La masse du parti national-socialiste, qui 
n' a rien de socialiste ni de national, es t 
formee par les desesperes, qu'en ce moment on 
compte par millions, et par une jeunesse 
anarchique (... ). Nous nous battons pour 
notre peuple contre ces ennem. i5 interieurs; 
et ce faisant nous defendons des interets 
communs ä la France et a 1'Allemagne"(140). 
Thomas Mann also called for "une alliance franco-allemande pour 
la paix" 
(141) 
, as well as for the revision of the iniquitous 
Treaty which the Nazis had so long exploited(142) 
Already the NRF was preparing to comment on this alarming 
state of affairs. In a letter of great importance, Martin du Gard 
told Paulhan that he fully approved of the idea that Jean Schlumberger 
should make a statement, - especially in view of the distress signals 
he had read in the French press(143). Martin du Gard clearly 
felt he could not over-emphasize the extent or the importance 
of the impact the NRF's view would have in Germany: 
"(le) retentissement depassera sans doute les 
milieux intellectuels. Jean sera considere 
comme le porte-parole du groupe de la NRF 
et davantage encore - comme representant les_ 
intellectuels f ramais. I1 va jouer lä-bas le 
role ue ouent pour nous, Franjais, les freres 
Mann"7144) 
It was for these reasons that the article should be extremely 
carefully thought-out and presented: it had to be a statement 
"(qui) nous engage tous" and, by virtue of this, it had to 
be "un coup magistral" 
(145) 
. From the tone of 
Martin du Gard's 
exhortation, it was obvious to Paulhan that the NRF would be 
making a momentous political gesture by publishing this statement 
on Franco-German "rapprochement", and that it would appear to 
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many in Germany as a last-ditch attempt to improve relations. 
On December 1st, the NRF appeared carrying Schlumberger's text 
"en tete". 
The article strove to be as restrained as possible in its 
criticism of French policy towards Germany: indeed, Schlumberger 
played down their specific relationship. He interspersed his 
commentary with an imagined dialogue between the author and 
an interlocutor, whereby he added depth to his statement by 
anticipating some of the more obvious objections. Schlumberger 
saw no reason why imagination, like hope, should not become a 
form of courage(146) . The implications of hasty political action 
and panic reaction by the public had to be carefully contemplated, 
because war remained a threat(147) . The central premise of 
Schlumberger's was that France had failed to adapt to "un monde 
ou tout s'est deplace"(148). If peace was illusory, it was the 
fault of the Versailles Treaty. Schlumberger underscored the 
difference between peace and peace-treaties 
(149) 
. He was 
certain that a choice had to be made: 
"La France met-elle son espoir dans la paix ou 
dans les traites de paix? Ce sont lä deux termes 
qui ne se recouvrent pas, qui souvent s'opposent 
et entre lesquels il faudra choisir"(150) 
This choice was crucial in understanding how Europe was a 
dangerous place, since "les pays d'Europe sofft encordees comme 
une equipe d'alpinistes 
(151) Should one of the "climbers" 
fall, the result would be only too plain. Yet this was not 
necessarily the central problem; 
France, like other countries 
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in Europe, was suffering from a "manque de confiance en elle- 
meme" 
(152) 
. Schlumberger asserted (like Thomas Mann) that 
"tous les pays d' Europe (... ) connaissent une Sorte de 
neurasthenie qui se traduit par ce que Freud appelle des 
complexes d'inf eriorite"153). Europe was in extreme peril 
because it was afraid of the unknown; France, which should have 
been a pathfinder, preferred to remain in her flimsy shelter. 
Once again, Schlumberger stressed how slowly France was 
adapting to the post-war world, and how technology was making 
it ever more dangerous to procrastinate over critical decisions: 
"Avec la T. S. F. les pays ressemblent ä des ruches que la moindre 
provocation alerte en un instant" 
(154) 
.A new sense of realism 
was long overdue, according to Schlumberger, because, in spite 
of the somewhat illusory concessions France had made over the 
previous decade, Europe was poised on the brink of disaster: 
"Entre une Amerique trop puissante et une formidable 
Asie, ii sera laborieux de nous tirer d' aff aire, 
et toutes nos chamailleries sont bien risibles 
entre ces deux gueul es ouvertes. C' es t quelque 
chose que dix annees dans la vie d'une 
civilisation dont 1'existence meine est en jeu. 
- C' etait les payer cher. 
- La paix vaut cher" 
(155 ). 
As far as Schlumberger was concerned, he detected a real and 
"tragic" gulf between the true aspirations of France and the 
way they were distorted by the Press: if imagination meant 
foresight, then this was the most lamentable shortcoming: 
"Nos preferences sont toutes pacifiques. Mais 
nous croyons encore que le choix se pose entre 
des preferences, alors qu'il se pose au-delä , 
entre etre et ne plus etre"(156). 
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Drawing an analogy with Pascal and especially the image of 
the 'pari', Schlumberger enjoined his reader in conclusion to 
reflect upon the fact that there was no harm at all, in fact, 
positive good, in reiterating some old truths: 
- Vous flattez-vous que ce soient lä, malgre 
1'aide de Pascal, des verites bien neuves, bien 
rares? 
- Si ces verites etaient rares, il ne serait pas 
urgent de les dire. C' es t parce qu'elles sont 
vieilles, et de gros bon sens, et du domaine 
public, qu'. elles ont chance d'etre bonnes a 
quelque chose et qu'il faut inlassablement les 
imaginer a nouveau "' 15 7). 
As Schlumberger has quite rightly indicated since, the effective 
content of his article was not a great deal different from his 
1923 view: what made it so much more critical was that the 
historical moment was infinitely more highly charged 
(158) 
. 
Hitler had been a part of the political scene in Germany since 
1923; yet it had taken seven years and considerable electoral 
success to awaken both French and German intellectuals to the 
growing menace of Nazism. 
Schlumberger's article met with much praise 
(159). 
Martin du Gard told Paulhan that the text, "imprime en tete 
du numero, et relu attentivement, m'a. fait la meilleure impression, 
et je suis tres stir qu'il a porte" 
(160) 
, Paulhan himself remained 
unconvinced, still believing that a literary review was the 
wrong place for such pronouncements 
161) 
, Yet for all P aulhan' s 
misgivings, some NRF-associated writers launched into debates 
at the "Union pour la Verite" 
ý162ý 
. These discussions provided 
the context for a further article in the NRF on the subject in 
January 1931 by Ramon Fernandez. Fernandez intended to 
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counterbalance Schlumberger, Europe and Friedrich Sieburg, 
whose controversial book Gott in Frankreich had just appeared 
in French(163) . Fernandez drew a distinction between Schlumberger's 
careful expressions of anxiety ("pacifiques" rather than "pacifistes") , 
and the uncompromising pacifism of Europe, mediated in "un langage 
absolu"(164). For this reason, the writers in Europe "prennent 
les choses de haut et de loin. En un mot, ils parlent en cleres"(165) 
Fernandez adopted a similar stance on this issue as he had with 
Benda's La Trahison des Clercs: however admirable and praiseworthy 
the pacifists' sentiments were, the Franco-German question required 
positive, practical action from those who best understood the 
problems involved(166) Le Francsais pacifiste", believed 
Fernandez, "c'est le conferencier ideal"(167), basically because 
he could bend both ways: "I1 croit coincider avec l' äme allemande 
lorsqu'ii lui prete des sentiments qu'i1 decouvre en lui-meme(168). 
Although the pacifist could and always did raise the well-worn 
commonplace that the Versailles Treaty needed revision, he 
was powerless to imagine a policy whereby relations between 
the two countries could be placed on a more equitable footing. 
As for the Germans, Fernandez thought that "Qu'il en ait 
conscience ou on (... ) 1' allemand attend de la revision des 
traites qu'elle lui rende sa liberte d' action" 
(169) 
. Whatever 
this meant for the Briandis t ideal of Europeanism, it was 
difficult to judge, but Fernandez', certainly believed -that 
it was 
a false ideal, one which intellectually and 
historically favoured 
France: 
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"I1 est vrai que le pacifisme francais se 
denationalise, ou croit se denationaliser, 
en se plaýant sous le signe d'un certain 
esprit europeen (... ) . L'Europe est une fausse 
synthese, puisqu'elle enveloppe des tendances 
violemment opposees (... ) Or, 1' Europe 4'a la 
meme dimension pour un Francais et pour un 
Allemand (... )"(170) 
The most lucid part of the essay dealt with Schlumberger's 
distinction between "peace" and "peace-treaties": if the aim 
of peace were divorced from reality, this could also lead to 
"1' autre impasse" 
(171) 
. Implying again 
(as Thibaudet and 
Schlumberger had done) that France desperately needed to 
treat Germany with more generosity of spirit, Fernandez clearly 
felt that the most perilous French failing was the inability 
to view their action from outside: 
"Gardons-nous de b ätir une doctrine universelle 
qui. serait resue par le monde comme un 
regionalisme. Ce contraste entre l'universalite 
de P inten tion et le particularisme de l'effet 
est presentement la trage-die de l'esprit 
politique f ranjais" 
(172Y 
French modes of thought ("la raison franýaise") were no longer 
universally applicable; if they were good for France, they could 
be dis tress trous if applied to Germany. Fernandez' thinking 
here prefigured much of the writing on Germany which accepted 
that there were irreconcilable differences between the cultural 
characteristics of the two countries, leading to the tendency 
to treat the phenomemon of Germany as a mysterious 
'enigma'. 
Quite rightly Fernandez believed that 
"1-'-abandon des traites n' inaugurerait pas le regne 
de la paix. Ce serait la fin d'une guerre qui se 
pr. olonge en sourdine, mais ce serait aussi 
le 
commencement d'une ere d' aventures et de risques 11(173). 
auxquels nos pacifistes semblent bien mal prepares 
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Curiously, Fernandez perceived pacifism as being, 
unwittingly, "l'envers negatif et sentimental d'une autre 
doctrine, active cella-lä, et coherente: je veux p arler du 
communisme" 
(174) 
. Yet under Communism peace was subordinated 
to other values; Fernandez preferred "une politique ouverte et 
souple, s'appuyant sur certains avantages juridiques, mais en meine 
temps modifiant le statu quo par des accords de fait avec 
l'Allemagne... "ý175ý . Essentially Fernandez thought that the 
French should take the initiative before events overtook their 
politicians and rendered them powerless. This article vacillated 
between shrewd insight and the familiar, lax tendency to apply 
"national psychology'. ' to a complex international problem which 
had its roots firmly planted in history and contemporary 
politics(176) . Moreover, if Fernandez favoured 
"une politique 
ouverte", there was no indication of what this would entail nor 
how it could be achieved. 
Likewise, in the review of Sieburg's book in the same issue, 
Fernandez believed the future Nazi had done the French a great 
service by publishing this book, for it showed, in high 
. relief, where the greatest failings of France were 
(177) 
Once again it was France which had a distorted view of the 
world 
(178) 
. The true threat to 
France and Europe was developing 
in Germany however, according to Raymond Aron, who reflected 
(179) 
upon Fernandez' assessment in Europe Aron believed 
Fernandez had completely misunderstood pacifism, while he 
himself felt that the fundamental cause of the crisis in Germany 
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was economic, not culturai(180). They both attended the "Libres 
Entretiens" at the "Union pour la Write", where the German 
representatives' tendency to be dismissive of Hitler sowed 
the seeds of confusion among French intellectuels, as ex- 
emplified by Fernandez 
(181) 
. The Nazis were increasingly 
able to actively promote such misunderstanding of Germany 
within France, not in any covert, subversive manner, but 
openly, and within prestigious intellectual and political 
. circles 
(182) 
Henceforward the issues of peace and the continuing calls 
for European unity became the central preoccupations in the 
minds of many intellectuals, as attested by the publication 
of the Notre Temps manifesto 
(183) 
. What is more, as Gide 
became obsessed with the Franco-German problem so he began 
to admire the achievements of Soviet Russia(184). In November 
1931 Gide wrote: "Je puis souhaiter le communisme, mais tout 
en reprouvant les affreux moyens que vous nous proposez pour 
l' ob tenir" 
(185) 
. Already 
he was preparing for his support 
of the "Amsterdam-Pleyel" movement . Most interesting, 
186 
however, was the f act that this realization of a desire for 
social change and the simultaneous rejection of revolutionary 
violence coincided . with 
his reading of texts in November's 
NRF. The "Lettres d' ttudiants allemands tues a la guerre" 
were selected from a German edition of letters written by young 
soldiers to their relatives and friends before they were 
killed; they affected Gide deeply c187> . These letters were 
followed by a French "Post-scriptum" in which Paul Desjardins 
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hoped that their publication would demonstrate how the 
Germans had suffered equally in the carnage of the First World 
War; it was a universal appeal to the emotions(188). Once more 
the path was being cleared towards adopting a pro-pacifist stance: 
"La paix est une chose non point revee, mais 
secrete, comme un germe sous des enveloppes; 
(... ) Voilaa quoi le recue. il de ces epaves 
aura servi quant a la Pacification. Autrement, 
a rien"(189). 
In conclusion, Desjardins underlined the bitter irony of the 
letters: the students had had to die before they could, as 
(190) 
Germans, ever be understood . This article appeared in an 
atmosphere of gathering gloom. Significantly enough, even the 
optimistic Thibaudet had emphasised that the chronic flaccidity 
of the "Societe des Nations" and the passivity of "les clercs" 
in finding a new approach had made 1930 to 1931 a very unpropitious 
year indeed. Thibaudet lamented: 
"La Federation Europeenne, si elle se produit, ne 
viendra pas de 1' initiative des homme d' Etat, el le 
sera imposee par l' opinion (... ), par les clercs. 
D' oü le devoir pour les cleres de faire entendre 
a Geneve autre chose... "(191) 
He concluded: 
"Le manque de reaction d'une opinion (... ) a contrj, 
i u 
ä faire de 1'annee 1930-1931, celle qui va de 1'Assemblee 
torpilleuse de septembre dernier a l'Assemblee de la 
semaine prochaine, ait ete depuis dix ans celle oü 
le prestige de Geneve a marque la plus forte baisse. 
Il n'y a presque plus de mystique de la S. D. N. "(192) 
Such evaluations of political ineffectiveness impelled some NRF- 
associated writers towards the formation of the intellectual-led 
Pacifist movement, for which the NRF showed support. 
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In December 1931, Curtius at last had a text published 
in the NRF. This was the first chapter of his book Deutscher Geist 
in Gefahr, and had originally been delivered as a speech in 
Berlin(193) . To the European humanist Curtius, Germany had been 
and was rapidly transforming itself into a society whereby the 
existing culture was becoming redundant. He predicted: 
"Le complet renversement des couches de la nation 
qui s' es t op ere dans les cent dernieres annees nous 
contraint, me semble-t-il, a reconnaitre que l'avenir 
de notre civilisation ne peut plus se realiser sous 
le signe de la culture et de la civilisation 
classiques" (194). 
For Curtius, the death of Hugo von Hofmannsthäl marked the end of 
an era: now, "la jeunesse s' es t emancip. ee depuis longtemps et 
ne lit que ce qui lui es t re commande dans les petites feuilles 
des associations ou des partis politiques" 
(195) 
. Curtius 
identified National-Socialism as the underlying cause of the 
new philistinism(196) . He proceeded to outline 
how the 
"irrational" was becoming fashionable in Germany: "en 
Allemagne on s'efforce aujourd'hui d'atteindre ä une nouvelle 
connaissance de 1'homme"(197). It was his obsession with 
French rationalism which tended to blind Curtius to the 
underlying political and economic changes in Germany which 
had brought about the new irrationalism there. He saw France 
nostalgically as a unified, classical, formalist - oriented 
culture, straddling the French Revolution: 
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"La culture classique du XVIIe siecle est une 
rationalisme es thetique et phi losophique ... (... ) La forme d'existence de ce rationalisme politique 
est la republique democratique. Elle ne s'est 
etablie en France qu'il ya 60 ans, apres bien 
des departs manques, mais cette duree de deux 
generations a suffi pour en faire le patrimoine 
imperissable de la nation" (198). 
Furthermore Curtius believed that French humanism was much closer 
to reality than German humanism. "Son principe directeur 
nest pas l'envol platonicien vers l'ideal mais le choix 
" (199) prudent du milieu juste, ä egale distance des extremes 
wrote Curtius, adulating what could be read effectively as 
a resume of French Radicalism. It was precisely this centrist, 
non-committed, passive attitude which was beginning to trouble 
so many in France at this time, not least Thibaudet himself 
among NRF-associated writers 
(200) 
. Such adulation on Curtius' 
part would have had a very hollow ring in France, particularly 
when he held up as an exemplar Tardieu, who had explained away 
the corruption in the_. "Ous tric Affair" by pointing to the lack 
of culture among the guilty 
(201) 
Another component of French uniqueness identified by Curtius 
was self-sufficiency: "au triple. point de vue politique, economique 
et intellectuel, la France es t un sys teure d' exis tence clos et 
isole" 
(202) 
. Once again, echoing 
Fernandez' critique of French 
insularity, Curtius felt that what might seem to-be universal to 
the French would appear as parochial to outsiders: 
"le Franýais 
(... ) se sent d'abord Franjais, et homme en seconde ligne 
"(203) . In conclusion, after quoting 
Rathenau' 
seulement s 
desire for an "indissoluble alliance" with France, Curtius 
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repeated the same refrain which, as it had become more familiar 
over the previous dozen years, seemed to have become less and 
less practicable in the contemporary situation(204) 
19 32 saw the failure of the final attempts at re-establishing 
equitable relations between France and Germany. Preliminary 
talks at the Geneva disarmament negotiations began in February, 
and Herriot, returned to power in May, presided over the Lausanne 
Conference, where German reparation payments were abandoned for 
good(205). Jacques Bariety and Charles Bloch have documented the 
detail of the last attempt of French and German industrialists to 
settle their countries' differences within the context of the so- 
called "Comite Mayriscn"ýL06). Moreover Hitler began to play down 
his own violent hatred of the French as he had expressed it in 
Mein Kampf, and concentrated his propaganda efforts on the 
intensifying pacifist mood in France 
(207) 
. 
As for Gide, during one of a series of visits to Berlin 
in 1932, he declared himself very pessimistic regarding Franco- 
German reconciliation, and told Heinrich Kessler that 
"le projet de desarmement d'Herriot n'est pas 
serieux, il ne l adepose que pour la galerie, 
dans l' espoir qu'il sera rej ete. Et pourtant, 
un accord etait tout a fait possible entre les 
deux peuples... "(208) 
This was also the beginning of the period during which Gide 
became increasingly interested in the problem of literary exiles 
from Hitler's Germany 
(209) 
Likewise during 1932 , the NRF 
switched its attention to the international Peace Movement and 
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to the debate it provoked, as well as to Gide's declarations 
of sympathy for the Soviet Union(210) All this did not 
detract from the success of the Goethe centenary tribute in 
(211) March 1932, which sold out very rapidly . Paulhan gathered 
the essays of a number of illustri6us writers, including CUrtius, 
Thomas Mann and Gide; the overall tone showed how Goethe was 
admired for his interpretations of the French Enlightenment, 
but Fernandez, in an essay entitled "Reserves", questioned 
the validity of praising Goethe's achievement in 1932212) 
After this, the only article of any substance was Fernandez' 
"Note" on Curtius' book Essai sur la France in July 
(213) 
With the cancellation of reparations on the 19th, however, any 
(214) 
remaining optimism for Curtius' view was quashed for good 
Due primarily to the nature of his intellectual formation, 
Curtius had displayed a clearly sterotyped view of France, a 
(215) 
. With his detected later by Jean Grenierýý 
supporters within the NRF Curtius had ignored or had been 
indifferent for too long to the menace of Nazism and its root 
causes, which were economic, not cultural. 
Apart from a few isolated and short reviews, the NRF 
remained silent on Germany until August 1933, seven months after 
(216) 
Hitler had swept to power on January 30th . Some in the NRF 
circle saw a new war as inevitable, basically due to French 
hypocrisy regarding disarmament(217) . Others, including 
Gide, were driven to protest at the alarming oppression of 
any effective opposition in Germany. Indeed the 
AFAR induced 
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Gide to speak on the matter on March 21st 1933(218) . Here 
Gide inferred that Russian Communism was infinitely preferable 
to Hitler's barbarism 
(219) 
. Germany under the Nazis had become 
the embodiment of a Fascist state and as such, the Franco-German 
question was realigned henceforward with the parallel issue of 
Fascism-Antifascism. The review tended to follow this development, 
which helps explain the fae't that after 1934-1935, having 
continued its interest in the Franco-German debate, "(eile) se 
detourna de l' actualite brillante "(220) . 
In August 1933, the NRF introduced a new rubric "Textes et 
Documents". The first to appear were the "Documents sur le 
National-Socialisme" 
(221) 
. Here extracts from a variety of 
sources were selected, introduced and linked by Brice Parain 
(a communist) and Georges Blumberg (a Jew). Evidently their 
intent was to be as objective as possible, for the authors 
stressed immediately that the National-Socialist movement in 
Germany was widely misunderstood(222) . There followed a brief 
historical outline, in which the crucial events after the 1918 
defeat were the Ruhr occupation, the rationalization of German 
. industry from 1925 and the electoral successes of 1928 and 1930 
(223) 
The early phase of National-Socialism had derived its major 
successes through responding in particular to the agricultural 
crisis, in which Parain and Blumberg detected most of the Nazis' 
strength 
'224 
. Furthermore, underlying 
the anti-industrialism 
was a profound anti-rationalism, which was the subject of the 
(225) 
first of four sections grouping a variety of documents . 
Anti -Semitism was elevated into a 
doctrine by those "Reprouves" 
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who "repoussent avec mefiance les valeurs dites "spirituelles" et ne 
se reclament que de la nation"(226). Secondly, National-Socialism 
had a ready-made mass audience among the unemployed as well as 
the "Reprouves" 
(227) 
. Thirdly, the electoral successes of 1928 
and 1930 were particularly due to peasant support, which 
explained the doctrine of "Le Sang et le Sol" 
(228) 
. Finally, the 
predominance of the agricultural question explained the early 
moves towards what Parain and Blumberg read as a plan for 
disindustrialization. The idealizing of the peasantry signalled 
the Nazis' hatred of the Left as embodied in the proletarianized 
masses, many of whom were unemployed. as a result of the 
rationalization of industry 
(229) 
. Hitler's attitude and policy 
towards industry was still uncertain at the time Parain and 
Blumberg prepared their "dossier", for in their conclusion they 
detected vacillation in the most recent Nazi declarations. What 
was clear was that Nazism was "une revolution contre la raison, 
contre la ville, contre 1'industrie, et. c'est pour avoir mis 
en question les valeurs du rationalisme industrialisateur qu'il 
a remporte son succes politique"(230) 
Gide was particularly pleased by the publication of these 
documents, for they fulfilled the role of the NRF, which was to 
"eclairer impartiellement l'endroit ou l'envers des pensees, 
des sys temes" 
ý231ý 
" Others however, 
like Alix Guillain, violently 
disapproved of the objective treatment Nazism received in the 
hallowed pages of the NRF(232) . On the international scene, 
the Germans withdrew from the ýS . D. N. 
" on October 14th, 1933(233) . 
In Germany, the Leipzig trials underlined the brutality of 
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Hitlerian repression: this provoked protest in France over which 
Gide presided in November, and which led to Gide and Malraux's 
journey to Berlin the following January to plead for Dimitrov's 
release 
(234) 
. At this time there were growing signs of a widening 
gulf at the heart of the NRF regarding Germany: while Gide found 
that "rapprochement" with Hitler was untenable, Schlumberger felt 
France could still negotiate for peace without necessarily 
interfering in Germany's internal affairs(235) . Schlumberger 
(236) 
put his point of view in an "Air du Mois" for January 1934 
Reviewing the confusion of press-opinion on Germany, Schlumberger 
criticized the left for resorting to the old "themes sur la 
. 
barbarie germanique" and for ignoring Hitler's appeals to France 
(237) 
As for the right, the general feeling was that this "last chance" 
(238) 
should not be lost . Schlumberger also noted that there was 
a marked tendency in public opinion to blame the Jews for preventing 
"rapprochement" with Hitler: "l' antisemitisme progresse ä pas tres 
rapides" 
(239) 
. 
"L' opinion oscille, tätonne, dans un extreme 
malaise", concluded Schlumberger(240) . 
The difference of opinion between Gide and Schlumberger 
highlighted once again that the issues of Franco-German relations 
and the Fascism-Antifascism opposition overlapped to an increasing 
extent. Moreover, the chronic confusion and misinterpretation 
on the French side made it ever more necessary to penetrate the 
smokescreen surrounding Germany. In February 1934, the NRF 
produced what was ostensibly a special number on Gobineau; but 
., ,º 
(241) 
there were two additional texts and the usual Airs du Mois . 
Apart from the second part of Giraudoux's Combat avec 1'gnge, 
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Paulhan inserted an extremely important essay by Trotsky(242) 
Lacouture points out that Malraux, at this time a sympathizer 
with Trotsky, gave the exiled Russian the occasion to publish 
(243) 
this essay in the NRF . The article was dated 10th June 
1933, at Prinkipo, but a paragraph had been appended dated 2nd 
November, 1933, while Trotsky was in France. There was no 
doubt for him that National-Socialism had prospered on the 
(244) 
disillusion of the "petite-bourgeoisie" . By exploiting 
the familiar grievances, the Nazis had managed to weld the 
disinherited petty bourgeoisie together in a common hatred 
of the proletariat(245) . Shunning Marxism, materialism and 
rationalism, the Nazis turned to racial theory to elevate the 
nation above History 
(246) 
. Trotsky wrote: 
"Hitler a dü emprunter 
de seconde main les ides du racisme a un f ranýais (... ) , le 
comte de Gobineau", as though to underscore the relevance of 
. including this essay in a tribute to the racial theorist 
(247) 
Continuing his analysis, Trotsky believed that once in 
power, Nazism was no longer "le gouvernement de la petite 
bourgeoisie. Au contraire, c'est la dictature la plus 
impitoyable du capital monopolis ateur"(248) . The inevitable outcome 
was imperialism - "mission historique reelle de 
la dictature 
fasciste -', 
(249) 
, and Trotsky's rhetorical question 
concluded 
the original article: "L'orbite politique des nazzis 
(sic) 
aboutira a cette alternative: la guerre ou 
la revolution?  
(250) 
. 
In retrospect, Trotsky's prognosis was remarkably accurate 
in 
pointing to the next European war: the November 
1933 addendum 
ended thus: 
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"Le delai qui nous se-pare d'une nouvelle 
catastrophe europeenne est determine par 
le temps necessaire au rearmement de l'Allemagne. 
I1 ne s'agit pas de mois, mais il ne s'agit pas 
non plus de dizaines d'annees. Quelques annees 
suffisent pour que 1'Europe se trouve de nouveau 
precipitee dans la guerre, si Hitler n'est pas 
arrete ä temps par les forces internes de 
1'Allemagne elle-meme"(251). 
A few pages further on, Paulhan included an "Air du Mois" 
by Drieu which celebrated "l'Allemagne, ce beau monstre 
industriel qu'avait choye le capitalisme international... "(252). 
This text, whose poetic prose reflected Drieu's idealized 
conception of National-Socialism(253) , heralded a longer text 
which appeared in March, alongside CrEmieux's analysis of 
(254) 
France's internal problems . Drieu's impressions were 
based on a recent journey to Berlin; he found that the 
overwhelming atmosphere was one of material poverty and 
sacrifice which dissembled "une richesse morale" and in which 
the Germans took great pride 
(255) 
. Drieu hinself rejoiced in 
this, and affirmed that "le fascis. me n'est pas de la crotte 
comme se contentent de dLagnostiquer sommairement la plupart 
des anti-fascistes... " 
256) 
. Drieu believed that the Nazis 
has learnt much from the Russian Revolution, and that Socialism 
was "en fermentation dans le monde f as cis te" 
( 25 7). At the same 
time, capitalism was being recuperated into the Nation-State: 
"Le capitalisme epuise a besoin de 1' Etat pour le so, utenir: 
il se livre ä 1'Etat fasciste. La mecanisation du capitalisme 
aboutit a son etatisoný258ý ati The old structures were 
in the 
process of being supplanted by "le statisme", 
"depuis le principe 
du racisme, jusqu'ä cette conception de la -societe(... 
) rangee 
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en corporations" 
(259) 
. Drieu saw European capitalism and 
socialism as having entered their final phase of decline: 
he believed there were two lessons to be learnt from this 
process. Firstly, all efforts and hopes had to be made under 
(260) 
the sign of a new Stoicism . Secondly, Germany was a 
microscosm of "L'Europe trop faible pour porter plus avant 
le capitalisme daps le monde, trop faible aussi pour accueillir 
(261) By le socialisme... y Nay 1934, Drieu felt 
confident enough in fascism to write: 
"Or moi, je suis s&duit par le courage des 
fascistes (... ) . Je veux esperer encore qu' ils 
emp loieront ce courage a faire le socialisme. 
Car si les fascistes ne font pas le socialisme, 
qui le fera? "(262) 
Drieu, however, did not celebrate the autodafes in Hitler's 
Germany. In June 1934, the NRF drew attention to the establishment 
of a "Bibliotheque allemande des 
livres brüles" under the 
auspices of, among others, Gide, Heinrich Mann, Rolland and 
(263) 
H. G. Wells Moreover Felix Bertaux examined German 
propaganda efforts in the literary domain, whereby 
it was 
insinuated that "real" German literature - that is, approved 
(264) 
by Goebbels - was being deliberately withheld 
from the French . 
The Nazis were operating a "renversement des valeurs" 
in their 
autodafes, firstly in the name of morality, secondly 
in the 
name of racial purity, and finally in order to replace all 
those intellectual values which did not absolutely conform 
(265) 
to Nazi orthodoxy The Nazis were effectively committing 
ýý the intellectual treason par excellence" 
(266) 
. 
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It was against this background that Paulhan began the 
serialization of Chamson's novel, L'Annee des Vaincus(267) 
Written after his own journey to Germany, Chamson opened his 
novel with a description of how five German diesel engineers 
interact with the French, in their "Village negre". Initially 
there is much reciprocal sympathy and understanding between 
the main protagonists, especially the central French character 
Carriere and the two Germans Karl and Ludwig 
(268) 
. The 
"instituteur" Martin, however, is clearly worried by the advent 
of Hitler, and the Germans can give no satisfactory answer to 
his fears: "Mais cet Hitler? I1 va faire la dictature? " 
(269) 
When Carriere is sent to collect some engine parts from Stuttgart 
in the company of Karl and Ludwig, it becomes clear that Ludwig 
is in fear of his life if he returns - to Germany, because of his 
communist activities. Carriere, however, is willing to turn a 
blind eye to Hitler; it is at the Germans' insistence that they 
explain what is going on in Germany 
(270) 
. The journey in the 
lorry across the border is described in such a manner as to 
highlight the absurdities of history(271). Once in Germany, 
however, Carriere's eyes are opened. Apart from being repelled 
by the constant presence of parading S. A. troops, Carriere 
is 
worried when Ludwig disappears and is replaced 
by a Nazi, 
Rudolf 
(272) 
. At the end of 
the novel, Carriere, back in France, 
reluctantly tells his friends about the real Germany: 
"Quelle 
sale annee (... ) Deux 3... 1 et 9 ... Deux 
3. Ce sont les 3 
qui 
portent 
malheur? " he wonders. After such 
hope 
and such propitious beginnings, 
Carrie-re says: "J'ai peur 
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de tout, de la guerre qui peut revenir, de la misere. J'ai 
peur de cette annee, de celles qui vont suivre. On est tous 
des vaincus, maintenant"(274) . Although Chamson's novel was 
severely weakened by its stock characters and sterQotyped 
images, the central points were clear. It was necessary to 
travel to Germany to fully appreciate the menace of Nazism 
and the implication was that Fascism should be resisted 
at all costs, for the inevitable result of its gathering strength 
was war 
(275) 
. 
"En tete' of the same number, Paulhan inserted the first 
of two extracts from a work by Andre Suares, "Vues sur 1'Europe"(276) . 
Those familiar with Suares work could have remembered the series 
. of anti-German polemics he had produced twenty years before(277) 
Benda' s anti-Germanism seemed mild by comparison: Suares' 
unbridled vituperation provoked Schlumberger to protest in the 
review itself 
(278). 
Suares fulminated: 
"Vous vous etonnez de l'horreur que 1'Allemagne 
nous inspire depuis deux ans. (... ) Vous n' etes 
donc pas sensible a la Barbarie?. La voici qui 
va du Rhin ä la mer du Japon; et celle de Berlin 
l' emporte sur celle de Moscou parce quelle se 
vante d' y etre contraire" 
(279 j. 
And again: 
"Je ne suis pas suspect si je reconnais dans l'Allemagne 
presente la perfection de la Barbarie (... ) les brutes. 
Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, toutes les sortes de Hesse (Sie) 
et de Rosenberg triomphent dans le plus vi l orgueil 
de la violence et de la haine ... 
"(280). 
Although Richard is right to stress that Suares castigated all 
totalitarianisms, Schlumberger believed that such concentrated 
abuse was out of place in the NRF 
(ZSl) 
. 
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In 1935, the NRF was consolidating its anti-fascist, pro- 
Popular Front image. Most references to Germany were now 
submerged by or subordinated to the Fascism-Antifacism 
opposition. The publication of Malraux's Le Temps du Mepris 
(282) 
should be seen in this light . Not only did the book act 
as a counter-balance to Drieu, it should also be remembered that 
since their journey to Berlin in January 1934, Gide and Malraux 
were instrumental in organizing the "Comite Thaelmann"(283) . 
Certainly Lacouture, quoting Malraux's opinion ("un navet"), has viewed 
Le Temps du Mepris as an "oeuvre de circonstance", dedicated 
. Moreover, this as it is to 
"les camarades allemands"284ý 
publication occurred against a background of increasing tension 
on the international scene. The Saar plebiscite (January 13th 
1935) and Hitler's restoration of military service in Germany 
(March 16th) underlined the Nazis' warlike intentions. Julien Benda, 
by now a convinced anti-fascist, favourably reviewed Germanist 
Edmond Vermeil's book in March 1935(285) . The commonplaces 
which had misled the French public for so long were, enthused 
Benda, fortunately absent from these pages. Quoting from a 
speech made by "un chef naziste" reported in Le Temps, Benda 
seemed mystified by the continuing, blatant self-deception 
of "certains de nos demagogues", who insisted that Franco-German 
understanding was still possible, 
"d'es lors que chacun est 
(286) dispose ä prendre en consideration 1'ideal de son voisin. 
In the May issue, Benda referred specifically to the 
(287) 
restoration of German military service on 
March 16th . 
Here Benda anticipated his call for "l'antifascisme patriotique" 
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in his June open letter celebrating Paul Rivet's election 
(288) 
, 
He found that the . pacifism of the CVIA was dangerously 
weak in its policy of "peace of all costs" with Germany. Benda 
dismissed the objection that the refusal of the French to disarm 
had caused the Germans to re-arm, and stressed that "l'Allemagne 
(289) 
nourrit des revendications territoriales" . Moreover he 
repeated his long-held conviction that Germany had deserved 
the "humiliation" of the Versailles Treaty, because''L'Allemagne 
a voulu la guerre (... ) et 1'a perdue" 
(290) 
. Benda concluded 
by attacking the Radicals, particularly for allowing the likes 
of Henri de Kerillis and Maurras to usurp the defence of 
Western civilization: 
"La verite es t que ces gen. s--lä (i. e. the Radicals) 
ont perdu tout sentiment de la France de la Revolution, 
toute permeabilite ä la moindre idee generale et ne 
s' emeuvent plus que de miserables interets electoraux" 
(291). 
The Radicals' incompetence in foreign policy had thus provoked 
Benda to savage the Party which allegedly represented the ideals 
he stood for: his disillusion drove him to favour the Popular 
Front and then the Communists in defending Republican ideals. 
As Duroselle has written, "assez peu d' ecrivains f ranpis 
connaissent 1'Allemagne contemporaine, si Von excepte quelques 
grands germanistes, tels Edmond Vermeil, Robert d'Harcourt, ... 
(etc. )"(292) In the NRF, two "Airs du Mois" by the economist 
Fran jois. Perroux signalled the beginning of a long period of 
silence regarding Nazi, Germany which lasted, indeed, until 
November 1938, when the NRF responded to the crisis provoked 
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by Munich 
(293) 
Perroux's two texts were preparatory notes 
(294) for a forthcoming book, Les Mythes Hitleriens 
, It was 
necessary to experience the country's achievements at first- 
hand, argued Perroux(295) , but his text itself mythologized 
Nazi Germany. For instance, he wrote: 
"Le Franýais se trompe quand il applique a 
l'Allemagne l'idee q. u'il a de la nation. 
Parler du "nationalisme" allemand, c'est 
tomber daps un contre-sens perpetuel. Bien 
plus vivante, agissant: e, decisive est la 
notion de Volk. Le peuple allemand es t la 
fealite supreme, et non la nation allemande" (296). 
In retrospect it is difficult to disagree with Mysyrowicz 
evaluation: "Perroux, a force de chercher ä comprendre le nazisme, 
s'en faisait (... ) jusqu'ä un certain point 1'avocat"297). 
The nature of Nazism had become such that is was impossible 
to fully understand the phenomenon without subscribing to its 
own mythic structures: by accepting them, it was difficult to 
avoid supporting Fascism. Given Paulhan's views, and how close 
the leading personnel of the NRF were to supporting the nascent 
antifascist Popular Front in 1935, silence was the only real 
alternative to the unwitting propagation of Nazi ideology. 
The view of Felix Bertaux, writing his penultimate review in the 
NRF in January 1937, helps to explain this attitude: 
"Il faut avouer que depuis trois ans nous avons 
perdu contact avec 1'Allemagne. Sur tous les 
terrains, et en particulier sur celui des idees. 
La politique du national-socialisme, tant ä 
l' interieur qu' ä 1' exterieur, nous a mis dans 
un etat de choc. (... ) On dirait que le monde 
allemand es t devenu l' autre monde, une sorte de 
f atalite qu'il faut accepter ou rejeter en bloc, 
sans penetration possible"(298). 
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Germany had become the "other world", in a dualist universe: 
understanding was impossible because Fascism was unacceptable. 
France and Germany had again become adversaries, and it was 
only a matter of time before war broke out. 
Despite his efforts to re-establish the literary primacy 
of the NRF, Jean Paulhan had been powerless to prevent the 
intrusion of the Franco-German question into the review; the 
long-standing interest in Germany of such as Riviere, Gide and 
Schlumberger outweighed his authority. His experience made 
him acutely aware of the risks incurred by the NRF in its 
making statements which were evidently regarded as representative 
if not authoritative, on a question which effectively belonged 
to the domain of international politics and diplomacy. Its 
early stance against French intellectual Nationalism marked the 
NRF thereafter as a review syupathetic to Germany, but at the 
same time it tended to propagate the pre-eminence of French 
culture. Indeed, by virtue of the very zeal and idealism of 
its contributors from both sides of the Rhine, the NRF, albeit 
in good faith, helped perpetuate a deceptive and sometimes 
dangerously naive approach to reciprocal understanding. The 
foundations of the problem were planted in the political and 
economic substructure, not in the cultural superstructure of 
each nation. It was only after History had forced the review 
and its contributors into coming to terms with the true menace 
of Hitler, and only after they had begun to interpret the 
German problem from an antifascist standpoint, that the NRF 
adopted a more penetrating and realistic attitude. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
"The NRF, the Soviet Union and the "engagement" of Andre Gide, 
1925 to 1938". 
"Peut-etre entrons-nous auj ourd' hui dans un age 
collectiviste" (Jacques Riviere, NRF September 
1919, p. 506). 
"Dans 1' etablissement de la societe sovietique, 
(je vois) une illimitee promesse d'avenir" 
(Andre Gide, Litterature engagee, p. 24, text 
dated 21st March, 1933). 
"Si Von prend parti, aussitot le parti vous prend" 
(Andre Gide, NRF April 1935, p. 500). 
"Je doute qu'en aucun autre pays d' auj ourd'hui, füt-ce 
l'Allemagne de Hitler, l'esprit soit moins libre, plus 
courbe, plus craintif (terrorise), plus vassalise" 
(Andre Gide, Retour de 1'URSS, 1936, p. 59). 
"Le desespoir de Gide, le desespoir qui 1'a conduit 
au communisme, le . 
desespoir d'etre communis to sont 
egalement etranges" (Jean Paulhan to Marcel Jouhandeau, 
BD. 3832,1936). 
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Although the relationship of France and Germany determined 
and dominated the course of Inter-War history, the nature of 
Franco-Soviet relations and the image of the Soviet Union 
as it was perceived in France were hardly less important(l). 
In particular, as Germany veered towards fascism in the early 
1930's, the influence of the USSR and its ideological, political 
and (later) material support for anti-fascists was such that 
Comintern policy led directly to hastening the formation of the 
Popular Front in France 
(2) 
. Communist front-organizations 
found willing adherents among French intellectuals, many of whom 
readily became fellow-travellers: with Andre Gide and Andre Malraux 
among the most eminent supports of the Soviet effort, the NRF, for 
a time, inevitably followed the same path 
(3) 
. 
In the case of Germany, it had been the intellectuals (with 
the NRF in the vanguard) who had made the first moves towards 
"rapprochement". While Poincare and the Right staunchly resisted, 
reconciliation and occupied the Ruhr, Gide and Ernest Robert Curtius 
represented those on both sides of the Rhine who favoured 
"detente". With regard to Russia, however, the reverse was 
true. It was the Radicalist politician Herriot who initiated 
recognition of the Soviet state, after first travelling there. 
Apart from a handful of pro-Soviet French "revolutionaries" who 
had been in Russia during and after the upheavals and who stayed 
there, intellectuals only began to satisfy their curiosity and 
(4) 
travel to Russia after official recognition in October 
1924. 
There are two important reasons for this. First, geographically, 
France is very distant from Russia; located beyond Germany and 
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Poland, the land of the Tzars was considered to be in Asia 
rather than Eastern Europe. Secondly, historically-speaking, 
Russia had been an ally bef ore the war and was considered as 
having betrayed France in particular and the Allies in general 
by concluding the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918(5) . This 
"betrayal" of the Tzarist alliance was bad enough but what was 
even worse, the Bolsheviks had perpetrated it. As a direct 
consequence France launched into intervention in Eastern Europe, 
by not only sending French troops into Poland under the command 
of Weygand, but also by backing the White Armies of Wrangel(6) . 
Faced with the resolve of the Red Army, the policy of intervention 
failed: the French only achieved the opposite of the desired effect. 
Maxime Mourin puts it thus: 
"Loin d'avoir nui au bolchevisme, (la France) avait 
confere au gouvernement sovietique, qui n! avait reu 
aide militaire ni subsides de personne, un caractere 
national et j acobin que lui-meme n' avait pas redherche et 
qui lui assurait, avec un plus large appui populaire, 
les chances de la duree" (7) . 
Among the many young intellectuals returning to his studies 
of ter the war, Brice Parain has admirably described the atmosphere 
which conditioned French perceptions of Russia at this time, against 
the background of extreme political and military hostility. He 
writes: 
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"Quand j' ai commence ä faire du russe, en 1920, 
ce qui se disait chez nous, c' est que nous etions 
les gens les plus raisonnables, les plus intelligents 
du monde et que la Russie etait un pays de foes. On 
avait eu la victoire, on avait evite la Revolution, 
on vivait comme il faut, on touchait des dommages 
pour la moindre chaise demolie ou pillee pendant la 
guerre, on etait des rois partout ä 1' etranger, lä- 
bas c'etait le genre famine, massacres, theories, 
tout cela ne faisant d'ailleurs que continuer les 
extravagances des boyards, qui, auparavant, n'avaient 
pas arrete de se saouler et de se ruiner aux cartes, 
de perdre toutes leurs batnilles, de se signer pour 
un oui ou pour un non... "( 8) . 
Parairi clearly places his own intellectual formation in a context 
which dated from before 1914. He detects two primary, influential 
currents whose juxtaposition merits reflexion: 
"Avant la guerre de 1914, il s'etait forme un peu 
partout en France des groupements de jeunes rebelles 
ayant des doctrines plus ou moms claires, cartes, plus 
ou moins rigoureuses, mais tous plus on moins sous 
lt inf luen ce de l' un ou 1' autre des nihi lisme5 Blab ores 
au XIXe siecle, tous obscurement decides a changer 
la vie, done. I1 n'y en a guere-eu que deux qui 
ont reussi a donner un mouvement d'ampleur 
internationale, le parti bolchevique, qui 
representait le dernier messianisme a structure 
politique, et la nouvelle gnose, la NRF chez nous. 
Cette sorte de prophetisme, ne dans le symbolisme, 
incapable de s'en affranchir, enseigne ä rechercher 
le salut individuel dans le creation litteraire et 
artistique des formes a priori de la liberte"(9). 
These comments imply a recognition of the essential and 
fundamental 
non-conformism of the NRF, a fact which assumes its 
full importance 
when considering the pronouncements which Gide made 
later in the 
review on the Soviet achievement. 
During this time too, however, the mythic image of revolutionary 
Russia as the focus of hope for a great many Western 
intellectuals 
(and potential fellow-travellers) was formed and 
began to evolve. 
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Jules Romains' fictional character Clanricard expresses a view 
common to many who were spellbound by Cette grande lueur ä l'Est: 
"Je ne suis pas communiste (... ) sur bien des 
points, je me sens meine tres eloigne des theses 
communistes (... ). Je crois plus a la revolution 
russe qu'au communisme, plus a l'elan qu'elle 
incarne qua la doctrine qu'elle pretend appliquer. 
Ce qui m'attire, moi, c'es t l'idee qu'il, se degense 
la-bas une force de renouvellement de creation, une 
enthousiasme, une foi en l'avenir de 1' homme, un 
heroisme, parmi peut-etre des exces terribles... (10) 
j'ai envie malgre moi d'en approcher, d'y participer" 
Cland card's admiration is typical of the "je-ne-suis-pas-communiste, 
mais... " attitude which prevailed in varying degrees throughout 
the Inter-War period. Moreover, Romain s' title (fette grande 
lueur... ) is highly significant when considering the fellow- 
travellers' perception of the Soviet experiment as somehow an 
historical extension of the "Enlightenment" 
(11) 
. This interpretation 
easily found its political counterpart in the leaders of the PCF, 
who portrayed themselves as "Jacobins" and who came to be perceived 
thus by such as Julien Benda, that staunch defender of the ideals 
. of the French Revolution 
(12) 
Once the NRF had resumed after the war, Riviere, as part of 
his skirmish with the "Parti de 1' Intelligence", acknowledged the 
fact of the Bolshevik revolution in an important article, 
"La 
Decadence de la Liberte"(13). Riviere pondered the notion that 
liberalism and liberty were decaying concepts, particularly 
within the context of the War: "C'est pour la 
liberte du monde 
que l' intelligence franýais s'est fait pendant plus 
de quatre 
ans decimer" 
(14). 
Riviere ended the first part of his meditation 
on liberty with a comment which has 
far-reaching implications. 
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"La liberte n'aura peut-etre ete qu'une phase 
dans 1' evolution de 1'humanite, De meme que 
1'existen ce humaine semble avoir revetu d'abord 
la forme collective, de meme il est possible qu'elle 
tende maintenant ä la reprendre. Peut-etre entrons- 
nous aujourd'hui dans un age collectiviste"(15). 
Yet Riviere's analysis was constructed according to the same 
dubious "psychologisme" which he had applied to L'Allemand 
(16) 
Riviere believed that all Lenin and Trotsky had had to do was 
exploit the instinctive "collectivisme" - or sovietism - of the 
'l me russe" 
ý17ý 
: "le bplchevisme est 1' epanouissement a peine 
organise, ä peine systematique, des instincts russes"(18) . 
French, humanistic individualism was diametrically opposed to 
this socialist collectivism, but the Russian experience was proving 
to be an invaluable lesson for socialism: "Grace aux Russes commence 
) de reali te" 
(19) 
. In a remarkably pour le socialisme une ere (... 
bold statement for the time, Riviere concluded thus : 
"I1 faut voir 
est vrai que 
d' of f reuses 
bolcheviste, 
et que, par 
socialiste a 
les choses en face: meme s'il 
le peuple russe subit en ce moment 
niseres, meme s'il repent d'etre 
un fait subsiste: c'est qu'il fest, 
lui, en un point du globe, lt existence 
commence"(20). 
As Richard has said, in confronting the fact of the Russian 
revolution "(Riviere) es t oblige de f afire part 
(... ) d'une 
sympathie qui va a 1'encoftre des mots 
d'ordre de L'Action francaise 
et des nationalistes" 
(21) 
. Antiboishevism was already 
the lynch- 
pin of extreme Nationalist doctrine. 
Henri Gheon, a founder-member of the NRF, and recently 
converted to both Catholicism and the 
Action franýaise, counter- 
. attacked in November on behalf of the 
"Parti de l' Intelligence. 
(22) 
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His primary belief was that "le monde entier a interet a la 
restauration de 1' esprit franýais, ferment, moteur, animateur 
de la seule civilisation que nous regarde (... ) , celle des 
Occidentaux' 
23) 
, and it was in the light of of this that 
Gheon proceeded to examine Riviere's view. Gheon contradicted 
Riviere's experience by emphasising that most French combatants 
had seen the Russians as having prolonged the war "sous pretexte 
de "vider" le tsar' 
(24) 
. Moreover, Gheon stressed that Bolshevism 
was not confined to Russia: "il es t ici, a notre porte (... ) et 
dej a nos voisins 1' imitent , 
(25) 
. In the f ace of this supposed 
threat from Germany, France had to strive to re-impose its 
political and cultural hegemony in Europe, "(dans) le sens le 
plus franSais, le plus universel, because "le monde attend de 
nous des directives ep rouvees, non des hardiesses sans lendemain. 
Tout le res to es t conf usion, contradiction, asiatisme"(26) . This 
text signalled the beginning of the end of Gheon's contributions 
to the NRF; even Gide, although he congratulated Gheon on the quality 
. of his prose, felt now that they fundamentally disagreed 
(27) 
Yet Schlumberger too had only been prevented from signing 
the "Parti de 1' Intelligence" manifesto by his Protestantism: 
essentially he was as antipathetic to Bolshevism as Gheon(28) . 
This was confirmed by the stance he adopted against Gide's and 
Riviere's acknowledgement of Dadaism, which, wrote Schlumberger, 
transformed "un canular" into "un evenement litteraire"ý29ý. 
Particularly Riviere's August article was highly inappropriate, 
Schlumberger believed, coinciding with Weygand's intervention 
(30) 
in Poland . Gheon agreed: 
he wrote to Schlumberger: 
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"... 1'intronation de Dada a la NRF est dans Vordre, 
et celle-ci coquettera avec le bolchevisme jusqu'au 
jour oü la bande du Journal du Peuple occu era 
militairement les bureaux de la rue Madame"(31). 
Thus there was considerable animosity towards Bolchevism within 
the NRF during this period before recognition of the Soviet State. 
One result of the Revolution was the emigration of White 
Russians(32). Among these was Boris de Schloezer, whom Riviere 
invited to contribute to the review from 1921. His particular 
sphere of interest was music, and he provided the "Chroniques 
musicales" throughout the Inter-War period(33) . Yet de Schloezer 
was also well-equipped to talk of Russian philosophy and literature, 
and did much to introduce the work of Leon Shestov into France(39) 
He also translated some of Dostoevsky's unknown work into French, 
of especial importance to Andre Gide, who was writing and delivering 
lectures for the centenary of the Russian author during late 1921 
and 1922(35) . De Schloezer's attitude conformed well to that of the 
NRF, at least as conceived by Riviere: in a book review of March 
1922, he displayed an ambivalence whereby he felt the reader of 
the work in question - "Mon Journal sous 14 Terreur" - learnt 
as much about the author as about the Revolution 
(36) 
. De Schloezer 
wrote: 
"L' accusation la plus terrible qu'on ait pu porter 
contre le regime bolchevis to c' es t d' avoir "avili 
les ämes". Sous l' action de la faim, du froid, de 
la terreur, les esprits se debiliterent (... ) __ 
Mme. Hippius ne put echapper a la contagion... "(37) . 
De Schloezer did not allow himself to be "avili" : as he pointed 
out, the diary had been written in 1919; it was now 1922, the 
beginning of the "New Economic Policy". Moreover, in April that 
- 2266 - 
year the Genoa Conference and the Russo-German Treaty of 
Rapallo signalled the beginnings of international recognition 
of Soviet Russia(38) . Herriot was "le premier honme p oli tique 
(39) a oser se rendre chez les Soviets", as Kupfermau puts it . 
There is no doubt some truth in the assertion that "Herriot voit 
ce qu'il veut voir: l' union Sovietique convertie au radicalisme, 
abjurant les erreurs du communisme de guerre, decouvrant les 
vertus de 1' initiative privee" 
(40) 
. This journey paved the 
way towards French recognition in October 1924, of ter the "Cartel 
des 5auches" victory of May 11th that year(41) . Herriot and 
Anatole de Monzie then set up a Commission to investigate the 
vexed question of Franco-Russian debts, and, in October 1925, 
de Monzie employed Brice Parain "pour un Centre de Documentation 
Russe"(42). By the time his various missions to Russia ended 
in 1927, Parain had become a communist; through the Education 
Ministry in Paris he knew Jean Paulhan, who then introduced Parain 
into the Gailimard publishing house 
(43) 
. 
After official recognition in 1924, Gallimard exploited 
the new atmosphere of "detente" with Russia and established 
two very important collections under the direction of_Boris de 
Schloezer. The first was "Les Classiques russes" launched in 1925, 
(44) 
and the second "les Jeunes russes" in 1926 Gallimard and 
the "Editions Sociales Internationales" were the only two 
publishing-houses to have such collections. Boris Pilniak's 
L'Annee clue opened the 1926 collection. In 1934 the NRF 
publicists boasted that 
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"Les editions de la NRF (... ) ont ete les 
premieres ä publier les jeunes ecrivains 
sovietiques, (et) scnt restees les seules 
ä continuer sys tematiquement une collection 
de la litterature sovietique... "(45). 
Not only was the NRF renowned for its interest in young Soviet 
literature, the "Documents Bleus" collection also carried some 
interesting titles 
(46) 
. The NRF, or certainly the publishing- 
house, had considerable interest in presenting the Soviet Union 
favourably. 
As Paulhan assumed the editorship of the NRF in 1925, in the 
USSR the policy of "Socialism in One Country" was being adopted; 
the risk of world revolution seemed to have diminished. In spite 
of the hardening anti-sovietism accompanying the return to power 
of Poincare in August 1926 
(47), 
a growing number of French 
intellectuals were making the journey to Russia. Most of the 
important "voyages ä la mode" 
(48) 
occurred between mid-1926 
and the end of 1927, and, for the first time since Riviere's 
articles and de Schloezer's reviews, the NRF began to devote space 
to treating the Russian question. One way in which the image of 
Russia was distorted is demonstrated by the fact that Stalin's 
instigation of the first Five-Year Plan dramatically displaced 
the NEP at the end of 1927. The false picture which ensued was 
thus partly brought about by the interval between the journeys 
of the French and their published accounts. 
The most illustrious pair to make the journey at this time 
were Luc Durtain and Georges Duhamel: "ils se lient d' amitie avec 
des Russes de bonne compagnie et reviennent enchantes'', writes 
(49) 
Kupferman . Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of 
the October 
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Revolution, Paulhan inserted the first fifty pages or so from 
Durtain's forthcoming book in the NRF for October 1927(50) . 
Durtain's text was highly impressionistic, dedicated as it was 
to artist Franz Masereel. Durtain asked the reader to imagine 
he was accompanying him in the railway compartment on the journey 
East. At the end of the text in the NRF. he apostrophized 
his reader: 
"Voyageur, ref lechis. (... ) Oü situer ce Moscou 
d' auj ourd'hui et le pays dont il es t le resume 
et la capitale? Ni en Europe, tu viens de la 
constater. Ni hors d'Europe, tu 1' avais reconnu. 
Cet amalgame, unique au monde, de nouveaute- hardie 
et d' habitudes archaiques... L' Autre Europe" (51) . 
For Durtain Russia was another world where the visitor (and by 
extension the reader) had to suspend their occidental disbelief, 
a requirement which applied also to the political question. The 
designation L' Autre Europe was pref erab. ie '. to 
"Les_ 
. mots 
URSS et Russie (qui) vehiculent en eux 
tant de passions politiques! Quelles que puissent 
etre celles que tu partages, un nom frais ne peut- 
il t'aider ä les mettre un temps ä l' ecart: m'aider 
aussi a oublier les miennes, au cas ou j'en possederais 
sans le savoir? " (52) . 
Essentially Durtain saw the new system in Russia as a new humanism: 
even the way his book is written and constructed demonstrates his 
liberal, humanist optic. The new Russia was "un motif de plus 
d'aimer et de redouter l'homme. Une fa9on de plus de le 
Connaltre" 
(53) 
Through this pre-publication Gallimard no doubt wished to 
exploit the literary "evenement" of that summer and autumn, 
the publication of Duhamel's version of the journey, Le Voyage de 
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Moscou(54) . Duhamel praised communism in Russia, but argued 
for its avoidance in France by reformism. His position provided 
a perfect example of what David Caute has called "remote control 
radicalism", involving commitment "at a distance' 
(55) 
. Duhamel 
applied the "convenient double standard" of the Western liberal 
idealist, a process which distinguishes the fellow traveller's 
commitment from the communist's "because his disillusion with 
Western society is less radical, less total... "ý56ý. On August 
1st 1926, Leautaud noted that "Les Nouvelles Litteraires publient 
par morceaux le Voyage de Moscou de Duhamel. C'est le document 
sensationnel annonce ... C' es t mou, fade, delaye" 
(57) 
. All in 
all, the implication was that communism was admirable in Russia, 
but not applicable to France 
(58) 
. 
In the December NRF, the leading book-review was Andre Therive's 
article on Duhamel(59). The rather peculiar -choice of Therive 
may well be explained by his growing involvement with "ouvrierisme" 
or populism at this time 
(60). 
In any case, Therive pin-pointed 
and attacked Duhamel's centrist position: 
"on croit generalement que le livre de Duhamel 
mecontente les ennemis du bolchevisne. Mais, 
a en croire des temoigna es forts stirs, il en a 
mecontente les tenants"(b1). 
He berated Duhamel for repeating exactly what he wanted to see: 
"il incline ä un fatalisme his torique qui accepte les evolutions 
et meme les revolutions parce qu'elles ne sont bien jugees que 
longtemps apres ... 
(61) 
. Duhamel was displaying 
intellectual 
bad faith when he showed the USSR such "indulgence", "prudence" 
and "timidite scrupuleuse 
"(63) In a critique which anticipates 
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David Caute's, Thrive squarely placed the blame on the French 
tradition and on liberalism for their tendency to exculpate 
Soviet tyranny, which Duhamel barely mentioned 
(64) 
: "Qu' on le 
veuille on non, la tradition franýaise aide lä oü elle 
penetre, le liberalisme d'esprit et de fait"(65) . 
This criticism is only one sample among many attracted by 
Duhainel's book(66) . Grasset then published Fabre-Luce's 
Russie 1927, a work which immediately took issue with Duhamel: 
Fabre-Luce wrote - 
"Je reproche ä l'auteur du Voyage de Mos cou de 
n' avoir pas marqu e plus vigoureu. sement 1' opposition 
morale (... ) 
6qu 
i sep are 1' intelligence libre du 
communisme 1 
Reviewing this work in February 1928, Drieu felt that Fabre- 
Luce showed much promise as a politician 
(68) 
. This is attributable 
to the way Drieu detected a similar political disposition to his 
own: 
"Son pre critique du monde communiste decele un 
pessimisme qui au fond de son coeur ne doit pas 
desarmer non plus devant la France" 
(69) 
. 
Fabre-Luce called the USSR "cette Amerique qui n' a pas re ussi" 
l7() 
; 
Fahre-Luce's journey had indeed coincided with the NEP , but now, 
in 1928, the first Five-Year Plan was beginning to sweep away the 
"petit-bourgeois" Nepmen. 
Fernandez' review-article of Durtain's book provides a 
third example of how Soviet communism was represented in the 
West(71) . Fernandez believed there was no better book on modern 
Russia, because Durtain himself was such a seasoned traveller and 
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could easily compensate for the "curiosity" and "fear" which 
characterised the shortcomings of so many others' journeys. 
Fernandez displayed his own humanism when he compared Durtain 
and Fab re-Luce : 
"M. Fabre-Luce, qui fonde sur la "liberte de l'esprit" 
ses critiques sommaires du bolchevisme, devraic72ý 
apprendre de M. Durtain le secret de ce11e-ci" . 
Durtain's book succeeded because he only depicted reality as it 
presented itself to him; it was truly objective(73) . By singling 
out and praising. Durtain's emphasis on Soviet vitality, Fernandez 
was already unconsciously anticipating his belief in the necessity 
for change in France's internal political affairs from 19 30 . 
Commenting on this first phase of liberal reportage on Soviet 
Russia, Kupfermau writes: 
"11 est vrai qu'un aller-retour suffit pour 
r_apporter en France une certain image de la 
Russie. Chacun a la sienne, on s'en doutait 
un peu. Partis le meme ete (... ) Duhamel et 
Fabre-Luce reviennent avec des certitudes bien 
differentes. Le processus est biers connu, 
depuis que les Franc ais ant perdu leurs derniers 
pays imaginaires. Le voyageur elabore, ä partir. 
de matexiaux qu'il a inconsciemment tries, l' image 
qui renforce son sentiment de securite" 
(74) 
. 
These comments on the tendency to sift information are largely 
applicable to the way the NRF's reviewers assessed writing and 
reporting on Russia: Therive disliked Duhamel's liberalism as 
much as Bolshevism; Drieu found in Fabre-Luce the reflection 
of his own political aspiration, and Fernandez, well-schooled in the 
French liberal, philosophical tradition, could admire Durtain's 
"objective" approach. What tended to be absent from all this 
was a true image of the Soviet Union : the irreversible process. 
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had begun whereby the skein of fact, misrepresentation and 
interpretation became ever-more twisted and difficult to unravel. 
Meanwhile, in the concluding section of La Trahison des Clercs, 
Benda progmosticated a new world war, "soit quelle ait lieu entre 
nations, soit entre classes" 
(75) 
. As it turned out, the war would 
be fought primarily between the fascist and the antifascist blocs. 
There is no doubt that had Hitler's National-Socialism been 
reported and understood in France in 1927, Benda could equally 
well have chosen Germany instead of Italy in his illustration 
of this phenomenon : 
"I1 suffit de penser, en ce qui touche ä la 
nation, ä l'Italie, et, en ce qui touche la 
classe, ä la Russie pour voir a quel point de 
perfection inconnu jusqu' a ce jour 1' esprit de haine 
contre ce qui n' est pas soi pent titre porte, chez 
un groupe d' hommes ,p ar un realisme conscient et enfin 
libere=de taute morale non pratique... "(76) . 
It was not long before the NRF itself provided a text which would 
illustrate the validity of Benda's thesis when applied to Russia. 
During 1928 and 1929, collectivization in the USSR was 
proceeding apace. Trotsky, already expelled from the Party, was 
expelled from Russia on 20th January 1929, from his internal exile 
in Kazakhstan. Lacouture recounts the now apocryphal story of 
how the impressionable Malraux - working for Gallimard by this 
time - wanted to lead an expedition to rescue Trotsky(77) . Malraux 
was beginning his "Trotskyist-adventurer" phase after the success 
of his novel Les Conquerants (serialised in the NRF). Yet if Malraux 
was a Trotskyist, he was no doubt in the minority among nascent 
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fellow-travellers, for "Trc tsky wanted a permanent world revolution 
and the fellow-travellers didn't" 
(78) 
. As the influence of Trotsky 
on such as Berl and Malraux (counter-balanced in Malraux's case 
by Groethuysen) was detectable during the early months of 1929, 
5o their youthful and exciting ideas were in turn beginning 
to make an impression upon Gide. Although at first little unsettled 
by their tendency towards iconoclasm, there is no doubt that Gide 
was impressed by Malraux(79) . 
On the international scene during 1929, relations between 
France and the USSR were somewhat strained 
(80) 
and at home, 
Tardieu's government took rigorous, preventive measures against 
81) 
the PCF in a wave of arrests . In France few details were 
known regarding the extent of the repression and liquidation of 
the "Kulaks" and the "Nepmen" in Russia during these months. That 
is, until October 1929, however, when the NRF published, "en 
tete", a very long extract from a forthcoming book by the Roumanian 
author, Panait Is trati 
(82). 
Istrati, a protege of Romain Rolland, 
had travelled extensively within the Soviet Union from October 
1927 
(83) 
. Rolland, j us t converted to the Russian cause, and anxious 
to lend it the support of Europe, had already suggested to Guehenno 
that he should ask Istrati for a text which he assumed would be a 
paean of praise for the USSR 
(84) 
. Yet after his return to 
Paris 
in February 1929, Istrati published nothing until his article 
exploded in October's NRF. His long, anti-Soviet invective was 
based upon his first-hand experience of what he felt to be the 
injustice meted out to Roussakov (and Victor Serge), and upon 
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the subsequent calumnies and mendacity of the authorities. 
The article opened by making twö forceful, basic points 
about what was to follow. Firstly, the treatment of Roussakov 
was only a microcosmic example of what was going on in the 
Russian macrocosm 
85ý 
. Secondly, Istrati underlined his belief 
that the proletariat was the victim of its own dictatorship which, 
it transpired, was imposed by the "caste" above 
(86) 
. Istrati, 
as it happened, had become entangled with the "opposants du regime", 
Serge and Roussakov, as early as November 1927(87). Y The GPU police, 
keeping the "subversives" Serge and his father-in-law Roussakov 
under surveillance, exploited the jealousies of some "jeunes 
communistes" in order to lay charges against Roussakov which could 
then be publicized in Party organs to remove him from his employment(88) . 
Istrati summarized the terrible logic of this sequence of events: 
"le Jakt ("la co-operative du Logement") provoque 
une agression; la Pravda relate 1'agression, 
fulmine, demande la mort du coupable; le syndicat 
lit la Pravda et exclut Roussakov; la f ab rique 
Samoilova (Roussakov's work-place) chasse un homme 
que le syndicat await exclu; la Pravda prend acte des 
declarations de la fabrique; le Jakt tient ensuite 
des assemblees oü il lit la Pravda et demande 
l'execution immediate du monstre... "(89). 
Utterly scandalized by this injustice, the volatile Istrati - for 
whom Roussakov was a model revolutionary - launched a counter- 
attack upon the Soviet authorities whereby it was only his status 
as a foreigner which prevented him from being arrested in turn : 
"Eh bien, tas de salauds'. assassins d'ouvriers! 
Oui, ce sont des ignominies, ce que vous faites, 
et je protesterai ici et ä 1'etranger! "(90). 
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The functionairies whom Istati harangued, however, merely 
repeated that they had received "dix resolutions d'usines 
p eine demandant la eine de mort! "(91). Yet with 
Istrati managed to contact Party chiefs, among them Kalinin, 
(92) 
who were, admitted Serge, "comprehensifs et circonspects". 
After one trial, which resulted in the acquittal of the Roussakov 
family, other charges were conjured up, leaving them without 
(bread 
rations or the right to work93ý . At the end of all these 
efforts, Istrati "quitte l'URSS, plus miserable qu'au temps oü 
j' etais moi-meme un de ces ouvriers qu'on ecrase sous tous les 
regimes" 
(94) 
. Later, he learnt that in spite of all the energies 
expended, the Roussakovs had been sentenced(95). Voila le 
visage de la "Patrie prole tarienne", voila sa justice", exclaimed 
Istrati(96) 0 Such institutionalized terrors did not even occur 
it chez Mussolini"; for Is trati , the 
"goulag" already existed: 
"D'un bout a 1' autre 1l empire, mate par la 
trique du fascisme 
bommuniste, 
les Siberies 
sont pleines de Roussakov. (... ) Il n' es t plus 
question lä-dedans de socialisme, mais d'une 
terreur (... ) dont on se sert pour le triomphe 
d'une nouvelle et monstrueuse caste ui raf f ole 
de fordisme, d' americanisation... "(9i) , 
. vitu perated Istrati, anticipating Celine's wrath 
(98) 
Such powerful material, articulated in such colourful and 
sometimes extreme language, with whole sections of text italicized 
or in block capitals, must have seemed an extraordinary choice 
of article to the reader of the normally restrained NRF. Even 
Benda had not reached these excesses of language and rhetoric. 
Not surprisingly, L'Humanite lost no time in mounting a scorching 
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counter-offensive whereby Istrati was so vilified that 
he never truly recovered before his suicide in 1935; his 
rehabilitator Marcel, Mermoz has even drawn a parallel with the 
Salengro affair, when the Popular Front minister also took his 
own life after a calumnious press-campaign(99) . On October 4th, 
L'Humanite's front-page indicated that "la presse bourgeoise 
fait grand bruit (... ) autour d'un article publie par Panait 
Istrati dans la NRF, daps lequel cet haidouk parjure hurle contre 
la Russie sovietique avec les chiens bourgeois et social- 
democrates... "(100) The next day, the 'paper continued to heap 
insults on the perpetrators of this "Social-fascism "(101). 
Rolland, disappointed by Istrati's article, nonetheless said 
he had foreseen his anti-Sovietism(102) . He wondered whether 
Europe should print a corrective, but then changed his mind, 
adding, quite rightly, that the NRF was an "etrange organe choisi, 
pour ce deballage politique! "(103) 
Within the NRF, it is only possible to speculate upon the 
motives for publishing this polemic, in the absence of concrete, 
textual evidence. The attack was so extreme as to make it 
unlikely that even the most convinced "Trotskyists" within 
the NRF (and there were few), should wish to so sweepingly 
tarnish the image of Revolutionary Russia. It is more likely 
that Gallimard wanted to exploit this opportunity for a pre- 
publication for commercial reasons; probably very 
few non- 
subscription copies remained once the content of the 
leading 
article became known 
(104) 
. Writing 
from Alb i, Jean Grenier 
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approved and felt the Istrati article was an excellent counter- 
balance to Benda(105) . Indeed the "Affaire Roussakov" inspired 
Benda's November "Scholie" (106) 
. He felt far enough removed 
from the Soviet situation to write: "je dois avouer que cette 
nouvelle affaire Dreyfus me laisse assez froid"(107). History 
was repeating itself, according to Benda; there was nothing new 
in the fact that "un groupement (here, the Soviets), ne peut etre 
fort que dans l' inj us ti ce et le mens onge" 
(108) 
_ Adhering rigidly 
to his well-established position, Benda defined the role of the 
intellectual: "c'est votre affaire et non la mienne" 
(109) 
9. ave a display of his gymnastic logic: 
He 
"Les necessites de Vordre social, les conditions 
vitales d'une nation, c' es t lä des choses que vous 
savez et qui ne me regardent pas. Je n'empeche pas 
les Etats de pratiquer le mensonge, s'ils le croient 
necessaire; je les empeche. seulement de dire qü'il 
est la verite"(110). 
Benda's extreme . an'tipathy 
for the bourgeoisie, however, allowed 
him to excuse the brutal exigencies of history of which Is tratiý 
account provided only one example. The violent repression by the 
proletariat of the bourgeoisie exploded because of centuries of 
accumulated injustice; for Benda, "cette remarque me paralt 
expliquer toutes les violences des mouvements populaires et en 
partie, les justifier" 
(111) 
. Here Benda annexed the Soviet 
experience to his own antibourgeoisism, yet the sting in the 
tail of his assessment also accused the Russian state for its 
betrayal of the revolutionary ideal 
(112) 
. However, the same 
exigencies of history would, with time, erode Benda's idealism, 
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and he would later rally together with the fellow-travellers. 
A few pages further on in the same number, Brice Parain 
(113) had his own corrective to Istrati inserted . Parain, himself 
a communist and conversant with the situation in Russia, picked 
out the inconsistencies of Istrati's polemic, referring to his 
"instinct d' a tateur"(114), Perhaps gi justifiably Parain saw 
Istrati as a "trotzkiste" due to his association with Serge 
(115) 
and, in one respect, Parain's appeal for impartiality showed 
just how "orthodox" he was at this time: 
"soyons impartiaux: le gouvernement sovietique r. 0,. 
p43 proclame la democratie en URSS estimant 
premature de relächer des riguatirs de la dictature. 
On ne peut donc exiger de lui ni la liberte de 
presse, ni la liberte de repandre (... )des propos 
contrariant 1'offort en cours"(116), 
explained Parain. The central problem was that Istrati was still 
a "bourgeois liberal" who, conveniently ignoring the true political 
significance of the issue, had produced "un requisitoire contre 
1' URS S du point de vue bourgeois" 
(117) 
. Parain believed no-one 
would be fooled by Istrati's accusations: "Aucun des lecteurs 
de la NRF, parmi lesquels or. releverait peu de proletaires, 
j'imagine, ne sly sera trompe" 
(118) 
. Istrati 
had to make a 
choice: he could not be a revolutionary and a liberal at the 
same time. 
This publication and its subsequent polemic ran concurrently 
with reports that the first Five-Year Plan was making incredible 
progress in industrializing Russia 
ý119) 
. French commerce suffered 
by the so-called "dumping" of extremely cheap Russian goods; 
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relations were soured by the French counter-measures 
(120) 
, 
and by November, Soviet goods were being boycotted in 
France(121) . At the end of the year, relations between the 
two countries had been almost set back to the 1924 situation(122) . 
It was the risk of a German-Austrian customs union which provoked 
action, in particular by Briand, who could easily foresee the 
consequences. In early 1931 preliminary negotiations began 
whereby the failure of the Locarno policy might be compensated 
by a non-aggression pact between France and the USSR(123) . Yet 
Briand was exceptional: as Mourin puts it ., 
' the Right continued 
to parade their inflexible antibolshevism: -- 
"La presse conservatrice continuait a exprimer 
son hostilite a la signature d'un pacte de non- 
agression f ranco-sovietique, qui selon eile 
renf orcerai t le prestige du gouvernement 
sovietique et faciliterait l' activite subversive 
des bolchevis tes ä 1' etranger. (... ) . Les partis 
de gauche (... ) a 1' exception du PCF, demeuraient 
prudents, (... ) attentifs a deceler les moind-res 
symptomes d'un affaiblissement des nationalistes 
allemands qui rendrait moins urgent le rapprochement 
avec l' Union sovietique" 
(124) 
. 
It was against this background of Soviet progress and French 
short-sightedness and hostility that Gide, already aware of the 
effect revolutionary ideas had had on the likes of Malraux, Parain, 
Berl and Groethuysen, began to take an obsessive interest in the 
USSR. This interest can partly be explained by the fact that 
contemplation of the Russian achievement was the natural corollary 
to the ever-increasing German menace: 1930-1931 were fraught 
(125) 
with tensions regarding Franco-German relations Moreover, 
Gide was reading much material on the success of the First 
Five- 
Year Plan. In Europe for February 1931, Gide would have read 
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Guehenno's statement that it was not necessary to be an economist 
nor a "grand clerc" to realise that the Russian Plan would exert 
a decisive influence over Europe(126) Guehenno was, like Gide 
would be, completely captivated by the endless pages of 
statistics which seemed to be the only method of attempting 
to quantify the enormity of the Soviet effort - as Caute puts 
. 
it, "statistics were the sacred digits of socialism" 
(127) 
Furthermore, Europe serialized Michael Farbman's Piatiletka 
(Le Plan russe) in April and May(1-28) : "La Petite Dame" remembered 
its effect on her companion who read it avidly - 
"Bypeed (Gide) entre avec un numero d'Europe 
(... ) "Ce que je lis es t passionnant, c' es t 
peut-etre le premier article sur la Russie qui 
m'emballe vraiment; ce sont de simples statistiques 
sur le plan quinquennal, c'est tout simplement 
prodigieux et je ne puis m'empecher de souhaiter 
de tout mon coeur qu'il reussisse. Ah! vraiment 
apres tout ce que les Russes se sont entendu dire' 
quel triomphe' toute 1' Europe sera a leurs 
gen oux ! "" (129) . 
This reading formed the basic raw material which Gide would draw 
upon for the published sections of his journal 
(130) 
In September 1931, the NRF printed a curious article by 
the aristocratic ex-White Army officer, D. S. Mirsky, which was 
. at least a profession of faith if not a true "autocritique 
, (131) 
Mirsky began by talking of the "intellectual emigration" from 
Russia, which was totally sterile, unlike the powerful reactionary 
ideologies which had flourished after the French Revolution. He 
asserted that "tout intellectuel emigre qui voulait rester vivant 
devait, ou bien se denationaliser, ou bien d' une facon ou 
d'une 
ºº(132) autre accepter la revolution After a brief sketch of 
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such curiosities as the "Eurasian" movement which flourished 
in 1920-1, Mirsky went on to explain how it became gradually 
more evident that an extreme and unifying form of Russian 
Nationalism would not displace Bolshevism. By 1926 he had set 
up an anti-emigre but non-communist movement called Versty: 
here their hopes were firmly placed upon poets and novelists 
through whom "vivait 1'eternelle Russie"133). The transitional 
phase was represented by the defeat of Trotskyism and the founding 
of a planned economy. Also at this time Mirsky underwent his 
intellectual conversion, attributable to two main factors. 
Firstly his discovery of Soviet literature(134) and secondly 
his studies of history(135) . Mirsky's "emancipation" was 
completed by the liberating death of L'Eurasie in 1929: 
"Mon "coeur" materialiste s'insurgeait contre 
cette pretendue "raison" qui le tenait prisonnier 
depuis presque un quart de siecle (... ) Pokrowsky 
avait d6-ja balaye beaucoup d'ordures materialistes 
(... ), mais de vieilles inhibitions m'empechaient 
encore d' aller plus loin.. ." 
(136) 
. 
It was then that the final liberation took place: Mirsky had been 
asked to write a book on Lenin, and it was the reading for this 
which released him 
(137). 
Mirsky ended his self-rehabilitation 
with lines from Maiakovsky: "J' ouvrais chaque nouveau volume de 
Marx comme on ouvre les volets de sa chambre"(138) " Gide 
felt 
this text was "fort interessant", in spite of grave reservations 
about Mirsky's motives(139). Coming nearly a year after the 
discrediting of Barbusse at the Kharkov conference on proletarian 
writing, and given Mirsky's emigre status, some would 
have viewed 
this article with some cynicism: interestingly enough, much 
later, 
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in 1937, Paulhan noted in his "Bulletin" that Mirsky had 
(140) been arrested in Moscow 
It was the next month, however, that Gide's private 
obsessive enthusiasm for the USSR reached its height. In an 
important conversation with S chlumb erger and Martin du Gard, 
Gide countered their objections by saying that it was Russian 
moral dynamism which attracted him. He even went so far as 
to admit that 
"ce qui se passe en Russie me passionne 
beaucoup plus d. u point de vue moral et je 
--- crois que pour individualiste que je 
sois, je me soumettrais tres bien a la 
contrainte sovietique" (141) . 
Further conversations and notations in his Journal show very 
well how Gide managed to think of Russia in a surprising variety 
of contexts: Martin du Gard anxiously confided to "la Petite 
Dame": "Vous savez, il file a gauche, notre ami, tout a fait 
a gauche"(142) . In November Gide told the Soviet Embassy that 
he was thinking of making his pro-Soviet feelings public, a 
move which must have heated the telegraph wires to Moscow 
(143) 
. 
By the end of February 1932, his mind was made up; after another 
important conversation with Martin du Gard, he declared: "Je 
vais publier dans la NRF mon journal actuel, puisque cela devient 
presque ma seule faýon de produire , 
(144) 
_ Two weeks later, 
Paulhan received the following letter: 
"... mieux vaut remettre d'un mois le debut 
du Journal daps la Revue. Cette publication 
est (pour moi du moins) fort importante et je 
serai soulage si je ne me sens plus talonne.., "145) 
- 243 - 
In early April Gide reminded Paulhan that they had discussed 
ways of publishing documents on Russia: the result of those 
early deliberations was Ehrenbourg's selection "la Jeunesse 
russe , 
(146). 
The atmosphere in Paris was highly charged 
during these months; on May 6th, President Doumer was assassinated 
(147) 
by a White Russian, Gorgulov The Right-wing press alleged 
that the GPU were implicated; once again, there was a temporary 
set-back in Franco-Soviet relations 
(148) 
In June 1932, Gide's "Pages de Journal" began to appear 
(149) 
June's selection carried nothing controversial on Russia, but 
Paulhan was critical(150) , these pages dated from 1929. It was 
in July's number that Gide dropped the bombshell: in the last 
page, he wrote: 
"Mais surtout j'aimerais vivre assez pour voir 
le plan de la Russie reussir. (... ) Jamais je ne 
suis penche sur l'avenir avec une curiosite plus 
passionnee. Tout mon coeur applaudit a cette 
gigantesque et pourtant toute humaine entreprise. 
(... ) La premiere condition pour que ce projet 
reussisse, c' es t de croire obs tinement qu'il 
reussira. Loin de defier l'intelligence il 
l'appelle et c' es t la raison qui doit ici 
triumpher" 
(151) 
. 
Coinciding as these pages did with moves to support the Communist- 
inspired Peace movement, Paulhan was very worried that the NRF 
might suddenly lurch to the Left; Martin du Gard told Gide of 
Paulhan's misgivings and Gide, in turn, told Paulhan that the 
review should remain as impartial as possible in spite of his 
(152) 
own fellow-travelling . To Paulhan, Gide seemed 
disappointed 
by the reception of the July "Pages de Journal11(153) 
Gide's critics would have been equally disappointed to find 
nothing on Russia in August's selection, but they were more than 
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compensated by the offering in September's NRF. However, once 
again, only a few sentences marked Gide's new stance. He repeated 
his admiration for the Five-Year Plan, for the workers' endurance 
of apparently subhuman mining 'conditions, and exclaimed 
"Comme je comprends leur bonheur(154) . Then Gide made his 
most forthright declaration of sympathy, hoping to live long 
enough to see such efforts succeed 
(155) 
. That so few sentences 
could unleash the storm of protest which followed, and which did 
not subside until Gide's so-called" ap os tacy" in late 1936, 
attests to Gide's personal influence and status in intellectual 
circles (and, indeed, outside them) at this time. This publication 
also signalled a new phase for the_ NRF for, in addition to the 
Peace question, Paulhan henceforward had to contend with the 
inevitable political bias which these meagre declarations gave 
to his review: Grover has shown how Paulhan had already reminded 
Gide of certain promises made regarding his weak position at 
6) 
the NRF 
Among the first reactions were the private ones of Guehenno 
and Paulhan. The editor of Europe wrote on September 2nd that, 
"J'aime(... )les pages de Journal de Gide. Toutes ces reflexions sur 
les Soviets, sur Barres, me paraissent venir un peu tard"(157) 
Paulhan, replying to Guehenno, felt that there was "de l' enfantillage 
(158) 
- d'ailleurs touchant.. - dans 
l' adhesion de Gide aux Soviets" 
Yet Paulhan was already anticipating worse to come, for he 
had 
read the 1932 "Pages de Journal" in pre-publication 
form: upon 
doing do, he wrote protesting to Gide that "je ne puis m'empecher 
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de penser qu' i1 es t facile de vouloir mourir pour les Soviets" 
159 ) 
Moreover, concluded Paulhan, it seemed foolhardy to make such 
strong affirmations of faith when Gide had not travelled to 
.. 
(160) Soviet Russia: he asked - "Pourquoi n'allez-vous pas en Russie? . 
Also in NRF circles, Fernandez began spreading the rumour that 
Gide was the victim of communist manipulation through his 
exposure to Groethuysen, and particularly through Alix Guillain 
(161). 
Martin du Gard later told Gide he believed there was some substance 
in this(162). 
All these initial views, all within the NRF (except Guehenno's), 
considered Gide's sudden entry into the political arena, as did a 
steady stream of comment from outside the review(163). 
Franjois Mauriac was among the first to commit himself to print: 
On September 10th his article " les Esthetes fascines" appeared 
in Henri de Kerillis ' L'Echo de Paris(164) . Moreover, Mauriac 
broadened his front and attacked the NRF in general: to him, 
it was risibly inconsistent for this group of "grands bourgeois" 
to commit themselves to the Soviet cause. He wrote: 
"Ce petit groupe de beaux esprits, ces grands 
bourgeois de lettres, vetus comme de luxueux 
voyageurs, et munis des mirobolantes valises 
de Barnabooth, chiffrees NRF, s'approchent 
a pas comptes de 1' ogre bolcheviste avec 
forces salamalecs... 11(165). 
Andre Rousseaux, in Je Buis partout, saw Gide's Journal as': the 
literary event of that summer, and Camille Mauclair gave an 
imaginative interpretation of "le corrupteur-ne qu' est M. Gide" 
in his "D'Oscar Wilde ä Lenine"(166). 
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The fifth and final part of the "Pages de Journal", 
dating from 1932, confirmed how Gide consolidated his current 
position. Here there were more substantial pages of commitment 
to the Russian cause. The entries for January 29th and 30th 
showed once more than Gide was rallying to the communist effort 
for personal, emotional and humanistic reasons: 
"29 janvier. 
Haine du mys ti cisme... oui, s ans doute. E-t p ourt an t 
monangoisse est d' ordre mystique. Que tant de 
souffrances puissent demeurer vaines, cette idee 
m' es t intolerable. Je ne puis pas, je ne veux pas 
1' adm. ettre . 
Cuverville, 30 j anvier. 
J'ai done lu le numero antisovietique de Je Suis 
out (... ) Je veux prendre pour exacts les 
renseignements (... ) . Its demontrent par A plus 
B la faillite du nouveau regime en URSS. Mais 
alors, si le plan quinquennal, ä les en croire, 
ahoutit a uný: fiasco certain, pourquoi ces 
craintes ? '. ' (167) . 
Then followed over a page of apostrophe in which Gide, addressing 
Je 5uis partout directly as "vous", underlined the combative, 
anti-rational aspect of their attack, adding that if the Russian 
. experience was a_"mirage", he wished it would become reality 
(168) 
From these pages it is possible to gauge that Gide's 
greatest reservations about Communism hung upon the question 
of individualism(169) . Following 
his noting of a conversation 
with Valery, who evidently believed Communism risked ending 
civilization as they knew it, Gide protested 
"Et je ne parviens pas 
ä me persuader que les Soviets doivent fatalement et necessairement 
ý, (170) 
amener 1'etranglement de tout ce pour quoi nous vivons , 
and went on to give a display of that intellectual agility or 
sleight-of-hand which was so common among the 
fellow-travellers, 
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allowing individualism and communism to co-exist in almost 
Platonic terms: 
"Un communisme bien compris a besoin de favoriser 
les individus de valeur, de tirer parti de toutes 
les valeurs de l'individu. Et l' individu n' a pas 
ä s' opposer ä ce qui mettrait tout a sa place et 
en valeur; n' es t-ce pas seulement ainsi que 1' etat 
peut obtenir le meilleur rendement de chacun? '(171). 
Happily for the cause, Gide then read a speech by Stalin which 
seemed to answer his objections, so much so that his fears were 
quelled enough for him to re-affirm that "je m'y rallie donc de 
tout coeur"(172). 
It was not only the socio-philosophical aspect of individualism 
which so fascinated Gide, but also the fact that Communism represented 
a type of "alternative theology" to Christianity. For Gide, the 
Church had corrupted and perverted the meaning of Christ's mission 
on Earth, and it was partly in response to his own constantly- 
deflected need for belief in a faith that Gide turned to the USSR. 
Gide interpreted the Soviet reality in a manner which was conditioned 
by the residue of his own Protestant formation. Talking of how 
Christ would have approached "la question Sociale", Gide wrote: 
"Ce qui dresse l' URSS contre Lui, c' es t qu'il 
p re the 1' accep tot't ort(... ) . La religion es t 
mauvaise parce qu'en desarmant l' opprime eile 
le livre ä l'oppresseur. Mais l'oppresseur, 
en prenant livraison de l' opprime, trahit 
le Christ et le j oue" (17 3) . 
The fact that Gide's rallying to Communism was motivated 
primarily by personal needs and responses - both in terms of 
the social question and the theological one - was confirmed 
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by his constant disavowal of politics. On at least two occasions 
in these pages, Gide referred to his incompetence in politics 
(174) 
Although he resisted with difficulty, Gide determined throughout 
his period of "engagement" to avoid joining a specific political 
(175) 
grouping Moreover, commentators of Gide's "political" 
phase have tended to ignore the literary element in his statements 
on Russia. In a letter replying to Paulhan's objections on his 
willingness to die for the USSR, Gide made this telling remark: 
"Toutes ces declarations de mon journal devraient 
titre endosses par_quelque heroine ou heros d'un 
roman... que je m'etais promis d' ecrire et oü 
j'eusse purge ma pensee... "(176). 
Such thinking challenges the seriousness of Gide's pro-Soviet 
statements; indeed, this private admission to Paulhan must have 
reinforced the feeling of the editor of the NRF that Gide was 
guilty of "enfantillage" in his pro-Communism. If confirmation 
were required of this aspect of Gidean "engagement", 
a year later in the Journal. Gide repeated: 
"Je 1' ai de jä dit: je n'entends rien a la 
politique. Si eile m' interesse, c' es ta 
la maniere dun roman de Balzac, avec ses 
passions, ses petitesses, ses mensonges, 
ses compromissions"(177). 
it came 
For all the private reservations he discussed with Paulhan, 
Martin du Gard and others, publicly Gide's professions of faith 
were only slightly tempered by his political shyness and 
reservations which, if they were not ignored (as they were 
for the most part), could be marshalled by Gide's opponents 
as evidence against his hypocrisy or inconsistency. However, 
it should not be forgotten that such a position was perfectly 
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compatible with the fellow-travelling stance: Gide's October 
"Pages" ended thus : 
"La realisation peut titre imparfaite. Ce qui 
m' imp orte c' es t la piece; pour la f aeon dopt 
on la j oue ... oh' cela c' es t une autre of f aire, 
qui regarde de plus competents" (178) . 
Most of the Right-wing press lost no time in exploiting 
Gide's "conversion" to Communism to the full 
(179) 
. Emile Henriot, 
in Le Temps, called Gide's October "Pages" a "Manifesto", while 
Thierry Maulnier similarly berated Gide in "Sur une Conversion "(180). 
On the Left, the PCF remained somewhat bemused, although L'Humanite 
(181) 
reprinted some extracts . One tangible way in which the 
impact of Gide's "Journal" could be measured was in terms of 
cancelled subscriptions: by October 11th, Paulhan's worst fears 
were confirmed. Gide told "la Petite Dame" of the "plusieurs 
desabonnements ä jla NRF depuis mon dernier Journal" 
(182) 
. 
Notwithstanding this, Paulhan proceeded to publish a short 
text by publisher and novelist Jacques Chardonne in Novembers 
NRF(183) . Very uncharacteristically, 
Chardonne too made some 
pro-Soviet pronouncements, although they were much more subdued 
than Gide's. Clearly impressed with reports of technical progress 
in Russia, Chardonne wrote that "ceux qui ne veulent pas comprendre 
(184) 
la Russie actuelle se privent d'un grand Spectacle" 
Chardonne, who seemed genuinely impressed with the apparently 
superhuman abilities of such as Stalin (in spite of his being 
"une brute rusee'ý185))' noted that 
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"pendant dix ans, un million d' homme s ont 
edif ie une oeuvre originale, dans des conditions 
tres difficiles, construit des usines, restaure 
un pays, gere d'immenses entreprises, sans 
l'attrait du gain personnel, sans aucun interet 
propre, simplement pour le bien du prochain, ce 
qu'on ne croyait pas possible"(186). 
For Chardonne, "seul le communisme a fait de 1'amour du 
(187) 
proclain une realite'. ' , but he still clung to the belief 
that in Europe, despite the coming phase of communist dominance, 
"des retours d'indiscipline sont probables, des revolutions 
de bourgeois, inspirees par la France" 
(188) 
. Such declarations 
again did not pass un-noticed. Jean Guehenno found that although 
Gide's and Chardonne's statements came too late and would have had 
an altogether different importance in 1920, it confirmed his 
suspicion that "de tels gestes temoignent que les vrais ecrivains 
ont besoin d'accompagner au moins la masse humaine" 
ý189ý 
. Further 
over on-the Left, L'Humanite remarked upon the fact that Chardonne, 
"encore un ecrivain bourgeois, ('... ) se tourne vers le monde 
nouveau quer construit le socialisme"(190); his pronouncements were 
no less important than Gide's, for they too were symptomatic of 
(191) 
"le desordre radical de 1'economie capitaliste" 
One result of Gide's favourable treatment of the Soviet 
Union was that the newly transformed front-organization, the 
AEAR, 
could expect a substantial increase in support 
from intellectual 
circles, now that Gide had lent the fellow-travelling stance such 
respectability. This support quickly became such that the 
AFAR 
was able to launch a high-quality periodical, 
Commune, in July 
( 192) 
1933, with Gide as a member of the 
"Comite directeur" . 
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Moreover, Gide's influence as a "maitre a penser" would rally 
many younger men to the cause, a fact very astutely noted by 
Leautaud, and which Gide's opponents would later use against 
him 
(193) 
The NRF certainly seemed to be following Gide's lead. 
"En tete" of the January 1933 issue, Paulhan placed a curious 
selection of documents on "la Jeunesse russe" 
(194) 
. These texts, 
"entretiens, lettres, journaux intimes", were introduced by 
Ilya Ehrenbourg(195). In his opening remarks, Ehrenbourg, using 
vocabulary which would become more familiar as the 1930's progressed, 
celebrated - the joint effort of Soviet engineers and writers in the 
search for "1' homme nouveau" 
(196) 
. Coinciding as it did with 
reports of the incredible success of the first Five-Year Plan, 
this set of documents seemed to provide confirmation of Gide's 
faith in the Soviet effort 
(197) 
. Ehrenbourg insisted that he 
was more interested in examining how Russian youth "relaxed", 
"loved" and "dreamt" rather than, in establishing the- nature of 
their ideology. The picture Ehrenbourg drew was an heroic one 
in which Russian students struggled on very limited resources 
in order to complete their studies: "ils ont soif d'apprendre 
et sont pleins d'energie",, he wrote 
(198) 
. These texts would 
be good enough to provide material for a. novel, insisted Ehrenbourg, 
appealing to the literary sensibilities of the NRF reader, as well 
as satisfying the requirements of the newly-instituted doctrine 
of "socialist-realism". Returning to the geological imagery, 
the documents 
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"Aident a comp rendre ce phenomene qui, maintenant, 
ramene a lui l' attention de l'univers, ce grand 
mouvement humain qui peut etre compare (... ) au 
dep lacement des couches geologiques"(199). 
From the wording of this introduction, it may be understood 
that Ehrenbourg was conspiring to perpetuate and propagate the 
favourable French (or Western) view of Soviet Communism as a 
new humanism; covered with such a respectable veneer, it was 
easy to see the logic of contributing such texts to the NRF. 
After Hitler's coming to power at the end of January 1933, 
attention was momentarily concentrated upon Germany. The 
establishment of Fascism in the neighbouring country bolstered 
the Soviet cause in France, as political issues suddenly came 
to be perceived in a Fascist/Antifascist optic. Gide was no 
exception: on March 21st, he delivered his well-known speech 
"Fascis. me" at the Salle Cadet(200) . Moreover, support for 
Russia was growing again in political circles: Herriot, a long- 
standing friend of the USSR, wrote a pro-Soviet article in 
Marianne, and left for Russia on another journey which he 
(201) 
retold in Orient .A gauge of how Gide's perspective had 
changed is provided by his comments on a text öy-A. Mtkret inserted 
in the "Revue des Revues" in April 1933(202). Gide concurred 
so whole-heartedly that he stressed he would have voluntarily 
signed Muret's text himself, a remarkable statement, considering 
the orthodox Marxist vocabulary of this piece. This provided 
a valuable indication of how far Gide was moving towards the 
Left at this time; Martin du Gard certainly noticed it, and 
write sharply to Gide on April 3rd: 
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"Vous etes emb arque . On souffle dans vos voiles, 
on trique votre gouvernail. Vous avez dü abandonner 
votre naturelle demarche, qui, quarante ans de suite, 
a ete de zigzaguer entre les extremes. Tres 
habilement, ou vous manoeuvre; ou vous fait dire 
plus que vous ne pensez ... 
11(203). 
Evidently shaken by this criticism 
(204) 
, and encouraged by 
Martin du Gard himself to do so 
(205) 
, Gide wrote his "Explications" 
or "Fe. uillets" for inclusion in May's NRF(206) . Here Gide took 
the opportunity to reiterate his conviction that Communism and 
Christianity could be reconciled. By inverting the critique 
of an opponent, Gide took to task the hypocrisy of the Christian 
capitalist: 
"Qu' un riche puisse se declarer pour le 
communisme, voici qui etonne F. V. I1 
trouve cela comique (... ). Ce qui m'etonne 
bien davantage, c'est(qu' n riche puisse se 
declarer ch retien... Ö Z. 
Both Gide and Martin du Gard had felt that the more controversial 
aspect of Gide's "commitment" could be played down by stressing 
the parallel with an idealized Christianity. Moreover, Gide 
concluded that reform of the economic system was inseparable 
from the need to recondition "1'4omme meme"(2os) , and 
he could 
think of no better illustration of this than to quote Henri Massis 
on one of his own works: "Ce qui es t mis en cause ici, c' es t 
la 
notion meme de 1'homme sur laquelle nous vivons 
(209) . 
Such continuing optimism for the Soviet experiment was 
considerably marred, or at least qualified, by the news- that 
(210) 
Victor Serge had been arrested and jailed in Russia 
Already on May 9th Gide replied tartly to Paulhan, strongly 
(211) 
advising against publishing an appeal on Serge's 
behalf 
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Furthermore, "la Petite. Dame" noted the evidence that Paulhan 
was equally as willing to entertain anti-Stalinists as he was 
forced to accept Gide's pronouncements(212). A little later, 
no doubt under the influence of Alix Guillain's strictly Stalinist 
position Gide re-affirmed his opposition to allowing the expression 
of Trotskyist opinions in the NRF(213) .. All this points once more 
to the fact that the political question of the moment split the 
NRF, but did it no lasting harm; Gide and Malraux, backed by 
Guillain and Groethuysen on the one hand, faced such as Paulhan 
and Martin du Gard on the other. This tense state of affairs 
soon came to a head: in late June, Gide read a "note" in proof- 
form by the new reviewer Charles-Albert Cingria on two works 
by Trotsky 
(214) 
. Gide was so outraged by the nature of the book- 
review that he intervened directly by writing to Paulhan(215). 
Gide confessed to being "consterne par l' article sur Trotsky, 
_. .. 
(216) 
(et) qu il paraisse dans la NRF Gide spelt out his 
reasons: "Ce que je reproche, ici, ce n' es t pas de me contenter 
les trotskistes, mais bien de leur donner de si bonnes raisons 
d'etre furieux contre la NRFn 
(217) 
. Gide was particularly 
annoyed by the f act that Cingria had made extremely negative 
comments about the first sentence of a translation from the 
Russian; it was intolerable that such sarcasm and irony be 
applied to such a serious subject, to the extent that 
"vers lo. 
rr 
(218) 
fin, (il) tourne a la bouffonnerie . Gide ended 
by 
insisting that if (against his wishes) the NRF were to turn 
away from current social issues, it should do so much less 
speciously: 
- 255- 
"je me dis (... ) qu'il signifierait, des lors: 
pour nous, Cingria (et nous, NRF)', qui refusons 
a nous placer a un autre point de vue qu' es thetique, 
la question sociale ne saurait nous interesser, 
n' exis to pas... Mais il aurait fallu l' indiquer 
moins specie: usement, et de maniere ä etre compris 
du gros des lecteurs. - Et quant a la NRF, cela a 
cesse d'etre vrai "(219) . 
Cingria had evidently touched a raw nerve. Paulhan wrote back 
defensively, to persuade Gide that Cingria met with the approbation 
of Claudel, Gaston Gallimard, Ramuz, and Max Jacob, and that 
personally he found Cingria's "notes" had "une ironique delicatesse, 
qui n' es t pas sans charme"X220» . Yet Gide's objections carried 
the day, for Paulhan asked Gide to re-read the review, "fortement 
remaniee et raccourcie"(221) . The episode illustrates well how 
Paulhan periodically played games with the review in order to 
re-establish equilibrium: strictly speaking, Gide's protests 
were well-founded in that such flippancy was out of place in 
the NRF; what made it worse, was the distinct political nature 
of the article, for Cingria delighted in his own anti-Communism, 
. and was perfectly willing for Paulhaj to exploit it 
(222) 
In the same issue, Ramon Fernandez wrote his "Notes sur 
L'Evolution d'Andre Gide"(223). Here Fernandez commented for 
the first time in the NRF on Gide's "Conversion". Evidently 
influenced both by Martin du Gard's view of Gide as an easily- 
manipulated recruit to the cause, and by Gide's "exegesis" in 
the May "Feuillets", Fernandez managed to criticise the dangers 
Gide ran of becoming conformist, at the same time recuperating 
Gide's evolution towards Communism in terms of a 
"natural 
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progression". For those who had read Gide's own comments 
carefully, Fernandez' words had a familiar ring: 
"A cause de sa naivete en ce qui touche aux questions 
sociales (... ) le communisme lui apparatt, non pas 
sous sa forme specifique, mais sous les traits 
simplifies du socialisme. Pour parier grossierement, 
son communisme est une dissociation de la foi et de 
la volonte c)tretienne, cette volonte nourrissant de 
motifs nouveauxses vieux mobiles, etc. "(224). 
What was more, Fernandez went on: 
"Definitivement dequ par le christianisme, 
di: Ta-t-il, j' adhere a ce vaste mouvement 
qui du moires tend ä creer un monde plus 
semblable ä celui que souhaitait le Christ 
que le monde chretien" (225) . 
In spite of this apology, Fernandez remained highly disappointed 
that Gide, whom he classed as a "transitional spirit" like 
Montaigne or Diderot, had apparently sacrificed his own 
fluidity of intellect for a philosophy which was rigidly 
orthodox: "Je regrette que Gide ait ainsi arrete sa marche 
si souple, si subtile et si süre, qu'il ne pouvait poursuivre 
qu'en restant seul"(226 
Very skilfully, Fernandez had managed to criticize Gide 
without disowning him, a fact which was amusingly noticed and 
commented on by the irrepressible Fernand Vanderem(227) 
Vanderem remarked upon the awkward position in which the NRF 
had found itself 
(228) 
. Calling Fernandez 
"1' habile porte - 
parole de la NRF", Vanderem concluded that both Fernandez and 
Gide were guilty of hypocrisy, 
"car, si M. Gide etait vraiment homme a s'asservir 
ainsi aux principes de son nouveau parti, n'y a-t-il 
pas beau jour qu'il eüt resigne tous ses biens de fortune, 
et ne serait-il pas, depuis un mois, a piocher dans les 
houillieres de 1'URSS? "(229). 
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Vanderem's attitude usefully illustrates the fact that for some 
the fellow-travelling stance was essentially illogical: for 
those critics on the Right, the ability to remain a bourgeois 
liberal at the same time as eulogizing the Soviet Plan derived 
less from a quality inherent in the French tradition, as from 
loathsome personal hypocrisy or cant. 
Paulhan no doubt felt relief that with Fernandez' "apology" 
for Gide, the now fully-charged political issue of interpretations 
of the USSR momentarily left the pages of the review. Abroad, 
attention was focussed increasingly on Hitler's Germany, and the 
domestic political situation was becoming gradually more critical. 
With the February 6th riots and the rallying calls from both left- 
and centre-intellectuals to unite against Fascism, relations with 
the USSR were further improved. Moreover, the PCF managed to 
manoeuvre and redefine itself, and from mid-1934, matured in its 
political appeal(230). Most important of all, "the February 6th 
(... ) riots (... ) appear to have tipped the balance in favour 
of Dimitrov on the Comintern Executive" 
(231) 
; the upshot of this 
was that Thorez was called to Moscow in April, and by June 1934, 
formal instructions on the "United Front" policy were issued and 
(2 
finally agreed with the Socialists on July 27th32ý . These events 
and moves seemed to provide further vindication for Gide's having 
adopted his current position. The fact that this position was 
still regarded with intense fascination was reflected by Paulhan's 
insertion of an article by Jean Louverne in the NRF for April 
1934 
(233) 
. This text and, 
indeed, its author, demonstrate very 
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clearly that Gide's influence over the younger generation was 
still considerable, and that his "commitment" allowed many 
such writers to make up their mind politically. Essentially 
Louverne intended to show that there was no sudden conversion to 
a political cause, rather a politicization of moral pre- 
occupations which Gide had had and written about since Les 
Nourritures terrestres and LeeRoi Candaule. His premise was 
based upon Gide's statement. in the recently-published volume 
Pages de Journal that "Communiste, de coeur aussi bien que 
(234) 
d' esprit, je l' ai toujours ete, meme en etant chretien' 
Louverne, conjoining the "non-conformist" interpretation of 
Gide's "Communism" with a literary one founded upon the preface 
to Le Rei Candaule, showed that this "Communism" "etait le 
fruit de son amour de 1'humain, de son "humanisme" : position morale 
plutöt que choix politique"(235) . He explained in conclusion that, 
far from being hypocritical, Gide's literary moralism was highly 
consistent(236)0 
Still more significantly, in the same issue of the NRF 
Paulhan included Fernandez' "Lettre ouverte ä Andre Gide" 
(237) 
9 
whereby Fernandez regretted that, having re-read his July 1933 
article, he had not seen the full importance of Gide's gesture. 
He confessed: "Je crains bien, ä me relire, que l'irritation ne 
fait emporte sur la sagesse"(238). Fermandez, believing that 
he had a deeper understanding of Marxism than Gide, admitted 
that it had perhaps been this familiarity which had prevented 
his fully comprehending Gide's move. Yet he still believed, 
although perhaps not for long given the political situation, 
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that Gide ought to retain "cette marge de liberte, de jeu, 
qui me paralt essentielle a votre mission 
(239) (sic) parmi nousºº 
However, continued Fernandez, delineating his new stance, "il 
est des moments, dan s la vie publique, oü l'on se voit force de 
prendre position of in de sauver son honneur d' homme, meme si 
cette position entraine des acceptations auxquelles 1'esprit 
s'astreint difficilemene4240) , 
Suddenly Fernandez took more 
steps than Gide down the road towards full "engagement"; brushing 
aside his own former objections to Communism, Fernandez proclaimed 
"te point essentiel : l'intellectuel a besoin de la classe ouvriere 
( 
pour se connaitre lui-meme completement"241). Fernandez leap- 
frogged Gide when he declared that "le liberalisme est wort: 
c' es t auj ourd' hui un cheque sans valeur" 
(242) 
. 
For Fernandez, the only remaining obstacle was the prickly 
problem of accepting the discipline of a Party: yet this was surely 
the most indispensible component of the fellow-travelling position, 
and one with which Gide had already come to terms. Gide had not 
joined and would not join the PCF: as Caute has shown, the very 
essence of the value of fellow-travelling was for the writer in 
question to remain on the outside in liberal circles where he 
was of greatest prestige(243) . Moreover this 
facet of fellow- 
travelling was not inconsistent with Stalinist thinking 
(244) 
. 
Despite these reserves, Fernandez insisted that as soon as the 
proletariat was endangered by its enemies, then he would be 
ready to act on its behalf 
(245). 
The motivation for such a 
realignment derived specifically from Fernandez' reaction against 
the Nationalists' agitation during February 6th; henceforward 
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Fernandez became active in the AEAR(246). Once again, however, 
the ideological inspiration found its origin in the new 
"humanism" in the USSR. 
As with Gide's Journal, the reactions from the Right to 
renewed professions of faith in the NRF were swift, vituperative 
and numerous 
(24 7) 
. Indeed, even Paulhan, in typical fashion, 
% 
intimated to Grenier a more "realistic" image of the USSR 
(248) 
and told Etiemb le of the cancelled subscriptions the two April 
texts had provoked 
(249) 
. Even Thibaudet could not avoid 
discussing this "probleme du jour" in his June "Reflexion" 
(250) 
. 
Thibaudet preferred to avoid the political perspective - "daps ce 
numero de la NRF oü nous descendions tous dans la rue" 
(251) 
and took instead the literary one. Thibaudet challenged Gide's 
statement which Etiemble had used as his premise, and thought 
it more appropriate that Gide should have written "J'ai toujours 
ete communiste, surtout quand j'etais chretien"(252). Gide's 
phrase, ".. meme en etant chretien", was unsuitable as far as 
Thibaudet was concerned 
(253) 
and, like his contemporary 
Maurras, Gide "a conrlu politiquement, plutöt qu'il ne s'est 
(254) 
converti religieusement". Thus, insisted Thibaudet, 
"il 
faut (... ) distinguer conclusion et conversion. (... ) Je crois 
tý (255) plutot a une conclusion In what remains perhaps one of 
the most convincing assessments of Gide's political evolution 
- or at least Gide's intellectual temperament 
--Thibaudet 
concluded: 
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"(Anatole) France et Gide ont trouve leur 
croyance politique au bout dune evolution 
interieure, dune critique interieure, d'un 
vide interieur. Elle correspond, chez deux 
grands bourgeois, a tm. dialogue interieur 
sur la nature bourgeoise, la societe bourgeoise, 
le genre de vie bourgeois, ä une scission entre 
eux et les autres bourgeois, soit a une crise 
de 1'intellectuel p lutöt qu'ä une crise du 
citoyen" . 
Proof that Moscow had (through the change in Comintern 
policy) revised its antipathy towards French bourgeois 
intellectuals was provided by Aragon's indulgence towards 
Gide 
(25 7) 
. Indeed, at this time relations between French 
fellow-travelling intellectuals and the Soviet Union were 
reaching their zenith: Gide allowed Ehrenbourg to take a message 
to Moscow to be read at the forthcoming "Congres des Ecrivains 
Sovietiques"(258). The Conference took place in August, and the 
French delegation included Nizan, Malraux, J. -R. Bloch and 
Vladimir. Pozner. Moreover on the international political 
scene, in September, the USSR was admitted to the SDN(259) . 
In Paris, the "ren tree" of 1934 was dominated by the 
reports of the statements which had been made at the Conference. 
Jean Grenier'$ "Air du Mois"in October(260) heralded a much 
longer selection of speeches reprinted in November's NRF(261) 
Grenier had rightly identified the central issue as being the 
doctrine of socialist realism. All the Soviet writers were 
of one voice and all followed Ehrenbourg when he said that 
"le nouveau roman commence ä prendre forme", based as it had 
to be upon "(1e) recit documentaire, toutes ces annotations 
st6nographiques, toutes ces confessions, ces proces-verhaux et 
-26Z- 
journaux intimes" 
(262) 
Ivanov was even more enthusiastic for 
a rigid socialist realism 
(263) 
. As for Radek, while talking 
of the Soviet literary doctrine in the context of foreign 
writers, he showed much more indulgence towards questions of 
technique and content(264) Yet perhaps none of this was 
surprising, given the circumstances of the Congres; what was 
much more shocking was Gide's attitude in his 
(265) 
31 
coinciding as it did with his important speech delivered at 
(266) 
the AEAR session reporting the Conference. In a bizarre 
coupling of terms, Gide wrote: 
"Sa (i. e. "de 1'URS. S") täche est aujourd'hui 
d'instaurer, en litterature et en art un 
individualisme communiste. (... ) Chaque 
artiste est n 6cessairement. '_individualiste, 
si fortes que puissent etre. ses convictions 
communistes et son attachement au parti"(267). 
The predictable stream of vilification from the Right was even 
more violent than bef ore 
(268) 
. Gide's 
"Message" drove Schlumberger 
(269) 
to protest in his "Note sur la Politique" in December's NRF. 
For Schlumberger, when Riviere had treated political questions 
he had at least been free from what he called 
"la pensee 
enrolee "(270). Although Schlumberger was aware of Marxist 
interpretation 
(271) 
, the 
NRF, he maintained, was not a suitable 
organ for such expressions. In this way Schlumberger was making 
a tacit apology to the review's subs cribers, on 
Gide's behalf. 
What Gide ignored in his "message" were the increasingly 
worrying reports of 
"deportes, affa. mes, Guepeou; propägande qui 
"(272 from the USSR. 
ne recule devant aucun mens onge coming 
Moreover, Schlumberger managed to criticize Gide and attempt 
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to explain his motives, when he wrote: 
"Ce que la foi remplace necessairement, 
c'est une certaine attitude critique ä 
1'egard de son objet. Elle est un elan 
vital plus qu'un jugement; eile bondit 
par-dessus les objections; eile accepte le 
risque qu'elle court s'il lui arrive de 
uranquer son saut"(273). 
Ironically enough, Schlumberger's "Note" appeared on the same 
day as the assassination of Kirov, 1st December 1934, a date 
which marks a significant change in the course of inter-war 
Soviet history. Moreover, preliminary moves were being made 
towards a Franco-Soviet Pact or Alliance 
(274) 
. 
The literary "event" of January 1935 was undoubtedly the 
debate provoked by Schlumberger's December "Note" and which 
took place at the "Union pour la Verite". This meeting gave 
Gide the opportunity to face his "contradicteurs" (so long 
hoped for by such as Schlumberger) and to explain himself to 
them 
(275) 
Using his "Message" as a "point de depart", 
Gide eagerly grasped this chance to re-affirm his essentially 
non-political position, and on several occasions repeated the 
humanistic nature of his gesture towards the USSR(276). Gide 
was plainly influenced by Malraux's fellow-travelling rationale 
(277) 
by this stage, for he happily adopted it himself 
(278) 
Schlumberger too, reporting the debate for the NRF , 
praised Gide for confronting his opponents, reminded 
his 
readers of Gide's admirable concern 
for the "question sociale" 
as represented by his Congo visit, and explained away 
Gide's 
fellow-travelling position by referring to his uniqueness 
. of spirit 
(279) 
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Quite clearly, Gide was as keen as ever to deny that he 
had become a "revolutionary", and, although his published "Pages 
de Journal" continued to show support for the cause, he repeated 
again and again that he would never join the Party(280) . Moreover 
"la Petite Dame" noted on several occasions how Gide was frightened 
by the role he would be forced to play during the forthcoming 
"Congres pour la Defense de la Culture" 
(281). 
Indeed, Martin du Gard 
. felt embarrassed at the role Gide took in the Conference 
(282) 
In the meantime, the Franco-Soviet Pact had been concluded 
on May 2nd 19 35 
(283) 
. It now seemed essential that Gide should 
travel to the Soviet Union and see for himself; not only Paulhan, 
but also Schlumberger, Martin du Gard and Gabriel Marcel. had all 
in previous months and years either hinted or suggested that 
Gide owed it to his own intellectual credibility to experience 
the USSR at first hand(284) . Preparations went ahead; but, 
in spite of increasing pressure from Mairaux and Ehrenbourg, 
Schlumberger managed to dissuade 'Gide from allowing himself to 
be manipulated(285). The result of these discussions and deepening 
misgivings led Gide to temper his pro-Sovietism in his Journal 
(286) 
for October 30th, 1935 Schlumberger was relieved momentarily 
delays that Gide had postponed his journey 
(287) 
, but in truth the 
were due both to the imminent winter, and to the fact that Gide 
. had not finally decided who was to accompany him 
(288) 
In the NRF' Paulhan had managed, since Schlumberger's "Note 
sur la Politique", to steer the review clear of further dangers: 
Gide's Journal contained relatively non-controversial material. 
Indeed, he was preparing to combat the manoeuvring of such as 
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Malraux and Gallimard to politicize the review by publishing 
Grenierts attacks on Marxist orthodoxy in April 1936(289) 
The first issue of the new year contained two texts whose 
inclusion within the same number achieve that "irony-through- 
contradiction" which so delighted Paulhan. Challenging Guehenno 
in his "Pages du Journal", Gide wrote: "Tout effort de 
desindividualisation au profit de la masse est, en dernier 
ressort, f uneste ä la masse e11e-meine", adhering to his own 
personal, socialist ideal(290). Further on in the review however, 
was a set of documents entitled "Le Mouvement Stakhanoviste"(291). 
In his urbane introduction, Habaru wrote: 
"Le mouvement stakhanoviste tend ä augmenter la 
production en elevant les capacites de la main- 
d'oeuvre au niveau des possibilites de la machine. 
Derriere 1' emulation individuelle (... ) se dessine 
un vaste plan de rationalisation du travail"(292). 
These texts were deliberately left to stand on their own without 
interpretive commentary(293) : the ironical effect was achieved 
by their inclusion in the NRF, bearing as it did Gide's very 
nuanced pronouncements. Paulhan was forced to spell out 
this intention to a correspondent who stridently objected to 
(294) 
the texts and complained in Combat Tisserand accused the 
NRF of descending to the level of L'Humanite in reproducing the 
Pravda documents, of denying workers their intelligence, and 
insisted he would never read the NRF again. Paulhan retorted 
that Stakhanovism merited treatment in the review, because it 
was "un evenement digne d' interet" 
(295) 
. Paulhan used these 
objections to illustrate his conviction that the 
NRF was "une 
revue normale", and that it should always 
be left to the 
(296) 
intelligent reader to interpret the facts . 
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By May 5th, 1936, two days after the "Front populaire" 
victory, Gide, albeit unenthusiastically, finally decided to 
travel to Russia(297). He arrived in Moscow on June 17th, 
joining his five companions later; there followed a lengthy 
tour which, despite its favourable and controversial aspects 
(298) 
1 
proved an experience which directly caused Gide's so-called 
"apostacy" 
ý299ý 
. In the meantime, rumours of Party purges 
in the USSR filtering through to France 
(300) 
made it difficult 
for Paulhan to include favourable material in the NRF : indeed, 
apart from Gide's "Pages de Journal" in March 1936 
(301) 
, the 
NRF contained nothing on the USSR. This period of silence before, 
during and after Gide's journey indicated a significant change 
in fellow-travelling attitudes, and it was therefore no longer 
tenable to print favourable perceptions of the USSR in the review. 
Furthermore, apart from awaiting Gide's reaction, Paulhan found 
himself subject to the tribulations of the Popular Front at home 
(302) 
which, itself, was becoming more preoccupied with the Spanish 
(303) 
Civil War 
The ill-starred nature of the visit to Russia seemed to be 
further compounded by the death of Eugene Dabit(304) . Gide and 
nE 
Paulhan were both upset by the way the Communists claimed1Dabit was one of 
their own, and that he had been favourably impressed by the Soviet 
Union 
(305)' 
a view which Paulhan, for one, contradicted 
(306) 
Controversy raged as to whether Dabit had been disappointed or 
(307) 
otherwise The literary and intellectual world awaited 
Gide`s 
account of his journey; after several delays, caused primarily 
by Ehrenbourg(308) , Gide's Retour 
de 1'URSS exploded on to the 
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public stage on November 13th 1936 
(309) 
, Paulhan lost no time 
in sending his congratulations: "Votre Retour est admirable de 
force, d'evidente verite... "(310); Gide believed his work 
"va declencher une scission communiste"(311) , for the principal 
reason for the delay in publication derived from the insistence 
of such as Ehrenbourg that Gide should temper his now hostile 
attitude by mentioning the Soviet effort in Spain(312), Yet 
whatever the continued political implications of the Retour were, 
Gide felt "un effoyable desarroi" 
(313) 
which many would interpret 
as a "defaite morale , 
(314) 
There was a flood of reactions to the Retour from all sides of 
the political spectrum(315), Benjamin Cremieux reviewed the book 
(316) 
in December's NRF Here Cremieux, in a long, well-balanced 
account, seemed to accept the picture which Gide drew without 
being afraid to remark that, if he had cared to, Gide would have 
discovered long ago all he needed to know "par une masse de 
reportages et de documentaires"(317). In what was an exemplary 
exercise in "NRF-style" objectivity, Cremieux identified the central 
paradox in Gide's "apostacy": 
"En resume, Gide est profondement froisse 
par la meconnaissance de certaines valeurs 
eternelles: verite, beaute, justice, liberte, 
et par la renaissance de certaines valeurs 
bourgeoises qu'il detester f amille, argent, 
conformisme, inegalite. 
Mais qui aurait imagine qu' Andre Gide, avant 
son voyage, i norät tout de ces caracteristiques 
sovietiques? "317) 
Moreover, Gide had the courage to display "une implacable lucidite" 
in the demolition of his own mirage, and Cremieux echoed Thibaudet's 
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1934 assessment of Gide's "evangelisme d'inspiration encore 
rotes tante" 
(319) 
P Cremieux rightly pointed to the undeniable 
crucial and irreconciliable differencbetween the French and 
Soviet social and cultural systems when he wrote: 
"Peut-titre arrive-t-on au coeur du debat quand 
on constate que Gide se refuse a sacrifier 
certaines des valeurs conquises par la 
revolution bourgeoise de 1789 et que 1'experience 
stalinienne se refuse ä reconnaitre cesvaleurs... "i320) 
Gide, a product of that "golden age" of Radical Republicanism, was 
ripe for fellow-travelling, because the ideology underlying 
his intellectual formation could with effort and zeal be extended 
to embrace and take account of the new revolutionary "humanism" 
in the East. Essentially Cremieux, reminding the reader of the 
political experiment currently being carried out in France, 
restated the liberal view that Communism might be appropriate 
in the USSR, but unacceptable at home. The final sentence 
encapsulated the NRF's position on this occasion: 
"Lenine pens ait avec raison que la revolution 
russe devait etre un exemple, non un modele 
pour l'Occident"(321). 
While the Right delighted in Gide's apparent "volte-face", 
the left-wing press erred between outrage and disappointment; 
many of the articles assisted Gide in preparing his Retouches 
a mon Retour de 1'URSS(322). Gide had nearly completed this 
work in late March 
(323), 
revised it by early May 
324) 
, and 
published it on July 2nd 1937325) . Once again, amid renewed 
protest from the Left regarding the book 
(326) 
, Cremieux was 
called upon to review it for the NRF(327) . 
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For Cremieux, this work added little to the Retour de 
1'URSS; its primary concern gravitated around Gide's objections 
to the apparently inescapable need to excuse the unimaginable 
terrors and repression inherent in Stalin's revolution and to 
(328) 
mask them by lying The result of Gide's inspection was, 
according to Cremieux, to wonder whether Soviet "etatisme" was 
any less barbaric than the Nazi version. Furthermore, he 
predicted that the tension created by the co-existence of the 
opposing ideologies could only lead to a cataclysm(329). It 
thereby seemed as though Benda's prognosis in La Trahison des 
Clercs had been proved correct. 
Now .. that the 
"truth" was known, thereafter the NRF observed 
an uneasy silence regarding the USSR: the debate raged on elsewhere(330) 
An indication that the poise of the review had been re-established 
appeared a year later in the August 1938 issue. The NRF, increasingly 
"(331) patriotic and committed to "National Unity, included an 
extremely vituperative anti-Soviet essay by Claudel(332) with 
(333) 
Benda'. s "chronique" "Anticommunisme et patriotisme" The 
message behind this juxtaposition was that the brutality of the 
Soviet regime should continue to be condemned but also that 
patriotism and unity at home were above party differences and 
should be encouraged. In the event, in spite of the efforts of 
the PCF, the "appeasement" or pro-Munich faction held sway of ter 
September 30th, 1938, and, with the conclusion. of the Nazi-Soviet 
pact just under a year later, the Government decided to 
ban the 
PCF. For many, the feeling that Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism 
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were ultimately equally barbaric seemed justified. 
Compared to treatment of the Franco-German issue in the 
NRF, P aulhan, despite encouragement to retain a balance, 
momentarily lost control over the review's ideological 
equilibrium due to Gide's pro-Soviet statements. The character 
of the NRF reflected the tendency of French liberals to view and 
approve the Soviet Union at a distance as a land of hope, where 
a new, socialistic humanism was replacing a feudal serfdom with 
an egalitarian paradise. It soon became clear, however, as 
exemplified by Istrati's reportage, that the road to the new 
Utopia (as it was conceived in the West) would only be constructed 
at. enormous cost to human effort. and lives . For a time, such 
sacrifice and "justifiable" brutality seemed to have been 
rewarded by the overwhelming-achievements obtained. So much 
so, indeed, that Gide, as one of France's leading humanists, 
went on to publicize his enthusiasm, and he even declared, 
admittedly from the safety of France, that he too was willing 
to sacrifice himself for the cause. The issue then became 
increasingly inseparable both from the effort at home to unite 
the Left, with the collusion of the PCF, and from the international 
antifascist movement. 
Gide's journey and subsequent change of heart coincided with 
the beginning of the purges; thereafter, "Cette grande ]-ueur ä 1' Es t" 
grew ever dimmer and more sinister. Gide's .. fellow-travelling 
(whether it was "revolting hypocrisy" or "a transferred masochistic 
fantasy" 
(334)) 
may have dented the non-partisan reputation of the NRF, 
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causing a number of cancelled subscriptions. All the same, 
like Gi de , it survived thanks to the in-built defence-mechanism 
of fellow-travelling. After the disillusion of Soviet reality 
experienced at first-hand, recuperation was permissible if 
the "apostacy" was seen to be sincere. The NRF did its utmost 
to ignore this debate, turning its attention to domestic 
affairs and the growing likelihood of war. Thus history 
had forced the NRF to take account of the "new ideologies" 
in the USSR and Germany. In the case of Nazism, its ideology 
incorporated a racialist philosophy which inevitably raises 
the question of anti-Semitism-' - the nature of the NRF meant 
that it adopted a questionable if not problematic posture 
regarding this issue. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
"The NRF, the Jewish question and anti-Semitism, 1925 to 1939" 
"On parle d' antisemitisme (... ) Gide dit en riant: 
"Par exemple, je n'aimerais pas me laisser infuser 
du sang juif"". (CPD 2, p. 146,26/5/31). 
"J'ai ete eleve dans le gout de la Republique et des 
principes democratiques (... ) L' attacl went de mon pere 
a la Revolution etait fait en partie de la reconnaissance 
qu'il lui portait parce qu'elle avait emancipe sa race, 
donne aux juifs les libertes civiles et politiques" 
(Julien Benda, La Jeunesse d'un Clerc, part I, NRF 
August 1936, pp. 282,286). 
"Au vrai je ne crois absolument pas ä 
race sur la personnalite intellectue 
individu. C'est le climat, le milieu 
qui sont tout" (Benjamin Cremieux to 
AP, 12/4/39). 
l' inf luence de la 
lle et morale d'un 
et 1'e ducation 
Jean Paulhan, 
"Le Juif est un mythe, comme la femme. La question juive 
ne soulevera chez nous que des polemiques" 
(Jacques Chardonne, "Politique", NRF February 1939, p. 208). 
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Anti-Semitism, by its very nature, is complex and protean. 
It combines different ingredients in varying proportions which 
have conspired throughout History to create, perpetuate and 
exploit the Jewish myth. Saul Friedländer illustrates one 
interpretive -methodology in his provision- of "trois voies 
d'acces pour 1'etude de l'antisemitisme": the three factors 
he identifies are the cultural, the social and the psychological(l) . 
Cultural considerations based upon theological differences form 
the historical foundations of the Jewish myth: however, Friedländer 
stresses too that "la permanence du stereotype negatif du juif 
exige que l'on elargisse l'explication historique traditionnelle 
pour y integrer les donnees de la sociologie et de la psychologie" 
(2) 
0 
More importantly, "dune maniere generale (... ), nous assistons a 
une interaction constante de ces trois f acteurs, avec des pressions 
particulieres de 1' un ou de 1' autre, selon? 1es circonstances"(3) . 
In the case of France, the specific "mix" of these circumsances 
was such that the greatest explosion of anti-Semitism occurred 
at the junction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with 
the Dreyfus affair: 
"C'est la France qui, lors de l'affaire Dreyfus, 
connaitra la manifestation collective la plus 
importante (... ). On y retrouvera la convergence 
de tous les themes evoques et l'apparition des 
tetidances sociales et psychologiques... "(4). 
However, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that with the election 
of the Popular Front in 1936 under Leon Blum, factors endemic to 
France further boosted anti-Semitismýý_- for a minority of 
fanatical pro-Nazi Frenchmen, laid the foundations of the 
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institutionalized anti-Semitism of Vichy. This is the view 
held by Michael R. Marrus and Robert 0. Paxton, who take a 
different perspective from Friedländer when they write: 
"It is not enough merely to assert that anti- 
Jewish feeling grew in the 1930's in France. 
Closer examination reveals an anti-Semitic idiom 
somewhat different from that of 1920's, to say 
nothing of the 1890's and the time of the Dreyfus 
affair. (... ) Anti-Jewish images permeated like a 
gaseous current beneath the cultural surface, 
periodically changing (... ) then sometimes bursting 
forth, after having mingled explosively with some 
economic or social issue "(5). 
The proximity of some of the right-wing press to pro-Nazi ideas 
inevitably led to a contagion with Nazi anti-Semitism; this, 
combined with domestic social problems and the fear of Bolshevism 
abroad, implanted the "roots of Vichy Anti-Semitism, 
(6) 
. Indeed 
anti-Semitism was very deep-rooted in the history of France and 
was traditionally associated with a range of issues from left 
to right, from Catholicism to anti-clericalism and from economic 
ý7ý. 
history to literature 
It is therefore not surprising that, given its propensity 
for devoting attention to such issues as Franco-German relations and 
attitudes to Soviet Russia, the NRF was also influenced by the 
fluctuating climate of anti-Semitism. The problems which Paulhan 
confronted as editor were not easily resolved when 
it is remembered 
that the NRF sheltered writers both of Jewish origin 
(such as 
Benda and Suares) and 
(such as Gide, Leauta 
both of the nature of 
shows that the review 
reputation 
(8) 
. 
those who displayed anti-Jewish sentiments 
ud and Jouhandeau) . However, an examination 
the NRF, and of Paulhan's editorial methods, 
managed to avoid any lasting damage to 
its 
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Although not mentioned specifically in the exchanges of 
1919 between Riviere and Henri Gheon regarding the Parti de 
l'Intelligence , the Jews were implicated - along with the 
Bolsheviks and the Chinese - in anything which threatened 
Western civilization: "tout le reste est confusion, contradiction, 
asiatisme", wrote Gheon(9) . In spite of the resistance of the NRF 
to the Nationalist ideology of the 'Part i de l'Intelligence , 
the review still tended towards Gallocentrism and perpetuated 
the immediate post-war view that, as Pascal Michon has written, 
"le Russe, le Juif et le Chinois sont les trois figures 
de l'anti-occident, de l'anti-civilisation 
chretienne, de l'anti-humanisme. Its rep resentent 
au sein meme de la culture occidentale ce point 
aveugle par lequelechappaient la Culture, le 
Sens et 1'Histoire"(10). 
Moreover, in the specific case of Germany, Mme Mayrisch, writing in 
the NRF as "Alain Desportes", saw Jewish influence everywhere and 
called for extra vigilance from the French: , 
her dangerous 
allegation that German Jews dominated the cultural sphere there 
reflects one of the many accepted stereotypes incorporated in the 
Jewish myth 
(11) 
This received view of Jewish activity illustrates one of the 
major categories of anti-Semites: "ceux qui sont antij uif s par 
conformisme et adoptent l'opinion qu'ils croient 
etre dominante"(12) 
It is also the major ingredient which fuelled Gide's more literary 
anti-Jewish feelings and which led Berl to exclaim: 
"Je ne peux 
(13) 
Berl no doubt pas lui pardonner son anti-semitisme stupide" 
attributed this in part to what he saw as the 
"vieux fond anti- 
dreyfusard de la NRF" 
(14) 
.. Gide privately expressed anti-Jewish 
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sentiments on several occasions in his Journal, and Berl refers 
to the widely-quoted passage from 1914 on Leon Blum's character 
and on Jewish literature(15) . In Berl's opinion, Gide saw the 
Jewish writer as "quelque chose d'intermediaire entre Bernstein 
et Rothschild"(16) . Gide turned a blind eye to the more lasting, 
or more inestimable achiwements of Durkheim, Levy-Brühl, Bergson 
and Proust. Moreover Gide was plainly distressed by Blum's 
ambition: "Un temps viendra, pense-t-il (i. e. Blum) qui sera le 
temps du Juif" 
(17) 
; Gide then went on to vent his anger against 
the work of French Jews which, he considered, was not French, 
but Jewish: 
"I1 est absurde, il est dangereux meine de vier les 
qualites de la litterature juive; mais il importe 
de reconnaitre que, de nos j ours , il ya en France 
une litterature juive, qui nest pas la litterature 
franjaise, qui a ses qualites, ses s3gnifications, ses 
directions particulieres (... ) etc. 1ý . 
These "directions particulieres" were not, or should not, as far as 
Gide was concerned, be those of the NRF, and there is no doubt much 
truth in the assertion that such thinking - equating Jewish literature 
with second-rate, "boulevard" or "Right-Bank" literature - led 
to the rejection in late 1912 of Proust's novel from the NRF. 
Ptoust was half-Jewish and was considered a "snob and a literary 
amateur" by Gide(19) . Even if, by 1921, Gallimard 
had bought back 
Proust's work from Grasset, Gide was still of the opinion that 
"en parlant de la souplesse de son style, je pourrais dire que 
c'est juif"(20). 
Considering Gide's attitude regarding "boulevard" literature, 
it is well-worth reflecting that the NRF may well have been much 
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different had Gide objected to and blocked the choice of 
Gaston Gallimard as publisher. Indeed Gallimard's influence 
over affairs in later years was often at variance with Gide's 
preferences and tastes in what both the review and the publishing- 
house produced under the NRF imprint(21). Yet Gallimard's wealth, 
business acumen and expertise outweighed the prevailing view 
that "on ne peut pretendre avoir l'esprit NRF et habiter la 
(22) 
rive droite. On se doit de vivre sur la rive gauche". 
It was inevitable that through Gallimard's connections with 
the Jewish "haute bourgeoisie" (he had been Robert de FlersI 
secretary, and knew Caillavet and Proust), Jewish authors 
would be considered and some eventually brought into the early 
NRF. By 1912 Gallimard had published the work of poet 
Henri Franck, a cousin of Emmanuel Berl 
(23). 
Jean-Richard Bloch 
also showed an early interest in the NRF undertaking, and Gallimard 
accepted his work, offering a long=term contract(24). Later 
Gallimard employed Louis-Daniel Hirsch as his commercial director, 
and appointed Robert Aron as his secretary 
(25) 
. Thus Gallimard's 
welcoming of Jewish authors and staff should be contrasted -- 
with Gide's particular (anti-Jewish) literary tastes. 
In the field of Franco-German relations too, Gide accepted 
the received opinion on Jews. He was, for instance, most surprised 
. that Rathenau did not comply with the conventional stereotype 
(26) 
To Gide, Rathenau should have been more like "les Juifs en general" 
because "(il) avait des antennes pour prevoir tout ce qui allait 
venir" 
(27) 
. Admittedly 
Gide's comments were not (and were not 
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intended to be) overtly anti-Semitic: but they attest to the 
nature of prevailing received thinking about Jews. 
Despite the "Union sacree" during the war and the concomitant 
temporary relapse in the direct anti-Semitism of L'Action franýaise, 
the tendency to view the Russian Revolution as a Jewish conspiracy 
funded by American Jews became dominant from 1917 
(28) 
. Moreover, 
although Drumont died in 1917 and la Libre Parole disappeared for 
lack of readers in 1924, the publication of the infamous "protocoles 
des Sages de Sion" seemed momentarily to confirm the conspiracy 
(29) 
theory. Despite being proved false, these writings fuelled 
much anti-Semitic sentiment in the Inter-War period. Yet by 
1924, "annee de victoire pour le cartel des gauches, (... ) la 
guerre (antijuive) de trente ans prenait fin , 
(30) 
. For a time, 
anti-Semitism seemed to be on the wane, to such an extent that 
by 1927, following the sensational acquittal of Schwartzbard, 
the Jewish assassin of the anti-Semitic nationalist Petlioura 
in 1926, "the French parliament passed a remarkably liberal 
law on naturalization which later eased the pain of exile for 
thousands of Jews" 
(31) 
Meanwhile, a few years earlier at the NRF, Riviere seemed to 
take a genuine interest in Jewish writing by publishing texts 
by 
Albert Cohen 
(32) 
and Jacques de Lacretelle's novel Silbermann 
(33) 
In the case of Silbermann, however, unfortunately the book only 
repeated once more some of the typical stereotypes of the 
Jew. 
Beatrice Philippe has written: 
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"ReSu ä sa parution comme une oeuvre nuancee, 
ecrite par un auteur anime des meilleurs 
sentiments, d' autant de Lacretelle es t 
lui-meme d' origine juive, ce Silbermann 
vehicule tous les cliches de l'antise- 
mitisme quotidien"(34). 
Moreover, Gallimard, who showed remarkable indulgence towards 
Cohen, enabled the young author to set up a review which would 
promote Jewish interests: this was the enterprise which became 
la Revue juive(35) . Cohen was close to Chaim Weizmann, head 
of the World organization of Zionists; this body provided a 
substantial subsidy, a contract was eventually signed with 
Gallimard's after protracted negotiations, and the first issue 
appeared on January 15th, 1925 
(36) 
. The review bore a remarkable 
resemblance in aspect and production to the NRF: Hirsch was 
"gerant", and Gallimard used the same printer, Paillart, in 
Abbeville. In his opening declaration, Cohen maintained that 
if the new review was first and foremost "une revue lit teraire" , 
it was also an "organe de l'activite et de la reconnaissance 
d'Israfl", and would, therefore, treat the Zionist movement 
with sympathy 
(37) 
. The editors were 
inspired by sincere 
optimism when they declared: 
"(la Revue) estime en effet que c'est par la 
creation d'une residence nationale que pourra 
titre resolu le probleme juif dans le monde 
entier; et sinon prendre: fin, du moins 
diminuer, 
1' antisemitisme" 
(38) 
" 
Whatever the reasons behind the demise of La Revue juive, 
its 
Zionism did not appeal to such as Benjamin Cremieux or 
Julien Benda, for their names never appeared in its pages. 
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Among the new reviewing personnel brought into into the 
NRF after the war was Benjamin Cremieux. Under Riviere' s 
editorship, Cremieux submitted no fewer than 142 "notes" 
(39) 
from 1920. His particular field of interest by training was 
Italian literature, but he not only wrote a number of essays on 
authors such as the Tharaud brothers and Pierre Benoit, he also 
reviewed much writing by'Jewish authors. For instance, he 
(40) 
warmly praised J-R Bloch' s Carnaval est Mort 
(41) 
, and wrote the 
following of the important compilation by Edmond Fleg, Anthologie 
jug ive : 
"Tel qu'il est, ce livre est 1'instrument de 
travail et le document "culturel" sur le 
judaisme le plus important qui ait paru en 
France depuis le livre sur L'Antisemitisme 
de Bernard Lazare"(42). 
On occasion, Cremieux also turned his attention to anti-Semitism, 
although. his critiques were controlled and even-handed. In his 
essay on the Tharaud brothers, who were inveterate anti-Semites 
(43), 
he wrote of their view of Judaism in Quand Israel est toi: 
"Le judaisme, sujet entre tous passionnant pour 
les deux freres, car ils y retrouvent ä 1'etat 
pur une race, une religion, un ideal, se conservant 
a travers les massacres et les persecutions 
seculaires"(44). 
Their prose style was of such quality that they deserved a place 
between "Gide et Larbaud"(45), according to Cremieux; he was 
even able to excuse the anti-Semitism of their works 
L' Ombre de 
la Croix and Royaume de Dieu because "on se sentait en plein 
roman" 
(46) 
; yet, in common with Barres, for example, their 
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"sympathie passionnee et malveillante pour le judaisme (... ) 
se mue dans Quand Israel est Roi en antisemitisme categorique et 
universelle, particulierement contagieux"(47) . Cremieux also 
found time to criticize Barres, Maurras and the nationalists in 
"Bilan dune enquete' 
(48) 
. 
Yet Cremieux did not hold the monopoly on reviewing Jewish 
authors; from around 1924, his own reviewing became much broader 
in scope, a move which tended to play down rather than emphasise 
his "Jewishness" : Cretnieux was as fully "assimilated" into the 
NRF as he was in society(49'. Other NRF personnel treated Jewish 
literature and writing with particular sympathy. Under Paulhan's 
editorship, reviewers such as Gabriel Marcel and Felix Bertaux 
examined the latest works(50). Bertaux, for instance, confronted 
the Jewish question head-on and used J-R Bloch's ... Et Compagnie 
to do so(51) This work, dating from 1917 in its original form, 
represented more than a novel for Bertaux. He wrote: 
"Jean-Richard Bloch est Juif, et c'est le 
probleme juif qu'il a pose avec une 
extraordinaire lucidite. Nous sommes 
trop habitues ä considerer que Von nait 
juif comme on nait blond ou brun, pour faire 
la difference essentielle et restituer par 
un effort (... ) leur caractere ongýnal aux 
Israelites que nous rencontrons"(5z) . 
In a forthright admission that stereotypes had 
become all too 
common, Bertaux went on to contrast these with 
Bloch's more 
realistic appraisal: 
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"Ni le Silbermann de Lacretelle, ni le Bloch 
de Proust ne nous touchent autrement que 
comme des types que nous pensions dejä 
connaitre; ils nous donnent seulement la 
satisfaction de penser que nous avions vu 
juste. 
Tandis que les Simler de "Et Compagnie" 
donnent la sensation de decouverte... "(53). 
Bertaux, in generous mood, concluded that the great merit of 
Bloch's work resided in his ability to 
"poser le probleme qui fait du bien. C'est 
comme s. i l'on ouvrait largement une fenetre, 
non pour s'eclairer entre sol ais pour 
convier chacun a la lumiere . 
Bertaux's review reflects the favourable atmosphere of these 
years when anti-Semitism went into relative decline: at the time 
of the naturalization law of 1927, Schlumberger praised Andre Maurois' 
(pseudonym for Emile Herzog) biography Vie de Disraeli 
(55). 
Howevej; this phase of calm did not last for long. L' Action franjaise, 
in September 1928, broke the news of a financial scandal which many 
considered as a new "affaire de Panama en reduction"(56) . This was 
the "affaire Hanau", in which Jewish financiers were directly 
implicated. As a result, a new, much younger generation of anti- 
Semites, led by Jean Drault, Jacques Ploncard and Henry Coston, 
went on to the offensive by launching a revived Libre Parole 
(57) 
Yet in spite of encouragement from Drumont's rationale 
natural heir Leon Daudet, this spasm died down to await the real 
explosion which would follow the better-known scandal, the 
Stavisky affair. 
Meanwhile the NRF continued to survey a fair proportion of 
Jewish literature, including in 1930, a novel brutally portraying 
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the Jewish-Russian world of finance, Irene Nemirowski's 
David Golder(58). Decourdemanche called this "un vrai roman", 
and found it was admirably well-structured(59) . Golder's life, 
he wrote, reflected an "eternel recommencement", and quoted the 
comment that the book described "1' incomprehensib le destin 
ýý 
(60) 
de tout Juif sur la terre In his account of Albert Cohen' s 
Solal, Leon Bopp was more critical(61). He accused this novel 
of lacking unity in characterization and structure, and compared 
it to the sub-genre of "Juifs errants" 
(62) 
. Aside from these 
reservations, however, Bopp praised the work for its irony, 
(63) 
caricature and observation 
Yet once again the outlook suddenly became more bleak for the 
Jewish minority. In the same month as Bopp's review (February 
1931), Georges Bernanos gave a lecture on the 25th entitled 
"Edouard Drumont, ' ou le clerc qui n' a pas trahi" 
(64. ) 
. In this 
title a swirl of allusions announced a renewed phase of attacks 
on the Jews and the gradual, inexorable build-up of anti-Semitic 
feeling which, passing via Maurras and Celine, exploded with the 
anti-Jewish laws of Vichy in 1940" As Pierrard has written, 
(65) 
Bernanos "f aisait ainsi d'une pierre deux coups: en exaltant 
Drumont, il attaquait le Juif Benda, auteur du celebre ouvrage, 
La Trahison des Cleres , 
(66) 
. The final product of this and 
other lectures and articles was La Grande Peur des 
ken-pensants 
published by Grasset. 
In the NRF, this controversial work attracted the surprisingly 
(67) 
In his essay he preferred sympathetic attention of Thibaudet 
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to examine Drumont's work as an example of "le journalisme du 
combat"; Drumont should be located with those talented right- 
wing polemicists whose tradition, Thibaudet believed, was much 
68) 
stronger than that of the left . This explains how Thibaudet 
could "admire" La France Juive: 
"Cela pour prevenir que le puis admirer 1a France 
Juive sans dej euner d'un rabbin, diner d'un 
banquier, ni souper d'un auteur dramatique. 
Encore auj ourd, hui, ]: a France Juive reste un 
bouquin tres fort, fort de style, d'allant, 
de pectus, oü le mouvement du coup de poing 
prend son temps pour se former, se declenche 
et s'abat dans une trajectoire impeccable, un 
bouquin certes romance apocalyptiquement mais 
oü le romancement s'engrene sur la realite et 
produit de faction; et oü le cadre de 
l' apocalypse s'adapte en effet ä une poesie 
de la race" 
(69) 
. 
Thus Thibaudet could praise such a work for its style, its "panache": 
he went on to stress that it was only its conjunction with the 
Dreyfus Affair which "a gangrene 1'arbre entier"(70). Yet the 
book was firmly planted within the French historical tradition, 
for it was based upon the mythical idea that "la masse du peuple 
franjais a ete conquise, ou est conquise, ou menace d'etre 
conquise, par une minorite ou par des minorites ou par des 
minorites ethniquesý71) . This tradition 
had influenced Drumont 
for he was a "celtiste". By the Third Republic this idea of a 
cultural or ethnic invasion fuelled "le racisme et le nationalisme 
terren de Barres et de Maurras"(72). Thibaudet highlighted 
the importance of the mythical nature of French racialist ideas 
(equally applicable in the context of anti-Semitism) when 
he 
wrote: 
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"Cette Idee raciste n'est ni vraie ni fausse, 
eile est viable. La critique historique ne 
peut 1'attaquer (... ) que jusqu'ä un certain 
point ( ... ) . Des quelle a ete communiquee ä 
un groupe, eile agit, eile est (... )"(73). 
Thibaudet saw Drumont's racialism as partly explicable through 
his experience of the "Semaine sanglante" of 1871, when Paris had 
been "conquered" by the Provinces. Drumont, although no "communard", 
"vit aux mains de la Republique la trace du massacre de 1871"(74): 
hence the strongly anti-Republican political charge underlying 
anti-Semitism. This, and the anti-Semitism of the "Republique 
des Lettres", conspired to enter "la Republique tout court" 
(75) 
wrote Thibaudet, and he went on to criticize Bernanos for not 
mentioning what he saw as a key to interpreting Drumont, "le 
krach de 1'Union generale"(76) . For Thibaud'et this prepared the 
way f or the intense phase of Catholic anti-Semitism, attested 
as it was by La Libre Parole "et ses milliers d'abonnes des 
(77) 
presbyteres". As the Third Republic progressed through its 
various phases in the last twenty years of the 19th Century, so 
Drumon t adapted his polemic, building up to its zenith from 1892, 
in the "Panama scandal. ". Yet if "le triomphe de Drumont fut 
le Panama, son desastre (fut) l'affaire Dreyfus , 
(78) 
, according 
to Thibaudet. He identified two Dreyfus Affairs, one being 
military, the other religious. Drumont' s demise was caused by 
the very success of his campaign in La Libre Parole, in that it 
(79) 
In led directly to "combisme" and the "Stparation" 
conclusion, Thibaudet wrote that Bernanos was the 
"lecteur- 
type de Drumont", he rightly stressed that "le lecteur de Drumont 
(... ) a fourni un type de Francais qui compte dans 
la vie politique, 
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intellectuelle, religieuse, de la Troisieme Epublique" (80) 
. 
Bernanos, himself a former "camelot du roi", and his 
resurrection of Drumont inevitably delighted L'Action fran ais-e,, 
thereby proving that anti=Semitism was deeply ingrained in the 
Third Republic; its political charge was high and of great 
value to the Right. However, another form of anti=Semitism was 
growing in strength in Germany: the increasing awareness of Hitler's 
anti-Jewish policies led to the creation in France of the "Ligue 
Internationale contre 1' antis&itisme", which later transformed, 
under Bernard Lecache, into the "Ligue Internationale contre le 
Racisme et l'Antisemitisme", or "LICA". French Jews, especially 
those on the Left, rallied behind Bernard Lecache's movement, 
and, in February 1932, before the advent to power of Hitler, 
their monthly newspaper Le Droit de Vivre made its first 
(81) 
appearance . 
Meanwhile the NRF, beginning in May 1932, serialized 
' 
J-R Bloch's novel Sybilla 
82ý. 
Jean Grenier found that 
"c'est a crever de rire", adding "Fantomas est largement depasse"ý83ý. 
Of course, Grenier's was a private opinion; but it is worth 
contrasting it with the article by Denis Saurat in May entitled 
"Jean-Richard Bloch', 
(84) 
. Identifying the 
dominant characteristic 
of Bloch's work as "l'inqui. etude: le sens de la mort"(85). Saurat 
denied that this was specifically because Bloch was Jewish, and 
he affirmed: 
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"I1 n'y a pas litterature juive. Les Juifs 
d'Angleterre sont des ecrivains anglais (... ). 
En France, le Juifs sont une province, comme les 
P roven Saux ou les Bretons (... ) Bloch (... ) est 
premierement franSais"(86). 
Saurat saw Bloch's work as a form of what might be called 
"proto-existentialism", especially in his obsession with death 
ý87ý. 
As escape-routes from his "impasse", Bloch's work contained its 
heroes and its "elus", both firmly wedded to the French side of 
Bloch's character($$). In the problematic area of "la race", 
Saurat nearly contradicted himself when he wrote "d'abord, Bloch 
n'a reussi encore, profondement, que des portraits de Juifs. Son 
esprit est f ranjais; sa maniere, son intelligence, ses methodes, 
ses idees sont franSaises. Son siijet est juif"(89). 
his sometimes caricatural representations of Jews, 
In spite of 
Saurat believed 
that Bloch "voit dans de sang juif une sorte de tonique, qui 
inj ecte sous la peau _ redonnera 
de la vig.. ueur am grand corps 
vieillissant"(90). Saurat concluded that 
"il nest personne dans 
les lettres f rancaises d'aujourd'hui dont nous puissions attendre 
davantage" 
(91) 
, although a cynic might 
have remarked that Bloch 
was recognised as a Gallimard house author. 
Bloch himself was coming closer to a fellow-travelling position 
during this period, and he had a regular rubric at Europe 
in which 
he commented on a wide range of politico-cultural manifestations: 
In fact Bloch deeply offended Martin du Gard and Gide in one of 
his "chroniques" a few months after his novel finished serialization 
in the NRF. On April 30th 1933, Martin du 
Gard told Gide to read 
(92) 
His "French" sensibilities had been Bloch's April article 
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severely bruise. d by what Bloch had written: 
"... nc, us desirons n'avoir plus rien de commun 
avec les pares ä Lenotre, les jardins bien 
ordonnes, l'apologie niaise de l'heritage 
cartesien, de la mesure et du depouillement"(93). 
Martin du Gard felt so incensed by this "nihilism" that "ä 
certains moments (... ) j'ai senti bouillonner enmoi je ne 
sais quel jus hitlerienl 0"(94). Although Martin de Gard could 
understand Bloch's arguments, he felt most disturbed by the 
fact that it had been a Jew who had "(porte) des coups d' icono clas to 
(95) 
sur quelque chose de pur et precieux" .'. Bloch had attacked, 
by inference, not only the "patrimoine national", but also the 
NRF: "en le suivant, ä quoi ab outirions-noes? A la supe riorite 
de Celine sur Valery? "ý96). Gide replied, saying the same 
thoughts had occurred to him: he advanced the theory that Bloch 
was displaying such feelings because "il a completement rate sa 
Sybilla" 
(97) 
, and this, for racial reasons: 
"Ces qualites d'ordre, de mesure (... ) qui, 
chez lui, n' etaient qu' acquises, sont 
innees chez nous et ressortissent au 
plus profond_ de notre nature" (98) . 
For Gide, they had entered a "dark age" in which the values 
they had held so dear were no longer respected; their work, 
Les Thibault or 1, es Faux-Monnayeurs belonged to a different 
category and it would have been absurd for either of them to 
attempt such an undertaking as Sybilla. 
Bloch's view was iconoclastic because for him the old 
cultural values and political dilatoriness of the victorious 
European nations had led to Hitler's rise to power in 
Germany: 
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if he called for a tabula rasa it was because the Nazis were 
showing their true colours. At the time of the exchange of 
letters between Gide and Martin du Gard, Le Droit de Vivre 
warned that 700,000 Jews were now under threat from the Nazi 
regime, and that the Jewish question was now a central issue 
not only in Franco-German relations, but in antifascism(99) 
Indeed Malraux, familiar with German-Jewish circles through 
his marriage to Clara Goldschmidt, rallied to the Jewish 
antifascist cause later that year, when he responded to a 
(100) 
survey in Lecache's newspaper . Here Malraux noted that 
"l' antisemitisme en France est touj ours une idee subordonnee" 
(101) 
by this he meant that anti-Jewish feeling could always be 
marshalled by Nationalist propaganda for ulterior motives 
(102) 
. 
This may have been the case in France until the advent of Hitler, 
but anti-Semitic racialism per se was an integral part of Nazi 
policies;, it was not long before such policies found favour 
among the small minority of genuine, racialist, pro-Nazi 
(103) 
Frenchmen . Moreover, Malraux, 
like Barbusse in his reply, 
interpreted the Jewish problem as a political one requiring a 
socialist solution: "1'idee de race, en Europe, en 1933, ne 
peut signifier autre chose que Poppression des minorites' 
(104) 
_ 
In combatting anti-Semitism (or fascism), the Jews must unite 
with one of the only two f orces which opposed the racialists: 
"la democratie ou le proletariat"; above all, they should not 
(105) believe that they could remain "au dessus des partis . 
Malraux's support for the Jewish cause was evidently 
highly 
appreciated by "LICA" during 1933 and 
1934, as attested by the 
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prominence given to reports of his speeches 
(106) 
; by this 
time, Malraux was generally considered as a front-line 
NRF author. 
One of those most responsible for formulating specifically 
racialist theories was Gobineau(107). He systematized the 
confused thinking on race which had proceeded him by dividing 
the Eurasian peoples into Aryan and Semitic, thereby heralding 
biological racialism. As Poliakov puts it, by the end of the 
19th Century the Aryan myth "had achieved pride of place among 
(108) 
men of learning" . On February ist, 1934, exactly a year 
after Hitler's coming to power, the NRF devoted almost all of 
its space to "Gobineau et le sobinisme"109). It is hardly 
necessary to point out that this issue coincided with what 
many believed was a genuine fascist "coup" on-the 6th of that 
month: indeed, some, such as Andre Wurmser never forgave Paulhan 
for publishing this "tribute"(110) . Paulhan's correspondence shows 
that he had been preparing this issue since at least March 1933(111). 
Among the contributions from non-NRF writers were essays by 
Robert Dreyfus, Abel Bonnard, Bernard Fay, Daniel Halevy, 
Ernest Seilliere and Heinrich von Keyserling(112). Paulhan 
cannot have been unaware of the potential damage the Gobineau 
special number might do, for apparently Paul Bourget, invited via 
Halevy to contribute, did not wish to do so, because "le racisme 
allemand le gene, et il ne s'en cache pas. Je ne doute pas que 
ce ne soit la raison de son silence viG, -ä vis de vous"(113) 
Not all the contributions praised "le gobinisme", 
however. Etiemble, writing as Jean Louverne, submitted a sharp 
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critique and alleged that had Hitler not resorted to the 
Aryan myth, Gobineau's work would still be languishing "sous la 
(114) 
poussiere des bibliotheques" For Etiemble, "le fascisme a 
(115) 
lance cet avocat retendu de Goering" Paulhan p personally 
found that this was an exaggeration, but he did not alter the 
wording(116) . According to Etiemble, modern ethnography was 
beginning to show how fraudulent Gobineau' s ideas were: "la 
naissance relativement recente de la civilisation aryenne forjait 
Gobineau ä rajeunir la vieille Chine"117). Heinrich von Keyserling 
examined Gobineau's influence in Germany via H. S. Chamberlain, and 
admitted to two errors: 
"J'ai eu tort, les faits le prouvent bien; 
Chamberlain a certainement ete 1'inspirateur 
principal de l'Allemagne qui a tenu durant la 
grande guerre. J'ai eu tort une seconde fois, 
lorsque j'ai ri, en entendant Chamberlain 
designer, des 1923, Adolf Hitler comme le 
p rophete de 1'Allemagne ä venir"118). 
The most inflammatory essay, however, and the one most 
likely to have caused the indignation of Jewish antifascists such 
as Andre Wurmser, was Clement Serpeille de Gobineau's 
"le 
Gobinisme et la Politique moderne" 
(119) 
Here Serpeille de Gobineau 
demonstrated quite clearly that "Jobinisme" was the direct .. 
inspiration for Nazi racialism. Summarizing Aryan "superiority" 
he wrote: "parmi les blancs, 1'Aryan seul est doue 
de 1'esprit 
s apte gouverner 
 
120) 
social estaa socialement This social 
superiority was fundamental to National-Socialism: 
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"C'est pour retrouver son unite sociale que 
l'Allemagne hitlerienne s'est cru obligee 
d'eliminer les Juifs qui, servis par le 
regime liberal, avaient mis en oeuvre 
toutes leurs qualites individuelles et 
leurs attirances raciales pour se tailler 
dans l'activite intellectuelle, economique 
et politique de l'Allemagne social-democrate 
la part du lion" (121) . 
The author went on to contrast the superior organizing abilities 
of an "Aryan" nation like England, and its colonial empire, with 
Spain, which, he alleged, was so racially-debased that it was 
socially chaotic. Serpeille de Gobineau concluded that in 
Italy (another Latin, equally "mixed" nation) "Renaissance 
heroes" were working to forge a new society. For him, the fact 
that Mussolini's Italy was fascist was paramount: 
"L'Italie moderne a senti et vu les rapprochements 
certains que l'on peut faire entre les idees de 
Gobineau et les idees sur lesquelles s'appuient 
les mouvements politiques actuels`; (122). 
If further proof were needed as to how "1obinisme" had fuelled 
Hitler's racialism, the impressive bibliography provided it, 
including a section devoted to "le Mouvement de polemique sur 
Gobineau et le racisme ä l' avenement de Hitler" 
(123) 
The NRF's special treatment of Gobineau appeared at a 
particularly crucial historical conjuncture: the Stavisky scandal 
(which seemed to support so- conveniently the extreme right- 
wing equation of Radical Republicanism = Freemasonry = 
Jews) and 
the ensuing political confusion, violence and reaction, all 
conspired to make anti-Semitism a dominant 
issue. Indeed, the 
NRF's reactions to the events of February, particularly 
those 
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of Cremieux, became the object and cause of a bitter exchange 
of views within the NRF in subsequent months(124). Cremieux 
opened his April "chronique" with the following sentences: 
"Un mois apres les j ournees de f evrier, on 
constate que tous les partis, loin d'avoir 
precise, eclaire leur positions, att¬ Lgnent 
au comble de la confusion. A 1' extreme- 
droite, Action franýai 
, consciente de 
sa faiblesse, ajourne ä 1950 le retour du roi 
et anathematise la guerre civile"(125). 
The next month Cremieux pointed out that Charles Maurras, in 
L'Action francaise for April 10th, had taken exception to these 
remarks 
(126). 
Cremieux had intended quite simply to state that 
the February riots had demonstrated the political weakness and 
ineffectuality of Action franraise, that they had not even 
"mis en bran-le le mouvement qui a abouti au .6 
fevrier"(127) 
Yet there was another reason for writing this letter: Maurras 
had singled out Cremieux as "un autre redacteur de la NRF, 
un Juif celui-lä" 
(128). 
Deeply offended, Cremieux wished to 
know whether "M. Maurras entend par lä que je suis FranSais de 
seconde zone, un Fran cais moins Franjais que lui, moins libre 
que lui d'avoir et d'exprimer des vues politiques" 
(129) 
. Cremieux 
went on to dismiss those negative connotations of the accusation - 
he was not a capitalist, he had served in the war, he was not 
on the Left politically, nor was he a "meteque". Neither could 
be imagine that Maurras was accusing him of"deicide". The only 
alternative was that Cremieux might be a partisan of Zionism, yet 
he rejected that too, seeing Zionism objectively, merely as a 
logical consequence of anti-Semitism. Clarification was necessary: 
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"Alors, pourquoi "un Juif, celui-lä? " Serait-ce 
parce que je suis de sang juif? Par simple 
racisme? J'aimerais beaucoup ä etre fixe sur 
ce point" (130) 
A letter from Maurras arrived too late for June's issue, 
so the debate continued in the July number, including Cremieux's 
own riposte to Maurras(131). Here Maurras corrected what he 
believed to be inaccuracies in Cremieux's representation of 
Action Fran ýaise ideas, and proceeded to answer the specific 
question of having singled out Cremieux's Jewish background. 
For Maurras, referring to Bernard Lazare, the Jewish tradition 
was dangerous, and therefore unassimilable, due to "la presence 
de certains elements conservateurset destructeurs"(132). The 
root of the problem, he felt, was traceable to the 1789 Revolution 
and subsequent Republicanism in France; democracy was too uniform 
9 to permit progress. Yet under 
"la royaute hereditaire , 
(133) 
Maurras could easily conceive of a "Jewish province" in France, 
so long as it could be controlled by statute. However, Maurras 
did not believe that French Jews were, or could ever be, assimilable. 
This, he felt, was due to the "nouvelle vague juive, un nouvel 
arrivage de sang juif (... ) venus de fest ou du midi comme en 1815, 
en 1870"(134). 
A principal symptom of this later "influx" was provided by 
the action of Isaac-Moise-Adolphe Cremieux, who, wondered Maurras, 
might be related to Benjamin Cremieux. Maurras was referring 
to the Cremieux law of 1870 whereby French citizenship was conferred 
upon Algerian Jews. Maurras implied that such action was 
treasonable, 
and against the national interest 
"sept semaines apres Sedan"; 
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he wrote: 
"ce juif nimois sans doute assimile depuis des 
siecles et porte au gouvernement par notre 
egalitarisme naif, pouvait songer ä tout 
autre chose que le service de la patrie en 
danger; il songeait ä se retourner vers ses 
bons freres. enburnous! "(135) . 
The leader of L' Action franýaise drew a direct parallel between 
this event and the fact that at the time of writing, "la croix 
gammee fait (... ) de redoutables conquetes dans 1' Af rique du 
Nord' 
(136). 
Once again, referring to the period since 1790, 
Maurras blamed the Republican regime for all the ills visited 
upon France, particularly by the Jews: "Is-r. a9l n' a ete si 
puissant sur, 'France 
que parce que la France souffrait des 
maladies du regime electif" 
(137) 
. 
Cremieux, in his reply, could see little to separate Maurras' 
attitudes to the Jews from those current in Nazi Germany:. 
"S. 'il ne dependait que de M. Maurras, leSJuifs 
seraient en France, comme en Allemagne nazi, 
soumis ä un statut special qui en ferait 
effectivement des Franjais de seconde zone"(138). 
Moreover, Cremieux indicated perceptively that since the imposition 
of anti-Semitic policies in Germany, Maurras had suddenly stopped 
alluding to "1' alliance judeo-allemande", nor did he mention that 
the Nazis accused Jews of rationalism, nor did he acknowledge the 
(139) 
Again, 
existence of a Jewish peasantry or proletariat . 
Cremieux showed that Maurras' doctrine equated the Jewish 
tradition with a "Jewishness" which was completely 
innate, therefore 
inescapable. Such racialist determination bore very close resemblances 
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to Nazism(140) , Turning his attention to the example of the 
naturalization law of 1870, Cremieux corrected Maurras 
demonstrating that Adolphe Cremieux (his distant cousin) had 
only(141) put the finishing touches to a "senatus-consulte de 1865". 
Maurras, as soon as political passions took over, destroyed the 
all-embracing nature of his argument when confronted with the 
hypothetical case of the assimilated Jew who was an Action franraise 
supporter(142); such Jews had to be ! 
'inimediatement promu au grade 
de "Juif bien-ne"" 
(143) 
. Thus Cremieux laid bare Maurras' real 
target: 
"Le liberalisme franjais assimilateur, 1'egalitarisme, 
voila au vrai 1' ennemi pour M. Maurras et non pas 
le Juif... "(144). 
In conclusion, even Cremieux was forced to admit that assimilation 
could not provide the complete solution to the Jewish question, 
but it remained the best and only solution for the time being. 
Anti-Semitism was an obstacle to assimilation, and that was why 
Cremieux was determined to highlight "l' inanite de l' argumentation 
(145) 
antisemite, füt-elle signee Maurras" " In a final, further 
point, Cremieux drew attention, in a footnote, to the important 
problem of immigration: at the time of his writing, the influx 
of Jews into France from Hitler's Germany was gradually increasing, 
but France was by no means the only destination; many times more 
than the proportion who settled in France found their way to 
the United States 
(146). 
As the 1930's progressed, however, the 
question of immigration became ever-more problematic and, 
by 
1939, such "establishment" Jews as Berl were calling 
for a 
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complete halt to the infl ux(147). Even Cremieux in 1934 
sounded a cautionary note regarding immigrants, calling for 
(148) 
a numerus clausus. In this way, although Cremieux himself 
favoured assimilation as an approach, he could understand that 
some Jews would prefer the Zionist solution to being treated 
as "citoyens de seconde zone" 
(149) 
. For the first time, the 
question of anti-Semitism had received treatment in the pages 
of the NRF. 
In common with moves towards the united political front 
supported by moderate- and left- intellectuals, "LICA" successfully 
incorporated the Jewish question into antifascism. Malraux, for 
example, repeated his pro-Jewish pronouncements in May 1934, 
alongside Lecache, Jean Longuet, Georges Izard (from Esprit) 
and Leon Pierre-Quint(150) . Moreover, the upsurge in the activity 
of the "ligues" after the 6th February became more menacing, 
and, although actual attacks on Jewish persons and property 
did not begin in earnest until late 1935, it was becoming clear 
that the "ligues" had adopted anti-Semitism and were placing 
it in the foreground as an issue, mimicking Nazi thuggery in 
Germany(151) . Maurras was proved right 
in the case of North 
Africa: anti-Jewish riots in Constantine, Algeria, left 25 
Jews dead 
(152). 
In the December issue of Le Droit de Vivre, reference 
was made to Suares' latest text in the NRF(153); 
"Andre Suares vient, dans le dernier numero 
de la NRF, de resumer, avec une magnifique 
partialite, ce que des millions d'hommes 
n'osent pas publiquement penser"(154). 
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Quoting from the last page of this extract, Le Droit de Vivre 
urged its readers to admit that "la race est de la bete. Le 
choix est de l'individu et de sa vertu libre"(155). For 
Suares, anything German was indeed barbaric and "de la bete" 
X156) 
However, VDroit de Vivre did not quote from the next paragraph, 
in which Suares berated Israel: 
"La:. grande misere d' Israel est d' avoir tourne 
le sentiment de la justice en raison universelle. 
Et, par une erreur inverse, d'avoir cru que le 
savoir et le juste sont fonction l'un de l' autre" (157) . 
Suares, himself partly Jewish, disliked Jewish "racism" or 
Nationalism as much as any other, for he believed all racial 
distinctions were below his own highly aristocratic conception 
of Humanism. Suares balanced his hatred of the barbaric with 
an extreme distaste for what he called the "specifically" 
Jewish(158) . He further qualified this 
hatred: 
"Je 1'ai de-iä dit: je suis contre les Juifs 
s'ils font bande a part et s' ils ne sont pas 
incorpores, e et chair, honneur et interet, 
ä la nation o retendent vivre (... )"(159). 
Again, Suares counterbalanced this by writing: "Je suis pour 
les Israelites contre ceux qui les souillent, tous ensemble, de 
leur Maine, de leurs injures, et de leurs calomnies" 
(160) 
. These 
remarks help explain Suares' own ambivalent attitude towards 
"Israel" in the NRF: 
"Isra&1 est alors un esprit qui, forcene dans sa 
mission par les sevices, la persecution et les 
injures, stest incarne ä-la terre et s'est voue 
par is tantot a tous les exces du sentiment propre, 
tantot a se meconnaftre lui-meme"(161). 
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Suares placed Nazism at the apex of a hierarchy of extremisms: 
in the case of Jews his antipathy was more redolent of anti- 
Zionism than of outright racist anti-Semitism. Thus Le Droit 
de Vivre could only publicise their admiration for Suares'by 
omitting his more unflattering comments on Israel. Suares 
laid himself open to attack from all sides, a fact which 
endeared him to Paulhan(162) . Indeed, Paulhan explained to 
Jouhandeau that he believed Suares and the NRF were entirely 
compatible in expressing "toutes les exag4rations"(163), even 
if it led to Schlumberger's anger 
(164) 
or to cancelled 
(165) 
subscriptions 
As for Julien Benda, evidence exists -in the NRF to uphold the 
view of Pierre Chambat, who writes: "la menace de 1' antisemitisme 
est presente dans la pensee de Benda 
". (. 166) 
, yet it should always 
be remembered that Benda, like Cremieux and Suares, rejected 
Zionism as a solution to the Jewish question(167). Benda had 
experienced the anti-Semitism of the literary world when his 
book L' Ordination was denied the Goncourt prize in 1912 because 
he was a Jew 
(168) 
; moreover, "la virulence de L'Action franýaise 
ne se dechaine qu'avec La Trahison des Clercs; eile s'ep anouit 
vers le fin des annees trente dans des appels 
a des operations 
de basse police... "(169) . Although 
he subordinated his Jewishness 
to his self-appointed r0-le of "clerc" 
(170) "Benda ranime sa 
tt i171) 
judeite devant l' antisemitisme envahissant 
Due principally to his attitude to war, 
Benda was often 
cast in the sterotype role of 
"Jew as warmonger". Maurras' 
"appels au meurtre" were no less repulsive regarding 
Benda than 
- ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo - ioo 
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"Peuple sans terre, rep ondrai-j e, mais non 
sans comptes de banque et, en tant que tel, 
peu bloque dans l' Esprit. Ajoutez sa croyance ä une verite juive; (... ) sa pretension depuis 
quelque temps de ranimer 1' äme specifiquement 
juive, l'äme, de-la"race Blue". Ma religion de 
1' esprit pur a autant consiste a me nourrir d' un 
certain semitisme qu'ä me liberer d'un autre ä 
rompre, comme mon maitre, avec la synagogue" 180). 
The possibility of any debate on this matter between Benda and 
Thibaudet was precluded by the latter's death a few weeks later; 
yet Benda's Memoires would appear in the NRF that year, and would 
contribute to the worst outburst of anti-Semitism from an author 
within the NRF. 
The prospect of a Popular Front government was becoming 
more likely during these months, and there were already clear signs 
that a government headed by Leon Blum would unleash a ferocious 
wave of anti-Semitism. The hatred of the Right for Blum reached 
such a level that he was physically attacked by Action £rancaise 
supporters and "ligueurs" : this act led directly to the dissolution 
of the "Ligue d'Action frangaise", extended to all the "fascist" 
"ligues" in June 1936, after the election victory (lsl) . On 
May 3rd, in spite of the anti-Semitic campaign in the extreme 
right-wing press (including incitements to murder), the Popular 
. Front was elected, and a month later Blum formed his government 
(182) 
Gide was genuinely sympathetic to the Popular Front, but 
Henri Massis lost no time in placing him in a highly embarrassing 
position. Evidently Massis had sent Gide an advance copy of his 
forthcoming "Lectures" rubric in .a Revue universelle dated June 
1st, for, on May 27th, "la Petit: Dame" noted Gide's consternation(183) 
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Massis, having read Gide's Journal in the Oeuvres completes 
(184) 
had discovered the well-known passage concerning Leon Blum and 
Gide's view of "Jewish" literature(185), Massis hardly concealed 
his delight in being able to quote Gide - an eminent fellow-traveller 
- and his effectively anti-Semitic sentiments of 1914, in order 
to discredit Leon Blum. Massis pointed to the relevance of his 
discovery by describing the designated personnel in the Popular 
Front government: 
"Ce personnel ne sort pas de la classe ouvriere 
(... ) . I1 se compose de fonctionnaires, de "bourgeois socialisants": intellectuels, 
universitaires, medecins, avocats, qui 
appartiennent aux professions liberales oü 
sont nombreux ces Juifs embourgeoises, 
dont M. Leon Blum es t le type re resentatif 
0 .. 
" 1. 
Massis then quoted the passage in which there was an implication 
that Blum would one day fulfil his ambition to "etablir sa 
superiorite dans tous les ordres... "(187) . Massis extended Gide's 
character sketch of the individual Blum to emcompass "Israel" 
in general: 
"Israel aspire au role d'arbitre souverain, de 
controleur de tous les autres elements du pays, 
qu'il s'agisse d'art, de litterature ou de 
p olitique" (188) . 
Furthermore, Massis used Gide's comments on "une litterature 
juive qui nest t pas la litterature f ranjaise 
(189)11 
, to illustrate 
that in fact, the Jews were, in the long run, unassimilab le . 
Referring specifically to Gide's sentence in which he 
implied that k 
to Jewish domination(190), prefer-red -> silence -- 
Massis commented: "Cela peut de meme s' entendre en 
bien d'autres 
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sortes de choses", meaning that extra vigilance and opposition 
would be required now tha "c'est de notre existence nationale 
qu' il 
( 
s' agit"191) . Gide probably noticed the irony that for 
once Massis had not distorted a single word of what he had 
written(192) through simply applying Gide's Jewish stereotype 
of Blum the writer to Blum the politician, Massis had made Gide 
attack his political ally on the grounds of anti-Semitism. 
The arrival of the Popular Front government in France 
lent support to the views of some anti-Semites that the Jews 
were in the process of taking complete control of the country, 
and of French interests. Marc Bloch, the historian, noted this 
in his work L'Etrange Defaite: 
"On ne saurait exagerer 1'emoi que, dang les 
rangs des classes aisees, meme parmi les 
hommes en apparence les plus libres d' esprit, 
provoqua l' avenement du Front populaire. 
Quiconque avait quatre sous crut sentir passer 
le vent du desastre"(193). 
Moreover, the adoption of a political anti-Semitism has been 
noted by Marrus and Paxton: 
"Anti-Semitism was plainly an important focus 
for opposition to Blum's Popular Front 
government. Those years re-shaped anti-Jewish 
sensibility into a political, economic, and social 
world view, giving it a combative edge, the 
cri de coeur of an opposition movement attempting 
to defend France against revolutionary change" 
(194) 
. 
At the NRF, Paulhan arranged to have Benda's first volume 
(195) 
. of Memoires serialized in the NRF, beginning in August 
1936 
Meanwhile, the anti-Jewish animosity of the exclusively NRF - 
author Marcel Jouhandeau reached such a level that 
in early 
autumn, he was pressurizing Paulhan to publish, 
in the NRF, 
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an article which attacked. Jewish influence in general, and 
Benda, in particular. Paulhan refused, feeling that if he 
included Jouhandeau's piece he would betray Benda: 
"tu est libre de dire dans la NRF tout ce qu'il 
to plait d'y dire. Pourtant, si je donnais to 
lettre, nest-ce pas moi ä qui tu ferais jouer 
le role penible? N' aurai-je pas l' air d'avoir 
attire Benda dans un guet-apens, en lui laissant 
d'abord publier ces pages pour ensuite (si juste 
que puisse etre ton sentiment) 1'accabler? Veux- 
tu y songer encore"(196). 
Clearly Jouhandeau had taken exception to passages in Benda's 
serial, but editorially it was not possible to attack an NRF- 
author towards whom Paulhan had shown much support: Jouhandeau 
took his article instead to L'Action fran9aise, and "Comment je 
suis devenu a ntisemite" appeared there on October 8th 
(197) 
Jouhandeau insisted that he had only become anti-Semitic through 
"patriotism" alone, not for reasons of personal rancour. He 
began with an anecdote concerning Maurice Sachs' alleged disgraceful 
behaviour at :a reception and his scorn of France and French 
(198) 8ý 
Dismissing Sachs as a nonentity, Jouhandeau then 
turned to Benda, supporting his assertions with references to the 
serialized67eunesse d'un Clerc(199) . For example, 
Jouhandeau 
took particular exception to Benda's tribute to 
his family and 
their "milieu": Benda had written - 
"Je vois une succession de juifs intelligents, travailleurs 
ironiques, amis de la science pendant que presque tout 
autour d'eux croupit encore dans les superstitions, 
agents de liberation humaine, sur qui s'appuient 
tous 
les partis de progres. En verite, je suis 
honteux 
de m'y prendre si tard pour me sentir 
fier de 
descendre d'une teile elite, comprendre tout ce 
que je lui doffs"(200). 
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Jouhandeau, a passionate Catholic, was outraged by this "free- 
thinking" attitude, the more so given its author was Jewish 
(201). 
Benda also denied that his father's (and his own) sense of 
patriotism had included any "element instinctif, charnel, 
irrationnel" 
(202) 
. Jouhandeau insisted that Benda, by denying 
this emotional attachment to France, simply could not be patriotic, 
and in his commentary on the text, Jouhandeau showed that his 
target was as much the French Revolution (and subsequent 
Republicanism) as the Jews, for the Revolution had emancipated 
the Jews(203). It was Republicanism which had "opened all the 
doors" to Jews and which had encouraged Jewish pride and ambition 
in obtaining "les premieres places' 
(204) 
In addition to this "oppression" as Jouhandeau saw it, he 
alleged that the Jews now had the temerity to "hate the French": 
Jouhandeau wrote - 
"Oü M. Benda se demasque un peu plus (- 
et devl-t to t d'w-t cot. p 
intolerable, c'est apres nous avoir confie 
"son culte pour les valeurs posees dans 
1'eternel", quand il nous exprime "sa haine 
de ceux qui ne les saluent que dans 1' his torique" 
(205) 
. 
Jouhandeau could hardly contain his rage, exclaiming: 
"Vous entendez? Rien que cela, sa haine, la haine 
de ce petit clown semite,, et vous savez a qui eile 
va, cette haine? A vous, a moi, a nous qui avons 
des 
traditions... "(206). 
He was also convinced that since the advent of 
Blum to power 
("Blum est le vrai successeur de Louis XVI 
"(207) ), Jews occupied 
all the primary places in French society: with one 
blow, Jouhandeau 
hoped he could vilify both the Republic and the 
Popular Front. 
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It was to this extent that he clearly demonstrated the political, 
or ideological, force of anti-Semitism. In conclusion, Jouhandeau 
signalled how close he was to Nazi anti-Semitism by affirming 
that if French Jews decided to leave for Palestine, he would 
willingly escort them personally; yet should even one remain, 
he would not be content until that single Jew were subject to 
a special statute(208) . Much later, when discussing Le Peril Juif 
with Jacques Danon, Jouhandeau confirmed that: 
"Les Juifs s'etaien t empare du pouvoir en France, 
ils conduisaient la France ä l'echec que nous 
avons connu et qu'ils ont partage. Le livre etait 
dorc essentiellement une critique du gouvernement 
de 1'ep oque. Le Juifs vraiment intelligents ne m'en 
veulent pas de mon attitude (sic)"(209). 
In 1936, however, it was difficult to ignore the fact that 
Jouhandeau was anti-Semitic per se, in addition to his extreme 
anti-Republicanism. 
Paulhan reported to Jouhandeau that Benda had not read 
the article in L'Action franc aise, but that Alix Guillain had 
begun to do so and Benda had left the room: moreover, he added, 
"Benda est (... ) pris ä partie par les Juifs, qui lui reprochent 
(210) 
de les trahir" Later, Paulhan gently admonished Jouhandeau 
for citing three names (one of whom was not Jewish) and 
for 
(211) 
generalizing when he was referring to specific examples . 
Reactions to the article were varied: Grenier, never an ally of 
Benda, thought it "tres modere concernant J. B. 
"(2U), while 
(213) 
Le Droit de Vivre likened Jouhandeau to Julius Streicher . 
Although Paulhan attempted to give Jouhandeau as much support as 
he could as editor and as a friend, he admitted 
to Suares that 
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he was distressed by this public expression of anti-Semitism: 
"Qu'aurez-vous pense de la (... ) violence 
antisemite de Jouhandeau? (... ) Je la connaissais 
depuis pres de deux ans. Pourtant son expression 
m' a etonne et peine" (214) . 
By mid-November, it became clear that Jouhandeau wanted to return 
to the offensive: "il se croit une mission", Paulhan told 
Suares(215) . This time, however, no newspaper would accept 
his article, not even L' Action franýaise or Je suis partout 
(216) 
. 
Benda waited until December 1936 to comment on the various 
criticisms levelled at1Jeunesse d'un Clerc, in particular those 
Jewish objections to the way he had distinguished French Jews 
from other Frenchmen 
(217) 
. Although willing to admit that many 
French Jews did have an emotional bond to France, he insisted 
he did not feel this due to his vocation as a "clerc". The most 
frequent criticism, however, was that Benda's distinction provided 
anti-Semites with a further weapon: but again Benda insisted that 
"mon propre est d'ecrire ce que je crois vrai, sans m'inquieter 
des consequences. En quoi je suis clerc et non specialement 
j uif 
(218) 
. 
Meanwhile Jouhandeau continued to attempt to have more 
articles published, indeed, well into the first half of 1937: 
(219) 
he met with little success . The second text eventually 
published in Le Peril Juif could well have been one such article; 
it included remarks made to Marcel Ayme on Jewish 
"predominance" 
in the Gallimard publishing house(220) . Yet again 
in June, 
L' Action fr ancaise rejected a Jouhandeau article, already refused 
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(221) b by Paulhan These refusals were probably partly the reason 
(222) 
for publishing Le Peril Juif Later, once the true extent 
of the Nazi repression of Jews was beginning to be realized, 
Paulhan told Suares that Jouhandeau "a cesse d"etre antisemite" 
(223) 
. 
Whatever his motivations had been in these outbursts, it is clear 
that Jouhandeau borrowed them in large part from the familiar 
catalogue; an extreme dislike of the Third Republic, exacerbated 
by the crisis of the 1930's and fuelled by Maurrassian "doctrine"; 
a nostalgia for the "ancien regime"; and a deeply entrenched 
Catholicism whose body - the Church -. had been irreparably 
handicapped by the Radical Republic. Also, his visceral dislike 
of Communism was compensated by an admiration for the "virility" 
of the Nazi regime in Germany which led Jouhandeau close to 
collaboration. A recent attempt to r-Lemr Jouhandeau 
was firmly quashed, proving that the controversy surrounding 
. the adoption of anti-Semitic positions outlasts their context(224) 
On June 21st 1937, Blum resigned and Chautemps formed a new 
cabinet. Although a short-lived attempt would be made to revive 
this political "experiment" in March 1938, many saw the Popular 
Front as dying a long, lingering death(225) . Also, many anti- 
Semites believed, like Jouhandeau, that the Jewish-led Popular 
Front had indeed wrought ruin upon France, which now seemed 
dominated by or at the mercy of every other European power. 
In the NRF for August 1937, Paulhan placed the first part of 
Un Regulier dans 1e Siecle, the second volume of Benda's 
(226) 
The August number contained Benda's recollections Memoires 
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of his intellectual itinerary during the aftermath of the 
Dreyfus Affair. Contrary to many "dreyfusistes" Benda believed 
that the political consequences of the Affair were equally if 
not more important than the judicial case itself. Too many 
"dreyfusistes", averred Benda, had deserted the Republican cause 
and its campaign against the Army and the Church. Benda went 
so far as saying: 
"La verite est que ces hommes, qui avaient 
sans doute ete dreyfusistes dans la sincer. ite 
de leur coeur, ont tres vite compris combien 
ce passe les generait (... ) On pent dire que 
leur ancien dreyfusisme aura empoisonne la 
vie de tels de mes contemporains" 
(227) 
This thinking underlay Benda's wish that "il existät comme une 
of faire Dreyf us en permanence, qui permit de touj ours reconnaitre 
ceux qui sont de notre race morale... "(228). The implications 
of Benda's view for the stability of France were evidently quite 
serious, and the expression of these attitudes did much to 
perpetuate the right-wing view that Benda, as a Jew, was indeed 
a belligerent subversive. Anticipating the very question "Que 
faites-vous de 1'interet de la France", Benda replied: 
"Je reponds que 1'interet de la France m'est 
fort peu de chose aupres de la nettete en 
matiere morale, et que cette prefIrence est 
une definition de ma forme d' esprit" 
(229) 
. 
Moreover, Benda affirmed that the 1930's had served him well in 
this desire 
(230) 
; moreover, he categorised the First World War 
X231) 
as "une replique a l' aff aire Dreyfus 
Once again, L'Action f rancaise and its supporters immediately 
profited from these latest controversial statements: 
Maurras 
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reproduced extracts on August 9th, and the NRF printed a "Lettre" 
dated 11th August signed "A. V. " as a "document" to accompany the 
December instalment 
(232). 
"A. V. " characterised Benda as an "esprit 
demoniaque de dissolution" typical of "80% des Juifs en general, 
(sLt) 
ýý(233) et 95% de 1 Intelliguentzia kisiaglite These were anti- 
Semitic, anti-Republican views: 
"... les faux semblants, le camouflage intellectuel 
et politique, grace auxquels les dirigeants Judeo- 
Jacobins (sic) de France out reussi, depuis plus 
de cinquante ans ä manoeuvrer l' opinion de nombreux 
"bien-. pensants", catholiques pour la plupart, 
ont permis un renouveau de 1'activite revolutionnaire 
en France, 
ýý 
enacant de s' etendre au dela des frontie-res 
de ce pays . 
"A. V. " extended the Dreyfus Affair back to 1789 and warned that the 
fatal equation of forces "Judaisme - Jacobinisme - Marxisme 
n' acceptera j amais sa def aite sans combat final... "ý235ý . This 
correspondent concluded by thanking Benda for having awakened 
him to the true dangers confronting France. It was not Benda, 
however, who replied, but Drieu, who, in a curious, long text, 
attacked "A. V. " for his Maurrassianism and his cowardly bad faith 
. for not being willing to die for France on French soil 
(236) 
The last part of Benda's Un Regulier dans le Siecle, was an 
untypically emotional summing-up of why he thought he 
had been 
a "bon clerc' 
(237) 
. Here he also explained 
his aversion for and 
distrust of the ruling bourgeoisie, for their betrayal of 
democratic 
(238) 
values, and how their betrayal had brought him close to 
Communism . 
Both Paulhan and Grenier were impressed by this last part 
for, 
after all, they could admire Benda's consistency and 
intellectual 
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rigour in the face of hypocrisy and constant vilifaction from the 
Right: Benda sacrificed his personality (Jewish or not) to 
Reason39) 
(2 
The literary event of the New Year period 1937-38 was the 
publication in December 19374Celine's Bagatelles pour un massacre(240) 
Celine's unrelieved stream of vituperation against the Jews was 
such that critical opinion varied enormously, both in regard to 
classifying the book, and in how to react to it(241), The Jewish 
perspective was quite clear, however: in Le Droit de Vivre 
Philippe Lamour was convinced that Celine had produced "un melange 
du plus mauvais Gohier et du pire Julius Streicher" 
(242) 
. "Non, 
ce n'est pas un pastiche", he exclained, and accused Mine 
of directly serving Hitler(243). As for Marcel Arland, writing 
in the NRF, he labelled the book a "pamphlet", but also saw it 
as a prolongation of Voyage au bout de la nuit(244) . Arland 
believed Celine saw the Jews as the principal actors in the 
Apocalypse, but, of ter quoting an extract on the physical 
appearance of Jews, Arland wrote: "Cette virulence laisse loin 
(245) 
derriere eile toutes les attaques antisemitiques". Moreover, 
he also found the book's eloquence and lyricism highly arresting. 
To Arland, Bagatelles pour un Massacre was everything except 
an anti-Semitic diatribe. 
Undeniably all the anti-Semitic themes are present 
in 
Bagatelles..., themes both from the 1930's and from the turn of 
'2 
the century 
46 
. Indeed, the reader 
is left with the impression 
that Celine - or Ferdinand - is the only non-Jew 
in creation. 
- 311 - 
Yet throughout this work - beginning with the very first 
page - Celine also makes numerous references to Gide and other 
contemporary writers, or "les raffines"(247) . Gide, and, by 
extension (or contamination) the NRF, were "enjuives", and 
on several occasions Celine passes remarks which make Bagatelles... 
as much an attack upon the established (therefore, for Celine, 
(248ý Jewish) literary world of Paris as upon anything else . 
Celine evidently abhorred the left-bank "raffines" (ironically, 
as much as Berl), and delighted in incorporating them into his 
assault(249) . The constant presence of Benda at the NRF would 
only reinforce Mines' view 
(250) 
. Moreover, it suited Celine's 
temperament to liken homosexuality and Jewishness; he only had 
to look again to the NRF(251) . The idea that Jews dominated 
the cultural scene was nothing new: Morand had already viciously 
satirized the film industry 
(252 (Jewish) and Eugene Weber notes 
that Jean Zay, the Popular Front education minister, rejected 
. one of Celine's ballet projects for the 1937 exhibition 
(253) 
This partly explains the relevance of the "ballets" framing 
the book. 
On March 11th, 1936, "La Petite. Dame" noted that Gide had 
just finished 
(254) 
"le dernier livre de Celine" . She reported 
Gide's feeling that 
"I1 n' es t d'aucune p ortee quant ä la question juive 
et qu'il ne le trouve pas moins fort interessant 
comme document revelateur sur un cas morbide, et 
que certains pages sont d'une_etonnant. reussite"255). 
The next day, as Hitler swept into Austria, and as France 
languished 
without a government, Gide, Herbart and Martin 
du Gard discussed 
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the Jewish question, which, Gide now considered, was paramount(256) . 
Gide's reading of Celine had inspired him: on the 15th he had 
finished an essay which then appeared in the April number of 
(257) 
the NRF . The essay, significantly and deliberately divided 
into two parts, reflected his impression on finishing the book. 
The first part dealt with the work itself: Gide wrote that by 
including "Cezanne, Picasso, Maupassant, Racine"... etc in 
his catalogue of Jews, Mine was evidently joking(258) : "I1 
fait son mieux pour qu' on ne le prenne pas au serieux"(259) . 
Coming after Arland's review, Gide's opinion reinforced the view 
that "la NRF (... ) etait prete a assumer pour son compte 
n'importe quoi pour pouvoir appuyer la "position" de Celine"(260) 
Returning to the question "du Semitisme, eile n'est pas eff leuree" 
(261) 
Gide himself separated the question from Celine's book and turned 
instead to Maritain's lecture "les Juifs parmi les Nations "(262 
Here Gide shows much scepticism towards Maritain's view that the 
Jewish question (or more accurately -. k stereotyped attitudes 
towards Jews) wtt$ socially- and historically- derived rather 
(263) 
than racially H determined Gide mis-read Maritain's view, 
and re-asserted his own conviction that "la question n' es t pas 
confessionnelle, mais raciale. I1 my a rien ä faire 
ä cela"(264) . 
Gide went on to discuss - in the void - the Jewish question 
as part of the problem of minorities in an alien culture, completely 
ignoring ideological or political variables which might give a 
different charge to the question. He even criticised 
Maritain - 
a converted Jew himself - for not dealing more extensively 
with 
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the "cote positif de 1' apport de la race juive"(265) In spite i 
of the Nazis' policies toward Jews in Germany, Gide adhered 
to his own long-standing view that the Jews in France were an 
alien minority which, if not wholly unassimilable , was widely 
at variance with his own "nature" as a Frenchman. Even Paulhan 
privately admitted to Jouhandeau that he suspected Gide of "un 
fond d' antisemitisme , 
(266) 
, and Maritain, in a reply to Gide 
in June 
(267) 
, justifiably corrected Gide's mis-reading of his 
lecture and pointed to the fact that it was not responsible 
(especially "dans une revue comme la NRF") to treat the question 
with frivolity 
(268) 
. 
Indeed, Gide did not comment on what was, in the historical 
context, the most interesting and apposite part of Maritain's 
very lucid essay. Whatever the interpretation of Celine's book, 
or, for that matter, however consciously or not Gide was anti- 
Semitic, the most important thing was to remember that 
"il y a, dans 1' Europe d' auj ourd' hui, ceux qui 
veulent 1'extermination des Juifs, car c'est 
bien de cela qu'il s'agit, n' es t-ce pas, en 
definitive? - et qui, sous l'appareil stupide 
du s Gien tisme raciste ou des documents forges, 
dissimulent aux autres hommes, et parfois ä 
eux-memes, l' espoir fou d'un massacre general 
de la race de Moise et de Jesus. Ce massacre 
res to un songe; les germes de haine - dont s' e 
lit 
1'atmosphere sont une realite" . 
If Gide or others remained cynical regarding such a view, 
events later that year were to validate Maritain's assessment 
(270) 
of Hitler's intentions With the 
"capitulation" of 
Daladier and Chamberlain at Munich on September 
30th 1938, 
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Franco-German relations entered am unprecedented critical 
phase. Paulhan assembled a "special number" on Munich which 
marked the NRF conclusively as "anti-Munichois" and, therefore 
as "pro-war" 
(271) 
; among the essays was Benda's "les Democraties 
bourgeoises devant l'Allemagne", a text which, conveniently 
enough for his enemies and anti-Semites, complied well with 
the s teaotype of the Jew as warmonger(272) . The anarchistic 
Le Crap oui llo t displayed its own anti-war attitude by publishing 
a special issue "Septembre 1938". Included among the "parti 
de la Fermete - (autrement dit: le parti de la Guerre)" were 
Genevieve Tabouis, in L' Oeuvre, Henri de Kerillis, in L' Epoque, 
and Gabriel Peri, in L'Humanite(273) .A section was also devoted 
to "Les Juifs et la Guerre", including Benda, whom the author 
of the article perceived as "un singulier melange de bouffon, de 
(274) 
attack based sadique et d' incurable imbecile" In a savage . 
on Benda's bellicose attitude towards Germany in the First World 
War as described in Un Regulier dans le Siecle, Le Crapouillot 
characterised Benda as a "buveur de sang", one of the oldest 
elements in the anti-Semite's mythology: 
"Pendant la crise de Septembre, M. Benda 
est une des publicistes qui ont le plus 
pousse au massacre. I1 fretillait 
ä 
1' idee de revoir ces temps benis de 
14-18 oü il pouvait chaque matin deguster 
un grand bol de sang frais. La paix ne 
l' interesse pas, les blesses, les mutiles 
(... ) , M. Benda s' en 
fout jacobinement, ä 
condition que sa petite ide'ö og'ie soit sauvee, 
füt-ce au prix de la destruction totale 
de la 
France"(275). 
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This attitude, although less violently expressed, extended to 
the pacifist weekly La Freche, where Gide's new friend Claude Mauriac 
had become embroiled in a complex exchange with Bernard Lecache of 
Le Droit de Vivre(276) . Indeed, Galtier-Boissiere, editor of 
Le Crapouillot, repeated his attack on Benda in his rubric 
"En toute liberte" in La Fleche(277) . Claude Mauriac has written 
that Gide, during these weeks, had grown very close to the position 
of La Fleche(278) . 
Following the assassination of Ernst Vom Rath on November 
7th, 1938, a ferocious wave of anti-Jewish violence broke out 
in Germany, during and after what came to be known as 
"Kris tallnacht, 
(279) 
- At last the Jewish question was being 
taken more seriously, at least to the extent that Hitler's 
intentions were now clearer to those who were willing to 
notice them. The Revue juive de Geneve reported some of the 
details of anti-Jewish repression in Germany after November, 11th: 
up to 60,000 arrests were made, whole Jewish families committed 
suicide, and "au camp de Buchenwald (calque sur le trop 
fameux Dachau) (sic), le nombre de Juifs passes par les armes 
es t de 200" 
(2 80) 
. In the wake of the violence, 
the same review 
asked leading personalities to comment on the Jewish question: 
(281 In his reply, among the respondents were Benda and Gide . 
Gide seemed more concerned about the style and presentation of 
his opinion than ajout making any bold, pro-Jewish, or anti- 
Hitlerian, statement 
(282) 
. Yet at 
least Gide had been sufficiently 
worried by the repression to declare: 
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"Independamment de toutes considerations 
diplomatiques, la mediocrite des reactions, 
en France, devant de tels abus de pouvoir, 
m' apparait comme un triste signe de decadence 
morale et de diminution de vertu. I1 importe 
d'autant plus que quelques-uns du moires fassent 
enten&re (... ) leur protestation" (283) . 
One direct consequence of events in Germany was the renewed 
influx of refugees fleeing the repression - this in turn inevitably 
led to a further intensification of anti-immigrant (and anti-Jewish) 
feeling, voiced by, among others, the government sponsored pamphleteer 
Emmanuel Berl in Paves de Paris 
(284) 
. Against this ever- 
darkening background, Paulhan could still not avoid the Jewish 
question in the NRF: the issue was now inextricably tied to the 
increasingly likely prospect of war. It was precisely with this 
in mind that Jacques Chardonne submitted a series of personal 
ref lexions to the NRF for February 1939 
(285) 
. Talking specifically 
of Germany and its evolution since 1918, Chardonne imputed that the 
Jews there had been responsible for the advent of Hitler: 
'Avant l'avenement d'Hitler, les Juifs n'etaient 
pas tres nombreux en Allemagne, ä peine six cent 
mille. Mais depuis 1918, ils detenaient les 
principaux emplois, et ils ont marque de leur 
influence et signe tous les evenements : la 
revolution, l'inflation, la faillite, l' anarchie 
de l' argen t ou de la mis e re" 
(2 86) 
. 
Chardonne believed that it was a typically German characteristic 
to be tempted by catastrophe and despair, and that this was 
a Jewish trait. In an astonishing and simplistic paralogism, 
Chardonne managed to congratulate Hitler for providing a cure 
for 
"le mal allemand": 
0 
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"L' Allemand recele un Asiatique; c' es t la 
part d'esprit juif qui est en lui. Aussi 
1' of f ort de regeneration prendra chez 1' Allemand 
la forme d'une revolte contre le j uif . Cette 
victoire sur soi-meme, opposee a l'esprit juif, 
est incarnee par Hitler. 
I1 na rien apporte, qu'une. foi au peuple, un 
remede au mal allemand" (2 87) . 
Although Chardonne thought the attitude of the French towards 
Jews was different, he nonetheless demonstrated how easily some 
intellectuals in France were becoming convinced that a French 
"dictatorship" might prove salutary for the country: indeed, 
Chardonne signalled his collaborationism by contributing to 
Drieu's NRF from December 1940 
(288) 
" 
During these months until the declaration of war in 
September, Paulhan became increasingly embattled at the review, 
and found himself caught betwene conflicting loyalties: 
underlying these problems a lingering anti-Semitism is detectable. 
In his renewed " Chronique Dramatique" for March 1939, Leautaud 
launched a vicious assault upon what he regarded as the unacceptable 
(289) 
demagogy of such as Jean Perrin, Paul Langevin and Joliot-Curie . 
Leautaud believed these (and others) were guilty of charlatanism 
for pronouncing on political matters. Furthermore Leautaud 
found it intolerable that Charles Dullin, in his new production 
of Je Mariage de Figaro, should apply 
his own personal "conception" 
to a "classic" French drama. "C'est un scandale", remarked 
Leautaud, and concluded: 
"I1 faut que nous ayons un ministre de 
1' Ins truction 
publique et un sous-ministre . aux 
Beaux = Arts 
etraners a la litterature fran aise, pour qu'il 
soit permis" 290 , 
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These were immediately recognizable as the (Jewish) ministers 
Jean Zay and Raoul Huisman. The "orages souleves" by these 
remarks severely tested Paulhan, and, as he reported to 
Jouhandeau, he was divided between his loyalty to Leauta: ud 
on the one hand, and to such as Gaston Gallimard, Cr6mieux and 
and Caillois (who all objected to Leautaud) on the other(291) 
The episode was eventually concluded by Leautaud's resignation 
from the review, and although Paulhan told Jouhandeau that the 
affair had calmed down, there had been a real risk that he too 
might have resigned(292) . Leautaud devoted the last pages of 
his final submission to the "Merveilleux effets dune Chronique 
dramatique", and disappeared from the NRF amid a storm of protest 
from indignant subscribers 
(293) 
A further problem confronting Paulhan was posed by the 
recently re-established presence of Suares in the NRF, in the 
"Chronique de Caerdal" 
(294) 
.` The reader familiar with: 
Suares' 
polemical work would not have been surprised that Paulhan played 
the role of censor regarding Suares' attacks on Hitler and 
Mussolini(295) . Italian anti-Semitism 
had been made official policy 
relatively recently: indeed, as late as December 1937, Ciano, 
Mussolini's foreign minister, had written "le problem. e juif 
(296) n' existe pas chez nous Just one year later 
however, 
a full, Nazi-inspired and implemented anti-Semitic policy 
existed in Italy, as reported extensively in 
La Revue wive de 
Geneve(297) . Suares, who 
felt a deep affection for Italy and 
Italian culture, found this development grotesquely 
inconsistent, 
and, against all Paulhan's demands for restraint, unleashed 
a 
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violent attack upon Ciano': 
"Il est infiniment probable que le Chiano (sic) 
et ses Chiani ont du sang juif daps les veines , comme du vent fasciste dans le cerveau (... ). 
Noirs bouffonn6, sacs a mensonges"(298). 
As a direct result, fascist Italy countered by banning the NRF; 
P aulh an announced, on May 5th: 
"Mauvaise nouvelle la NRF se voit interdite 
en Italie. Chian os``6ins patient que Mussolini; 
(ou si vous etiez tombe trop juste? ) Cela fait 
500 abonnes de moins (... ) Et plus de mille 
Italiens, sans doute, qui n'auront plus le 
reconfort (je pense) que leur donnait la 
revue"(299). 
"Rien de tout cela n' es t gai", added Paulhan, laconically 
(300) 
One final incident placed Paulhan in further difficulty, 
an incident which shows how profoundly the issues of the day 
during these troubled months penetrated into the very heart 
of the NRF, to affect policy and presentation. Paulhan's 
loyalty towards Julien Benda, despite much opposition and 
criticism, remained unyielding. In one sense, Paulhan had 
always needed Benda to anchor the NRF firmly in "neutral" 
territory: although Benda's most long-standing adversary was 
IL Action franRaise, he had also opposed the Left in the shape 
of Guehenno and Rolland. His stance since 1936-7, however, 
had considerably readjusted towards the Left, in particular, 
the Communists. Moreover, Benda stridently opposed "appeasement" 
after Munich. All these f actors combined to render Benda's 
presence in the NRF more problematic for some, especially 
- 32) - 
Jean Schlumberger. Ever since 1935, in fact, Schlumberger 
felt Benda occupied too much space in the review. By April 
1937, Paulhan had the unpleasant duty to inform Benda that he 
would not dispose of as much room in the NRF as he had previously; 
(301) in principle, Benda did not object to this , In his very 
long self-defence, Benda stressed that in all his time at the 
review, he had always denied having any influence whatsoever, 
and suspected that his political stance and his contributions 
elsewhere were the underlying reasons for Schlumberger's 
criticisms 
(302) 
. Benda then appealed explicitly to Paulhan's 
sense of loyality: 
"I1 est clair que si la direction veut ma 
peau, non pas seulement en raison de mon attitude 
dans la NRF mais ailleurs, et en raison de ma 
tendance politique generale, ma cause, - notre 
cause -, puisque vous voulez bien me defendre, 
devient singulierement menacee" (303) . 
Writing again a little later, Benda pointed to rather more sinister 
undertones concerning his -"Jewish" - presence in the NRF: 
"(Schlumberger) me reproche d'avoir, depuis cinq 
ans, pub lie dans la revue tous mes ouvrages des tines 
ensuite ä devenir des livres. On dirait vraiment 
que cest moi le maitre de ces publications; alors 
que j. e n'ai fait que proposer les ouvrages, qu'ensuite 
on a bien voulu prendre (... ) Je suis aussi affecte 
par l' accusation d'etre bien "de la race jui, avec 
Qette volonte d' occuper toute la place d'es que je suis 
admis dans un lieu... " C'est lä rigoureusement 
l'antisemitisme le plus bas. I1 m'est penible de 
savoir qu'il siege dans les conseils 
de la NRF"(304. 
). 
Benda was understandably very upset and disturbed 
by such aspersions, 
and, indeed, from -this time onwards, did not occupy 
his customary 
(305) 
At the time of these proportion of space in the review 
letters, the 11 loi Marchandeau" of April 21st 1939 effectively 
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banned any further overtly anti-Semitic material from the 
Press. Fortunately for Paulhan, this law spared the NRF 
any additional public embarrassment. 
Unlike the other major issues it had examined, the NRF 
had no real, delineated "parti pris" regarding the Jewish 
question. This is partly explained by its being tangential 
to other questions, like Franco-German relations, Republicanism, 
literary judgements and taste, or immigration. If, for some, 
the NRF had an anti-Jewish reputation,. it was due mainly to the 
(usually) unconscious or culturally-acquired prejudices of some 
within its circle. For others on the Right, the NRF was a haven 
for influential, subversive, "warmongering" Jews who represented 
all that was dangerous in the French Republic. Yet all those 
major contributors of Jewish o. gin - Benda, Cremieux, Suares - 
wrote as assimilated Jews and eschewed Jewish (and other) 
Nationalism. One further, central observation arising from 
this issue concerns the review's - but particularly Gide's - 
treatment of Celine's anti-Semitism. By applying purely literary 
or stylistic criteria to Bagatelles pour un massacre, the 
underlying issue was poorly treated if not dismissed, when, in 
retrospect, the Jewish question had already assumed dimensions 
of historical significance confirmed only months later by 
events. The "loi Marchandeau" put a temporary halt to public 
expressions of anti-Semitism, but the 
"roots of Vichy anti- 
Semitism" had already taken hold. 
After the "capitulation" of Munich, and particularly throughout 
the "Drole de Guerre", Paulhan determined to steer the 
NRF away 
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from its "neutral" course to adopt instead an attitude which 
deliberately opposed "appeasement", the betrayal of alliances 
and "peace at all costs". In a word, Paulhan and the NRF were 
beginning to resist. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
"Resisting Delusion: the NRF in the Drift to War, 1938 to 1940". 
"Et personne ne sait mieux que moi 1'etrange, 
l'etonnant retentissement que peut avoir au 
dehors un article de la NRF " (Jean Paulhan to 
Andre Suares, BD. 4970/3,17/2/39). 
"Certes, notre republique se 
vingt ans, tous les vices d 
font grief. P our tant, nous 
quelque chose qui ressemble 
(Jean Paulhan, "L'Espoi. r et 
June 1940, p. 722). 
ble avoir avoue, depuis 
nt les adversaires lui 
nous battons pour 
a la Republique" 
le Silence", NRF 
"J'ai ete, du premier jour, resistant. I1 faut 
avouer que 1'horreur, le degoüt que m'inspiraient 
les gouvernements de l'etre-deux-guerres a fait 
beaucoup pour me jeter-et me maintenir - dans 
ces bons sentiments (qu'il m'est arrive d'exprimer, 
bien avant 1940)" (Jean Paulhan, in Claude Jamet, 
Le rendez-vous manque de 1944, Editions France- 
Empire, 1964, p. 257). 
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During 1938, and especially after the conclusion of the 
Munich agreement on 30th September, the increasingly likely 
prospect of war had, once again, become the overriding issue. 
Munich was eventually seen as a delusion whereby an obsessive 
desire for peace at all costs led both Britain and France into 
a betrayal of their commitments to Czechoslovakia and, therefore, 
into capitulating to Hitler's expansionist ambitions. A French 
historian writing in 1979 has rightly stressed the pivotal nature 
of Munich, identifying it as the 
"reference cle de notre histoire contemporaine, 
injure supreme de notre langage politique, et 
(Munich) marque une etape decisive dans le destin 
de 1'Europe: on cro air la paix retablie, on entrait 
en fait dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale" 
M. 
His point is further confirmed by a writer who lived through the 
Munich crisis and who, at the time, was one of those who saw 
it as a capitulation; - writing of Munich as a contributory factor 
in the lack of enthusiasm among the French during the "Drole de 
Guerre", Georges Bernanos noted: 
"Auj ourd'hui appartient encore au passe, tient 
par toutes ses fibres ä Munich, c'est-ä-dire 
a 
une date hideuse dans 1'histoire de notre peuple 
... Notre guerre s' ouvre sons 
le signe de Munich" 
(2) 
. 
Moreover all the issues which had dominated the period took on a 
different complexion during the course of 1938 and, 
in many ways, 
the two years between April 1938 and June 1940 witnessed 
the 
eventual release of all the tensions built up 
during the 1930's 
in the inevitable outbreak of war, followed 
by the Nazi occupation 
of France in 1940. The chronic ineffectiveness 
throughout the 
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1930's of French governments to contend with problems at home 
and abroad was gradually checked and even partially reversed 
after the demise of the Popular Front, particularly following 
the election of Daladier's more authoritarian government 
(3) 
. 
Those who suspected Hitler's warlike intentions were proved 
right by his increasing belligerence following the re-occupation 
of the Rhineland in March 1936, the Austrian Anschluss of 
March 1938 and his exploitation of the "appeasement" politics 
of both Daladier and Chamberlain. Franco-German relations were 
(4) 
now dominated if not dictated by Hitler. Regarding the Soviet 
Union, the revelations of the show-trials and Stalin's purges, 
and the disappointment of fellow-travellers such as Gide, seemed 
to have tarnished for ever the image of Russian Communism as a 
form of new Humanism; some, indeed, considered supporting Hitler 
(5) 
as a bulwark against the threat of Soviet expansionism . Finally, 
the issue of anti-Semitism remained in the foreground as France 
experienced a continuing influx of Jewish immigrants fleeing 
Hitler; the outburst of endemic anti-Semitism fired by the 
supposed Jewish domination of the Popular Front was exacerbated 
by the assassination of Ernst Vom Rath, the consequences of 
"Kristallnacht" and by apparent Jewish belligerence after 
Munich 
(6) 
. 
In the light of all this, and in particular in reaction 
to the failure of the Popular Front "experiment", Jean Paulhan 
had 
already determined to alter the course of the NRF 
by taking a 
harder, more openly political line as exemplified 
by Petitjean's 
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article "Dictature de la France", coinciding as it did with the 
formation of the Daladier government on April 10th l938(7). 
Indeed already in March 1938, precisely on the 12th, Gide was 
intensely preoccupied by the news of the Nazi Anschluss in 
Austria(8). Four days later, Paulhan signalled to Suares 
that he too was highly perturbed by events: 
"Oui, les evenements sout effroyables: 
ä mesure de quelles fautes? J'en vois plus 
de mille, ou une seule: il eüt fallu, pour 
oser l' alliance de la France avec Mussolini, 
qui seule eüt sauve l'Autriche, et epargne 
1'Espagne, un roi, un dictateur ou un fou. 
Nous n' avions pas cela, mais de gens honnetes 
et gauches, tout empetres de doctrines. Nous 
n' avons pas fini, je pense, de les payer 
cher"(9). 
By publishing Petitjean's "chronique" Paulhan indicated that 
the NRF now intended to "regarder en face la realite de 1938" 
(10) 
10 
and that to do so properly, France had to be reunited as a 
nation under a strong government which would re-establish the 
country's military preparedness 
X11) 
. In particular Petitjean 
called upon the Communists to affirm their loyalty to the "patrie", 
and Benda, indeed, on at least two occasions in the months to 
follow, acknowledged that the French Communists were now the 
only political party which held the "patrie" in true esteem. 
In an "Air du Mois" for July 1938, Benda wrote: 
"Touteune societe, en France, a cesse d' titre 
patriote, juste - au moment oü" Staline a. donne 
aux communistes francais fordre de l'titre. 
La politique de ce monde-lä est commandee 
entierement et uniquement par la haine du 
communisme. Its mettraient le feu ä leur 
maison si les communistes decidaient de la 
conserver. Tel est leur bon sens"(12). 
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Benda repeated these sentiments and developed them next month 
in his "chronique" "Anticommunisme et Patriotisme"(13) The 
effect of these texts and the attacks they drew was, ironically, 
to re-align the NRF more closely to the Communists than to 
either the government, or, for that matter, the Maurrassians, for 
earlier that year in February, Paulhan and Grenier had both 
displayed considerable sympathy for the achievement of the 
(14) 
Action Franýaise leader . In fact Paulhan seemed determined 
to make clear his indignation at Hitler's invasion of Austria 
by including, "en tete" of the same issue as Benda's pro- 
Communist "chronique", a text by Pierre Jean Jouve entitled 
"In Memoriam Salzburg , 
(15) 
. Here Jouve, opening with an 
extract from his elegiac poem "Mozart" dated 1924, cast a 
nostalgic glance back to what he considered as the golden age 
of creativity in musical performing which had flourished in 
Salzburg between 1921 and 1937, and now suddenly cut short by 
Hitler's invasion: 
"Cette petite fleur fine de 1'Autriche, 
pointe de bien des s ie cles f ami liers et 
graves, cet edifice si proportionne de 
genie allemand ancien qui s' epanouissait 
dans de petites villes, -. l' envahisseur 
ne peut jue la detruire" 
(16). 
These comments, and the article as a whole, were certainly not 
overtly political, but they indicated a continuing opposition 
wi tF w the NRF to the spread of Fascism. 
The next month , September, 
Paulhan inserted a ten-page 
essay by Petitjean entitled, significantly enough, 
"Apres 1' apres- 
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guerre 
(17) 
This text was, in effect, a development of 
Petit j ean' s earlier call for a "Dictature de la France" 
(18) 
, 
Oü en est-on? ", asked Petitjean, and proceeded to answer his 
own question thus: "Nous en sommes, selon toute apparence, 
au plus bas de notre histoire" 
(19) 
. Yet the thrust of Petitjean's 
argument consisted basically in challenging the widely-held view 
that France was in the final stages of its "deecadence"; he 
could not believe that a civilization such as France, if it was 
truly decadent and decaying, could spend so long meditating on 
causes and effects of this process 
(20) 
. Petitjean refused to 
see the Popular Front as a total disaster particularly as it had 
shown that France was still capable of social change, even if 
certain sectors of society did their best to interfere with 
the results: 
"I1 a suf fi qu'avec l' avenement du Front 
Populaire, la fraction de notre population 
qui etait jusqu'ici tenue a l'ecart de toute 
vie nationale y eüt brusquement acces, pour 
que celle dont la nationalisation date de 
quelques decades se comportät de6faSon la 
plus contraire aux interets du Pays... "(21). 
All in all Petitjean remained remarkably optimistic regarding 
France and its civilization because, although he could not agree 
with Riviere's Gallocentrism, 
"Nous restons meme l'un des rares pays d'Europe 
qui ait du champ devant lui, de 
"1' espace vital", 
de fair dans ses idees, et qui ne se laisse 
opprimer ni par les f rontieres.: de son territoire, 
ni par celles de son ame" 
(22) 
. 
Like Paulhan and Benda, Petitjean could not tolerate the 
defeatism 
which seemed so rife in France during these months, and 
he re-affirmed 
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his conviction that Frenchmen might again find strength through 
a sort of Jacobin patriotism. Petitjean went on to analyse 
the reasons for France's apparent weakness in the period since 
the 1920's. He believed the nation had placed too great a 
faith in those whom he called "les intermediaires", whereby 
reality was not properly appreciated and therefore not properly 
dealt with(23) . Another grave shortcoming had been the entirely 
"speculative" way in which France conceived and carried out 
foreign policy, founded as it had been upon "des mensonges pires 
que ceux du temps de guerre , 
(24) 
. The intellectuals too, according 
to Petitjean, had been fascinated to the point of hypnosis by 
"1'idee du politique", but, in the long run, they were powerless 
to act: 
"Apres ýquelques annees diplus complet desordre, 
deportes de l'histoire, raidis par l'intellect, 
ils s'excitent a l' idee du politique, du social, 
ou meine de l' action, en sont tantalises: ils songent 
ä Von ne sait quel activisme impuissant et mental 
0 .. 
"(25) . 
Yet Petitjean could detect some signs which, amid such general 
paralysis, were encouraging, and thus bore witness to the 
fact 
that the French were at last coming to terms with "historical 
reality", as he put it. He placed much faith in the youth 
movements which were springing up, and detected much cultural 
renewal and creativity(26) . In conclusion 
Petitjean called upon 
his readers to recognize their duty to participate 
fully in the 
community, because 
- 331 - 
"1' apres-guerre es t bien morte, deux fois 
morte. A nous de ne pas nous laisser 
mourir de cette mort. A nous de quitter 
le plan des principes, pour vivre et pour 
bestir" (27) . 
Meanwhile on the international diplomatic scene the sequence 
of events had begun which would lead to the signature of the 
Munich protocols during the night of September 29-30th(28) . By 
the 19th September, both Paris and London instructed Prague to 
concede the Sudeten territory; but Hitler made new claims on the 
Czech state and, after a period of extreme tension during which 
France mobilized a million reservists and Britain put the Home 
Fleet on alert, Mussolini's idea for a four-nation conference 
was seized upon whereby the "club des charcutiers" would decide 
the fate of Czechoslovakia at Munich(29) . It had been too 
late 
to reflect upon the outcome of September's events in the October 
NRF, although Arland's "Chronique de Vacances" noted how oppress&v 
the atmosphere had become in Vienna(30) . Initially Paulhan 
advocated circumspection in the face of events: seeking Schlumberger's 
advice, he wondered whether a policy of autocensorship might not 
be 
wise: - 
"la situation demeure trop grave, il Me semble, 
pour que quelque precaution ne s' impose pas. 
Ne pensez-vous qu'il faut nous interdire 
a 
la NRF toute attaque desormais contre l'Italie 
et Mussolini? (J'ai eu plus d'une occasion 
de 
voir qu'ils sont diaboliquement sensibles aux 
critiques de la NRF (sic), et le 
dernier ClajdeL 
entre autres, nest pas passe tout seul)" 
31 
. 
Martin de Gard told Gide on 29th September 1938 that 
he 
believed "tout vaut mieux que la guerre 
ý, 
(32) 
, and, although 
Gide 
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at first shared his correspondent's enthusiasm for what he called 
the "victory" of Munich, he became much more hesitant(33) . 
Claude Martin has shown that an important letter from Jef Last 
dated October 1st significantly altered Gide's appreciation of 
the situation 
(34) 
, with the result that on October 9th, Gide 
told Martin du Gard that "je ne sais moi-meine que penser" 
(35) 
Quite simply Gide was caught between the deeply-held convictions 
of both his friends: Martin du Gard believed in "peace at all 
costs", even if this involved betraying French commitments to 
Czechoslovakia, while Last, a Communist, saw Munich, as "une 
defaite lc itaine"'36) . Public opinion also attenuated: Duroselle 
notes that the first public opinion polls ever conducted in 
France showed initial approval, whilst others made later 
(3 
reflected a greater preference for resistance7ý . He further 
analyses how the Munich agreements forced political re-alignments 
according to the convictions of the opinion-makers 
(38) 
. As 
Rene Girault puts it: 
"Au fond (... ) en politique exterieure, tous 
les partis sont transcendes par des options 
qui proviennent de convictions profondes, non- 
politiciennes: les "pacifistes" et les 
"bellicistes" 
se trouvent meles an sein de tous les partis 
de 
gouvernement, voire meme daps les partis extremes"(39). 
Once the implications of Munich had become clearer, and once 
it was 
realized that the options could of necessity only 
be for or against, 
Paulhan at last signalled his intention that the 
NRF should take 
a deliberate, unambiguous stance. His commitment would 
go to the 
"antimunichois" party, to resistance to Hitler. 
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Paulhan told Schlumberger that he was in the process of 
assembling three major reactions to Munich, whereby "Von verra 
bien la NRF est catholi ue ,. 
(40) 
que q (universelle) He explained: 
"cela fera trois reactions: 
Petitj can/25 ans/catholique 
Schlumberger/50 ans/protestant 
Benda/70 ans/juif"(41) 
In another extremely important letter outlining how Benda saw the 
situation, Paulhan even spoke of expressing a unified "engagement" 
in the NRF: 
"1' article de Benda tiendra, je pense, de 10 
a 15 pages. Son theme sera: Chamberlain et 
Daladier ont refuse la guerre, par crainte 
de la gagner... Je voudrais bien savoir 
quel sera le sens de votre article (... ). 
Je souhaiterais qu'il eilt le sens d'un 
engagement (de nous tous) pour l'avenir. 
J'ai tout lieu de penser que Particle de 
Benda - qui sera fin, et, dans 1'semble, 
plausible - s' achevera sur une demission: 
"la politique des clercs" - s'il en fut 
jamais une -doit disp araitre avec la 
Societe "des Nations" (et je remonte dans 
ma tour)". ' C' es t ici que j. e voudrais bien 
que vous repreniez la question. C'est ici 
qu'il nous faut la reprendre"(42). 
Petitjean's "Priere pour les Copains" 
(43) 
was an emotional 
appeal to protect France and Frenchmen from impending 
doom. In 
a religious poetic style reminiscent of Peguy, 
he pleaded: ' 
"Seigneur, camarades, faites taire tous ces 
representants qui, depuis vingt ans, ne 
representent plus rien. Et si Vous 'prenez 
le temps de Vous apitoyer sur eux, montrez- 
leur donc un jour ce que c' es t que la France, 
qu'elle es t faite de Francais; faites-leur 
faire par exempie un exercice de mobilisation; 
conduisez-les devant la ligne Maginot, 
a 
quelques kilometres de la Mort, 
lä oü j'avais 
la chance d'etre il n' ya pas huit 
j ours avec les 
copains"(44). 
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Petitjean called upon his (particularly French) "Seigneur" 
to inspire French men and women with courage and strength and 
to protect them from death. He concluded: "Enfin, s'il le faut 
pour que nous survivions (... ) , donnez-nous le recul de la mort, 
(45) 
a notre heure" 
Benda's contribution was particularly critical and offered 
an acute analysis of what he saw as the complicit weakness of 
"les Democraties bourgeoises devant 1'Allemagne"(46). He boldly 
labelled the Munich accords as nothing but a "capitulation" to 
Hitler's ambitions. Benda found that Chamberlain and Daladier, 
far from being at a disadvantage regarding Hitler - in fact they 
were "nantis (... ) d' atouts formidables" 
(47) 
- had allowed 
the Germans "de crier au triomphe... "(48) . Indeed, argued Benda, 
French and British ministers had known even in May that year that 
"Si leur refus de ceder davantage eüt 
amene la guerre, ils savaient ä cette 
date que leurs ays ne le leur reproch- 
eraient pas" (44. 
He detected three reasons for their preferring capitulation to 
resistance (and possibly war) : "1'humanitarisme (... ) ; la 
(so) crainte de perdre la guerre; (... ) la crainte de la gagner 
The motivation underlying this third reason was the 
f act that 
Britain preferred appeasing Hitler to risking a triumph of 
Communism, which the British despised. Yet Benda insisted that 
instead of ensuring a Communist victory, surely the 
defeat of 
Hitler would represent a triumph for democracy. 
He then examined 
why these countries did not wish to win. 
The heart of the problem 
was that the bourgeois democracies could not allow true 
democracy 
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("accroissement de justice sociale, realisation des revendications 
ouvrieres" 
ýS 1)) 
to damage the interests of their class: 
"De cette democratie-lä, les democraties 
bourgeoises ne veulent ä aucun prix 
(j'entends si les reformes sont serieuses). 
Preuve: leur insurrection contre le ministere 
Blum en France... "(52). 
The ruling bourgeoisie had found it expedient to liken the plans 
for social reform in France to Communism, which they attacked 
not for promoting social justice, but for suppressing 
liberty - and negating culture and civilization as they knew 
it(53). Benda illustrated his argument by several references 
to French history, stressing that 
"la democratie bourgeoise a touj ours eu la 
haine de la Revolution, en tant que ce]k-ci 
pretend a une emancipation non superficielle 
mais profonde des classes inferieures"(54). 
It followed for Benda that the bourgeois democracies would 
therefore do all in their power to assist "Les Etats hostiles 
ä la Revolution"; again, using several historical instances, 
Benda accused the democracies of-placing 
"resolüment. les 
(55) 
interets de leur classe au dessus de ceux de leur nation . 
He demonstrated that there was nothing exceptional in this, 
and that, at Munich, "les ministres 
de democraties (... ) ont 
eu la vo lonte (... ) de ne pas humilier 
1'homme qui, aux yeux 
de ces bourgeoisies, incarne la resistance aux montees 
revolutionnaires" 
(56) 
. 
Benda followed this analysis with four remarks. 
Firstly, 
he found that the democracies were completely misguided 
by 
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placing faith in Hitler's "order" against revolutionary "chaos". 
Part of the delusion derived from the fact that the democracies 
ignored that "le fascisme n' a rien ä faire avec fordre 
traditionnel"(57) . Secondly, Britain's attitude towards 
alleged French hegemony in Europe and a long-standing distrust 
of France as "le dangereux pays de la Revolution", explained 
British indulgence towards Germany after 1918, but especially 
of ter the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact(58) . Thirdly, 
Benda believed that war tended to benefit the "revendication 
du peuple": so, if avoiding war meant perpetuating the status quo, 
then the bourgeois democracies would avoid war. Finally, the 
ruling bourgeoisie had found it useful to exploit the reluctance 
of the popular majority to fight their battles; they adjusted 
their rhetoric accordingly which, for Benda, provided some 
glaring examples of sophistry(59). 
Benda called for a return to the more realistic "mode 
de conscience nationale" current during the early formative 
years of his generation after 1870, when "nous etions resignes 
ä ce que la France ne füt plus qu'une nation paisible et 
travailleuse et cessat, sur l'echiquier mondial, de tenir 
une premiere place" 
(60) 
. But the true source of anxiety 
for 
Benda was to be found in his remarkable anticipation of the 
Vichy regime: 
"la bourgeoisie franjaise poussera-t-elle 
sa soumission au Reich jusqu' 
ä adopter le 
regime fasciste, notamment la suppression 
de la liberte d'expression, la destruction 
du systeme representatif, le racisme? 
"(61). 
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Answering his own question, Benda believed that this future 
regime would cling to some conscience - salving vestiges of 
liberalism whereby "on ne verra pas en France de f as ciSme total 
(... ) . Un f ascis me larve me parait probab le"ý62) , In his 
conclusion, Benda alluded to his own position as "clerc", and, 
in spite of his pride in Republicanism and the occasional triumph 
of "les valeurs clericales", he re-affirmed axiomatically that 
"la loi de ce monde dechu est celle de classes qui jouissent"(63) 
Schlumberger'S-essay was directed "Contre 1'Ftumiliation"(64). 
Commenting much later on this "embardee la plus decisive dans 
ce qu'on peut encore appeler de la politique", Schlumberger 
remembered that "(ces) pages de la NRF (... ) furent saluees 
par beaucoup d' amis comme un premier rappel de dignite" after 
the "shame" of Munich 
(65) 
. As he had done with his previous essays 
on Franco-German relations, Schlumberger preferred to penetrate 
beyond the political implications of events; 
he 
.: ' 
sought moralistic enlightenment of "nos mobiles memes et nos 
volontes"(66). For Schlumberger, the true gravity of the situation 
derived from "un -sentiment 
de honte" whereby it was impossible 
to ignore that through their action, France was responsible 
(67) 
for ceding Czechoslovakia to the Nazis . Moreover 
France's 
"humiliation" was traceable once again to the 
"ravages operes 
dans l'esprit allemand par les fletrissures du traite 
de Veraailles 
... 
, 
(68) 
. Quite simply 
France had not been equal to the role 
designated by the Versailles Treaty; what is more, negligent 
disregard specifically of French aviation had 
deprived the nation 
of its ability to back its undertakings, and, 
by extension, 
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"Quand il s'agit d'un glissement qui a dure tant d'annees, 
et sous tant de ministeres, une nation est complice"(69) 
His second major point was that broken French promises 
meant that their allies might justifiably accuse them of 
inconsistency, if not perfidy 
(70) 
. Much advantage had been 
squandered according to Schlumberger, for 
"Etre cru sur parole represente une force q. ui, 
pour parler realiste, vaut cher. Les grands 
forbans, une fois leurs coups accomplis, 
donneraient beaucoup pour l'acquerir, et 
nous l'avons perdue sans les benefices d'un 
mauvais coup's (71). 
In fact, Schlumberger placed most of his hope in the relatively 
calm acceptance of the call for mobilization issued on September 
24th; he regarded it as a "miracle", saying "c'etait comme si, 
dans 1'angoisse commune, toutes les cellules du pays retablissaient 
leur cohesion , 
(72) 
0 Schlumberger countered hypothetical objections 
to his attitude regarding the mobilization, denying that he relished 
the prospect of war: 
"Est-il vraiment besoin de repeter qu'on peut 
redouter la guerre, travailler contre eile 
de toutes ses forces, sans moins redouter 
pour cela ni moins comb. attre certaines formes 
de paix. Ce que j'ai salue durant les Cinq 
Jours, ce n'etait pas une France belliqueuse 
(... ) mais une France qui a rep ris sa tension 
vitale" 
(73). 
A second suggestion that France might consider 
"la vie caporalisee 
des regimes totalitaires"(74) was swept aside by Schlumberger, 
stressing that such a possibility was dramatically opposed 
to the 
nature of France. Drawing towards his conclusion, 
he repeated 
the familiar call: 
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"Le retablissement qu'il est urgent de reussir 
demande une coordination nationale, sans laquelle 
trop d'efforts se neutralisent reciproquement 
... 11(75). 
The ability to achieve this coordination had not completely 
perished, Schlumberger believed, especially when he considered 
the attitude of such as Armand Petitjean, whose NRF "chronique" 
"Dictature de la France , 
(76) 
was inspirational. In spite of 
the protest it had provoked, and although it was not flawless, 
Schlumberger felt that the article was "un symptöme de saute", 
all the more so since it had appeared in a review "oü Von 
n' aime pas la fanfare"; hence its value, because it took on a 
meaning "Qu'il n' aurait pas eue ailleurs"(77) . Less pessimistic 
than Benda, Schlumberger insisted that peace was a worthy aim, 
but only if it proved to be an honourable one 
(78) 
. 
These were not the only commentaries on Munich, however; 
the whole of the "Air du Mois" section was given over to further, 
shorter reactions. In "L'Attente", Marcel Arland described his 
own observations of Frenchmen as he travelled through the provinces 
in September(79). With "ave. uglement et rodomontades" obscuring 
the true meaning of events, all the French people could do was 
wait, 
and Arland wondered how many of the million men mobilized 
knew 
why they had been called upon to fight; it was certainly not 
for 
Czechoslovakia 
80) 
. In common with 
Petitjean and Schlumberger, 
Arland pointed to the vacuum at the centre of 
French life during 
the last twenty years: 
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"Encore faudrait-il que les Frangais eussent 
conscience de la France, c'est-ä-dire dune 
communaute, d'un depot, d'un devenir, - de 
valeurs irremplaSab les . (... ) L' eclat d'une 
tolle crise permet de mesurer cet abandon, 
et ae ve'rifier que le regime le plus libre 
doit titre aussi le plus ennemi des 
facilites" (81) 
. 
The underlying cause of Arland's "nouveau mal du siecle"182) 
took on a new importance and had grave implications in 1938: 
"un peuple a besoin de dieux pour mourir; et il eti a besoin 
pour vivre dignemen t, 
(83) 
. 
Henry de Montherlant sent Paulhan the pages which Candide 
had asked him to suppress on the ironically - titled "la Paix 
dans 1'honneur"(84). Montherlant too wrote from the provinces, 
in his case Lorraine. His extract lambasted the French: 
"Que vows le vouliez on non, laches imbeciles, 
un jour viendra oü l'odeur de vos cag-. yes sera 
etouffee dans l'odeur de votre sang. A moins 
qu'eternellement vous ne vous preserviez du 
sang, par la honte"(85). 
Denis de Rougemont submitted a text in the form of pages from an 
(86) 
imaginary history book . Like Benda, de Rougemont concentrated 
on the "appeasement" politics of the democracies, but differed in 
his "Conclusion" by applying the example of Switzerland: 
"Personne de sut opposer au Fuhrer l'ideal qui 
avait fait j usqu' alors la force et l' equilibre 
dynamique de 1' Occident : l' utopie agissante d'une 
Federation desEgjux dont la seule Suisse figurait 
le microcosme CS7 . 
Jacques Audiberti's poetic and impressionistic text described 
the reaction of the bourgeoisie living around the 
Champs-EJ.. y. sees 
(88) 
the night after Daladier's "triumphal" return to 
Le Bourget . 
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Two shorter pieces by Henri Pourrat and Marcel Lecomte preceded 
the "Declaration du College de Sociologie sur la crise 
internationale", signed Bataille, Caillois and Leiris(89). 
After first admitting their limited competence and their 
inability to deal with "toutes les faces de la question", the 
authors of the Declaration concentrated their attention on 
analysing the nature of the "reactions psychologiques collectives" 
(90) 
which the proximity of war had provoked. Daladier had characterized 
the French public as having behaved with "sang-froid, dignite 
et resolution", yet a more accurate choice of words would have 
been "consternation, resignation et peur"(91). From the point 
of view of the College itself, these events and their aftermath 
had indicated how necessary and relevant it was as a "foyer -. 
d'energie": given the "absolu mensonge des formes politiques 
actuelles", the College would continue its research for 
'un mode d'existence collective qui ne tienne 
compte d' aucune limitation geographique ou 
sociale et qui permette d'avoir un peu de tenue 
quand la wort menace"(92). 
Finally Paulhan - writing as Guerin in his "Bulletin" - 
indicated his own view in his ironical commentary on events: 
"Munich. Par les accords de Munich, la paix est 
sauvee. La paix dans ce qu'elle a de plus plat 
et de plus perissable. 
Paris. Les tailleurs repandent le slogan: la paix 
nous donnant la voie de vtv9rý, 
Von s'habillera 
en clair cet hiver", etc. . 
Paulhan 's "Special number" on the Munich accords, although 
purporting to reflect what a broad church the review was, 
and how it could apply its ecumenism to the 
domain of 
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international relations, proved to be overwhelmingly 
"antimunichois", against Government policy and, therefore, 
anti-Peace. The nature of the essays themselves and, more 
particularly, the nature of the storm of protest which followed, 
re-established the NRF alongside the Communists in the anti- 
fascist camp 
(94) 
. Martin du Gard, who had declared himself 
an integral pacifist in La Fleche, lost little time is signalling 
his profound dissent with the November number 
(95) 
: "La NRF a 
pris parti. Et ce parti n'est pas le mien" 
(96) 
. As for Gide, 
his attitude was certainly closer to Paulhan's or Schlumberger's 
than to that of Martin du Gard 
(97) 
, for he confided his complete 
disillusion with French foreign policy to his Journal 
(98) 
. 
Thierry Maulnier was among the first to react from the 
Nationalist right in La Revue universelle(99). A message addressed 
"A nos Amis, ä nos abonnes" had already made it clear how the 
Maurrassians felt in the euphoria after Munich(100). In spite of their 
somewhat limited usefulness, Maulnier found that the collected 
reflexions in the NRF were "dune assez grande sterilite"(101). 
He believed that the NRF had missed the point, that the reflexions 
were a dangerous blend of aesthetic moralism and politics. 
Maulnier, refusing to see the relevance of writers such as Benda 
and Montherlant challenging a political and international 
"fait 
accompli" 
(102) 
, affirmed that 
"1' attitude de l' intelligence 
franjaise doit etre de travailler a faire que les evenements de 
(103) 
demain soient autant. que possible differents 
de ceux d'hier" . 
It did not seem to matter to Maulnier that this could only 
be 
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achieved by distortion and delusion. Maulnier's primary target 
was Benda, "ce professionel du faux inteliectuel"(104) and who 
typified that category of intellectual who 
proclaimed 
for so 
long his lack of interest in political tasks and priorities 
(105) 
facing France, He, and they, had arrived too late, and 
Maulnier concluded: "Que les auteurs de nos d"efaites ne viennent 
"(106) pas juger auj ourd' hui le courage de la France. 
Among the most substantial and bitter counter-attacks, and 
one which was very close to the Government line, came from the 
pen of Emmanuel Berl in his subsidized pamphlet, Paves de Paris. 
Entitled La NRF contre la paix(l°7) , Berl's attack opened: 
"Le numero de la NRF du 1 er novembre est une vraie lamentation 
sur la paix de Munich" 
(108) 
, and he berated the review (and 
later the publishing-house) to which he had once been recruited 
by Malraux: 
"Sans doute la NRF n'est pas ce qu'elle fut 
j. adis. Elle a perdu la plus gtande partie 
de son importance. I1 y await au fond de 
Jacques Riviere un predicateur; il ya au 
fond de Jean Paulhan un farceur. Tout cela 
n' en merite pas moins un serieux conmentaire" 
(109) 
. 
Again Benda was the principal target; Berl devoted seven pages 
to his article, and set out to demolish his argument by attempting 
to devalue all his political and historical examples by showing 
how spurious they were in the present context. Yet Berl reserved 
his most concentrated virtiol for Benda's comments on 
how the 
bourgeois democracies would avoid war if their (class) interests 
were threatened: Berl felt that here Benda 
"cesse d'etre ridicule 
(110) 
Coming to Benda's pessimistic prognosis pour devenir odieux" 
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of what would become the Vichy regime, Berl commented: 
"Si un fascisme larve parait probable ä 
M. Benda, c'est qu'un gouvernement de 
Front populaire a en quelque Sorte fait 
le lit du fascisme en rendant illusoires 
et derisoires les libertes dont la petite 
et la moyenne bourgeoisie ont souhaite et 
souhaitent encore lä sauvegarde" (111) . 
Here Berl effectively proved Benda's thesis on the self-interest 
of the ruling bourgeoisie, but, given that the Government backed 
Berl, this was hardly surprising. 
Berl's polemic was hardly less scathing regarding 
Schlumberger's text 
(112), 
but the most searing allegations 
were held until his final paragraphs on his former publisher, 
Gaston Gallimard, whom Berl implied was a draft-dodger and a 
hypocrite(113). He concluded: 
"Mais je n'attaquerai pas M. Gaston Gallimard 
sans dire que l' offensive belliciste menee 
par la NRF n'est qu'un cas particulkex de 
l'offensive generale menee contre la paix 
par les chefs d'orchestres invisibles . 
qui 
veulent ä tout prix empecher la conciliation 
de la France et de 1'Allemagne"(114). 
Quite evidently Berl was propagating the Government view that 
somehow Franco-German reconciliation was still possible even 
if it entailed complicity with Hitler's expansionism. Many 
at the NRF no doubt noticed the rather disturbing 
irony that 
Berl, once the "enf ant terrible" of Mort de la Pensee 
bourgeoise 
and admirer of Malraux's Garine, was now not only among 
the 
bourgeois regime's most staunch defenders, 
he was even in 
their pay 
(115) 
. 
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If the most substantial reactions to the November issue 
of the NRF were highly critical, and thereby reflected the 
preponderance of the pro-Munich camp at this time, Paulhan's 
"special number" found enthusiastic support and praise in 
the antifascist camp, as represented by the Communist-backed 
Commune(116). Georges Sadoul opened his assessment by 
writing: 
"Le numero de novembre de La NRF est ä peu 
pres un numero special consacre a la honte 
des capitulations de Munich (... ) (I1 y a), 
une violente indignation contre la politique 
de trahison menge par Daladier au cours des 
tragiques Journees de Sep tembre"(117). 
This was strong language indeed, and such zealous opposition to 
the official line after Munich could only reflect upon the NRF, 
hereby so willingly applauded by the Communists 
(118). 
The NRF for December paid homage to Francis James and 
Apollinaire, continued the serialization of Giraudoux's Choix des 
Elues and concluded Chamson's La Galere: the literary emphasis 
(119) 
Yet in "l'Air du Mois" had, once again, been re-established , 
Paulhan, this time using his own name, placed a short, highly 
(120) 
indignant article entitled "I1 ne faut pas compter sur nous 
Here he took exception to the way the Government and 
its supporters, 
only too conscious of "la honte", and 
"1'humiliation", now deflected 
criticism of their actions into 
"good advice": 
"Les Ministres, les Percepteurs, et jusqu'a u 
President de la Societe des Gens de Lettres nous 
prient de devenir de meilleurs Francais: plus 
unis, 
mais plus travailleurs; plus intelligents, 
mais plus 
genereux; par dessus tout, prolifiques et prets 
a 
tous les devouements. Je regrette de 
dire (mais je21), 
dis fermement), il ne faut pas compter sur nouslt 
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It was not the ordinary French people who were to blame, but the 
way the State and politicians wielded power which had done so much 
to discredit democracy, and which had done so much to promote the 
arguments of the anti-democrats: 
'Von n' aj amais tant pane d'honneur que durant 
la chienlit de 1'apres-guerre. Les Moralistes 
nous disent encore que toute Democratie exige, 
du haut en bas de 1'echelle, la vertu des 
citoyens. C'est une affirmation imprudente: 
car, s'il est naturel d'en conclure qu'il 
faut supprimer le vice, il est ä la fois plus 
naturelet plus expedient d' en conclure qu'il 
faut supprimer la Democratie"(122). 
He summarized his point of view by writing: "C'est 1'Etat qui 
nous invite aux partis, ä la division, a la difference"(123) . 
Effectively Paulhan was insisting that he, and the NRF, would 
continue to resist interference from the State in affairs which 
were not, in his view, affairs of State. In another short note, 
Jean Grenier took the converse position and upbraided what he saw 
as the damaging tendency of intellectuals to become embroiled 
in matters which exceeded their competence 
(124). 
Paulhan told Etiemble that his "petites reflexions" had been 
"jugees anarchiques ou reactionnaires. Ce qu'elles n'etaient 
pas" 
(12 5) 
, and, in the NRF 
for January 19 39 , he returned to the 
question of the threat facing France, should the government 
pursue its "pacifist'' policies(126). Part of Paulhan's concern 
was to show that the pacifists - however admirable their previous 
opposition to complicity in belligerence could never avoid 
the impasse of war: "A parler franc, je ne vois pas 
d' ins titution, 
(127) 
dans nos societes, mieux reglee, mieux obei e, qui 
la guerre" 
He saw the war as a rite with its conformists, 
heretics and 
- 347 - 
martyrs, and clearly believed that the more the nation proclaimed 
. 
its opposition to violence, the more it invited attack(128) 
He felt that, rather than risk war, the Government might 
consider ceding French terrirory: 
"L'Italie, comme l'on sait, nous reclame 
aujourd'hui Tunis et la Corse. Et il est 
vraisemblable - si j ten juge par les precedents - 
que nous allons sous peu les lui remettre(129). 
(... ) C'est aussitot le Savoie, la Provence et 
j usqu' ä Manosque (130) , qu' exiger ont nos voisins. 
Et je ne vois point du tout comment cette fois 
noes eviterions la guerre"(131). 
These were, indeed, daring criticisms to make during such a 
sensitive period. Paulhan's stance, and his committing the NRF 
to the "antimunichois" party, were courageous enough, given that 
the government was still negotiating closely with both Hitler's 
and Mussolini's diplomats 
(132) 
0 
However, Paulhan realized that the price of outspokenness 
could well involve the hostility of the government towards the 
NRF, or even direct intervention. Indeed, the question of 
censorship arose once again for Suares, ren. owned for his 
forthright attacks upon Hitler and Germany, had at last consented 
to contribute his regular "Chronique de Caerdal" from January 
1939 
(133) 
. As exemplified 
by Berl's counter-attack on the NRF, 
the "quai d'Orsay" would not countenance . repeated disparaging 
comments directed at the fascist dictatorships. 
A few days 
after the appearance of the first 
"Chroniques de Ca9rdal", 
Paulhan explained his motives for cutting 
Suares text: 
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"Ne m' en veuillez pas si je n' ai presque 
rien retenu de vos pages sur Hitler, ni de 
celles sur Mussolini. _.. 
I1 me semble qu'il` 
faut tout craindre pour la France ces mois- 
ci. Que la NRF n'ait point a se reproche'r, 
du moins, de lui avoir tire un ennemi de 
plus-puisque ce n'est pas eile qui aurait 
a les combattre, puisque les chefs politiques 
(helas ! quels chefs) semblent vouloir -ä tout 
prix eviter 1'hostilite, et la lutte"(134). 
Petitjean, moreover, was coerced out of the "Qual d'Orsay" for 
(135) 
his "notes" . Although the NRF had evidently struck a chord 
in its anti-Munich issue 
(136), 
it was beginning to take risks, 
for, once again, Paulhan was forced to explain his position 
a month later: 
"Ne pensez pas que je sois lache. Certes la Mere 
des Af f. Etr. (sic) (qui a subventionne dej ä 
la brochure de Berl - immonde, non pas sotte - 
"La NRF contre la Paix"") , nous a fort averti 
que la NRF serait poursuivie au premier article 
contre Hitler ou Mussolini. Cela encore 
importerait assez peu. Mais je pense qu'il 
ne faut creer a une France malheureuse, 
abandonnee de ses ministres; entouree, ý, de 
trahisons, nulle difficulte qui ne soit pas 
absolument necessaire. -- Et personne ne sait 
mieux que moi 1' etrange, 1' etonnant retentisse- 
ment ue peut avoir au dehors un article de la 
NRF" 13 7. 
The most telling remark here is Paulhan's final sentence, and 
confirms that, in spite of editorial policy and pronouncements 
(both public and private), the NRF was regarded on the outside 
as an influential tribune - it was not simply or solely a 
(138) 
neutral, literary organ This point 
is all the more . 
central given that during this highly-charged period, 
the NRF 
was operating in a publishing world where 
foreign manipulation 
was widespread. Rene Girault 
has written: 
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"En 193.7-1939, le monde 
est "actionne" par des 
comme le celebre Otto 
(... ) sans oublier les 
italien represente äP 
Landini" (139) . 
de la presse parisienne 
manipulations emerjtes, 
Abetz pour l'Allemagne, 
services du Minculpop 
aris par le consul 
The independence of the NRF is not nor was not in doubt; but 
its standing as an intellectuals' forum encouraged propaganda 
services to approach individual contributors, as demonstrated 
by the case of Benjamin Cremieux recorded as early as 1929 by 
Leautaud(140) . Moreover many of the review's author-personalities, 
among them Giraudaux, Morand, Claudel and St. John Perse (pen- 
name of Alexis Leger, diplomatic secretary-general from 1933), 
worked in the highest positions at the "quai d'Orsay". There 
is little doubt that periodically Gallimard or Paulhan received 
"unofficial" advice from inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(141). 
During these confused months preceding the imposition of the 
official censorship in August 1939, Paulhan did not entirely 
sacrifice principle to caution regarding remarks he published 
on the conduct of state aff airs. Yet he remained wary of of fending 
the authorities, and his anxieties were justified when, due to 
Suares' invective, Italy banned the NRF in May bringing a loss 
of some 500 subscribers 
(142). 
Paulhan's sequence of critical, political texts culminated 
in two further articles, the first of which, by Jacques Chardonne, 
, ýý 
(143) 
Chardonne's essay appeared "en tete in February 1939 . 
began with a glowing eulogy of French liberal capitalism which, 
he argued, had laid the foundations of the nation's wealth. 
- 3- 
"Grace ä lui, en trois generations, le bien- 
etre du manoeuvre s'est accru plus qu'en 
vingt siecles. I1 permet de satisfaire la 
variete des gouts et admet une Sorte de 
liberte tres chere aux Francjais; aussi 
chacun es t interesse ä ces questions, meine 
celui qui se croft etrange r aux deme les 
entre patrons et ouvriers"(144). 
Chardonne firmly believed that the Popular Front government had 
damaged the nation's fabric by following the path towards 
collectivism: 
"Le collectivisme, c'est la misere pour tous, 
parce que les cadres improvises et leur 
superposition de controles absorbent le 
revenu national. Mais la misere peut 
conduire au collectivisme. Nous suivons 
cette voie, avec des pauses"(145). 
For Chardonne the tendency towards collectivism was far more 
menacing that the disadvantages inherent in the French system, 
primarily for the reason that each European community required 
a different political structure, and, to the conservative 
Chardonne, collectivist tendencies were completely incompatible 
with the French character. He did not deny the nation's 
faults: 
"Pendant vingt ans, de Poincare a Leon Blum, 
c'est dans notre democratie que l'on a 
discredite les mots droit, justice, paix, 
societe des nations, -,, 
': en les associant ä la 
force ou aux debris de la force, pour les 
employer enf in ä cacher la deb ilite . De ce 
jargon, ýa4 
6)hecoslovakie 
fut la premiere 
vi c time tý . 
Chardonne was most surprised by the apparent reversal produced 
of ter Munich, when the Right 
"voulait la paix ä tout prix" 
whereas, hitherto, its representatives 
had always been willing 
.. to die for the patrie" 
(147). 
Likewise L'Humanite - once the 
organ of the militant : pacifist 
Jaures - was now in the van of 
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the "war party". Yet these harmful oppositions were, in the 
long run, explicable through the very nature of France and the 
French: " nous sommes dan. s le pays des contradictions et des 
negations" 
(148) 
. Politically the Frenchman, "ce revolutionnaire 
(... ) conservateur' 
(149) 
, gained most from liberal capitalism, 
because 
"en verite, il n'y a pas de politique fixe 
o. u de programmes opposes a droite et a 
gauche. I1 n'y a que des passions, et ces 
passions touchent a une certaine idee de la 
valeur humaine" (150) . 
The second of these texts was Paulhan's important essay "la 
Democratie fait appel au premier venu", published in March 
1939(151), p aulhan's primary intent here was to show that 
the essence of democracy had been betrayed by the politicians 
and technocrats (Paulhan' s word is "techniciens") of the period. 
His ideas are a curious blend of Rousseau, Alain, G. K. Chesterton 
and even Maurras. He began by identifying what were the forgotten 
or discarded ideals of democracy: "C' est d'abord que l' individu 
vaut mieux que 1' Etat, c' est que la societe es t faite pour 1' 
homme, 
non 1'homme pour la societe" 
(152) 
. The individual was all 
that 
democracy required: "eile se donne la personne, et la personne 
lui suffit"(153). Secondly true democracy did not 
distinguish 
racially: "il s'agit de n'inporte quelle personne, 
füt-elle de 
peau noire ou rouge 1, 
(154) 
. Finally, echoing' 
Rousseau, Paulhan 
believed that "1' homme vaut par ce qu' il a de naturel, 
d'immediat, 
(155) de naif, p lutot que par ce qu'il acquiert . 
He felt that 
"ordinariness" was the true secret of democracy 
(and here Paulhan's 
argument takes on a certain 
"purity" reminiscent of Benda) : 
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"La democratie fait appel contre les aristocrates, 
- et specialement contre les atistocrates de 
de l' intelligence - au premier venu. Et Von 
en voit bien la raison: c' es t que le premier 
venu es t demeure pres de l' essentiel" (156) . 
With this in mind Paulhan declared: "il saute aux yeux que nous 
ne sommes pas en democratie(157) . 
Turning his attention to the recent crisis, Paulhan attempted 
to show that all the commentators who had assessed the ills of 
France were all right: 
"En bref , tout se passe comme si la France n' avait j amais 
suivi le conseil de personne. Car il n'est pas une 
seule politique qui (... ) ne nous eüt evite la 
honte du dernier Munich, et celle des Munichs 
ä veni r" (15 8) . 
The central weakness of the manner in which France had conducted 
international affairs derived from the lack of decisiveness, or 
rather the equivocation, which characterised the period, and which, 
for some (like Chardonne), epitomized France: 
"De tant de b. onnes intentions (... ) Von a 
prefere les prendre (toutes) a la fois 
faiblement: d'humilier 1'Allemagne, mais 
lui permettre de decupler sa force. Accorder 
a 1' Italie je ne sais quels services hypocrites, 
mais la blesser ouvertement. Feindre 
d'etayer 
la SýiýBguand nous nous moquions d'elle... 
" 
etc. 1. 
Such conduct was idiotic and non-democratic, according 
to Paulhan, 
and, in the final section Le prince 
de l'es rit, et l'homme de la 
rue, he returned to his own conception of 
democracy. Common 
sense and honesty were absent 
from politics, he implied, when 
pointing to the duplicity underlying 
French contact towards 
Czechoslovakia: 
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"1' homme ordinaire se dit tout betement 
qu'en lächant un ami qu'il aj ete dans 
le danger, il se conduit comme un salaud"(160) 
France was pot democratic because its affairs were controlled by 
"les princes de 1' esprit" , by the apparatus of the Parties and 
161) by the "techniciens" , He did not deny that "il faut des 
savants et des techniciens" 
(162) 
, but when they were in dispute, 
as they usually were, "je crois seulement (... ) que(... ) le 
dernier mot doit revenir (... ) ä 1'Arbit; age, a 1'Arbitraire... , 
(163). 
This "Arbitrator" was "le premier venu", but Paulhan concluded 
that "quant ä designer ce premier venu, c'est une autre affaire" 
(164) 
. 
_That 
this text was highly esteemed is clearly attested by 
Paulhan's correspondence, although Cremieux, for one, on seeing 
the proofs, felt that the conclusion was contradictory: if Paulhan 
wanted to see "un roi ou un dictateur, dis - le carrement", he 
exhorted(165). Jean Grenier admired the text, but he thought 
there may have been a confusion between "1'humanitarismeet la 
democratie", a charge denied by Paulhan 
(166) 
. Moreover, Grenier 
too felt the conclusion was too weak, but his correspondent replied 
that it was deliberately and necessarily so(167) In letters to 
Etiemble and Jouhandeau, Paulhan explained how closely his 
view coincided with that of the English author, 
G. K. Chesterton, 
whom he deeply admired: 
"Je trouve dans Chesterton (... ) ce mot etonnant: 
"le despotisme hereditaire est democratique dans 
son essence: s' il n' admet pas que tous les 
hommes 
peuvent ä la f ois gouverner, du moins admet-il 
que n' Importe qui peut gouverner"-c' es t 
lä tout 
le sens de ma note" 
(168) 
. 
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Paulhan was indeed familiar with Chesterton and commentators 
are right to point to the influence of the 1908 text Orthodoxy 
(169) 
However, he also knew What's Wrong with the World?, the "social" 
sequel to the rather more theological-philosophical, earlier 
text 
(170), 
and, later in 1939, Paulhan included in the NRF a 
two-part translation of the first section of this book 
171) 
Indeed echoes of Chesterton are traceable in several letters to 
the reactionary Jouhandeau, who had evidently had difficulty in 
understanding Paulhan's March text: 
"un roi est precisement un voisin, il na pas 
ä etre particulierement intelligent (... ), 
il est un homme comme vous ou moi, et en 
admettant qu'il est roi, et en l' aimant comme 
tel, nous admettons que n'importe qui peut 
gouvýner, ce qui est le sentiment democratique 
par excellence. Mais personne auj ourd' hui n' a 
assez de confiance et d' admiration dans 1' homme 
seul, dans l'homme qui n'est que 1'homme... "(172) . 
It is true that Paulhan's conclusion weakened the overall effect 
of his reflexions on democracy, but his reticence is partly 
explained by the likelihood that he would have drawn much criticism 
from the Left if he had been more explicitly in favour of monarchy 
or dictatorship. As it was, Andre Wu. rmser's reaction in Commune 
provided a useful sample of how the Left saw Paulhan's remarks. 
Wurmser accused his friend of examining the question in the void; 
the "quidam", as conceived here, had as much to do with 
democracy 
(173) 
However 
as the "statue de la place de la Republique" 
unrealistic Paulhan's appreciation of 
democracy was, and however 
powerless or unwilling he was to explicitly 
(or even seditiously) 
suggest anything better, it remained clear enough 
that successive 
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governments had disappointed if not embittered him and others 
at the NRF. In the same issue, March 1939, an "Air du Mois" 
by Grenier signalled this unambiguously enough: 
"La France n'a fait ni une politique de justice 
ni une politique de force (... ) ses perpetuels 
louvoiements, son inconsistance d'idees due au 
regime electoral et parlementaire prouvent par 
leurs resultatS actuels qu'il yä quelque chose 
de pire pour un peuple qu'un mauvais gouvernement: 
c' es t l' absence de gouvernement" (174) . 
For all its faults, however, the Daladier Government remained 
relatively buoyant 
(175) 
; after Hitler's invasion of Bohemia on 
March 15th 1939, Daladier "s'efforca de creer un climat d'union 
nationale"(176) . Moreover, opinion polls taken at the time suggest 
that the NRF had gauged very well what would eventually be the 
majority view, that Hitler had to be resisted. Already in February 
1939,79% "(des FranSais) estiment que "le souci le plus urgent du 
gouvernement doit etre de renforcer la puissance militaire"", and, 
although 57% believed in February that there was no threat of war, 
(177) 
Moreover by June 1939 the figure had fallen to 34% 
Mayeur has shown that, contrary to the misconception, the 
pacifism of such as Marcel Deat 
("Mourir pour Dantzig? - Non! ") 
(178 This relative change of was, in reality, a minority view " 
course, and government by 
"decrets-lois", explains why, for a 
few months at least, the NRF ceased to 
be critical of the regime. 
Moreover Paulhan had to contend with the internal 
disputes 
simmering at the NRF at the same time: 
Leautaud left the review 
amid much bitterness, Schlumberger attacked 
Benda's position, 
(179) 
and Italy banned the review 
in May 
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Yet the failure of the "Grande Alliance" during these 
months, following Soviet proposals delivered on April 30th, showed 
that the "Allies" were far from united(180) . Benda believed that 
the governments of Britain and France no longer represented the 
desires of their people: "Leurs chefs font ce qu'ils veulent", 
he noted bitterly in June 
(181) 
He predicted accurately once 
again: 
"Quant aux masses, elles s'eveilleront un matin, 
soit pour les masses allemandes avec une guerre 
terrible qu' aura, voulu leur chef, soit pour les 
masses francaises dans une vassalite totale que 
leur ennemi aura realisee sans meme combattre et 
avec l'aide de leurs ministres"(182), 
and concluded: "Je m' en veux parfois de donner mon attention a 
de tels cloaques"(183) 
The NRF for July 1939 opened with Petitjean's resounding 
tribute to Peguy, killed in action just twenty-five years before; 
he bore a profound relevance in 1939, argued Petitjean who, 
characteristically, concluded with a sombre survey of contemporary 
France: 
"A droite, la tradition est morte pour faire place 
ä l' anarchie, mais quelques vieux "patriotes" 
commencent ä s' ouvrir au peuple de France. 
A gauche, la revolution es t morte, puisqu'elle 
s'en tient ä la defense des droits acquis; mais 
plus ieurs comprennent que le peuple n' es t rien 
s' il n' es t pas la Nation. La victoire es t bien 
morte, et l' apres-guerre se meurt, mais de partout 
levent enfin des forces nouvelles.. . v t(184) Pe-guy parmi nous ne serait pas depayse longtemps . 
Paulhan found it increasingly difficult to make relevant comments 
on events, as they were now moving very quickly, 
in spite of the 
hesitation of France and Britain in international 
diplomacy. The 
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negotiations of the hoped-for military alliance between France, 
Britain and the USSR took eleven days to vacillate over proposals: 
on August 17th, the talks were suspended by the Russians(185). 
Paulhan wrote to Hellens explaining his fears: 
"Il me semble qu'on a ce soir plus de chances 
de s'en sortir sans guerre -a moins que ce 
delai ne soit la consequence d'un pacte 
inattendu, et de toutes les justifications 
et des amenagements qui s'en suivent. T'y 
attendais-tu le moins du monde? "(186). 
By the 23rd Hitler and Stalin had signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 
a move which pushed Europe "vers l' inexorable" 
(187) 
. Indeed Hitler 
invaded Poland on September 1st, France mobilized, and by the 
3rd both Britain and France had declared war on Germany, honouring 
(reluctantly) their pledges to Polarid 
(188) 
. Obviously the review 
could not react to the fact of war until its October issue; in 
the meantime, however, Gaston Gallimard decided to move the review 
and publishing house to the relative safety of his property 
"Mirande", in the department of the Manche, near the Mont Saint- 
Miche1(189). 
Despite the inconvenience of the relocation, the NRF 
continued to appear, although it was now not only subject 
to all 
the vicissitudes of mass mobilization and printing-delays, 
it 
had also to negotiate the obstacle of the official 
censorship, 
(190) 
September 
inaugurated by "decret" on August 27th 1939 . 
5th Paulhan told Grenier that 
"la NRF a traverse la censure sans 
dommages autres 
qu'un p aragrap he coupe daps Pourrat, un 
autre dans 
Petitjean (nos deux auteurs dangereux, 
evidenment)" 191) , 
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A day or so before their departure for "Mirande", Paulhan told 
Jouhandeau of a visit to the "Commissariat -a 1'Information", 
located in the Hotel Continental on the rue de Rivoli: 
'Tai eu tort de m' egarer hier a la 
Propagande. Tut'imagines pas le 
defaitisme de tous les gens que Von 
y voit. Je les aurais fait volontiers 
fusiller... n(192). 
Later, Paulhan reported to Schlumberger that the "Commissariat" 
was a "f ourmiliere inerte"(193) . The major drawback of the 
censorship was that delays were inevitable between the submission 
of the "morasses", or first-proofs, and the final printing, 
a point noted by Leautaud(194) . The mobilization also meant 
that both administrators and contributors would no longer be 
able to work for or submit material to the NRF: Paulhan, his 
wife Germaine and Gaston Gallimard were hard worked as they only 
had a skeleton staff. In addition to these duties, Paulhan ensured 
that news of the postings of staff was passed on: as Sartre put it, 
he was the "godmother" of the NRF 
(195) 
. 
Once the October issue had passed through the censorship, 
subscribers would have noticed Paulhan's leading article 
"Retour 
sur dix-neuf cent quatorze" 
(196) 
. Here Paulhan, remembering 
his 
own circumstances at the outbreak of the First World War, remarked 
that, in 1939, 
"ceux qui partent auj ourd' hui, comme 
sages - et, je pense, plus sagement 
Silencieux: sans cris ni curiosite. 
Sans trop de surprise. (... ) Oü son 
le savons de jä plus. Qu'ils vivent 
notre pays" 
(197) 
. 
ils sont plus 
diriges. (... ) 
Sans pillages. 
t-ils, nous ne 
tous, Que wive 
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Moreover, the Parties (which he saw disparagingly as "les 
intermediai. res entre la verite et nous"(198)) remained just as 
paralysed in the face of war as they had been hitherto: "j amais 
les Partis n'ont ete mieux deroutes, ou plus faux' 1(199) . Paulhan 
hoped that, unlike the previous war, the French would retain their 
reason, that the authorities would not implement "un bourrage de 
crane", and that the war would be seen as a stark reality with 
real men, and not as a "mythe , 
(200) 
. He also hoped that the 
soldiers in this war would receive more recognition than they 
had in 1914-1918, and wrote: 
"A la question: "Pourquoi to bats-tu? ", faites 
que chacun d'eux puisse -rep ondre : "C' es t pour 
etre un jour heureux et honore"" 
(201) 
. 
Gide felt Paulhan's contribution had been "discrete et pourtant 
tres significative" 
(202), 
while Sartre, posted near the German 
border, told Simone de Beauvoir that "l' article de Paulhan m' a 
fait litteralement gonfler (... ); ` s'il savait combien les types 
. "(203) d'ici sont loin de penser ä etre un jour heureux et honores. 
Sartre's comments clearly show that Paulhan, despite the good 
intentions of his article, had somewhat misjudged the mood and 
opinions of the ordinary soldier at the front. 
The next issue of the NRF suffered more substantially at the 
hands of the censors. Paulhan told Suares, upon acknowledging 
receipt of November's "Chronique de Ca9rdal", that 
"j'y glisse 
une admirable lettre que m' a ecrite Armand Petitjean 
'd'Allemagne 
(204) 
occupee' , pourvu que 
la Censure vous respecte, le respecte . 
As things turned out, both Suares and Petitjean 
's "Chroniques" 
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were noticeably pruned(205) ; indeed, the whole of Page 781 
was left blank. Paulhan felt it necessary to apologize to 
(206) 
readers the next month. Petitjean, as a serving soldier, 
was particularly likely to be censored: in fact, anything 
touching on the conduct of the war or which might endanger 
national security had to be scrutinized. Suares, however, 
poured forth his familiar invective, and, talking of Hitler's 
treatment of Poland, he wrote: 
"Seul, le plus vil des ennemis, cinq cent mille 
fois assassin ose vomir l' injure sur ses victimes: 
il mele.. son crachat ä la mer immense de sang qu'il 
fait couler"(207). 
Remarkably enough his call for the mobilization and resistance 
of neutral countries escaped the blue pencil: 
"P revenus de toutes parts, les Neutres n'ont 
plus le droit d' etre sourUs (... ) . Neutres, 
c'est pour vous que la France et l'Angleterre 
se sont armees autant, que pour elles-memes; 
pour vous qu'elles versent leur sang. C'est 
vous qu'elles sauvent en se sauvant; leur 
victoire sera la votre(... ). Votre salut a 
tour depend du notre" (208). 
If Suares' text partially satisfied the censors, it caused offence 
among several readers, some of whom were very close to the 
NRF; 
Paulhan told Schlumberger(209) and Suares(210) that the review 
was thought to be too bellicose. Moreover the 
"balance" of the 
November number had been damaged by Schlumberger's opposition 
to the publication of a text by the pacifist 
Giono: Paulhan 
believed a long-held principle had been 
flouted: 
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"(Votre position) est horrible, et dangereux, 
parce qu'elle ne tend ä rien moins qu' ä 
saper l'un des principes profonds de la NRF. 
c' es tä savoir que iorsqu' un texte 1) es t 
parfaitement beau; 2) ne contient rien 
d'absolument scandaleux, il faut le publier 
quel qu'en soit le signataire. Lä-dessus je 
vous laisse a votre remords" (211) 
Paulhan clearly wished to preserve the independence of the NRF 
(or at least a semblance thereof): the evidence shows, however, 
that the publication of certain authors, which for some signified 
balance, was regarded by others as provocative, if not seditious. 
However admirable it was to wish to debate matters of principle, 
the State (and its Censors) had to conduct affairs according to 
the rules of war. Such was Paulhan's dilemma; he would have 
undoubtedly concurred with the sentiments of Petitjean who, in 
his truncated November "Lettre", wrote: 
"J'espere que la revue va conserver sa liberte 
et sa vie, qui deviendront scandaleuses. Pourquoi 
ne pas discuter maintenant des. buts de guerre et 
des moyens de paix. Du principe meme de la 
guerre? Vest pendant qu'il est bon et 
courageux d'en parier"(212). 
Indeed Schlumberger made his own feelings clear in the conclusion 
of his "Air du Mois" "Premier rnort" in November: talking of the 
death of. the first French soldier, he remarked: 
"Quand un pays consent de (sic) tels sacrifices, 
c'est qu'il est engage, sans recul possible. I1 
nous en a desormais terriblement convaincus. I1 
nous a terriblement engages, nous aussi. 
Vest 
ýý(213) . fait. Nous n'essayerons plus de nous reprendre 
(214) 
Drieu, too, writing of "L'Actualite du XXe siecle" , 
believed 
that Revolution had been the root cause of the present 
internecine 
struggle in Europe; he concluded that a divided 
Europe should 
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unite economically and politically to establish "une vaste 
autarchie, parmi les debris du socialisme et du liberalisme", 
to restore the greatness of Europe in a "fed"eration europeenne"215) 
In exactly one year's time, Drieu would be called upon by 
Otto Abetz, Hitler's ambassador in Paris, to relaunch the NRF 
as what Drieu came to view as one of the cultural pillars of 
the Greater Germany 
(216) 
. In the meantime however, Drieu concluded 
that the dictators would succeed sooner or later, 
"Si la France et 1'Angleterre ne sont.. pas 
capables des ipaintenant de penser une Geneve 
virile et humaine qui s'articule sur des pensees 
moins debiles que celles d'un vieux monde 
politicien hypocrite et incapable" 
(217) 
. 
Realizing there was little point in submitting material to the 
censors which may have had to be immediately cut, Paulhan 
temporarily changed his tactics, and invited controversial 
authors (i. e. controversial politically) to submit non-political 
material; he believed it had been "un petit tour de 
force d'avoir 
extrait d'Alain, un p anegyrique de l'Angleterre, voire 
de 
' v) 
218 
1'Angleterre guerr In the same number he inserted iere. 
Aragon's poems "Le temps des mots croises", and arranged to 
serialize his latest novel 
(219) 
. The discerning reader would, 
moreover, have realized the full significance of 
Schlumberger's 
essay "Actualites Retrospectives-Documents sur 
le Patriotisme 
franýais" and, indeed, Schlumberger returned to 
the question 
(220) 
next month . 
The "Drole de Guerre" led many at home- 
in Paris-to lapse 
into a state of stunned complacency; 
inaction and lack of enthusiasm 
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at the front lay behind the f act that "les 'ressorts' de 
l' opinion publique etaient completement detendus" 
(221) 
. As 
Schlumberger commented later, the war,. "gardait quelque chose 
de fantömatique. N'etaient reels que le desordre de la vie 
(222) 
quotidienne et que les departs des mobilises" . It even 
seemed likely for a time that the censorship - at least as it 
affected the NRF - might be eased 
(223) 
. Paulhan intended to 
resist the general complacency, and, in the leading pages of 
of the January 1940 issue, he included an important essay by 
Schlumberger "Pour saluer 1' annee nouvelle" 
(224) 
._ "I1 ne suffira 
plus d'etre le pays de la vie facile", urged Schlumberger, 
and concluded: 
"C' es t de fond en comble qu'il faudra tout 
renover, tout derouiller et rajeunir. Personne 
ne pourra rentrer dans ses vieux chaussons et 
regagner le coin de son feu en disant: Ce n'est 
pas mon affaire"(226). 
Paulhan agreed: he believed that the NRF had been consistent 
on the questions of threatened war and patriotism since April 
1938: 
"Je crois qu' actuellement toute valeur franSýwise, 
dans ]. d mesure oü eile ne joue pas contre la 
patrie, joue pour eile. Vivent les vers 
d' Aragon, et les fantaisies montagnards de Giono, 
et les p anegyriques anglais d' Alain! C' es t 
de 
lä aussi que viendra le renouveau francais. 
Et 
pour le res to je veux dire: 
"Pour tout ce qui. 
touche au patriotisme, titre aussi inflexible 
qu'il se peut". (... ) Petitjean depuis 
deux 
ans a tres bien fixe notre attitude, 
il me 
semble" (227) . 
This was more than simply Paulhan's personal opinion; 
it was a 
statement of faith and of editorial policy which 
was adhered 
to throughout the "Drole de Guerre" period, and was 
further 
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confirmed by an announcement in the publicity brochure for 
January 1940. Notifying the subscribers of an inevitable 
price increase due to wartime conditions, the text underlined 
the f act that now the NRF and its readers needed each other more 
than ever: 
"La guerre enfin a laisse ä la NRF son aspect 
habituel(228). Les problemes qu'elle pose a 
chaque Franpis et ä chaque homme, ceux que 
dej ä nous pose l' apres-guerre, seront dans ses 
pages l' ob jet d' une attention constante. Si 
nos abonnes et nos lecteurs estiment. que la NRF 
es t digne de leur confiance, qu'ils nous aident 
en renouvelant sans tarder leur abonnement, en 
nous gagnant autour d'eux de nouveaux lecteurs. 
Leur amitie nous est plus que jamais necessaire"(229). 
As though to confirm this outlook, Paulhan prepared an issue 
for February 1940 which stands as the wartime counterpart to 
the November 1938 "special number" on Munich. Out of the 144-page 
number, some 56 pages were directly concerned with the war; it 
opened with Pierre-Jean Jouve's emotional poem "A la France 
1940"(230) . 
"Aux armes: ", apostrophized Jouve, and he went on to 
liken their struggle to a battle with the Antichrist, in a sequence 
reminiscent of Suares, in particular his "Chronique de Ca9rdal" 
for December 1939 
(231) 
: 
"La face humaine es t of f ensee 
Par le gorille a la casquette noire 
Dieu souffre et la face humaine est offensee 
La bete de la mer est la bete de fer 
Hitlerienne! et le chiffre 666 a son front (232) 
Elle avance contre nos coeurs! A Dieu, aux armes'. 
" 
In an image which conjures up Delacroix's La 
Liberte guidant le 
Peuple, Jouve's poem ends: 
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"La Croix de Christ encor se voit contre ton sein 
Et sur ton front leger le bonnet phrygien: 
Pour. suis ä mort la guerre au tueur pourrissant 
Tes beaux yeux consacres par la Liberte pure 
Le sang rouge, le bleu divin, et l' ange blanc" (233) 
Julien Benda, in his last major text in the NRF, analysed 
"La Crise de la Morale clericale"(234). Here Benda assessed the 
motives behind the desire of the democratic governments to restore 
what he called "la morale socratico-chretienne"(235) once Hitler 
had been defeated. Hitler's regime had debased the old values 
of Justice, Truth, Trustworthiness and respect for the individual 
regardless of class or condition. Benda asserted that he, and 
others of his generation, had taken them for granted; but, towards 
the end of the Nineteenth Century a veritable crusade had been 
launched against these values. Benda's enumeration of the 
"actions collectives" forming this crusade were familiar to 
readers of La Trahison des Cleres and, in one way, his essay 
may be read as a 1940-postscript to the well-known book 
(236) 
German Nationalism, Marxism and those 11 faux cleres" Sorel, 
Nietzsche and Maurras had all contributed to the erosion. He 
estimated that any governments restoring these values would 
not do so completely: the achievements of the Communists, 
(237) 
Yet this for instance, would have to be accounted for . 
imperfection was not regrettable, thoughtBenda, saying 
"tant 
de purete inquiete"; he concluded: 
"On se demande parfois si ceux qui revent 
d' un tel monde n' eprouvent pas certaine 
joie, 
pour peu que quelque sensibilite artistique 
les asservisse encore, de penser qu'il ne se 
realisera jamais qu'impatfaitement"(238). 
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The next two texts are remarkable in that they stand 
as invaluable documents bearing witness to the feeling of 
inertia which characterized the "Drö1e de Guerre". Petitjean, 
writing as "Armand" from the Saar front, returned to a familiar 
theme in "Pour 1' Apres-guerre" 
(239) 
. For him, the opening of 
hostilities had been "aussi peu sacree que possible", but 
it had then been followed by "une periode d'indicible tristesse"(240) . 
He and his comrades at the front now realized that 
"la formidable mythomanie entretenue depuis pres 
de vingt ans, en Allemagne et ai lle urs , par une 
generation d' anciens combattants et des cohortes 
d' adolescents est peut-etre en train de s' epuiser 
lentement au contact de reste, malgre 
tout, la realite des realites (. 
The threat of death was only too real, lamented Petitjean, and 
he honoureda fellow-soldier Julot, among the first fatalities 
(242) 
. 
Also part of the reality was the supreme disenchantment he and 
others had experienced after the mobilization: for the Communists 
particularly, the Nazi-Soviet Pact left them crying with rage and 
(243) 
Already in October this had tearing up their Party cards 
(244) 
proved to be an "ersatz" war, as he put it ; yet, 
"la guerre 
, (245) 
sera peut-etre, cette fois, propice au murissement... . 
Petitjean held firm to his optimism when he wrote: 
"c' est la vie 
du pays entier qui peut et doit sortir regeneree 
de notre 
, (246) experience His hope and call 
for a "Nouvelle Revolution 
yq Franjaise" whereby "la Nation entrera dans notre vie uotidienne 
(247) 
have an ominous ring when it is remembered 
that later Petitjean 
(248) 
went on to "collaborate" with 
Drieu's NRF 
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Secondly, Andre Chamson, to whom Daladier had offered the 
direction of the "Commissariat de l' Information" and who had 
preferred to be attached to the French Fifth Army among the 
fighting troops 
(249), 
sent Paulhan some extracts "d'un Carnet 
de Route d'un officier de liaison" 
(250) 
. "Est-ce la presence 
(251) de la mort qui pese sur tout"' asked Chamson . He qualified 
his affirmative answer in sentences which recall Malraux: 
"Mais ce qui pese plus encore, c'est la fraternite. 
Fraternite dans la solitude. Lä, 1'homine est 
plus seul qu'il ne peut 1'etre en aucun autre 
lieu du monde (... ) . Mais nulle part ailleurs 
1'homme n'est aussi fraternel a 1'homme"(252). 
Action under fire produced, for Chamson, a unique solidarity among 
men; his feelings were strongest for "les pays ans" . "Ce que 
j'ai fait de meilleur dans ma vie", he admitted, 'Vest 
d'avoir temoigne pour les paysans (homme de la route hier, homme 
(253) 
de la boue et du sang, auj ourd'hui)" . Moreover, reflecting 
upon the reasons for fighting this war, Chanson felt that "nous 
sommes dans quelque chose de beaucoup plus grand qu'une guerre. 
Nous sommes dans une metamorphose de la vie humaine" 
(25 4) 
. Af ter 
all the hopes of the preceding twenty-five years, "deux mois ont 
suffi ä tout balayer (... ). La moitie de 1'Europe est tombee 
entre les mains des aventuriers et des gangsters. Il s'agit 
(255) 
d' epargner ce malheur a la France" . Chamson's message was 
quite simple: only by resisting Fascist aggression could 
France 
be saved. There could now be no turning back; the war must 
be prosecuted to its conclusion: 
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"Guerre ou pas guerre, nous sommes partis, 
1' enj eu es t sur la table (... ) . Le peuple le plus pacifiste et le plus pacifique de 
la terre, le notre, refuse la main qu'on 
feint de lui tendre. I1 accepte la guerre, 
parce qu'il ne veut pas d'une fausse paix, 
parce qu'il n' a plus confiance dans la paix" (256) . 
In the "chroniques" section, Drieu, criticizing Maurras' ideas 
on foreign affairs, did so as a pretext for affirming his basic 
assumption that "il faut que quelqu' un ä 1' Es t ou au centre de 
1'Europe soit assez fort pour tenir tete ä la Russie"(257) . 
The censors, however, cut the last half-page of, Drieu's text, 
so his speculative ideas hung in the void with no conclusion. 
Even more drastic was the treatment meted out to Alain's "Sur 
(258) 
la Guerre de Finlande" The Soviets' attack on Finland 
on November 30th, and the subsequent defeat of this neutral 
country, were regarded particularly severely in France as an 
example of Bolshevik perfidy 
(259) 
. Of Alain's text not even the 
first sentence remained intact, and two and a half pages were 
excised in their entirety. The censors could evidently not 
tolerate mention of this sensitive war for, once again, it 
showed up the flagrant inconsistencies of their own Government's 
policy: 
"Alors que l'ecrasement di 
alliee, par 1'Allemagne, 
suscite dans les milieux 
1' opinion publique qu'un 
1'honorable defaite d'un 
vive emotion" 
(260). 
la Pologase, notre 
notre ennemi, n'avait 
politiques et dans 
ennui dis tingue, 
pays neutre cree une 
Indeed the approach to the Finland debacle was a major contributory 
factor to the change of government on 21st-22nd March 
1940, when the 
(261) 
"bellicistetý Paul Reynaud replaced the "munichois" Daladier . 
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The February issue of the NRF had emerged relatively unscathed 
from the censorship: perhaps Paulhan's negotiations with his 
childhood friend, Guillaume de Tarde, an administrator at the 
Hotel Continental, had helped to pass the issue(262) . In March 
the proportion of texts directly treating the war diminished 
dramatically, except for Ramuz' "Pages dun Neutre , 
(263) 
and 
Schlumberger's "Chronique" "Les Maries et les Marthes"264) 
This text reflected upon the opposition of those who wished to 
remain "au dessus de la mel"ee" and those for whom such a stance 
was inadmissible in times of war(265) . Using a Biblical analogy, 
Schlumberger mused upon those "esprits (qui) se consacrent ä 
preparer les lendemains"(266) 
"Ils s'attribuent la part de Marie qui (... ) 
passait les j ournees aux pieds du Seigneur, 
a ecouter parler de la vie eternelle, tandis 
que sa soeur Marthe se plaignait de vaquer 
toute seule aux soins de menage(... ). l'eternite 
est peut-titre aux Maries, mais les temps de guerre 
sont les temps de Marthes"(267). 
The April issue contained material still less directly concerned 
with the hostilities. Paulhan was wise to be so circumspect, 
given the change of regime. Yet the gulf between the 
"pacifists" 
and the "bellicists" widened in the NRF, and Schlumberger's 
(268) 
Indeed Schlumberger was fears of a split were justified 
among the most responsible, for he baulked once again at the 
(269) 
Paulhan told inclusion of Giono in April's issue 
Martin du Gard on April 4th: 
"Parce qu'il vient d'y trouver le nom de Giono, 
Jean Schlumberger ä son tour romp t avec la NRF. 
Injuste certes. Ni plus ni moins que voüs" 
(270) . 
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Martin de Gard was not totally surprised by Schlumberger's 
action, given that he had signalled his full approval of 
Mauriac's stance on the war and change of regime as expressed 
in an article published in ILe Figaro(271) To Paulhan, 
Schlumberger's action "parait fou"(272), and he wrote to 
Grenier asking for advice. He clearly felt, once again, that 
the NRF had to make its position as well-defined as possible: 
"Crois-tu qu'il faudrait, en tete de chaque NRF, 
une ou deux pages (de preference non signees) 
qui serviraient de "prise de position", donneraient 
ä la revue une sorte de continuite, serviraient 
aussi ä la justifier des reproches bizarres et, 
heureusement, contradictoires dont on l'accable. 
Par example, qu'elle est au fond defaitiste et 
commet une sorte de trahison en donnant Giono 
(dixit Schlumberger). Ou bien, qu'-elle est 
belliciste, et peut-etre pas tout ä fait 
innocente de la guerre, avec son Benda et son 
Petitjean (dixit Martin du Gard, etc)11(273 
There then follows a text which Paulhan entitled "Pour la Liberte 
de 1'esprit en temps de guerre", and which he characterized as 
11 une sorte d'apologie pour le bourrage de crane" 
ý274ý" 
Suares 
was asked for the same advice; summarizing 
his intention, Paulhan 
wrote: "J'y dirais que la pire censure vient 
des faux-bonshommes 
qui voudraient nous empecher de dire qu'Hitler est un 
imbecile 
(275) 
sanglant, que les Allemands, etc... 
While Paulhan was wondering how to reconcile if not eliminate 
the differences within the NRF, the war spread, 
in April, to 
Denmark and Norway(276). The Nazis overran 
their latest victims 
in a matter of hours, according to a pattern 
becoming familiar: 
the "Blitzkrieg" would soon be unleashed on 
the West. The leading 
text placed in May's review partially 
fulfilled Paulhan's requirements; 
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this was Bernanos' "Nous retournons dans la guerre"(277) 
This extract from Bernanos' wartime journal 'in exile' was 
an impressive reminder of the talents of this former devotee 
of Charles Maurras(278). Essentially Bernanos' bitter 
ref lexions gravitated around what he saw as the treacherous 
split between "1'Avant" and "l'Arriere". "Je n'ai jamais senti 
le moindre orgueil de ce que nous appelions la Victoire", 
he began, and continued: 
"ce que nous gardions d'orgueil n'avait pas 
resiste longtemps a une certaine experience 
commune et vulgaire de 1'angoisse, dont ne 
sauraient se faire aucune idee les Grands 
Citoyens de 1'Arriere"(280). 
Placing himself in an historical perspective, Bernanos believed 
that "notre victoire n'etait pas une victoire, et nous n'avons 
jamais ete de vainqueurs" 
(281) 
. For him the greatest treachery 
committed by "l'Arriere" was that the "peace" they had 
negotiated betrayed all the sacrifices of the dead soldiers 
(282) 
. 
Bernanos' attitude to the leaders of "l'Arriere" bore a 
remarkable resemblance to the criticisms of Inter-War governments 
already voiced in the NRF by Paulhan. Yet for Bernanos, exiled 
in Brazil, recent events seemed all the more pointless when a 
section of the Press saw the new war as a means of rehabilitating 
the previous one(283)" In the face of such rhetoric, 
he felt 
(284) 
that "il est necessaire que ces choses soient dites" , 
for 
"1'important n'est pas d'accelerer ou de 
retarder le cours des choses, 
(... ) c'est 
d'aider ä maintenir debout un petit nombre 
d'hommes capable de fierte"(285). 
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Although he'was confined physically to "1'Arriere". Bernanos 
remained attuned in spirit to those at the front, and concluded 
that 
"L' Histoire 
. n' est _ pas 
faite par les heureux 
ou les malheureux (... ) mais par les hommes 
qui se reconnaissent incapables au cours d'une 
vie trop courte de distinguer entre le bonheur 
ou le malheur, decident de les surmonter tous 
les deux, choisissent de tenir ferme a la place 
oü Dieu les a mis, selon leurs lumieres et leur 
conscience"(286). 
Petitjean, whom Paulhan saw as oneFthose "capable de 
fierte" 
(287) 
, had a further extract published from his autumn 
(288) "Journal de Guerre" directly after Bernanos' text .A few 
days after the May number had appeared, Hitler began his Western 
offensive on May 10th; by the 13th; his Panzers had crossed the 
Meuse at Sedan and, two weeks later, the British Expeditionary 
Force was trapped at Dunkirk 
(289) 
. Against this chaotic background, 
Paulhan was already anticipating worse to come. Writing to 
Jules Supervielle on May 24th, he lamented: 
"C'est un mauvaise journee: Calais et Dunkerque 
perdus, les Belges nous lächent. Enfin plus que 
jamais, espoir ... Tout est angoissant. 
Pourtant 
je m'attends ä ce que 1'Angleterre maintenant 
etonne le monde ... 
"(290). 
The key-word here is "Espoir", and it returns again in the title 
of Paulhan's final text in the NRF for June 1940: 
"L'Espoir 
et le Silence" 
(291) 
. Echoing Chamson, 
here Paulhan equated 
hope with resistance to "une des plus grandes forces du monde 
"(292) In addition to faith placed (... ) dressee contre nous 
in "1' intention" and "le genie", the French were now 
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"con train is aussi de ressemb ler a cet autre 
espoir que mettent en nous dix peuples 
tortures, dont les uns souffrent silencieux, 
et les autres se battent en heros"(293). 
The greatest hope in the face of the threatened Nazi invasion 
was a political one, after all: 
"Certes notre republique semble avoir avoue, 
depuis vingt ans, tous les vices dont les 
adversaires lui font grief. Pourtant nous 
nous battons pour quelque chose qui ressemble 
a la Republique: pour la liberte des personnes, 
contre la servitude volontaire"(294). 
In what he called "une reconciliation franjaise", Paulhan hinted 
at the coming Resistance: 
"En verite, le probleme a des termes si clairs 
qu'il serait fou de ne point esperer une 
reconciliation f ranýaise, si chacun de nous, 
des auj ourd' hui, le pose et s' essaie ä le 
resoudre, dans son secret. Dans son silence"(295). 
With these words, Paulhan anticipated his own attitude in the 
months and years to come under Nazi Occupation. In the meantime, 
still in the June NRF, "Armand" assembled a selection of 
"Temoignages sur la Guerre , 
(296) 
intended to show "pourquoi 
nous epions avec tant de soin le premier souffle des hommes 
However, travailles par la guerre" 
(297 
these texts arrived 
too late for, by June 4th, Dunkirk had finally fallen. Only 
ten days later, German troops entered Paris, the Occupation 
had begun. 
Faced with the threat of the Nazi advance the NRF uprooted 
again, and, not unscathed this time, fled southwards, where 
(298) 
As for the they settled in Villalier, near Carcassonne 
review itself, Paulhan told Suares that 
"Von nous enleve 70 
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pages de la NRF, par les decrets de mai. Soit. Je suis tout 
heureux de pouvoir donner le P araclet"(299); but, given that 
the Germans reached the printers' in Saint-Amand before July's 
number could be finalized, Paulhan needed to worry no longer 
about the delicate problem of selecting material for this 
(300) 
issue. The reign of the NRF over the world of intellectual 
and literary life in the Inter-War period had come to an 
abrupt end. 
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IN CONCLUSION 
Although the Occupation put an end to the preparation and 
publication of the NRF, Paulhan and some of his colleagues did 
not remain inactive. Not long after the Armistice, moves were 
made to launch "une NRF de zone libre", with Pascal Pia, 
Andre Malraux, Roger Martin du Gard and Francois Mauriac as 
founder-members; the authorities in Vichy, however, witheld their 
permission(1 . As the summer of 1940 drew on, Paulhan remained 
silent publicly, but kept a very close watch upon the moves being 
made "behind the scenes" regarding the future of the NRF. If 
Paulhan chose silence (and resistance), the Germans, for their 
part, would not allow such a valuable asset as the NRF to disappear; 
by September, Paulhan knew that Drieu had been called upon by Otto Abetz 
to relaunch the Nouvelle Revue Franraise; the title remained the same, 
but this would be a very different review(2). Drieu had initially 
wanted him as co-director, but "Je n' en ai aucune envie", wrote 
Paulhan in November 1940(3). Moreover, as he told Hellens, even 
if the Germans had accepted him, he would have been betraying those 
Jewish contributors he had invited to the review and whom he had 
protected for so long, for they were to be excluded 
from the NRF 
consistent with the new anti-Jewish laws passed 
by Vichy bef ore the 
Nazis' own laws came into force 
(4). "Je vais etre chomeur", the 
former director of the NRF informed Leautaud(5). By this time 
Paulhan had become an enthusiastic supporter of Britain and of 
De Gaulle, and was instrumental in setting up 
"la Resistance 
litteraire". Another "resistant", Jacques Debü-Bridel, 
has 
honoured his role: 
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"Malgre les conseils des prudents, Paulhan 
devint le centre- et l' animateur de toute la 
"resistance lit teraire"; cofondateur des 
Lettres franýaises, du Comite National des 
Ecrivains (... ) dependant du Front National 
et des Editions de Minuit"(6). 
Paulhan himself, looking back at the role of the NRF during those 
inauspicious months before and after June 1940, acknowledged the 
review's anticipation of Resistance when, after the war, most of 
the texts chosen for the "Drö1e de Guerre" section of the 
anthology La Patrie se f ait tous les fours were taken from the 
(7) 
NRF. 
The NRF was, indeed, the prime mediator in publishing what 
was and is recognised as the most enduring literature of the 
Inter-War period in France; yet the review also reflected (and 
reflected upon) the issues which preoccupied most intellectuals 
at the time, whether on the Left or Right of the political spectrum. 
Like the gradually declining Radical Party, it had no rigid, 
doctrinaire ideological preferences or commitment, other than its 
ultimately unshakeable esteem for the French Republic. 
This fact, 
ironically enough, although it may have sometimes seemed that the 
NRF - through its senior 
"chroniqueurs" - was forever fixed in a 
sterile veneration of Radicalist ideals and thus consigned 
to 
political immobility, protected it 
from usurpation by either 
the extreme-Left or the extreme-Right. 
Even when it or its 
contributors fell prey to the more persuasive 
temptations towards 
expressing political commitment more 
forcefully, Paulhan counteracted 
so that the poise of the review could 
be re-established. In this 
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way, despite certain individuals' and the public's misconceptions 
concerning the status of its regular personnel, and concerning 
its location in the centre of the range of periodical reviews, 
the NRF played a genuine, leading role in the promotion of 
intellectual debate in Inter-War Europe. 
Jean Paulhan, admirably equipped to take over as editor from 
Jacques Riviere after his untimely death in 1925, became, at first, 
gradually more willing, as a matter of policy, to consider texts 
which were not strictly literary, so long as they were well- 
written and not identifiably partisan. In the same way he usually 
worried little about the political views of his contributors, a 
partial explanation of the apparent eclecticism of the NRF, where 
texts by writers with Marxist affiliations. would appear alongside 
those by writers of the moderate- and even extreme-Right. However, 
closer examination has revealed that those regularly involved 
with the review did have political preconceptions, preferences and 
prejudices including Paulhan himself, Gide, Benda, Alain and 
Albert Thibaudet. In fact these last three named not only formed 
the pivotal centre of the regular features - or "chroniques" - 
of the NRF, they were also renowned as the brightest intellectual 
stars in a specifically Radical-Republican firmament. To borrow 
Thibaudet's words, they represented all that was best in the 
mature Third Republic, the Republique des Prof esseurs . 
Paulhan's assiduous and unflinching support for Julien Benda 
especially, betrays a desire at the heart of the 
NRF for perpetuating 
a non-ideological, idealistic, rationalistic conception of all 
that 
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was just and pure in the Republican intellectual tradition in 
France. Nowhere in this tendency more clearly illustrated than 
in the decision to pre-publish, in 1927, Benda's celebrated and 
of ten-reprinted work La Trahison des Clercs. Even Benda, 
determined idealist though he was, set out to interpret the role 
of the intellectuals within historical terms of reference which 
explicitly extended back beyond the Radical Republic to its 
origins in the French Revolution: as the 1930's progressed 
towards further, albeit milder, political revolution in the 
shape of the Popular Front, so Benda aligned himself with those 
whom he considered as the Twentieth-Century inheritors of the 
Jacobins, the Communists. The long-running debate following the 
publication of La Trahison des Cleres had effectively opened the 
NRF to intellectual exchange and had directly cleared the way 
towards the increasing "engagement" of its "regulars", above all 
Gide, Malraux, Benda and Fernandez. 
The implications of these exchanges led to a regularly expressed 
and widespread recognition of the necessity to balance or even 
confront the idealistic conception of the Radical Republic with its 
outmoded and ineffectual political practices, as well as to 
modernise the ideas and ideology which underpinned them. The 
NRF publicly participated in this scrutiny and even lent itself 
as a platform for the expression of new doctrine although, at the 
same time, Paulhan learnt much about the dangers the review 
incurred 
in doing so. 
To a certain extent the NRF had been primed 
for political 
considerations in respect of an issue which 
had always been present 
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there . The status and connections of such as Riviere, Gide 
and Schlumberger, their interest in Germany, as well as established 
editorial policy, made it impossible to ignore the central, topical 
issue which dominated the period, that is, Franco-German relations. 
The question was such that it gave rise to renewed misconceptions 
concerning the validity or otherwise of French attitudes to Germany 
following the imposition of the Versailles Treaty, misconceptions 
which were not overcome until it was realized, too late, that 
tensions between the two countries were politically and historically 
derived, and not explicable through differences in culture or their 
respective "national characters". It was only when the question 
began to be considered in terms of a Fascist-Antifascist confrontation 
that a more realistic appraisal could be made. Once this confrontation 
was recognised as inescapable, the issue was dropped from the review. 
Continuing the international theme, Gide's long-standing 
search for a new, non-conformist, anti-bourgeois humanism led him 
for a time into expressing sympathy for Soviet Russia. This 
affiliation was, it is true, actively encouraged and abetted by 
Bolshevik sympathisers and fellow-travellers both within and 
outside the review; yet, once again, the interest shown in the 
Soviet experiment is partly comprehensible in a Radical-Republican 
perspective. Most important, despite the strenuous efforts of 
Paulhan, the NRF risked, for a time, through the expressions of 
faith it carried, following reviews such as Europe and Commune 
into the broad-Left camp : it was only Gide's disappointment with 
Soviet reality, and Paulhan's promotion of a critique of 
Marxian 
orthodoxy which; restored 
balance. 
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As the true nature of Nazism began to be perceived 
in France, so the issue of anti-Semitism took on an increasingly 
high charge. Of course anti-Semitism was neither new nor foreign 
to France: its undercurrent may be detected well before the 1930's. 
However, as Nazi racialism spread and found favour among certain 
elements of the French intellectual world, the more difficult it 
was to exclude the Jewish question from the NRF, especially as 
three of the front-line regulars - Benda, Cremieux and Suares - 
were all of Jewish extraction, although, significantly, they 
eschewed Zionism. Other contributors too, among them Gide, 
Leautaud and Jouhandeau - were either mildly or extremely anti- 
Semitic. Where compromise was impossible, resignations were 
threatened. 
Finally, the weakness of the Third Republic (although still 
revered for its ideals and origins) and external factors set off 
an irreversible advance towards a new world war: some writing 
in the NRF had foreseen this by the late 1920's and, after the 
Munich accords of 1938, Paulhan deliberately steered the NRF 
towards a partisan, patriotic stance which others perceived as 
bellicose. 
Until the final demise of the Popular Front, Paulhan had, 
as editor, attempted - perhaps not always successfully - to maintain 
balance without adopting a recognisably entrenched position. 
During the drift towards war, however, Paulhan noticeably changed, 
taking a much more firm and autocratic grip over the orientation 
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of the NRF. He no longer showed unreserved deference to such as 
his former mentor Jean Schlumberger; his attitude was, rather, 
one of downright bluntness, especially when editorial vetos 
menaced the consistency of the line P aulhan wished to take. 
Once the Munich agreements had been exposed more universally 
as the delusion they were, and once the public had adopted a 
more realistic outlook, the NRF, without changing its own 
perspective, canoe to represent the majority view regarding the 
likelihood, if not the necessity, of war. Especially after the 
outbreak of the Second World War - during the "Drö1e de Guerre" - 
Paulhan reinforced his line by nurturing the intense patriotism 
gravitating around him, finding that it was not at all inconsistent 
to criticise the weakness of the regime when the homeland was 
threatened as a consequence. 
If Paulhan's partisan attitude after Munich signifies a break 
with or a deviation from his previous thinking, this was, of 
course, imposed as a result of external, historical factors and 
was hardly the product of any voluntary shift in editorial policy. 
Overall, in fact, the treatment the issues received was ultimately 
subordinated to the politically- or historically-derived assumptions 
that the review's contributors made: Paulhan, once he . had invited 
them, could no more stem the tide of politically-charged reactions 
to and implications of a work such as La 
Trahison des Cleres and 
its sequels, than prevent the NRF from reflecting 
(and nurturing) 
such debate. 
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Despite Paulhan's invocations of literary primacy, and despite 
his claims that the NRF's independence was assured by its unique, 
in-built "orthodoxy", editorial choices and preferences had to 
be imposed. Very often, especially regarding "non-literary" 
texts, these choices were determined by conjunctural factors. 
Moreover in the long run, the success of any review like the 
NRF is the result of the status, influence and acceptability 
of its contributors: these, at least, are the conditions 
determining commercial success from a reader's or subscriber's 
point of view. In this way the literary qualities and credentials 
of writers such as Gide ar Malraux, Jouhandeau or Arland, 
Schlumberger or Drieu are 'beyond doubt: but it is certain 
too that the success of the Inter=War NRF must also be ascribed 
to its standing as an internationally-recognised forum for 
intellectual debate. 
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INTRODUCTION - NOTES 
Place of publication is Paris unless otherwise stated. 
1. "La Nouvelle Revue Francaise dans 1'Histoire des Lettres, 
par L. Morino, Paris, Gallimard, 1939", Romanic Review, 31, 
31,1940, pp. 190-4 (p. 194). 
2. La Revue critique des Idees et des Livres, 27,25/1/20, p. 117. 
3. See, for instance, Germaine Bree, editor, Litterature frangaise, 
16, "le XXe siecle, 2,1920-1970", Arthaud, 1978, p. 78, 
and Jacques Chas tenet, Histoire de la Troisieme Republique, 
Tome V, Les Annees d' Illusion. 1918-1931, Hachette, 1962, 
pp. 276-7: "C'est la NRF qui emporte les suffrages de la 
majorite des curieux de la litterature contemporaine". 
Cf. also below, Chapter One, notes 1 and 48. 
4. For the inside view, cf. the opinions of Jean Paulhan and 
Jean Schlumberger (See Chapter One, epigraphs); for the views 
of the outsiders, see the following samples: 
Arl: dre Wurmser : ti.. . nous devorions chaque mois, comme tout 
le 
monde, La Nouvelle Revue Francaise... (... ) La NRF, c' etait 
glorieux. C'etait le peloton de tete; le san ctuaire des Lettres, 
le Pantheon des Vivants... " (Fid-element vötre, Grasset, 1979, 
pp. 51,53). 
Francois Mitterrand: "A 
evolution personnelle e 
(Le Nouvel Observateur, 
Even Robert Brasillach 
see Notre avant-guerre, 
dix-sept ans (... ) j' avais eu mon 
t je lisais Gide, Claudel, la NRF" 
18-24/11/68, p. 8). 
admitted to faithfully reading the NRF: 
Plon, 1941, p. 33. 
5. Auguste Angles, "NRF", Magazine litteraire, February 1983, p. 21. 
6. ibid. 
7v For a perceptive judgement of the NRF's 
"publishing cycle" in France, see Regis 
commanding role in the 
Debrav, Le P ouvoir r '7 
nn 
i, ntellectuel= n Erance, Ramsay, ly /y, esp. pp. ii- "+. 
8. For full references the reader is referred to Claude Martin's 
complete index of the NRF from 1919 to 1940 in three volumes: 
for details, see bibliography below, Section III. These indexes, 
indispensible for the student of the NRF, list each issue of the 
review chronologically by Contents, as well as alphabetically 
by Contributor (referred to as NRF Index 1,2 or 3). 
9. My task was facilitated in this respect by the generosity of 
of Mme. Jacqueline F. Paulhan; see Acknowledgements. The reader 
is also. referred to Section I of the bibliography below, 
Unpublished Correspondence, for an important note regarding 
the presentation of references. 
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10. Inspection of the important 
Paulhan's Choix de Lettres, 
es t une -fete (par Dominique 
revu et annote par Bernard 
bears this out. (Hereafter 
with date and page number). 
and substantial volume of 
I, 1917=1936, La Litte rature 
Aury et Jean-Claude Zylberstein; 
Leuilliot), Gallimard, 1986, 
referred to as Choix de Lettres 
11. As reflected by Angles' tribute to Paulhan's achievement: 
"La composition du sommaire de chaque numero, cet arrangement 
de fleurs, :. ret "ike-bana" a la japonaise, sans regles eta. it 
a eile seule un tour de force critique, renouvele chaque 
mois", Magazine litteraire, February 1983, p. 21. 
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CHAPTER ONE - NOTES 
1. The early NRF, founded in 1908 under Eugene Montfort and then 
restarted in February 1909 by Andre Gide, Jean Schlumberger, 
Henri Gheon, Jacques Copeau, Andre Ruyters and Michel Arnauld, 
has been studied in microscopic detail by the late Auguste Angles 
in his magisterial history Andre Gide et le premier groupe de 1a 
NRF, 1890-1910, Gallimard, 1978. The only other book-length 
published history is Lina Morino's "La Nouvelle Revue Francaise" 
dans l'histoire des tettres, 1908-1937, Gallimard, 1939. Although 
far surpassed by Angles for the early period, Morino's work remains 
informative, if shallow and descriptive. A founder's view is 
provided by Jean Schlumberger, in Eveils (1950), in Oeuvres, VI, 
Gallimard, 1960. Sylvia Caides Vagianos examined a specific 
relationship in Paul Claudel et la NRF, 1909-1918, Droz, Geneva, 
1979. See also the interviews with Riviere and Copeau, among others, 
in Frederic Lefevre, Une Heure avec..., 2e serie and 5e serie 
respectively, Gallimard 1924 and 1929. 
Michel Decaudin's article "l'Annee 1908 et les origines de la NRF", 
La Revue des Sciences Humaines, 68,1952, pp. 347-58, remains 
informative, while the same author's La Crise des valeurs 
symbolistes, Vingt ans de poesie francaise (1895-1914), Privat, 
Toulouse, 1960, examines the detailed literary-historical context 
of the pre-First World War years. 
Jacques Riviere's review has also attracted considerable attention: 
Morino's study is basic, while the following items examine specific 
questions: 
The circumstances surrounding the resumption of the NRF in 1919 and 
the reaction to Riviere's controversial "manifesto" are traced in 
detail by Jean-Pierre Cap in his introduction to Jacques Riviere-Jean 
Schlumberger, Correspondence 1909-1925, Centre d'Etudes gidiennes, 
Lyon, 1980, especially pp. 13-36. This is a re-worked and more 
complete version of his earlier article "La Reprise de la NRF en 
1919 a travers la correspondance de Jacques Riviere et Jean Schlumberger" 
Bulletin des Amis de Jacques Riviere et d'Alain-Fournier, II, 1,1976, 
pp. 9-32. A brief descriptive outline and complete index of Riviere's 
NRF has been provided by Claude Martin in La NRF de 1919 a 1925, 
Centre d'Etudes gidiennes, Lyon, 1983. The remainder of the Inter-War 
period receives similar treatment in two further volumes, La NRF de 
1925 a 1934,1976, and La NRF de 1935 a 1940,1977. 
The important question of the political orientation of the review 
under Riviere is the subject of Daniel Durosay's "La Direction 
oolitique de Jacques Riviere a la NRF (1919-1925)", in La Revue 
d'histoire litteraire de la France, 77,1977, pp. 227-45, a study 
expanded into "Les Idees politiques de Jacques Riviere", Bulletin 
des Amis de Jacques Riviere et d'Alain-Fournier, No. 20-21,1980, 
esp. pp. 21-70. An earlier study is Lionel Richard's"Riviere et 
l'Orientation ideologique de la NRF au lendemain de la Premiere 
Guerre mondiale", Ethnopsychologie, 3-4,1975, pp. 431-54. 
There are three unpublished studies on the Inter-War NRF of which 
two concentrate upon Riviere's review. In chronological order, 
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these are: Bernard Garniez, "La NRF pendant la periode de 
1'entre-deux-guerres", Ph. D. dissertation, New York University, 
1960; 
Daniel Durosay, "Attitudes politiques et productions litteraires 
dans le milieu de la NRF de 1919 ä 1927", these pour le doctorat 
du 3e cycle, Universite de Paris-X, Nanterre, 1980; 
Pascal Michon, "Recherches sur l'Ideologie de la NRF (1919-1924)", 
memoire de maitrise, 1981 (M. Jean-Pierre Dauphin of Editions 
Gallimard kindly indicated the existence of this study and provided 
a copy for consultation). 
There exist two non-French language anthologies of texts in 
translation from the NRF. The first, in English, is edited with 
an Introduction by Justin O'Brien, The Most Significant Writings from 
the NRF, 1919-1940, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1958. Secondly, 
there is an Italian selection la NRF, scelta e note a cura di 
Marco Fini e Mario Fusco, Lerici editori, Milano, 1965. This 
selection mysteriously stops short in May 1939, thus missing some 
of Paulhan's most significant political texts. 
Finally, for a detailed history of the activities of the publishing- 
house, see Pierre Assouline, Gaston Gallimard, un demi-siecle 
d'edition franZaise, Balland, 1984. 
2. From notes by Jacqueline F. Paulhan, in Cahiers Jean Paulhan 1, 
"Correspondance Jean Paulhan-Guillaume de Tarde, 1904-1920", 
Gallimard, 1980. p. 14 (hereafter referred to as CJP 1). 
3. See Cahiers Jean Paulhan 2, "Jean Paulhan et Madagascar, 1908-1910", 
Gallimard, 1982 (referred to as CJP 2). Jean Paulhan, 
Les Incertitudes du Langage, 1970, pp. 22ff. and 59ff. ' 
4. CJP 1, esp. pp. 58-81, and CJP 2, p. 39. 
5. CJP 1, p. 57. 
6. les Incertitudes..., pp. 116ff, and CJP 1, p. 75. 
7. Non-paginated brochure in je Spectateur, No. 33, March 1912. 
8. Les Incertitudes..., p. 117. 
9. For La Vie, see CJP 2, pp. 218-9. 
10. CJP 1, p. 17. 
11. ibid. 
12. Paulhan, les Incertitudes-, p. 16. He also had a deep and 
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un plan de propagande (... ) sur le modele ä peu pres de celui 
qui a assez singulierement assure au Progres civique(... ) 
une clientele convaincue au point que Pappel en faveur des 
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moindre vient se placer dans mon esprit sur le Theme plan que les 
choses les plus importantes; je distingue bien son insignifiance 
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peu facheuse. On s'est demande si elles correspondaient bien 
ä votre programme primitif et Von est arrive a cette conclusion, 
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37. "Voici en gros en quoi consiste mes fonctions: 
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JP to Riviere and returned, AR., (June 1920). 
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55. March, May to August 1925. 
56. See Corresp ondance Andre Gide-Roger Martin du Gard, I, edition 
etablie par Robert Mallet, Gallimard, 1968, pp. 258 and 272. 
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57. CPD 1, p. 251,1/6/26: "I1 avait pense a reprendre une 
chronique reguliere ä la NRF qui commence ä l'ennuyer un 
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IX, p. 305). 
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d'interet... " (my italics); Les Marges, May 1933, pp. 318-20. 
64. JP to Suares, BD 4965/1,7/1/35, my italics. Paulhan is 
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65. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25097,3/8/37. 
66. See above, notes 53 and 54. 
67. Claude Martin, NRF Index 2, pp. VIII-IX. 
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were sour if not bitter; see esp. NRF May 1926, for 
Isabelle Riviere's indignant letter of protest regarding the 
sceptical way the NRF talked of her late husband's religious 
commitment. See also J-P Cap, ed. cit., pp. 219-39. 
69. Paulhan, "Pages de Carnet", NRF August 1979, p. 189. 
70. Martin, NRF Index 2, p. IX. The importance of these 
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John Weightman, "La NRF", The American Scholar, Vol. 50, 
Winter 1980-81, No. 1, pp. 91-100. 
71. See NRF April 1925, pp. 400-832. Paulhan sent out a main batch 
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see esp. JP to Johannes Tielrooy, BN Mss. NAF. 14698, f 349, 
circular dated 23/2/25. In the event over 70 articles of 
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72. Of some 110 letters available sent between 1925 and 
December 1939,42 were written between 1925 and December 
1926, with a further 20 despatched during 1927, leaving 48 
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73. See JP to Schlumberger, BD 25014 and 25015, (July) 1925. 
74. See above, note 68, and JP to Schlumberger, BD 25038, (April) 
1926: "Gaston me parle de la lettre d'Isabelle (i. e. for 
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75. See above, and Grover, MIN pp. 832-3 on Oedipe, which appeared 
in the review Commerce before the NRF; see also JP to 
Schlumberger, BD 25075 (autumn) 1930, and CPD 2, pp. 65 and 75. 
76. On Paulhan's complaints to Gide, see MLN pp. 832-3; on his 
appointment as "directeur", see JP to Grenier, AP., dated 
6/12/34: "G. G. m'a demande de m'appeler "directeur" de la 
NRF. I1 y aurait eu de l'hypocrisie ä refuser (puisqu'en 
realite je fais ce que fait un directeur, et que G. G. connalt 
surtout la revue par les plaintes de ceux de ses auteurs dont 
on n'a pas assez (... ) parle). Seulement, il ya aussi 
de 1' hypocrisie ä accepter, parce que je ne puis pas (... ) 
faire de la NRF ce que je voudrais" . Cf . JP to Jouhan de au, 
BD 3615, (December) 1934: "Cela ne change Tien en rien, 
d'ailleurs. (Je p ref ererais n'etre rien du tout, mais de 
continuer a m'en occuper de la meme facon, qui est passionnante). 
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77. The -treatment the issues received in the NRF is detailed below, 
Chapters T ao to Seven inclusive. 
78. e. g. JP to Adrienne Monnier, BD 4455,11/11/34: "Jai d'u 
demander a Chamson de supprimer six pages, a Suares sept, 
que je na i pu garder que les "Airs du Mois" et les notes de 
stricte actualite, qui n'auraient plus eu de sens le mois 
prochain... Songez qu'il est difficile de faire une revue". 
79. See JP to Suares, BD 4966/15,5/12/36: "Dans quelle mesure suis-je 
le maitre de la NRF? Ou plutot; dans quelle mesure est-ce que 
je merite d' y etre . 
le maitre? Peut-etre Les Fleurs de Tarbes 
(i. e. Paulhan's most celebrated critical work then in pre- 
publication) me vaudront-elles (... ) une autorite qu'en ce 
moment je n'ai pas- ce serait peu; qu'evidemment je ne 
merite pas. Enfin, je le voudrais, non pour moi". 
80. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25102, September 1938. 
81. J-P Sartre, Lettres au Castor, I. Gallimard, 1983, p. 503, 
23/12/39. 
82. Morino, p. 173. 
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83. On Suares, see above, notes 61-63, and below Chapter Six. 
84. Claudel, a particularly fastidious author regarding the 
presentation of his work, lived an uneasy relationship with 
the NRF and Gallimard to whom his contract tied him for life. 
Claudel's sensitivities were most especially offended by the 
inclusion in the NRF during 1929 of what he considered to be 
scurrilous texts bug Gide, Leautaud and Montherlant: Claudel 
loudly protested and broke with the review until Paulhan managed, 
with the help of Adrienne Monnier and Charles-Ferdinand Ramuz, 
to coax Claudel back during 1932. Claudel broke again with the 
review when Leautaud and Mauriac had texts published in 1939 
and 1940. For further details, see the following: Vagianos, 
op. cit., passim; Claudel, Journal I, Bibliotheque de la 
Pleiade, 1968, p. 842, December 1928; Cahiers Paul Claudel 3, 
Gallimard, 1961, p. 112,27/3/29; Leautaud, Journal, VII, p. 234, 
27/3/29; ibid., pp. 250-1,264-85, etc.; JP to Monnier, BD 4442, 
November 1932; Ramuz to Claudel, in Ramuz, Lettres II (1919- 
1947). Grasset, 1959, p. 256,10/12/32; Claudel to JP in 
Jean P aulhan a travers ses peintres, catalogue, 1974, p. 32, 
18 12/32, and Claudel to Ramuz, in "Correspondance", NRF 
July 1967, p. 168, note 1,31/12/32. For the 1939 break, see 
esp. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3855,20/10/39; JP to Grenier, AP., 
19/10/39, anil Leautaud, Journal, XII, p. 318,23/10/39. 
85. Paulhan had witnessed Leautaud's early break with Riviere's 
NRF at close quarters (see Lea-. utaud, Journal, IV, pp. 11-159, 
178, May 1922 to May 1923) and was familiar with the mischievous 
character of the secretary of Le Mercure de France; Paulhan, 
indeed, almost invited trouble when, during the second phase 
of contributions in 1939, he had promised complete independence. 
In the event Leautaud managed to scandalize many at the NRF, 
including Gallimard and Cremieux. This exchange, at first 
amusing but then tainted by Leautaud's anti-Semitism 
(see below, 
Chapter Six), led to Leautaud's resignation as "chronique ur 
dramatique ; Paulhan himself had also come close to resigning, 
having had his loyalties split between Leautaud and Gallimard. 
For details, see Leautaud, Journal, XII, pp. 178-240, November 
1938 to May 1939; JP to Suares, BD 4970/11,17/4/39; JP to 
Jouhandeau, BD 3840, no date (1939). 
86. See, for instance, the selections reproduced in the NRF for 
June 1978, July 1979 and February 1982, as well as the Choix 
de Lettres, 19.17-1936, La litterature est une 
fete, Gallimard, 
1986. 
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87. The range of financial reward for publication in the NRF was 
immensely varied depending on the author. It is worth 
contrasting some figures: Valery, once elected to the Academie 
Franýaise, was guaranteed 30,000 francs per annum by Gallimard 
(Leautaud, Journal, V, p. 132), whereas Leautaud himself earnt 
a mere 600 francs per month at Mercure de France (ibid., p. 215, 
8/5/26). Riviere, as director of the NRF, received 2,000 per 
month (J-P Cap, ed. cit., p. 211), which contrasts with Leautaud's 
payment of 250 francs for each "chronique dramatique" submitted 
in 1921 (Leautaud, Journal, III, pp. 348,366, and IV, p. 53). 
Fees for the "Airs du Mois" of the 1930's varied between 75 or 
80 francs per page (JP to Suares, BD 4960/2,17/12/32, and 
4969/1; 16/3/38), and a maximum of 100 francs (JP to Monnier, 
BD 4471,22/2/36). 
88. In the period under examination (January 1925 to June 1940) 
the NRF appeared 180 times (Nos. 142-321) in a total of 28,676 
pages. With Paulhan as editor the average monthly size of 
the review was 153 pages, increasing to 169 and a half pages 
as director. Until October 1926, the NRF appeared in 128 pages; 
with the expansion begun in 1927 it then progressed steadily 
from 144 to 160 (October 1930 until February 1937), from 
March 1937 to 168 pages and eventually 182 in 1938-9 until 
October 1939, when the privations of war reduced the pagination 
to 144, remaining thus until the end in June 1940. 
89. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25038, April 191.6. Paillart was used 
until December 1936 when Gallimard switched to Bussiere's 
of Saint-Amand, in the Cher departement. C*f . JP to Suares, 
BD 4964/6,25/10/34, cancelling a visit due to his unforeseen 
journey to Abbeville. 
90. JP to Grenier, AT., 25/8/37. Sometimes the mechanical nature 
of the review presented the converse of the same problem: on 
May 22nd 1940, Gide pleaded with Paulhan to remove his 
"Lettres du Cameroun", but this time it was too late to 
to substitute material; Gide to JP, AT., telegram, 22/5/40; 
"Si possible encore vous prie instamment differer publication 
lettres africaines dont effet serait presentement deplorable". 
91. JP to Grenier, AP., 28/5/35, and ibid., 4/9/35. 
92. For the early review, see Angles, Le premier groupe..., p. 131; 
for Riviere's, see Riviere to JP, AR., 12/9/21; and JP to Lalou, 
BN Mss NAF 14692, f 47, May 1926. 
93. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25028, January 1926; "Je songe qu' au 
centre de la NRF d'aujourd'hui il faudrait le desinteressement 
et 1'energie d'un comite- et tout particulierement pour ce qui 
touche ä la "direction" des notes, au choix des auteurs nouveaux. 
Voici mon plan: un comite d'action se reunirait tous les sept 
ou tous les quinze jours- il pourrait comprendre Arland, 
Fernandez, Groethuysen, Rambaud, un surrealiste (Vitrac? ), et moi. 
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(Eventuellement: Lhote, Gabriel Marcel, de Schloezer, et - 
si Le Navire(d'Argent) venait ä disparaitre - Jean Prevost). I1 existerait, d'autre part, un sur-comite, ou comite d'anciens, 
comprenant Gide, vous, Giraudoux, Romains, Thibaudet, Cremieux, 
Bertaux, dont les membres seraient bienvenus a nos reunions, 
mais ne s'attireraient aucun reproche s'ils n'y venaient pas... 
D'ailleurs ces reunions ne seraient pas seulement consacrees a 
des discussions et a des echanges d'idees autour de la NRF. 
Je voudrais aussi qu'il ij eüt des communications des lecteurs". 
(Cf. with Morino's appreciation, p. 174, note 1. ) 
9 4. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25056, July 1927. Marcel Arland remembers 
Paulhan's "cabinet de direction" in "Valery Larbaud et la NRF" 
(discussion) 
, 
Auguste Angles and Jean-Philippe Segonds, Actes du 
Colloque Valery Larbaud, 1977, p. 76: 
'J'ai tres bien suivi la NRF depuis environ 1920, j'ai collabore 
depuis 1922. Mais intimement je n' en ai fait partie que lorsque 
Jean Paulhan a fait son petit cabinet de direction avec 
Benjamin Cremieux et Jean Schlumberger. Notre and.. Jean Schlumberger, 
Fernandez et moi nous nous reunissions, nous parlions, nous discutions 
et vraiment on n'y allait pas de main morte &t lorsque'on faisait une 
lecture, c'etait abominable; quand mon tour amenait la lecture 
d'un texte personnel, les autres ne se genaient pas pour critiquer". 
Cf. JP to Arland, in Choix de Lettres, pp. 155 and 458. 
95. This very important phase after September 1938 and leading to the 
war is dealt with. _in 
detail below, Chapter Seven. Paulhan's 
evolving authority may also be detected in his dealings with 
such as Gide and Martin du Gard during 1932, when Gide was 
pressing to politicise the NRF; see below, ChaptersTwo, Three 
and Four. 
96. See JP to Suares, BD 4960/2,17/12/32: 
1932, Paulhan urged his correspondent 
all speed, explaining: "Si j' y tiens 
de l'annee est composee avec plus de s 
ou bien, observee plus attentivement, 
writing on December 17th 
to despatch his copy with 
c' est que la premiere NRF 
oin, ou plus d'amour - 
que les suivantes... ". 
97. e. g. November and December 1926; November 1929; January 1933. 
98. e. g. Duhamel's Journal de Salavin I, September 1926; Andre Chamson's 
Les Hommes de la Route, September 1927. In September 1936, Paulhan 
told Suares: "Il etait trop tard dejä pour le numfro de Septembre. 
Vous ennuie-t-il beaucoup de ne les trouver que daps la NRF 
d'Octobre? (C'est un numero de rentree, qui se lit plus, et 
mieux, que d'autres)"; JP to Suares, BD 4966/9,4/9/36. "Satan 
tient tete a Dieu" was held over until November 1936. 
99. Many examples of this care applied in composition exist in 
Paulhan's correspondence; see esp. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25082, 
25/6/33, where he points to a potential clash between Schlumberger's 
"Reflexions sur la Religion" and a long essay by the anthropologist 
Levy-BrUhl. See also JP to Schlumberger, BD 25012, July 1925, 
25017,16/8/25,25023, November 1925,25039, July 1926, etc. 
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100. "Giraudoux a fait doubler le tirage (... ) qui est passe se 
10,000 ä 20,000 en un mois"; Aury, Actes de Colloque Valery 
Larbaud cit., p. 76. Mme Aury does not specify, but the 
novel was, more than likely, Bella. 
101. See Halevy to JP, AT., 22/5/28: "j ' ai un manus cri-t d'un nomme 
Giono-Colline. Ce Giono est tout a fait inconnu, nous le 
connaissons par Guehenno et Pouaille. Lisez Colline. Je 
le publie aux "Cahiers Verts" ( ... 
) tres rapidement. Si 
vous pensiez le retenir, 1'interet serait si grande pour 
l'auteur (sic), que j'attendrais le moins de temps possible! ". 
Paulhan helped administrate and compose the Princess . 
de 
Bassiano's luxury quarterly Commerce, with which Paul Valery, 
Saint-John Perse and Fargue were also involved. 
102. See JP to Grenier, AP., 20/5/31: "Europe donne le Grand Troupeau 
de Giono. Gallimard telephone a.. l0h.: "n'oubliez pas le copy- 
right NRF". Brun (Grasset's commercial director) a llh; 
"le copyright Grasset'. " Lä-dessus, coups de telephone, injures. 
I1 se decouvre ä6 heures dusoir que Jean Giono a signe deux 
contrats, i1 ya quatre et trois ans: l'un qui promet ses cinq 
prochains romans a G. G. (en echange d'un mensualite de 2,000), 
l'autre les six prochains a Grasset (en echange d'une autre 
mensualite de 2,000). Qui l'emporter a? Le contrat Gallimard 
est le plus ancien, mais le contrat Grasset a ete enregistre 
le premier. Jean Giono habite Manosque et semble bien 
tranquille". Cf. also Andre Gide-Jean Giono, Correspondance 
(1929-1940), ed. etablie par Roland Bourneuf et Jacques Cotnam, 
Lyon, 1983, pp. x-xiii, letter 1 and notes, pp. 3 and 57ff; also 
Assouline, pp. 130-2,196. 
1 103. "Cette publication f ragmentaire m'a valu un tel courrier de 
rep rochen et d'injures (du type: "Ah, vous voulez nous obliger 
ä acheter le volume", etc. ), que je me suis bien promis de 
ne pas recommencer... "; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25099,11/4/38. 
See also ibid., BD 250-09,20/6/25: "I1 Me semble que la revue 
Re devrait, sous aucun pretexte, servir d'appät pour la maison 
d'edition: eile est un tout, comme la maison d'edition elle- 
meme, et 1'aide que l'une peut apporter 
ä 1'autre ne sera 
efficace que si elle evite de se fonder sur 
des ruses". 
104. Sometimes Paulhan had difficulty in persuading discountenanced 
authors that he was right, and that his 
decision could only 
benefit the review: see his explanation to Schlumberger 
regarding his refusal of Histoire des Quatre 
Potiers in 
1935: "Il me semble que la division en tranches 
(qui servait 
si bien Saint-Saturnire) les desservirait. 
Je ne vois guere 
le moyen (... ) d'eviter que la seconde partie 
(... ) ne 
paraisse longue, vide, un peu trainante. 
A moires d'y faire 
quelques coupures? (Mais je ne vois guere sur quoi 
il serait 
possible de le centrer (... 
)). Je crains que toute cette 
periode ne semble, en revue, un peu 
eparpille et que le 
roman n' y perde de son equilibre. A vrai 
dire je suis of f raye 
par de Fernand pour Walther (... 
). Elle nous vaudra (dans un 
moment dejä passablement dur) quelques 
desabonnements, quelques 
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desaffections. Votre roman est de nature ä 
le d'ecoupage'; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25093, 
italics. 
See also JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3572, January 
in and interruptions to Binche-Ana, BD 3574 
well as JP to Schlumberger, BD 25099,11/4/ 
Joseph's Breitbach's Le Retour. 
mal supporter 
1935, Paulhan's 
1932, on cuts made 
and BD 3553, and 
38, on 
105. See Dalmas, pp. 52-3: "Le progres des -editions 
(dont la revue 
etait 1'embl-eme et le prolongement) etait si evident que 
1'even tail des ressources de la revue s'etait etendu, trop 
etendu meme (... ), d'oü un curieux effet ä l'allure "mecanique", 
disait Jean Paulhan, mais qui favorisait la diffusion de la 
revue". 
106. "Le numero Proust (i. e. 'Hommage ä Marcel Proust', January 1923) 
nous a valu en quatre mois (... ) 450 abonnes nouveaux 
(janvier a avril 1923); Bella (octobre 1925 a janvier 1926) - 
460; Le Voyage au Congo (octobre 1926 h janvier 1927) - 470. 
Le Temps retrouve et Le Voyage au Congo reunis (fevrier 1927 
ä mai 1927) - 800"; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25059, August 1927. 
107. "Le livre qui, en revue, m'apparaissait touffu a l'exces, 
reb utan tä force de complexite (... ) me semble, a le relire 
d'un trait, p arf aitement clair, ordonne dans la confusion, 
d'une intelligence admirable et malgre cela (je veux dire: 
malgre l'intelligence), profondement enforce dans la vie, 
engage, et pantelant d'une angoisse parfois insoutenable"; 
Journal I. p. 1165,10/4/33. In the review, Malraux's novel 
took six issues from January to June 1933. Regarding Les 
Conquerants, see Christiane Moatti, "Esthetique et politique, 
Les Conquerants, 1928-1947, ou les aventures d'un texte", 
in Andre Malraux 5, "Malraux et 1'Histoire" (textes reunis 
par Walter G. Langlois), La Revue des Lettres Modernes/ 
Minard, October 1982, pp. 117-57. 
108. "Qu'est-ce qui 1'a pris de 1'ecrire? Et qu'est-ce qui vous 
a pris de le prendre? ", asked Gide; see Grover, MLN, pp. 
844-5, letters dated 21/3/40 and 2/4/40. 
109. For Paulhan's early attitudes of 'resistance', see below, 
Chapter Seven. For the defence of his choice, see Grover, 
MLN, p. 845: "Je n'aurais pas vecu dans le sentiment 
(paresseux) que tous nos amis etaient ravis d'Aragon(... ). 
Mme. les dames qui ont bien connu ce temps-lä (comme 
Mme. Paul Gallimard) me disaient, non pas a 1'ordinaire 
des dames, qu'elles "ne supportent pas de lire un roman en 
tranches" mais que ce roman etait le plus passionnant qti' ait 
jamais donne la NRF (... )", etc. 
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110. See Georges Raillard: "Le decoupage d'un roman et sa publication 
en revue posent tout le probleme de la lecture romanesque", 
in "Jean Paulhan et la NRF", Jean Paulhan le Souterrain, 
directed by Jacques Bersani, 10/18,1976, p. 112. Dominique Aury 
reports too that cutting novels for pre-publication was a source 
of amusement for Paulhan (Ibid). 
111. Cf. Chamson's unsatisfactory novel 1a Galere, pre-published 
in seven monthly parts from June to December 1938; for the 
context of this publication, see below, Chapter Three. The 
longest serialisation was that of Prousts'"s Le Temps retrouve 
in nine parts in 1927. 
112. See JP to Schlumberger, BD 25099,11/4/38. 
113. RMG to JP, AP., 6/11/27,26/2/28,28/4/28; and, later, on 
"Parmi les papiers posthumes de M. Thibault" (NRF November 1928), 
ibid., 4/10/28. 
114. Paulhan unconsciously praised himself when he-: told Ramuz in 
1934 that "je m' aperýois chaque jour davantage du nombre d' amis 
que vous a faits Adam et Eve parmi nos lecteurs. (Un abonne) 
mettait Adam et Eve au-dessus de tous les romans qu'il a 
lus dans la NRF"; JP to Ramuz, NRF July 1967, p. 187. This 
work appeared from November 1933 to February 1934. 
115. Cf. the opinions of Leautaud, Claudel and Romain Rolland; 
Leautaud, Journal IX, p. 34,3/6/31; Claudel, in Vagianos, 
op. cit., passim, and Bernard Duchatelet quoting Rolland: 
"J'admire le talent, les efforts pour toucher une tradition 
nouvelle, et le juste equilibre qu'ils tachent. de garder contre 
l'exces de liberte"; in Andre Gide 7, La Revue des Lettres Modernes/ 
Minard, 1984, p. 197. 
116. Schlumberger, Eveils, Oeuvres, VI, p. 492. CF. Angles. " 
Le premier groupe..., pp. 145-6, and Angles, Bulletin des Amis 
d Andre Gide, January 1984, pp. 24-7. 
117. See the following: P-0 Walzer, Le XXe siecle I (1896-1920), 
Litterature franraise Vol. 15, Arthaud, 1975, pp. 248-9, and 
ibid., Vol. 16, pp. 77-8 (Germaine Bree). Also see 
Georges Poulet, La Conscience critique, Corti, 1971, pp. 57-70: 
Alvin Eustis, Trois Critiques de la NRF, Debresse, 1961; 
and the special number of Esprit Createur, XIV, 2,1974, 
pp. 97-192, "The Critics of the NRF", including Eustis' 
'Jacques Riviere's Crew", pp. 138-145. Albert Thibaudet 
provides a contemporary view it Histoire de Litterature 
frano, aise de 1789 La nos j ours, Stock, 1936, p. 533, 
and in the NRF itself, for March 1933, he called the monthly 
a "poste d' ecoute" (pp. 507-513). 
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118. Thibaudet, Histoire de la Litterature..., p. 533. These 
critics "representent dans la critique de la rue de 
Beaune (the NRF's headquarters) des formes diverses de 
la culture philosophique". 
119. Here the emphasis will be deliberately placed upon the "non- 
literary" "chroniques" by Thibaudet, Fernandez and Benda. 
It should not be forgotten-that the novelist and critic 
Marcel Arland wrote a regular essay on literature, artist 
Andre Lhote on art and exhibitions, and Russian emigre 
Boris de Schloezer concentrated upon music. Arland 
(1899-1986- see obituary in Le Monde, 14/1/86) was brought 
in under Riviere in 1922, reviewed regularly in the "Notes" 
section until 1933 and then took charge of the "Chronique 
des Romans" from January 1933 to July 1937. Lhote 
(1885-1962) was also introduced by Riviere and was an 
assidious contributor, as was de Schloezer (1881-1969), 
who introduced the thought of Leo Shestov into France; see 
"Hommage" in NRF December 1979, pp. 920-1, and below, 
Chapter Five. 
120. The political orientation of the NRF is examined in depth 
below in Chapter Three. 
121.:. Alain is the pen-name of Emile-Auguste Chartier (1868-1951); 
the essays in "Hommage ä Alain", NRF September 1952, by many 
of his former pupils, remain informative. A biography has 
recently appeared; Andre Sernin, Alain: un Sage dans la Cite, 
Robert Laf f ont, 1985. Riviere had asked Paulhan (AR., 
15/5/20) to contact Alain in 1920, but he was helping his 
pupils Michel and Jeanne Alexandre to set up the review 
les Lib res P rop os; see "Hommage ä Alain", pp. 168-84. 
See also JP to Schlumberger, BD 25026,1925: "Que penseriez- 
vous d'un propos d'Alain dans chaque No.? (Cela m'effraie un 
" peu). 
122. Europe January 1928, pp. 129-52; essays by Jean Prevost, 
Ramon Fernandez, Jean Schlumberger and Pierre Bost. See also 
the reminder in NRF March 1928, p. 432. 
123. "Pourquoi Alain, 
1vous 
donne-t-il toujours le moins bon de ses 
Propos de mois?; RMG to JP, AP., 25/1/30. Cf. Paulhan's 
reply: "Chaque mois je recjois de lui 3 propos, entre 
lesquels choisir (... ). Est-ce vraiment le plus mauvais que 
parait dans la NRF? Je täche de croire que c' es t vous qui 
devenez plus severe pour Alain... "; JP to RMG, BN MSS, Fonds RMG, 
Vol. 118, f. 223; Cf. also Corr. Gide-RMG I, p. 488,391-2, 
4/2/30. 
12 4. "Cher and, tu t'es entoure de primaires (au mauvais sens du 
mot), genre Ramon Fernandez., Julien Benda, Benjamin Cremieux- 
qui donnent le ton ä la NRF, ou Alain... "; Grenier to JP, 
AP., 9/3/34. It is easy to add to Grenier's list- apart from 
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Grenier himself, Thibaudet, Arland, Rene Lalou, Denis Saurat, 
Marcel Jouhandeau and, later, Roger Caillois, Armand Petitjean 
and Etiemble were all teachers. Cf. also Grenier to JP, AP., 
4/10/35: "tu as besoin (d'Alain) pour to clientele des Ecoles 
Normales et E. P. S. ". Paulhan himself found Alain "curieux" : 
"I1 me semble que plus d'une erreur ou d'une sottise, qui 
est dans ses Propos, s'explique par un dessein secret tres 
precis, qu'il ne veut jamais dire" (JP to Suares, BD 4970/28, 
22/11/39). 
125. Pierre Bost, "Histoires et Legendes", in "Hommage ä Alain", 
pp. 37-44. 
126. See Nicole Racine-Ferlaud's study "Le Comite de Vigilance des 
Lntellectuels 0. ntif ascistes (1934-1939)", in Mouvement Social, 
101,1977, pp. 87-113. 
127. See below, Chapter Seven. 
128. Thibaudet (1874-1936) served his apprenticeship with Phalange 
and moved to the early NRF in 1912. See details in Morino, 
pp. 157-62. The NRF honoured him in 1936 just after his 
death (NRF July 1936, pp. 5-176; cf. esp. Alain, pp. 32-36, 
and Leon Bopp, pp. 15-23, who points to Thibaudet's "affection 
pour les contraires, cette disponibilite aux divergences 
(qui fut l'une des marques d'un certain style NRF... )"). 
Cf. John C. Davies' "Bibliographie des Articles d'Albert 
Thibaudet", La Revue des Sciences Humaines, April-June 
1957, pp. 197-229. 
129. The NRF's Fernandez was particularly marked by Thibaudet: 
see "La Critique d'Albert Thibaudet", in NRF July 1936, 
pp. 47-54. 
130. "Reflexions sur la Politique", promoted to leading-article 
status, is examined below in Chapter Three. 
131. "J'aimerais bien parler de Clemenceau", wrote Prevost of the 
February 1930 essay "Anatole France et Clemenceau", "dont 
justement Thibaudet n'a dit que des sottises, mais jugez 
vous-meme (je regrette le bon temps oü les "Reflexions 
sur la litterature" se specialisaient dans la cuisine et 
Ubu-Roi). Clemenceau jacobin- quelle enormite"; Prevost 
to JP, AP (1930). 
132. "Les articles de Thibaudet deviennent inouis; sa rage 
d' etablir des rapports, des compartiments dans la litterature, 
est une manie qui frise l'absurde"; CPD 2, p. 
489,27/10/35, 
on "Une Volee; in NRF November 1935. 
133. "C'est le meilleur Thibaudet que nous ayons depuis longtemps"; 
J f> to Schlumberger, BD 25074,23/9/30. 
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134. JP to Gide (1936), in NRF May 1969, p. 998; to Charles Maurras, 
p. 999. Paulhan and Leon Bopp prepared Thibaudet's Histoire 
de la Lit terature f ranaise ... for publication in 19 36 . See also JP to Suares, BD 4966/5&6,17/4/36 and 7/6/36. 
135. CPD 2, p. 564,23/10/36; JP to Suares, BD 4966/15,5/12/36. 
136. Fernandez' (1894-1944) reputation has suffered due to his 
collaborationism, although Grasset republished his Messages 
in 1980. See William Kidd, "Un dialogue interrompu: 
Jacques Riviere et Ramon Fernandez" in Bulletin des Amis 
de Jacques Riviere et d'Alain-Fournier, 14,1979. Among 
his early duties was directing Gallimard's Cahiers 
Marcel Proust. 
137. "L' approf ondissement de l' oeuvre par la reflexion, de son 
explication par l' univers de. la pensee, vows montre que 
1' analyse critique fait appel, auj oud' hui, aux connaissances 
philosophiques"; and "c' es t dans les lettres qu'il faut 
chercher nos metaphysiques, et non dans la philosophie, 
qui se trouve, en France, un peu paralysee par la surveillance 
jalouse des savants"; in M. Rouzaud, Oü va la critique?, 
1928, pp. 188-9. 
138. "Retour ä 110ccident", including comments on Malraux's 
La Tentation de 1'0ccident, pp. 487-92. 
139. Fernandez talked of his work to Paulhan: "Je puis, comme tous 
les auteurs, souhaiter voir mes ecrits paraitre, mais les 
sentiments que je nourris pour la Revue et pour son directeur 
sort beaucoup plus importants que mon impatience- professionelle. 
J'espere seulement qu'il sera possible d'assurer aux "Essais" 
une periodicite plus courte, mais seulement quand le mecanisme 
de la revue la permettra"; Fernandez to JP, AP., 5/8/28. 
140. "Je crois, d' apres les echos que j' en ai, que la forme 
plus "generale" de mes derniers essais a plu. Je continue, 
donc"; Fernandez to JP, AP., 16/6/31. 
141. Martin du Gard recommended Fernandez for the direction of the 
critical section of the review; esp. RMG to JP, AP., 29/10/31: 
"Un de ceux qui m'ont le plus intelligemment parle de mon 
ours (i. e. Franco-German relations; see below, Chapter Four) 
l'etonnant et toujours inattendu Fernandez... ". 
142. This was after the shock of 6th February 19 34 , see his 
"Pour 1'Unite d'Action" in March and "Lettre ouverte a 
Andre Gide" in April 1934- these are discussed in detail 
below in the pertinent contexts, Chapters Three and Five. 
143. See CPD 2, p. 387,3/6/34; see also below, Chapter Three. 
14 4. See issues for 1/6/38,5/8/38,12/8/38, in the latter attacking 
Benda. 
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145. For instance see Les Cahiers de 1'Emancipation nationale, 
November-December 1942, January-February 1943. 
146. On Benda (1867-1956) see Morino, pp. 162-7. After a 
schooling in mathematics and history Benda became a staunch "dreyfusard", contributing to La Revue Blanche after 1898. 
There followed a period with Peguy and a longer campaign 
against Bergsonism which, in many ways, made him a natural 
counter-balance to Thibaudet. Benda's Belphegor (1919) 
provoked a long reply from Riviere in the June 1919 issue 
of the NRF and kept him from contributing regularly; yet 
it was his La Trahison des Clercs (1927) which truly 
estsblished him. He deeply influenced younger writers 
such as Etiemb le (see Mes Contrep oisons , Gallimard, 1974 
pp. 219-52) and Andre Wurmser (see Conseils de Revisions, 
Gallimard, 1972, pp. 307-24, and Fid'element yºötre, Grasset, 
1979, pp. 52ff). His own autobiographical trilogy is 
revealing and much of it was pre-published in the NRF; see 
also the 1968 edition with an-adulatory preface by Etiemble, 
La Jeunesse d'un Clerc (suivi de Un Regulier dans: le Siecle 
et de Exercice d' un enterre vif) (orig. published 1937, 
1938 and 1947). 
147. See below, Chapter Two, for details. 
148. See below, Chapter Three, for details. 
149.12 "Scholies" appeared between 1929 and 1933, as well as 
literally scores of book-reviews (see NRF Indexes 1 and 2). 
He also had eight books pre-published there (a record) : these 
are La Trahison des Clercs (August to November 1927) ; 
La Fin de 1'Eternel (August to October 1928); Essai d'un 
discours coherent (October 1930 to January 1931) ; Discours a 
la Nation europeenne (January to March 1933) ; Delice d' Eleuthere 
(irregularly between January 1934 and March 1935) La Jeunesse 
d'un Clerc (August to November 1936); Un Regulier dans le 
Siecle (August 1937 to February 1938) ; and Songe d'Eleuthere 
(March to June 1939). 
150. Louis Guilloux, Carnets 1921-1944, Gallimard, 1978, p. 49, 
23/11/27. 
151. Wurmser, Conseils de Revision, p. 307. 
152. "Portrait de Jean Paulhan", Cahier des Saisons, No. 10, 
April-May 1957, p. 274. 
153. "J' etais soutenu par le directeur, Jean Paulhan, qui publiait 
nous les ecrits que je lui portais, evidemment parce qu'il 
savait ne nullement mener par lä sa monture aux ablmes, et 
aussi, ai-je quelque raison de croire, par un goüt qu'il avait 
pour eux, gout qui me touche d'autant plus que j'ai pu 
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constater depuis, par les siens, qu'en de nombreux points 
il partageait 1'esp rit du lieu"; Exerciee d'un enterre vif, 
ed. cit., p. 314. In October 1935 Paulhan told Grenier 
"il n'y a que moi qui defende Benda"; JP to Grenier AP., 
(October 1935). 
154. See Exercice... , loc. cit. , and below, Chapters Four, Six 
and Seven, on Benda's preponderance in the NRF. 
155. "Je trouve l' article de Benda remarquable, et ne puis trop 
feliciter la NRF de le donner (... ). Felicitations pour tout 
le numero; la NRF, grace ä vous, devient de plus en plus ce 
qu'elle doit titre et merite d'interesser un nombre toujours 
plus grand de lecteurs"; Gide to JP, AP., 2/8/27. By 1932, 
Gide thought Benda to be "l'un de nos principaux conducteurs"; 
Journal I, p. 1148,29/12/32. 
156. Jean Grenier in particular: "de la philosophie de bazar"; 
Grenier to JP, AP., 11/1/31, an Benda's Discours coherent... 
157. Grenier again: "A to place je publierais comme tu le fais 
quand meme touj ours Benda- parmi les gens qui ecrivent il a 
un public et si Von regarde l'ensemble des litterateurs ce 
nest pas si mal que cela"; AP., 11/1/31. 
158. See below, Chapter Four on Germany, and Chapter Seven on 
Benda's "bellicosity"; the implications for the issue of 
anti-Semitism are treated in Chapter Six. 
159. As early as 1935, Schlumberger had protested against "la 
place un peu encombrante que (Benda) commence a prendre 
a . 
la NRF; CPD 2, p. 479,14/10/35. 
160. Benda to JP, AP., 25/4/39. Benda continued in the same letter: 
"La vraie pensee de S. devrait etre: - il est inadmissible qu'on 
fasse ä J. B. une place teile qu'on puisse s' imaginer qu'il 
dirige la revue. Ceci est un tout autre reproche qui ne 
s'adresse plus ä moi, mais presque a S. lui-meme, qui n'a 
pas le courage de faire acte de franc anti-liberalisme en 
mettant son veto sur certains de mes papiers". 
161. ibid., Benda's italics. 
162. Suares had contributed to the NRF as "Ca9rdal" between April 
1912 and June 1914; during the First World War Suares wrote 
vitriolic anti-German polemic. 
163. See below, Chapters Six and Seven. 
164. See below, Chapter Six. 
165. For instance, see the double review by Jean Prevost and 
Henri Petit of Peguy's Note conjointe sur M. Descartes, NRF 
November 1924, pp. 608-615; also Fernandez' review-article 
"Retour ä l'Occident" cited above, treating four books in 
October 1926 (note 138). 
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166. e. g. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25008,25/5/25; ibid., BD 25020 
(late 1925); BD 25082,25/6/33, etc. On Prevost, see Prevost 
to JP, AP., (1928) and JP to Prevost, AP., (1928), (brouillon) ; 
and JP to Grenier, AP., 20/12/35 and 31/12/35. 
167. See, for instance, RMG to JP, AP., 29/4/30: "Cependant (... ) 
puis-je vous dire que, si le corps de la revue se maintient 
tres riche, la parti "notes", "critique de livres" et surtout 
de romans (... ) s' of faiblit, me semble-t-il, de numero en 
numero. Et c'est facheux. La NRF renoncerait lä, selon 
moi, a 1'une de ses plus importantes missions. et ä l'une 
de ses plus estimables traditions! Je ne crois pas etre 
seul a 1'avoir remarque". 
168. Lalou reviewed 176 books in this manner between November 1925 
and March 1927. 
169. See the correspondence between Paulhan and Lalou, BN MSS NAF 
14692, F 21 et seq. The intention was to spread the "notules" 
among all the regular contributors. A "chapeau" outlined the 
purpose of the "revue des livres" in September 1929: "Une 
revue ne peut setendre hors de son programme, ni commenter 
ce qui est Clair, ni discuter ce qu'elle approuve, ni repeter 
(meme ä -propos d'un bon livre) ce qu'elle a dit ailleurs. 
Pour ne pas omettre ainsi des oeuvres excellentes ou 
importantes,. '_nous proposons certains ju4ements sous la forme 
la plus resserree" (p. 431). 
170. See Dominique Aury, Jean Paulhan le Souterrain, 1976, p. 108; 
cf. RMG to JP, AP., 9/10/30: "J'ai horreur de vos "notules"'. 
Horreur! Cette . 
innovation vous fait commettre cent injustices 
(... )", etc. 
171.. In particular the quarterlies Commerce and Mesures, both 
administered by Paulhan; he also commented favourably on 
Bifur and Le Grand Jeu in July 1929, Bifur and Documents 
in February 1930 and Le Minotaure in March 1934 and July 1939. 
172. Cf. below, Chapter Two, on the exchanges following the 
publication of La Trahison des Clercs. 
173. Dominique Aury testifies thus: "Une part de la NRF qui etait 
particulierement sienne, c'est cette "revue des revues", 
si vivante que tres souvent les lecteurs commenSaient par 
lä. Paulhan etait ravi; chaque fois que se creait une 
nouvelle revue, il se jetait dessus, il faisait de petits 
decoupages; il ecrivait immediatement ä l' auteur de tel ou 
tel article pour lui demander sa collaboration"; Jean Paulhan 
le Souterrain, p. 107. 
Paulhan- as Guerin- in his first "Revue des revues", managed 
to deeply offend Martin du Gard, who wrote to chastize him 
severely for among other things having treated Andre Rouveyre 
as a 'sot': see NRF July 1927, p. 126, and RMG to JP, AP., 
3/7/27, as well as Choix de Lettres, pp. 124-5 and notes. 
- 40.46- 
174. See, for instance, Gide's prai 
quoted above, note 155, and RM 
"Je soupdonne ce qu'est votre 
la fievreuse besogne qui fait 
croitre entre vos mains (... ). 
de reconf ort ä voir peu ä peu 
effort silencieux ou presque, 
l'estime des meilleurs". 
se of Benda and the NRF 
G to JP, AP., 31/3/27: 
double vie de travail, 
que la NRF ne cesse de 
J' eprouve un sentiment 
al consecration de ce long 
qui vous vaut, depuis longtemps, 
175. Publicity brochure "de tete", March 1927, reproduced in 
extenso in NRF Index 2, pp. xv-xviii. 
176. For instance, see JP to Schlumberger, BD 25080 (April- 
May 1932) : "La NRF a gagne, en fevrier (1932), 50 abonnes 
15 en mars, 44 en avril. Malgre un battement de 2.000 
exemplaires, 1'hommage a Goethe est epuise, recherche. 
I1 me semble que le mouvement ascendant va reprendre, 
ou a repris". Europe too produced a Goethe tribute in 
April 1932, causing Leon Daudet to complain that there 
was Goethe "a n'en plus finir"; L'Action fran9aise, 
21/2/32,3/3/32,14/3/32. 
177. As shown by the advertisements in the review's publicity 
brochures., 
178. Angles, Bulletin des Amis d'Andre Gide, January 1984, 
p. 22: "1.400 abonnes ä la veille de la guerre de 1914( ... ), 
3.000 lecteurs; je crois que c' es t bien le bout du monde". 
Riviere told Schlumberger (in Cap. ed. cit., pp. 78 and 97, 
note p. 263) that the itirage' in August 1913 was 2,100. 
179. "A nos abonnes", October 1919, cited in NRF Index 1, p. xiv. 
180. Joseph Kvapil, Romain Rolland et les Amis d' Europe, Prague, 
1971, p. 88. Europe itself had 1,600 subscribers in June 
1923, rising to 2,000 by the end of 1929. Pierre Gamarra, 
in a letter to me dated 30th October 1981, stated that the 
maximum "normal" printing for Europe at that time was 5,000, 
a figure which confirms the tendency for 'tirage' to be 
about double the subscription-list. 
181. "I1 faudrait toucher plus directement nos abonnes, il me 
semb le - leur demander de s' interesser a la revue, 
de nous 
faire de la propagande (... )" ; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25009, 
20/6/25. 
182. ibid. Later the 
gagne 100 ab onnes 
malgre un tirage 
sont tout ä fait 
(November 1925). 
same year the trend continued: "Nous avons 
d'octobre a novembre; et les deux numeros, 
un peu plus fort (300 exemplaires de plus), 
epuises"; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25023 
183. BD 25009,20/6/25 (my italics). 
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184. BD 25059 (August 1927). 
185. This figure makes the NRF a medium-sized review for, compared 
to reviews such as Commerce and Bifur, it had a relatively 
high print-run: Commerce had 800 abonnes, while Bifur claimed 400 and had a top printing of 3,000; see Jacqueline Leiner, 
"Preface", p. XIII, of the facsimile republication of Bifur, 
J-M Place, 1976. Mesures (administered Paulhan) had a 
declared' tirage' of 1,800 in 1935 and 1,200 in 1937. Yet 
compared with the high-circulation general reviews, the NRF 
seems modest: for example, Plon's La Revue j ebdomadaire 
printed, on average, 30,000 numbers a week (Robert de Saint-Jean, 
Passe pas mort, Grasset, 1983, p. 135), and the Revue des Deux 
Mondes rose from 15,000 numbers an issue in 1921 to 40,000 in 
1931 (Robert Aron, Fragments de Memoire, Plon, 1981, p. 28). 
186. Cf. Germaine Bree, in Litterature franýaise, Vol. 16, p. 77, 
who gives a figure of 20,000 in 19 39 ; Leautaud, reporting 
Benda in 1931, gives 17,000 (Journal VIII, pp. 310-11). 
187. Guehenno's ousting from Europe in 1936 (March) caused many 
moderate readers to switch from what was rapidly becoming a 
Communist-controlled organ to the NRF; Paulhan told Guehenno 
that "la NRF a depuis quatre mois quelque deux mille abonnes 
nouveaux (dont j'ai tout lieu de penser qu'une bonne partie 
vient d' Europe)", AP ., 
4/3/36. Meanwhile, Rolland was 
sceptical; he asked Guehenno: "la pensee libre de la 
France peut-elle etre reduite ä la NRF? (dont nul ne peut 
jamais dire ce qu'elle sera demain- ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui)"; 
Rolland to Guehenno, Cahiers Romain Rolland No. 23, p. 376. 
Paulhan would have delighted in this last remark. 
188. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25106 (March 1939). For details of the 
changing nature of the NRF after Munich and during the 
"Drole de guerre", see below, Chapter Seven. 
189. "La NRF va bien", wrote Paulhan in November 1939: "250 abonnes 
de gain net pour ce mois-ci (... ) . Avouez que c' es t un petit 
tour de force d' avoir extrait d' Alain un panegyrique de 
1'Angleterre (guerriere) "; BD 25114 (November 1939). 
190, On Detective, see Assouline, pp. 207-14. Brice Parain was the 
"gerant" of this money-spinning weekly which quickly built up 
a circulation of 350,000: Gide detested it; see above, 
note 59. Du Cinema, founded by Corti in December 1928, 
transformed into La Revue du Cinema in October 1929; the 
Gallimard imprint appeared in May that year. The high quality 
of this review has warranted a facsimile. reprint in 5 volumes. 
See La Revue du Cinema, 1928 (... )-1949, Pierre Lherminier 
editeur, Paris 1979. Cf. esp. "Sous la banniere de la NRF", in 
Vol. 1, pp. xxiii-xxxii (not referenced in Assouline). Gallimard 
had also launched La Revue juive in 1925 (see below, Chapter Six), 
and La Revue l iusicale under Henri Prunieres in 1920; see 
Assouline, pp. 179-83, and 109f. 
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191. An NRF publicity brochure for November 1932 announced that "un grand hebdomadaire litteraire illustre" was about to 
appear to oppose the right-wing thinking which dominated the other weeklies: "Marianne est de gauche - comme fut 1'Encyclopedie", it boasted. See Assouline, pp. 216-20, 
and Claude Estier, La 3auche hebdomadaire, Armand Colin, 1962. 
192. For Berl's view of the 'arcane' Paulhan, see Patrick Modiano-Emmanuel Berl, Interrogatoire, Gallimard, 1976, 
pp. 53-4. and 118-9; Paulhan wrote to Guehenno, AP, probably in late 1932: "Maurois s'indigne, de temps en temps, que la 
NRF parle mal ou peu de lui. Cela fait bien des incidents, 
rue de Beaune, auxquels je me mele assez peu (... ). Malgre 
quelque defiance, je ne soupcjonnais pas, chez Berl, une teile 
obstination a lecher les gens qui le paient". Paulhan's 
accusation of sycophancy seemed vindicated later when Berl 
attacked the anti-Munich stance of the NRF, in his 
Government-backed pamphlet Paves de Paris; see below, 
Chapter Seven. 
193. Cf. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3507 (1932) : "Un abonne de la NRF, 
instituteur, m'a ecrit que le reve de sa vie (... ) avait ete 
de voir la NRF devenir hebdomadaire. Nous l'avons aussitot 
raye de la liste d'abonnes". Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, 3/11/32 
and 5/12/32. Moreover Grenier raised an interesting 
question: "L'unique raison d'etre de ce torchon n'est-elle 
pas de faire de la publicite pour les editions Gallimard? "; 
AP, 24/9/33. Regarding Gide's lukewarm view, see CPD 2, p. 268, 
9/12/32, and p. 272,14/12/32. 
194. At the height of the pre-"Front populaire" euphoria in May 1936, 
Vendredi was reaching 70,000 circulation, without endangering 
Marianne (then 100,000), but lagged well behind Fayard's 
Candide (230,000); JP to Grenier, AP, 20/5/36; on the sale, see 
ibid., AP, 19/1/37. 
195. Paulhan vented his spleen to Jouhandeau, an extreme right-wing 
traditionalist: "Je serais gene d'avoir ä demander (... ) 
quelque chose a Gaston. I1 a change avec moi, depuis quelques 
annees, et meme il ne cesse pas de changer. Comme les reproches 
qu'il me fait ouvertement sont absurdes, et qu'il n'y peut pas 
trop croire lui-meme: par exemple, que la revue ne parle pas 
assez souvent ni avec assez d'eloges de Maurois ou de Morand, 
ou bien que 'la NRF n'a pas assez de retentissement', qu "il 
n'y a pas assez de collaborateurs "jeunes"", que "Marianne est 
mille fois plus vivante", etc. Je pense que simplement il n'a 
plus de sympathie pour moi, comme d'ailleurs il s' of f orce a 
demeurer "gentil" dans nos relations, je ne parviendrais pas a 
lui demander quoi que ce soit"; JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3610 
(1932-3). 
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196. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3789 (March 1936). Cf. below, Chapters 
Three and Five. 
197. See above, note 187; and JP to Grenier, AP, 10/2/36: "Je crois 
que Gallimard va reprendre Europe (ou plutet donne a Guehenno 
la direction d'une nouvelle revue)". 
198. One of the principal editors was Guillaume de Tarde, Paulhan's 
childhood friend. Founded by a group of professional men of 
various political affiliations, Les Nouveaux Cahiers (taken 
over from Alcan with No. 20,1/3/38) were intended to "liberer 
la pensee de 1'asservissement auquel la soumettent les interets 
particuliers, 1'esprit de parti et l'esprit de classe". See 
Petitjean, NRF April 1937, pp. 644-7, on the links with 
'peguysme', and Guillaume de Tarde, "Sur Les Nouveaux Cahiers", 
Les Nouveaux Cahiers, No. 20,1/3/38, pp. 13-18. 
199. "Lettre(s) aux Nouveaux Cahiers sur le Pouvoir des Mots", 
Nos, 22,24,25 (1/4/38,1/5/38,15/5/38). 
200. Assouline, p. 253f; "Bulletin", NRF November and December 1938; 
Jean Paulhan's "Presentation de la NRF a Radio-37", in Oeuvres 
IV, pp. 361-5. On Gide's performance, see CPD 3, pp. 122-3. 
The memoirs of Radio-37's administrator Fernand Pouey, Un 
ingenu ä la radio, Domat, 1949, esp. pp. 164-7, are of greatest 
interest and show that this venture was not the success implied 
by Assouline, who omits this text. 
201. Pouey, p. 167: "Ce fut la catastrophe. (... ) Ces meurtrissures 
ne m'eussent guere affecte si le coup du crochet dont avait 
souffert le poete n' avait blesse, par ricochet, Jean Paulhan 
(... ). Nous la supprimames d'un commun accord". Cf. JP to 
Grenier, AP, (January 1939). 
202. CPD 2, p. 146,28/5/31; also ibid., p. 165,14/10/31. The 
political and social implications and their treatment in the 
NRF are discussed below in Chapters Two and Three. 
203. Gide to JP, AP, 12/3/32. 
204. Gide to JP, AP, 4/4/32; "Jeunesse Russe", NRF January 1933, 
"presentation par Ilya Ehrenbourg"; see below, Chapter Five 
for details. 
205. Mauriac, L'Echo de Paris, 10/9/32, "les Esthetes fascines". 
206. Gide to JP, AP, 21/7/32. 
207. e. g. CPD 3, p. 254,11/10/32; for detailed discussion of the 
repercussions of this issue, see below, Chapter Five. 
208. It was uppermost in his mind as late as 1956, when he wrote to 
Arland at the time of the Algerian War: "Notre position 
d'extre^me milieux (comme disait Gide) nous fait automatiquement 
paraitre trop ä droite-quand c'est la gauche, comme 
a present, 
qui triomphe; mais trop a gauche, quand c'est la droite"; NRF 
May 1969, p. 1032. 
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209. Grenier to JP, AP, 9/4/35. The articles were Leiris' text "Raymond Roussel", and the latter's "Comment j'ai ecrit mes livres", NRF April 1935, pp. 575-95. 
210. "... Bien entendu, il ya des lecteurs qui trouvent dans la 
NRF un peu trop de saugrenu. Mais enf in est-ce qu'il n'y en 
a pas eu de tout temps? Et est-ce que de tout temps ce n'est 
pas eux qui en ont tort? C'etaient ceux qui se desabonnaient 
en 1911 pour Leger, en 1912 pour Fargue, en 1921 pour Breton. 
Mais Leger, Fargue et Breton ont tenu le coup, tandis que Von 
oubliait pas mal de gens raisonnables: de 1911, Ducote, de 
1912, Llona ou Ruyters; de 1921, Gil Robin ou Nicole Stiebel. 
Apres tout il ya eu des l'origin e une orthodoxie de la NRF 
qui n'allait pas sans une pointe de saugrenu (songez que le 
saugrenu a etC longtemps ce que l'opinion publique reprochait 
a Claudel)"; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25091,1/7/35. (This was 
not the first time such criticism had been levelled at the 
review; see JP to Guillaume de Tarde, in Choix de Lettres, 
pp. 157-159. ) 
211. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25091,1/7/35. 
212. CPD 3, pp. 8-9,6/4/37: "Ils parlent de Paulhan, de son gout 
exagere parce que quasi exclusif pour le saugrenu, genre (sic) 
particulierement contraire a Jean, qui annonce l'intention de 
faire un prochain article sur ce sujet (... ). Nous tombons 
d'accord que le saugrenu de Malraux, qu'il a baptise farfelu, 
est pour nous completement sans saveur, inexistent". 
213. See, for example, the "Presentations (de la NRF " in Oeuvres 
IV, pp. 361-77, especially the Radio-37 talk of late 1938, 
pp. 361-5. Moreover Paulhan spoke of the NRF's peculiar 
"orthodoxy" in a letter reproduced in Garniez' thesis in 1960: 
"Si je tentais de resumer la conduite de la NRF entre '20 et 
'40, voici ä peu pr-es ce que je dirais: c'est qu'elle s'est 
consacree (... ) a la defense et ä 1'illustration de la 
litterature: b ref, ä une certaine orthodoxie litteraire. 
I1 est toujours facile d' etre un moderniste, il est facile 
d'etre un inventeur d'ecoles, il est facile d'etre un snob, il 
est facile d'etre un f ou . I1 n' ya rien de plus facile que 
d' etre un dada ou un surrealiste. Il es t toujours facile de 
tomber. Mais la NRF, tout en se gardant d'accueillir le 
surrealiste ou le neo-classique, a invente et maintenu une 
place pure, oü la litterature put se tenir debout, sans 
concessions et sans f acilites. Oü, tout en demeurant prete a 
accueillir les heretiques, eile refusät les heresies" (p. 39). 
214. RMG to JP, AP, 6/9/36. 
215. Oeuvres, IV, p. 364. 
216. Chapter Two below. 
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217. Among the regular contributors introduced in the consolidating 
phase after 1927 were Denis Marion (a cinema critic from La 
Revue du Cinema and later friend of Andre Malraux), Jean Wahl 
(philosophy teacher at the Sorbonne), Andre Rolland de Reneville 
(a fugitive from 1, e Grand Jeu and author of poetry criticism), 
Denis Saurat (an Anglicist who taught for some time at the 
London Institut f rancais), and Denis de Rougemont (a Swiss, 
recommended by Martin du Gard to Paulhan and member of the 
founding Esprit group). 
2 18. JP to Hellens, BD 7273 (1933). 
219. JP to Grenier, AP, 7/11/33. Cf. also JP to Larbaud, and JP to 
Ponge, in Choix de Lettres, pp. 307-8. 
220.24 texts in all appeared with eight by Rene Daumal, three by 
Eugene Dabit and two each from Drieu la Rochelle, Lhote and 
Maurice Sachs. 
221. NRF Index 2, p. xiii. 
222. Martin du Gard called the new rubric "une tres heureuse 
trouvaille", saying too that he began his reading with the 
"Air du Mois" (RMG to JP, AP, 21/12/33); however, barely a 
month later he wrote again: "Surveillez l'Air du Mois, bon 
Dieu, je le disais bien, ja va glisser sur la pente savonnee 
de la litterature d'hebdomadaires" (RMG. to JP, AP, 14/1/34). 
223. Grenier's opinion was similar: "(L'A. ir du Mois) fait tres bien, 
a condition que les sujets n'y soient pas traites comme dans 
Candide ou Marianne" ; Grenier to JP, AP, 27/12/33. 
224. i. e. NRF March 1934, when, for once, the "mechanics" of the 
review allowed Paulhan to include current, topical material; 
see below, Chapter Three. 
225. JP to Grenier, AP, 8/2/37. 
226. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25098 (September 1937); Petitjean 
(born 1913) was a philosopher and Germanist by training; his 
contribution to Drieu's NRF during the Occupation has caused 
him since to observe a rarely-broken silence. 
227. "Bulletin", NRF November 1939, p. 815, on "les Evenements": 
"les uns sont trop connus, et d'ailleurs trop graves"; quoted 
in NRF Index 3, p. x. 
228. This circular is reproduced in at least two locations; in NRF 
May 1969, "(lettre) A Rene Daumal" (11/4/38), and in 
Jeannine Kohn-Etiemble, 226 Lettres inedites de Jean Paulhan 
(contribution ä 1'etude du mouvement litteraire en France, 
1933-1967), Klincksieck, 1975, pp. 155-6. This work provides 
extracts from the Brasillach article in Je suis partout, 
14/1/38, pp. 156-7. The letter was also received by Grenier 
and Caillois (AP). 
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229. NRF May 1969, p. 1010. 
230. ibid. 
231. Gide-RMG Corr., II, p. 129,1/4/38. 
232. "La NRF n'a jamais ete plus vivante ni plus suggestive. Le 
numero d'Avril (1938) est un chef d'oeuvre a ce point de vue. 
Esprit et Europe sont des revues qui ont besoin dune unite 
formelle. Mais c'est tres bien que la NRF garde sa pluralite 
qui est une richesse et qui cache une unite d'esprit"; 
Grenier to JP, AP, 10/4/38. 
233. "Si tu adherais completement a un systeme (de maniere ä avoir 
un panorama tres partiel-philosophique, politique ou 
religieux) la chose serait evidemment simplifiee" (ibid. ). 
234. See below, Chapter Seven. 
235. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25108 (September 1938). 
236. ibid. The issues for September (pp. 453-6), October (pp. 612-5), 
November (pp. 769-73) and March 1940 (pp. 384-7) were provided 
for. The "general interest" articles included P-L Couchoud, 
"Jesus, Dieu ou Homme? ", September, pp. 390-415; 
R. Delavignette, "Le Commandant du Cercle", October pp. 552-70. 
237. For a detailed analysis, see below, Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER TWO - NOTES 
1. Between 1919 and April 1925 Benda submitted just one essay for 
publication in the NRF, on "Le Triptyque de M. Abel Hermant", 
NRF March 1922, pp. 257-75. On Riviere and the "Parti de 17Intelligence", see below, notes 14 and 15, but above all Daniel Durosay, "Jacques Riviere et la Politique", in"Les Idees 
politiques de Jacques Riviere, Bulletin des Amis de Jacques Riviere 
et d'Alain Fournier, Nos. 20-21,1980, pp. 21-70. 
2. See esp. Benda's Sur le Succes du Bergsonisme, Mercure de France, 
1914, and Robert J. Niess, Julien Benda, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
1956, Chapters 1 and 2. 
3. On the failure of Les Amorandes, see Un Regulier dans le Siecle, 
ed. cit., pp. 257-8, and Paul Rival's book review in NRF August 
1922, pp. 229-31. For Riviere's view of Belphegor (1919), see 
NRF June 1919, pp. 146-53. 
4. Benda, "Qu-est-ce que la critique? ", La Nouvelle NRF May 1954, 
p. 821; Un Regulier dans le Siecle, ed. cit., Ch. 3; Exercice 
d'un Enterre Vif, ed. cit., p. 321. 
Posterity has shown a lasting fascination for La Trahison des 
Clercs; see, for instance, the several re-editions, especially 
1977 Livre de Poche/Pluriel, which includes Etiemble's 
"Avant Propos" (1958), an Introduction by Andre Lwoff (1974), 
and an instructive "Postface" by Pierre Chamb at. The critical 
material too is abundant: see H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and 
Society, The Harvester Press, 1974 (orig. 1959), p. 418; Niess, 
pp. 144-73; David L. Schalk, The Spectrum of Political Engagement, 
Princeton U. P., 1979, Chapter 2, pp. 26-40; Regis Debray, Le 
Scribe, Grasset/Livre de Poche "Essais", 1980, pp. 87-101. 
James D. Wilkinson, too, sees the book as at the --Origins of 
Intellectual Resistance in Europe, Harvard U. P., Cambridge, 
Mass., 1981. 
5. See David Nasaw, "From Inquietude to Revolution", Journal of 
Contemporary History, II, 1976, pp. 149-72, who deals with the 
different varieties of response and solutions to "inquietude". 
Cf. Daniel-Rops, Notre Inquietude, Perrin, 1930, and Jean-Pierre 
Maxence, Histoire de dix ans, 1927-1937, Gallimard, 1939, p. 69. 
6. Les Cahiers du Mois, 21-22, Emile Paul, 1926. The last sentence 
of Arland's contribution encapsulates the tone: "Prendre conscience 
de ses besoins, de sa sujetion, de son destin. C'est par lä 
qu'on est fixe a soi-meme; par lä, qu'on sent son poids et sa 
miserable grandeur" (p. 13). 
7. See NRF February 1924, and "Essai", ibid., December 1925. These 
are collected in Arland's Essais critiques, Gallimard, 1952. 
8. NRF October 1926, "Reflexions", pp. 478-86. 
9. NRF June 1927, "Le Quartier des Philosophes", p. 798. 
10. ibid., p. 797. 
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11. "La Nouvelle Revue Franjais e" , in NRF June 1919, p. 2. The background to the serious problems caused by this "manifesto" 
are considered at length in Daniel Durosay, "Jacques Riviere et 
la Politique", cit., pp. 21-70. Cf. Lionel Richard, "Jacques 
Riviere et l' Orientation Ideologique de la NRF au lende. main de 
la premiere Guerre mondiale", Ethnopsychologie, 3-4/1975, 
pp. 431-454. 
12. NRF June 1919, pp. 2-3. 
13. ibid. , p. 4 (my italics) . 
14. Details and history are provided by Jean David, Le Proces de 
l'Intelligence, 1919-1927, Nizet, 1966. 
Reviews of the "Young Maurrassians" such as La Revue critique 
des Idees et des Livres and La Minerve {ran aise displayed an 
intense Nationalism and fully supported "la mobilisation de 
l'intelligence". The former, moreover, clung on to ideas it 
had nurtured before 1914 and explicitly attempted to perpetuate 
them after the war; see La Revue critique des Idees et des 
Livres, July 1919, pp. 335-50. Despite his chauvinism the 
editor, Jean Rivain, was generous enough to salute the quality 
of the NRF; see ibid., 25/1/20. 
15. See, for example, Benda, La Trahison des Clercs, NRF October 
1927, P. 493 (note 2). 
16. NRF June 1919, pp. 9-10. 
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94. ibid., p. 472. Cf. Serge, p. 291. 
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genereux, il ne veut pas p river ces gens de leur liberte, il 
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99. See L'Humanite, 4/10/29 and 5/10/29. Cf. Vers l'akutre flamme, 
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Souvarine had written the other two. This fact supports the 
view that the Trotskyists encouraged this affair. 
105. Paulhan-Grenier, Correspondance, p. 23,23/11/29. Grenier 
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110. ibid. Jacques Robertfrance, writing in Europe, December 1929, 
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Mirsky", and Robert Levesque, Journal, BAAG, No. 
59, p. 340. 
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J-P Bernard's interpretation of Gide's "engagement" as a 
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AP, 4/4/32). On these texts, see below. 
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294, 
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165. ibid. 
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partout", 1930 1944 (les maurrassiens 
devant la tentation 
fasciste), la Table Ronde, 1973. 
168. j1 October 1932, pp. 486-7. 
169. Cf. . above, 
his conversations with Martin du Gard, note 
141. 
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for Pierre Masson's "Robert ou 1'Interet general: quelques 
elements pour un proces en rehabilitation". 
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- 48,9 - 
198. NRF January 1933, p. 6. 
199. ibid., p. 7. 
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204. Martin du Gard renewed his attack on 14th April; see Corr., 
I, p. 561. 
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Cette appararente "gratuite" de l'oeuvre et l'aisance avec 
laquelle on y saute de 1'eff. ýsion lyrique aux raisons 
mallarmeennes, de la chronique badine au drame biblique, ne 
peuvent tromper que les sots" (NRF April 1934, pp. 647-8). 
237. ILEE April 1934, pp. 703-8.. Cf. above, Chapter Four. 
238. ibid., p. 703. 
239. ibid., p. 704. 
240. ibid. 
241. ibid. , p. 705 
(Fernandez' italics) . 
242. ibid. Yet if liberalism were dead, Fernandez could still 
(rather pompously) parade his humanism: "Quand on defend 
comme moi un certain humanisme, f onde sur la croyance que 
1' homme est pour 1' homme la plus haute valeur, 
( ... ) on ne 
saurait laisser triompher les gees qui pensent exactement 
le 
contraire sans encourir ce deshonneur philosophique qui est 
peut-titre le plus amer de tous les deshonneurs" 
(ibid. ). 
243. Cf. Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals, Chapter I. 
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244. See the 'exergue' to Maurice Sachs' almost immediately-devalued 
book Andre Gide (Deno9l et Steele, 1936); quoting Stalin, 
Sachs wrote: "Le proletariat ne peut atteindre la Revolution 
que par une seule voie qui est celle du Parti; mais chaque 
intellectuel peut rejoindre la Revolution par sa propre voie". 
245. NRF April 1934, p. 706. 
246. ibid., pp. 703 and 708; and above, Chapter Three. Later, in 
June, Fernandez wrote to Martin du Gard thanking him for 
signing the AEAR declaration adding, most interestingly: "ne 
vous inquietez pas trop (Lettre ä Gide). C'etait surtout de 
ma part une manoeuvre tactique afire d' accuser ma position. 
A les frequenter, les cadres communistes sont d'une teile 
sottise... " (my italics) ; Fernandez to RMG, BN Mss. Fonds RMG, 
Vol. 115, p. 271, dated 17/6/34. 
247. Cf. Doss BD., items 46-57, esp. Thierry Maulnier, in 1, a Revue 
universelle, 15/4/34, pp. 244-6, where he characterised 
Louverne's article as "une grossierete de pensee presque 
incroyable". His text also shows how the NRF, seemed to prove 
the validity of Maurrassian ideas: "Le marxisme (... ) ne trouve 
des adherents que parmi des esprits formes et prepares par 
l'ideologie democratique et revolutionnaire dont il n'est que 
le terme et le logique aboutissement" (ibid., p. 246). 
Maulnier clearly saw the NRF as a Radical-Republieworgan with 
"Revolutionary" potential. See also Jean de Fabregues, La 
Revue du Siecle, May 1934. 
248. JP to Grenier, AP, 28/5/34: "Songe aussi ä 1'Air du Mois. 
N'y faudrait-il pas des "nouvelles"? Par exemple: 
"L'industrialisation de la Russie se poursuit heureusement. 
On trouve, au matin, dans chaque ville, 50 cadavres de 
paresseux. La doctrine marxiste et l'argent americain 
con tinuen tä donner toute satisfaction" etc. ". 
249. Kohn-Etiemble, p. 68,18 or 25/5/34. 
250. "Conversions et Conclusions", NRF June 1934, pp. 997-1003. 
251. ibid., p. 997. 
252. ibid., p. 998. 
253. "Aucun communiste nest chretien, puisque c'est 
defendu par 
Moscou" (ibid. ). 
254. ibid., p. 999. 
255. ibid. (Thibaudet's italics). 
256. ibid., p. 1000. He added: "L'un et 
lautre participent plus ou 
moires au malaise (... ) de l'intellectuel 
bourgeois "qui va au 
peuple" et qui, malgre toute sa 
bonne volonte (... ) est pris 
(c'est le cas de Gide) entre deux feux, ceux de 
la classe qu'il 
quitte (Massis) et ceux de la classe 
dont il ne veut ni ne veut 
etre (Guehenno)" (ibid. ). 
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257. See L'Humanite, 25/6/34: "Son passage aux cotes du 
proletariat qui combat pour abattre le capitalisme, c'est le 
signe du passage au proletariat de toute la culture que la bourgeoisie laisse echapper de ses mains sanglantes... " (cited by Bernard, p. 169). 
258. On this important phase, see Lottman, pp. 128ff; Litterature 
engagee, pp. 52ff, and Kupferman, pp. 102ff. For Gide's 
attitude, see CPD 2, p. 388,4/6/34. 
259. Mourin, pp. 186ff, 195ff, and Duroselle, La Decadence, 
pp. 111-21. 
260. Jean Grenier, "Le Congres des Ecrivains de 1'URSS", NRF 
October 1934, pp. 631-2. Grenier was sceptical, even 
scathing, of the attitude of such as Radek, and challenged 
the worthiness of "socialist realism". Yet his view was not 
entirely negative; quoting Malraux - "tout homme s'efforce de 
penser sa vie, qu'il le veuille ou non" -, Grenier concluded 
that 'Vest ainsi que le communisme ne laissera pas perdre 
inutilement ses grandes forces d'enthousiasme et de creation 
et qu'il rejoindra vraiment 1'experience humaine" (ibid., 
p. 632). 
261. "Le Congres des Ecrivains Sovietiques", NRF November 1934, 
pp. 721-50. Following an introduction by J. E. Pouterman 
(pp. 721-2) came four sections of statements by a variety of 
(mainly Soviet) writers on "le Roman", "la Poesie", "les 
Lettres etrangeres" and "D"el"egations et Messages". The 
selection ended with Gide's message, re-translated into the 
French from Russian, since the original was unavailable 
(pp. 749-50). 
262. NRF November 1934, p. 727 (Cf. his attitude in "Jeunesse russe" 
above). 
263. See NRF November 1934, p. 728, and esp. p. 729: "Je puis 
assurer que les jours oü je travaillais daps une de ces 
brigades chargees d'ecrire l'histoire du canal de la 
Mer Blanche, ont ete et resteront pour moi parmi les 
meilleurs de ma vie d'ecrivain". 
264. Cf. for example NRF November 19 34 , p. 746: 
"I1 ne s'agit (... ) 
pas d'une methode irrpartiale qui representerait la vie teile 
quelle est, mais bien un choix de moments vus... 
", and "Nous 
de devons pas seulement decrire l'ouvrier heroique et le 
mechant capitaliste, nous devons decrire la naissance 
du 
socialisme avec toutes ses contradictions. C'est cela que 
nous appelons le realisme socialiste" 
(ibid., Radek's italics). 
Radek was purged in 1938. 
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265. Cf. NRF November 1934, pp. 749-50, and Litterature engagee, 
pp. 55-6. Yvonne Davet has clearly shown that Gide, by 
declaring that "la litterature n'a pas a se mettre au 
service de la Revolution", broke the seventh point of the 
official Socialist-Realism statute (Litterature engag6e, 
p. 54). 
266. This took place on 23rd October 1934; Gide's 
"Litterature et Revolution", is reproduced in 
engagee, pp. 56-61. 
267. NRF November 1934, p. 750. 
speech, 
Litterature 
268. Doss BD. contains some ten major articles between 25/10/34 and 
the end of December 1934, including three important texts by 
Emile Henriot in Le Temps (items 71-73). Most calumnious of 
all was Mauclair's piece in L'Eclaireur de Nice for 8/11/34, 
"Leurs Complices"; Mauclair called Montparnasse an "abces 
pousse dans l' apres-guerre en plein Paris, (... ) un quartier 
general de meteques d'anti-France, recemment accrus des rebuts 
d'hitlerisme" (Mauclair's implicit anti-Semitism is highly 
significant here). He almost libelled Gide when he wrote: 
"Un celeb re p rop agandis to de 1'homosexualite, riche, avide, 
gave de succes et de faveurs par la bourgeoisie dont il est 
issu, proclame, en haine de la f amille, de la propriete dont 
il jouit, de la religion dont il se reclame longtemps, son 
adhesion eclatante au sovietisme (ibid. ). 
269. NRF December 1934, pp. 866-71. This important text has been 
examined both in the light of the domestic political 
situation (Chapter Three) and Franco-German relations 
(Chapter Four). 
270. NRF December 1934, p. 868. 
271. "Toute pensee est inconsciemment enrolee, diraient les 
marxistes; si ce n'est pas ä un parti, c'est a une classe" 
(ibid. ) . 
272. ibid., p. 869. 
273. ibid. 
274. Cf. the opinion of Pierre Herbart, reported in CPD 2, p. 423, 
5/12/34. 
275. The meeting took place on January 26th at the rue Visconti; 
Gide, flanked by Fernandez and Georges Guy-Grand of the "Union", 
f aced the extreme - and moderate - Right in the shape of 
Rene Gillouin, Massis, Maulnier, H alevy, Mauriac and Maritain; 
Guehenno was the only Left intellectual present. The 
debate 
received much coverage in the Press, and merited publication 
in Andre Gide et jotre temps, Gallimard, 1935. (See the 
extracts in Litterature engagee, pp. 63-76. 
) 
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276. Cf. Andre Gide et notre temps, 
Schlumberger's dictum that ce 
menent 1'homme et non point les 
p. 61, where he quoted 
sont les sentiments qui 
idees". 
277. Cf. ibid., pp. 63-4: "Ainsi que Malraux le disait fort bien 
1'autre jour: un artiste, dans notre societe, nage contre le 
courant au lieu de se sentir porte par lui. J' ai toujours ecrit jusqu' ä present sans chercher du tout l' approbation du public; mais si, maintenant, j'ai besoin, pour ecrire, 
d'avoir l' approbation d' un parti... je prefere ne plus ecrire, 
encore qu'approuvant le parti". 
278. "Gide rue Visconti", NRF March 1935, pp. 482-4. Also in 
Andre Gide et 01 otre temps, pp. 83-5. 
279. e. g.: NRF March 1935, p. 484: "En rentrant dans le courant 
commun de sa generation, Gide se sera trouve prendre position 
ä contre courant. Ce ne sera pas un des moindres paradoxes de 
sa biographie" (my italics). In the NRF for June 1935, 
pp. 946-8, Paulhan reproduced extracts from a letter which 
Gide sent the Bulletin de l'Union pour la Verite whereby he 
insisted that he had been attracted by the "question sociale" 
much earlier than the Congo visit, in fact, in 1893 to 1896 
with Amyntas... The full text is in Litterature engagee, 
pp. 79-82. 
280. In April 1935 the NRF resumed publication of the "Pages de 
Journal". Eight selections appeared, spanning the years 1933 
to early 1936 (i. e. the section published in NRF March 1936, 
pp. 331-8). These extracts correspond to pages 1173 to 1243 
of the Pleiade edition. 
On Gide's noticeably cooler approach, see, for instance, NRF 
April 1935, p. 498: "D'humeur et de temperament, je ne suis 
rien moins que revolutionnaire... ", etc.; and p. 500: "... si 
Von prend parti, aussitöt le parti vous prend". 
281. Cf. CPD 2, pp. 466-7, Litterature engagee, pp. 82ff, and 
Gide-RMG Corr., II, p. 28,5/5/35. 
282. Gide-RMG Corr., pp. 37-8,6/7/35. 
283. See Mourin, p. 205; Duroselle, La Decadence, pp. 139-42, who 
calls it "du galimatias", and Jacques Kayser, De Kronstadt a 
Krouchtchev: Voyages franco-russes, 1891-1960, Armand Colin, 
1962, pp. 187-201. 
284. On Paulhan, see above, note 160; on Martin du Gard, see CPD 2, 
p. 241,17/6/32, pp. 278-9,16/12/32, and cf. Gabriel Marcel's 
comment: "Le deplacement de celui qui, etant incroyant, est 
devenu chretien, est un deplacement aussi important qu'un 
voyage en Russie! ", in Andre Gide et notre temps, p. 
37. 
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285. Cf. CPD 2, pp. 478ff (from 14/10/35) with ibid., p. 475 
(2/10/35), where Gide was aware that "je me laisserais 
entrainer ä depasser ma pensee... " etc. See also Maurer, 
p. 90f. Gide also discussed it with Martin du Gard; see 
Corr., II, pp. 48-50,12/9/35. 
286. See Journal I, p. 1241 (also in NRF March 1936, pp. 335-6): 
"Non, il serait faux de dire que mes opinions, mes pensees, 
n' ont pas change, et je serais de mauvaise foi de le 
pretendre. Mais le grand, le tres important changement est 
celui-ci: j'avais cru, jusqu' ä ces derniers temps, qu'il 
importait d'abord de changer 1'homme (... ) et que c'etait par 
lä qu'il fallait commencer. C'est pourquoi j'ecrivais que la 
question morale m'importait plus que la question sociale. 
Je me laisse persuader aujourd'hui que l'homme meme ne 
peut changer que d'abord les conditions sociales ne 1'y 
invitent et ne l'y aident". This shift of emphasis came 
nearly a month after his confiding to "la Petite Dame" that 
"ce qui se passe lä-bas commence a m' effrayer un peu, j'ai 
terriblement peur d'un embourgeoisement" (CPD 2, p. 476, 
2/10/35). 
287. CPD 2, p. 491,28/10/35. 
288. Maurer, pp. 92-6. 
289. See above, Chapter Three, where it is demonstrated that 
P aulhan clearly intended to distance the NRF from the 
imminent "Front populaire". 
290. NRF January 1936, pp. 15-16 (Journal I, p. 1232,3/8/35). 
Also typical in the same passage was the following: "Cette 
figure ideale de l'homme, je la vois, avec une epaisse masse 
commune, toute nimbee d'individuelles possibilites". 
291. NRF January 1936, pp. 75-95. Introduced by A. Habaru, a 
Communist journalist who worked on Monde and L'Humanite 
(cf. Guessler Normand, art. cit., p. 176) , .: these texts were 
all drawn from Pravda. To many in the West, the 
incentives 
system, named after its first "hero", was a very cynical way 
of increasing production among the mass of workers 
by 
implanting "individualistic" aspirations. The texts were 
reports of the records attained and broken 
by competing workers, 
backed by statistics. Saboteurs of Stakhanovists were tried 
and shot as enemies of the people 
(p. 94). 
292. ibid., p. 75 (my italics). 
293. ibid. 
294. See Combat No. 2, February 1936, "Lettre ouverte au 
directeur 
de la NRF", by Pierre Tisserand, "un vieil universitaire 
de 
province". 
295. Combat No. 3, March 1936, "Une lettre de M. Jean 
Paulhan... ". 
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296. ibid. For Paulhan the NRF was "mormale" to the extent that it reflected "tous les exces et les folies de l'homme normal - mais avec 1' equilibre aussi que composent daps l'homme normal, 
ces divers acces". In Paulhan's view, it was Tisserand who had interpreted this phenomenon as "le debut d' une 
taylorisation de la Russie", whereas Nizan would consider it "un triomphe du travail intellectual sur le travail physique" (ibid. ). 
297. CPD 2, p. 539f, 5/5/36. 
298. Maurer recounts the itinerary in detail, based on the Soviet 
Press, as well as on Gide's unpublished Journal; esp. 
pp. 97-117. See also Goulet, art. cit., pp. 162-7, and the 
detailed account of Gide's and Jef Last's preparation in 
Andre Gide, Correspondance avec Jef Last, edition par 
C. J. Greshoff, presses universitaires de Lyon, 1985, esp. 
pp. 19-31. 
299. See Maurer, Deuxieme Partie, "Gide apostat (1936/37)". 
Although it might be desirable to detail at length the 
specific events of Gide's journey and its aftermath, such an 
enumeration would spread too far beyond the intention of this 
Chapter, which is, rather, to concentrate upon the journey's 
effect upon the NRF. Indeed it is significant that the issue 
was diverted by both Paulhan and Gide to more "appropriate" 
organs that the NRF, which was deemed to have risked enough. 
300. Kupferman, p. 169. 
301. NRF March 1936, pp. 331-8; cf. above, note 286. 
302. See above, Chapter Three, on Paulhan's' anti-orthodoxy, and 
Henri Michel, "Le Front populaire et 1'URSS", in Les Relations 
franco-britanniques de 1935 a 1939, Editions du CNRS, 1975, 
pp. 215-21, on Blum's distractions from sealing a military 
alliance with the USSR. 
303. Duroselle, La Decadence, Chapter X, esp. pp. 301-5. 
304. Maurer, pp. 116-7, and Gide's tribute in NRF October 1936, 
pp. 581-90. 
305. CPD 2, p. 552,7/9/36, and JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3712,1936. 
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306. Paulhan "interpreted" Dabit's death for Andre Suares: 
"(Dabit) est mori dans un petit höpital de Sebastapol sans 
medecin pres de lui qui parlät franpis, sans pouvoir lui- 
meme dire ou ecrire le moindre mot. Gide avait regagne 
Moscou. Dabit avait pour 1'hopital 1'horreur qu' ont tpus les 
ouvriers (sic) ; et peut-etre le besoin de parler, qu'ont tous 
les intellectuels, aux derniers moments. (... ) Je ne me defais 
guere de la pensee que Dabit a vu en URSS la ruine des valeurs 
dans lesquelles il voulait mettre son espoir (... ) et que de 
cela aussi il est wort" (BD 4966/9,4/9/36). It is worth 
comparing this with Paulhan's letter to Jouhandeau, whose 
virulent anti-Communism evidently merited a less restrained 
version: 
"Apres trois semaines en URSS, Schiffrin, Guilloux, decident 
de revenir en France: ils sont ereintes (on ne dort pas ä 
Moscou, ä cause du bruit et des punaises. Si Gide dort, 
c' es t qu'un avian l' emmene chaque soir dans un sana a 40 km. 
de Moscou), inquiets... agaces (ils ne peuvent faire un pas 
sans se sentir surveilles). On interdit Gide de le voir 
(Dabit mourant). Gide revient ä Moscou, et Dabit meurt 
quatre j ours apres, seul, decu" (JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3717, 
(1936)). 
307. Cf. Grenier to JP: "Vu Guilloux ä S. Brieuc. (... ) 11 ma 
dit des choses forts interessantes" (AP, 17/8/36), and later: 
"Impression generale de Guilloux en Russie: peuple oriental 
mou et apathetique qu'il est tres meritoire pour le parti 
bolchevik d'avoir su secouer et faire travailler. (... ) Et 
puls A. Gide et ses compagnons, c'est une autre histoire" 
(AP, 13/9/36). When-the NRF published Dabit's Carnet vert 
in its October issue (pp. 591-609), Guilloux noted that he 
felt sure this would have conflicted with Dabit's wishes; 
Carnets, I, Gallimard, 1978, 'p. 134,1/ 10/36 . 
308. PD 2, pp. 560-3,23/10/36. 
309. See Maurer, pp. 124-8. Kupferman notes that Gide's book went 
through nine printings to September 1937, totalling 146,300 
copies; p. 182. 
310. Grover, MLN, p. 840,12/11/36. 
311. JP to Grenier, AP, 16/11/36. 
312. The last sentences of Retour de 1' URSS are: 
"L' aide qui 1' URSS 
vient d'apporter a 1'Espagne nous montre de quels 
heureux 
retablissements eile demeure capable. L'URSS n'a pas 
fini de 
nous instruire et de nous etonner". Gallimard/Idees edition, 
p. 73. 
313. Journal I, p. 1252,3/9/36. 
314. Leautaud, XI, p. 278,25/11/36. 
315. Maurer, pp. 129-48. 
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316. NRF December 1936, pp. 1071-7. (It is 
to say that except for "des remarques 
(sic)" this article would have almost 
Commune; see Maurer, p. 143). 
317. NRF December 1936, p. 1072. 
318. ibid., p. 1073. 
319. ibid., pp. 1073 
communisme n'a, 
1' impossibilite 
poser la questi 
titre ne lui est 
320. ibid., p. 1076. 
a gross exaggeration 
d"'eurocommunisme" 
been suitable for 
and 1075: "La pretendue conversion de Gide au 
en fait, ete qu'une constatation de 
oü se trouve 1' homme des basses classes de se 
on morale si un minimum de dignite et de bien- 
pas d'abord assure par la revolution sociale" 
321. ibid., p. 1077. 
322. Among the most polemical were Lion Feuchtwanger's "Opinion 
d'un esthete sur l'Union sovietique", in Le Journal de Moscou, 
5/1/37; Rolland's "Lettre aux Ouvriers de Magnitogorsk", in 
ibid., 12/1/37; Andre Wurmser's "1'URSS jugee par Andre Gide", 
in Commune, January 1937, pp. 567-83. Europe reproduced 
Georges. Friedmann's essay "Andre Gide et 1'URSS" 'en tete' in 
January 1937, pp. 5-29. Paulhan, in fact, believed that this 
was the best corrective to Retour de l'URSS; see NRF May 1937, 
"Bulletin". 
Vendredi balanced Nizan's violent "Un esprit non prevenu" 
with Pierre Harbart's article "Faisons le point" on 29/1/37. 
323. JP to Grenier, AP, 27/3/37: "Gide acheve un nouveau livre sur 
1'URSS plus feroce que le premier". Paulhan added, on the 
purges: "etrange que ces revolutionnaires orient attendu pour se 
massacrer d'avoir de fausses dents, du ventre, de la calvitie... ". 
324. CPD 3, p. 14,3/5/37. 
325. CPD 3, p. 26, 
"Retouches va 
326. Maurer, pp. 1, 
de 1'URSS, ou 
pp. 1422-36. 
23/6/37; Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, 7/6/37: 
paraitre... " . (Gallimard, 1937). 
49-68; see esp. Wurmser, "Retouches ä son Retour 
propos dun pharisien", Commune, August 1937, 
327. NRF August 1937, pp. 339-41. 
328. ibid., p. 340. 
329. ibid., p. 341: "La crise des ideologies d'apres-guerre, 
communisme comp ris , es t plus proche qu'on ne 
le croi t. 
Fascistes, nazis et sovietistes ne vivront pas eternellement 
d' enthousiasme collectif et d' espoir" . 
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330. See CPD 3, pp. 30ff, passim, and the polemic between Gide and 
Vendredi over his change to La Fleche, in Guehenno's Journal 
d'une Revolution, Grasset, 1939, pp. 213ff, "la Querelle avec 
Andre Gide"; see la F1'eche, 20/11/. 37,25/12/37, and Vendredi 
16/12/37,24/12/37, and throughout January 1938. 
The literary supplements of Le Figaro also carried the 
reactions of several personalities to Gide's change of heart 
(see 14/8/37 and successive weeks); S. chlumberger summed up the 
feelings of many at the NRF when he wrote: "Depuis que Moscou 
affecte d' avoir depasse la phase oü de telles contraintes 
etaient indispensables, on se meut manifestement dans le 
mensonge" (14/8/37). 
Benda, however, was entering the period whereby he felt the 
French Stalinists (whom he could easily characterise as 
Jacobins) should be supported, given that they were the only 
Party calling for "un accroissement de justice sociale et ä 
un respect des droits des peuples qui me sont chers" (21/8/37). 
Paulhan preferred to exile himself in the "domaine litteraire" 
(18/9/37), while Marcel Arland averred: "J'aime et je trouve 
beau, et trop rare, qu'un ecrivain refuse de s'embrigader, et 
dise ce qu'il croft la verite, quelles qu'en soient les 
consequences... " (11/9/37). 
331. See above, Chapter Three. 
332. "Une saison en enfer", NRF August 1938, pp. 210-24. Claudel's 
essay was based upon Yvon's L'URSS teile qu'elle est, preface 
d'Andre Gide, Gallimard, 1938, and Anton Ciliga's Au pays du 
grand a ensonge, Gallimard, 1938. 
333. "Anticommunisme et patriotisme", NRF August 1938, pp. 307-9. 
Here Benda re-asserted his conviction that the PCF was a 
truly patriotic Party. This text drew fire from both Berl 
(Paves de Paris, 2/9/38, pp. 3-6) and the now pro-Doriot 
Fernandez (in L'Emancipation nationale, 12/8/38: "La- 
Communisme et M. Benda"). 
334. Caute, The Fellow-Travellers, p. 72. 
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CHAPTER SIX - NOTES 
1. See the invaluable essay "Aspects de l'Antisemitisme moderne", 
which opens his L'Antisemitisme nazi: histoire dune psychose 
collective, Seuil, 1971, pp. 11-52. This work is most 
profitably read in tandem with Leon Poliakov's Histoire de 
l' antisemitisme, edition nouvelle, 2 vol., esp. Tome II, 
L'Age de la Science, Calmann-Levy, 1981. 
2. Frie dl. nder, p. 18. 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid., p. 51. Friedlander concludes by contrasting France with 
Germany: ".. Sur le fond de 1'evolution de la France contemporaine, 
il ne s'agira (... ) que d'une poussee de fievre conjoncturelle 
comme n'en suscitera meme plus avec autant de violence la crise 
des annees trente du XXe siecle. En Allemagne par contre, pour 
des raisons (... ) particulieres, on va assister a evolution 
beaucoup plus profonde et systematique des sentiments 
antijuifs" (pp. 51-2). 
5. Vichy France and the Jews, Basic Books, New York, 1981, p. 26. 
On the right-wing Press, in particular the Fayard weeklies, see 
Dioudonnat, Je suis partout... (cit. ), passim, and Marrus and 
Paxton, Chapter Two, "The Roots of Vichy Anti-Semitism", 
pp. 25-71. 
7. The following works deal in varying degrees with all these issues: 
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199. These references were- drawn from the August number, esp. pp. 
282-90, and September, pp. 447-9. 
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201. Alain Finkielkraut, discussing the attraction of Republican 
ideology for Jews keen on assimilation in the 19th Century, 
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202. NRF August 1936, p. 285; also in Jouhandeau, L'Action franRaise, 
8/10/36. 
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f ranjais 
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204. NRF August 19 36 , pp. 2 
86-7 . 
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206. L'Action f ran ýaise, 8/10/36. 
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peuple, tout le temps qu'il en restera un seul en France 
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franr, a ise, 8/10/36. It is precisely this type of thinking 
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Belfond, 1966, 
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Paulhan passed this on to Jouhandeau (BD 3727). 
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they predominated; Jouhandeau wrote: "J'aurais pu lui demander 
de faire seulement le tour de la maison, de notre editeur 
commun oü nous venions de nous rencontrer, oü presque tous 
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229. ibid. 
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severes ont aime la fin du Regulier (sauf Brasillach qui 
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its context and structure as formulated in Bagatelles-, 
see Kingston, Part II; Philippe Almeras, "Les Pamphlets", 
Magazine litteraire-, September 1976, pp. 22-3; Marc Hanrez, 
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pp. 66-76, and Nicholas Hewitt, "L'Antisemitisme de Celine: 
historique et culte de la blague", Etudes inter-ethniques, 6, 
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Le Droit de Vivre, 5/2/38. 
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254. CPD 3, p. 76,11/3/38. 
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maitresse de la propagande fasciste, parce qu'il permet 
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281. See ibid., December 1938 (Gide), January 1939 (including 
Montherlant and Marcel), March 1939 (Benda, Bergery) , 
and June 1939 (Henri de Kerillis and MAritain). Cf. also 
Claude Mauriac, p. 35. 
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287. ibid. 
288. See NRF December 1940, "L'Et6 ä la Maurie", pp. 7-16, and 
see Lottman, pp. 280ff. 
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Cremieux, Caillois, 50 autres, le (i. e. Leautaud) disent ' deshonorant' (mot de G. G. ) pour la revue, etc. Cela 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - NOTES 
Jean-Pierre Azema,. De Munich ä la Liberation, 1938-1944, 
Seuil, 1979, p. 9 (my italics). This work surveys the period 
using all the available historiography, especially the two 
volumes of the 1975 colloquium "la France sous le gouvernement 
Daladier", published as Edouard Daladier, chef de gouvernement, 
FNSP, 1977, and La France et les Franýais en 1938-1939, FNSP, 
1978. Also in dispensib le, particularly for the events 
leading to and following Munich (30th September 1938), is 
Duroselle, La Decadence..., Chapters XI and XII, pp. 325-404. 
2. Bernanos, Les Enf ants humilies, Journal 1939-1940, cited in 
Guy Rossi-Landi's La Dro le de Guerre: la Vie politique en 
France, 2 Septembre 1939- 10 Mai 1940, Armand Colin, 1971, 
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Guerre et l'Esprit public", Chapter 4, Part 2, pp. 167-190. 
3. Cf. Mayeur, La Vie politique, pp. 360ff: "Le long gouvernement 
Daladier, de 10 avril 1939 a mars 1940 (... ), contraste avec 
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aspiration ä etre gouverne et l'apparition des nouveaux 
clivages sur la guerre et la paix... " (p. 360). 
See also the two volumes on Daladier referred to above 
in note 1, and above, Chapter Three, on the political 
confusion of the previous ten years. 
4. Cf. above, Chapter Four; also, Duroselle, Chapter XI, and 
Poidevin et B ariety, Les Relations franco-allemandes..., 
cit., pp. 304-10. 
5. Cf. above, Chapter Five, as well as Weber, L' Action franýaise, 
Dioudonnat, Je suis partout..., and Martin Gilbert and 
Richard Gott, The Appeasers, 1963, for British attitudes 
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6. Cf. above, Chapter Six; also Marrus and Paxton, Chapter 
2. 
7. "Dictature de la France", NRF April 1938, pp. 663-5, cf. above, 
Chapter Three, for discussion. 
8. CPD 3, p. 76. 
9. JP to Suares, BD 4969/1,16/3/38. 
10. NRF April 1938, p. 663. 
11. ibid., p. 665. Cf. Paulhan's view as expressed 
in the third 
epigraph above. 
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in Paves de Paris, 2/9/38, pp. 3-6, "M. Benda et la Guerre 
des Clercs". Here, Berl characterised Benda as a "f arf elu 
... heritier de Spinoza" and concluded: "... il nest pas 
soutenab le qu'on devienne ün traitre des Tors qu'on prefere 
ce que M. Benda ne prefere-pas. Tout cela est frivole. Mais 
d'une frivolite grosse de sang'. " (ibid., p'. 6). See also 
Fernandez' attack in L'Emancipation nationale, 12/8/38, 
"Le communisme et M. Benda". 
14. See above, Chapter Three, and Grenier's article, "Reflexions 
sur Charles Maurras", NRF February 1938, pp. 292-8. 
15. NRF August 1938, pp. 177-86. 
16. ibid., p. 178. 
17. NRF September 1938, pp. 478-88. 
18. NRF April 1938, pp. 663-5. 
19. NRF September 1938, p. 478. 
20. ibid., pp. 479-80. 
21. ibid., p. 481. 
22. ibid. 
23. ibid., pp. 484-5. 
24. ibid. (Cf. above Chapter Four, on the misconceptions held 
by some at the NRF regarding Franco-German relations). 
25. ibid., p. 486. 
26. "Un mouvement de jeunes s'est fonde, qui n'a pas adopte 
d'autres p rincip es que celui du mouvement et 
de la jeunesse: 
c'est le mouvement jociste- et ils sont 
400.000. Le premier 
livre de philosophie de l'histoire qui ait 
ete ecrit depuis 
la guerre vient de p araitre: il est 
d'importance. Un 
renouveau du theatre franpis se prepare... 
"; p. 488. 
27. ibid. 
28. For details, see Duroselle, pp. 343-55. As 
P aulhan finalised 
the October issue of the NRF (i. e. on 15th 
September), 
Chamberlain met Hitler at Berchtesgaden. 
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29. Duroselle, pp. 343-55, and Azema, p. 15, The USSR and Czechoslovakia were excluded. 
30. "Chronique de vacances", NRF October 1938, pp. 636-9. Arland characterised Austria as a "pays abandonne et 
conquis, pays de femmes qui appellent et redoutent la 
defaite: decidement je respirais mieux meme en Allemagne" (p. 637). 
31. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25101 (Autumn 1938). Paulhan was 
referring to Claudel's "Air de Mois" in the September number "Le regime du bouchon", in which Claudel wrote of Italy as 
a totalitarian state: "Oü la police oblige chaque matin 
150 millions d'hommes ä se pros. terner la face contre terre 
devant le gorille le plus immonde qui ait jamais assume 
une espece de ressemblance bestiale avec le visage 
humain" (P. 512). 
32. Gide-RMG Corr., II, p. 151. The NRF in fact, was still 
printing Alain; see his three-part pacifist allegory "Le Roi 
Pot", NRF September, October and November, and also Giono's 
text "Les Grandeurs Libres", in NRF October 1938, pp. 529-60. 
33. Gide-RMG Corr., II, pp. 152-3,2/10/38. 
34. See "Ce fou de Jef: Andre Gide et Munich", in La Revue des 
Sciences HumaineS, January-March 1970, pp. 119-25, and the 
full presentation of Andre Gide's Correspondance avec Jef Last, 
cit., esp. pp. 59-64 and notes, by C. J. Greshoff. 
35. Gide. RMG Corr., II, pp. 154-5. 
36. Gide, Journal I, p. 1323,7/10/38. 
37. Duroselle, p. 355. 
38. ibid., pp. 357-64. 
39. Rene Girault, "Les Decideurs franSais et la Puissance franjaise, 
1938-9", in La Puissance en Europe, ed. Rene Girault et 
Robert Frank, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984, pp. 26ff, 
Girault too cites Duroselle's four "poles" of opinion, divided 
thus: "les pacifistes traditionnelles de la gauche; le nouveau 
pacifisme de droite; les antifascistes resistants 
de gauche, 
la droite nationaliste" (see Duroselle, pp. 357-64). 
40. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25101 (Autumn 1939). 
41. ibid. The Three texts in question were all included in the 
NRF, 
November 1938: Armand Petitjean, "Priere pour les Copains" 
pp. 757-60; 
ýýJulien 
Benda, "Les Democraties bourgeoises devant 
1 Allemagne pp. 761-71; Jean Schlumberger, 
"Contre 1'fumiliation", 
pp. 772-83. All of the "Airs du Mois" were 
devoted to the crisis. 
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42. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25103 (Autumn 1938). 
43. NRF November 1938, pp. 757-60. Subtitled "Apres la Mobilisation de Septembre 1938", the text was entirely italicized. 
44. ibid., pp. 758-9. 
45. ibid., p. 760. 
46. ibid. , pp. 761-71. 
47. ibid., p. 761. 
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est conforme on non ä l'interet national... " (ibid., 
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64. ibid., pp. 772-83. 
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70. ibid., pp. 775-6. 
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(pp. 781-2) 
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79. NRF November 1938, pp. 860-3. 
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83. NRF November 1938, p. 863. 
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87. ibid., p. 867. 
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89. Henri Pourrat, "Les exigeants", and Marcel Lecomte, 
"Quand 
les Neutres mobilisent", in ibid., pp. 873-4. 
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NRF; see JP to RMG, BN Mss, Fonds RMG, Vol. 115, f. 275, 
3/12/38 and note. 
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100. La Revue &niverselle, 15/10/38, p. 129: "Par une victoire 
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duree de la nation nYest plus immediatement menacee... ", 
etc (anon., editorial). These sentiments are archetypally 
"munichois". 
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114. ibid., p. 14. Cf. Duroselle, p. 381f. 
115. Cf. above, Chapter Two, on the debate surrounding Mort de la 
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Petain; see Berl-Modiano, pp. 92ff. 
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Chapter Three. 
120. ibid., pp. 1065-7. 
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personne et non celle de l' Etat, de la Nation ou d'une 
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Oeuvres V. pp. 483-92. 
123. NRF December 1938, p. 1066. 
124. ibid. , pp. 1068-9. 
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Grenier to JP, AP ., December 
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"Le Cercle carre (suite)", NRF January 1939, p. 173. 
125. Kohn-Etiemble, p. 174. Ina note (p. 175), she misattributes 
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"la Democratie 
fait appel au premier venu". 
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127. ibid., p. 171. 
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131. ibid., p. 172. 
132. See Duroselle, pp. 381-96. 
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135. Kohn-Etiemble, p. 178: "A la suite de ses notes, Petitjean 
a ete averti par le Quai (poliment, mais fermementy qu'il 
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136. See JP to Schlumberger, BD 25106 (March 1939)-. "la montee 
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fevrier,, 140 en f evrier-mars. Je crois que le numero de 
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137. JP to Suares, BD 4970/3,17/2/39 (my italics). 
138. Cf. the widely-quoted saying of Otto Abbrtz, the Nazi 
ambassador in Paris: "I1 ya trois forces en France: 
le 
communisme, la haute banque, et la NRF" 
(Lottman, p. 274). 
139. Girault, "Les Decideurs... ", p. 29. Cf. Duroselle, pp. 203ff, 
on foreign propaganda influence in France. 
Penetration of 
the Press was much deeper than is normally credited; 
La Revue hebdomadaire was entirely controlled by Landini 
(see Max Gallo, La Ve Colonne, Plon, 1970), as were 
L Franciste, Q Emancipation nationale, L' Ami du Peuple. 
The Germans had interests in Notre Temps, Le Cri 
des Peuples 
and others. 
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dep ouillement de toute la presse italienne et qui est 
ties renseigne sur 1'etat interieur de 1'Italie, dit que 
le regime quelle subit actuellement vaut absolument dans 
son genre le regime que subfit la Russie. I1 dit que sa 
fortune serait faite s'il voulait se laisser acheter par 
Mussolini, qu'il a ete sonde indirectement a ce sujet, et 
qu'on ne lui demanderait pas beaucoup, nullement de celebrer 
le regime fasciste dans sa totalite, mais seulement de dire 
qu'ä cote du mauvais il ya du bon, cette maniere developpee 
selon les circonstances. Mais il est par toute la nature de 
son esprit trop profondement republicain pour accepter de 
faire ce metier" (my italics). 
141. See, in particular, Duroselle, Chapter IX, "la Machine 
diplomatique", and Assouline, passim. 
142. Tor details, see above, Chapter Six. 
143. "Politique", NRF February 1939, pp. 194-211. 
144. Ibid., pp. 194-5. 
145. ibid., p. 196. 
146. ibid., p. 203. 
147. ibid., p. 204. 
148. ibid., p. 210. 
149. ibid., 
150. ibid., p. 208. Chardonne seemed to be both Monarchist 
and Radical-Republican at the same time when 
he wrote: 
"Je ne conseillerais pas a roi de venir gouverner 
la 
France, bien qu'elle en ait grand besoin. 
I1 serait 
surmene et offrirait trop de prise aux revolutionnaires 
(... ). D'oü me vient cette tendresse pour un aff reux 
regime parlementaire? Peut-titre 
d' urn grande mefiance 
des hommes. I1 me semble qu' on ne prend 
j amis assez 
de precautions contre 1'autorite" 
(ibid., pp. 206-7, 
my italics). 
151. NRF March 1939, pp. 478-83. 
152. ibid., p. 478. 
153. ibid. 
154. ibid. Paulhan's italics. 
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155. ibid., p. 479. 
156. ibid. , Paulhan's italics. 
157. ibid. 
158. ibid. , p. 4 80 (P aulhan' s italics). 
159. ibid., p. 481 (on Chardonne, see above). 
160. ibid., p. 482. 
161. ibid., p. 483. 
162. ibid. 
163. ibid. 
164. ibid. 
165. Cremieux to JP, AP., 20/2/39. Cremieux believed Paulhan 
could have complemented his argument: "I1 manque au moires deux 
autres parties; il y aurait a distinguer les solutions 
democratiques des solutions egalement bonnes, mais non- 
democratiques, il y aurait surtout ä traiter le probleme 
des elites en democratie. Si on ne traite pas ce dernier 
probleme et si on n'y trouve pas une solution admissible, 
il faut en toute logique reconnaitre que le sort de la 
democratie est lie au sort du liberalisme, lequel es t 
etroitement lie- au capitalisme". Cremieux's view is not 
essentially different from that expressed in 1934 (see above, 
Chapter Three). 
166. See the exchange of two long letters in Paulhan-Grenier, 
Correspondance, pp. 111-16. Grenier's prime objection was 
that in a Party system democracy was farcical because 
candidates were chosen by the Parties and not the people: 
"De toute f ajon ce ne peut titre le premier venu. Tu aurais 
done dü ajouter qu'il ne pouvait titre que tire au sort et 
c' es t1 la democratie" (ibid., p. 112). The problem was 
that in a modern State a universal lottery was impracticable. 
167. ibid.; "L' ideal serait", wrote Paulhan, "un empereur choisi 
par tirage au sort, recevant un pouvoir absolu, et de temps 
en temps execute: (... ) mettons tous les cinq ans. (... ) 
j'ai la plus grande horreur de dictateurs. Un dictateur est 
le type meme du specialiste (... ) ayant envie de gouverner, 
etc. (... ) Mais je voulais simplement conduire au bord de 
ces reflexions" (ibid., p. 115). Paulhan expressed similar 
thoughts to Etiemble; see Kohn-Etiemble, pp. 183,185-6. 
168. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3 766 (1939) ; also Kohn-Etiemble, p. 184. 
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169. See Kohn-Etiemble, pp. 43ff, and p. 186. Orthodoxy, 
Personal Philosophy, The Bodley Head, London, 1908. 
Claudel and Massis too were deeply interested in 
Chesterton. 
170. What's Wrong with the World?, Cassell, London, 1910. 
Chesterton himself believed in an idealistic "democratic 
republic of a more or less Rousseauian kind: literal 
self-government by ordinary men, each of them secure 
and independent in possession of his own land or 
workshop (Cf. French Radicalism), ruling themselves 
through equal laws (... ). He caught from Hilaire Belloc 
a romantic veneration for the French Revolution and the 
democratic tradition it had left behind". Quoted from 
Margaret Canovan, G. K. Chesterton, Radical Populist, 
Harcourt and Brace, New York and London, 1977, p. 76, 
my italics. The democracy Paulhan admired in Chesterton 
was, in fact, French, but filtered, and conceived in an 
age of social reform in Edwardian Britain. 
171. 
_ 
See G. K. Chesterton, "La Jungle familiale", in NRF November 
1939, pp. 677-92, and December 1939, pp. 838-57, trs. 
J. C. Laurens. 
172. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3777 (1939); also BD 3638 (1939): 
"je prefere sürement un roi (a la democratie, la folie 
meme)", and BD 3639 (1939), "... Quel soit le regime que 
tu souhaites pour la France, tu ne peux souhaiter en ce 
moment une guerre civile (... ). Mais quas-tu contre 
un roi? Et vois-tu, entre le. bolchevisme et les faisceaux, 
une autre solution franjaise? ". Paulhan seems noticeably 
more reactionary when writing to Jouhandeau... 
173. Andre Wurmser, "Divers intellectuels", Commune, April 1939, 
pp. 430-1. Wurmser quipped, on Paulhan's "insularity", 
that "il (... ) a longtemps habite le Plessis-Robinson" 
(ibid). Cf. also his Fidelement Vötre, p. 54. 
174. NRF March 1939, "Les lejons de 1'histoire", pp. 537-8 (p. 538). 
175. See, for example, Azema, pp. 29-30: "... on deduit des deroutes 
de l' annee quarante que le regime etait dej ä moribond en 
1939. A tout le moins, le bilan merite d'etre nuance. Les 
contemporains eux-memes avaient 11impression que 
le regime 
s' etait requinque, d' abord parce qu'il subsistait quelque 
chose du renouveau incontestable que le 
Front populaire 
avait app orte, ensuite parce que le daladierisme 
etait 
mieux qu'une periode de transition: Daladier 
jouissait 
d'une grande popularite". 
176. ibid., p. 29. 
177. Mayeur, p. 367. 
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178. "L'opinion, realite fluide et mobile, n'est pas responsable du pacifisme et du defaitisme du personnel politique. Mais celui-ci, par ses divisions, a pu contributer a la 
p assivite de l'opinion, cependant bien moindre dans les faits que daps l' image qui en est parfois donne " (ibid). 
179. See above, Chapter Six. 
180. See Duroselle, Chapter XIII, pp. 405-35. 
181. NRF June 1939, pp. 1070-1; "Politique personnelle". 
182. ibid., p. 1071. 
183. ibid. 
184. Armand Petitjean, "Peguy parmi nous", NRF July 1939, 
pp. 5-13 (p. 13). 
185. For details, see Dutoselle, p. 433. 
186. JP to Hellens, BD 7317,17/8/39. 
187. Duroselle, Chapter XV, pp. 471f f. 
188. ibid. Cf. CPD 3, pp. 147ff, 1/9/39. 
189. See JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 118, where Paulhan 
notes on September 5th that Gallimard was already contemplating 
the move. 
Cf. also JP to Schlumberger, BD 25111,17/9/39- Leautaud 
found the NRF offices in the rue Sebastien-Bottin almost 
completely deserted (Journal XII, p. 310,26/9/39), and 
mused that Gallimard had perhaps been too hasty, for he 
was told that the printer - Bussiere - had found a suitable 
property adjacent to his in Saint-Amand. (ibid., cf. Assouline, 
p. 267). 
190. Already on 29th July the "Commissariat general ä 1'Information", 
under Jean Giraudoux, had been created to survey propaganda. 
On 1st September, Paulhan ironized in his "Bulletin": "Paris. 
Jean Giraudoux, "Commissaire a 1'Information", disposera des 
fonds secrets de la censure de la presse, du cinema, et de 
la radio"; NRF September 1939, p. 525. See also Claude Bellanger, 
Histoire generale de la Presse franraise, Tome III: de 1871 ä 
1940, PUF., 1972, pp. 616ff. Cf. my "Jean Paulhan et la 
Censure: la NRF ä la ve ille de la guerre", Cahiers Jean Paulhan 3, 
"Cahier du Centenaire, 1884-1984", Gallimard, 1984, pp. 219-27. 
191. JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 118,5/9/39. Cf. 
Leautaud, Journal XII, p. 301,5/9/39, where he notes too that 
"les cinq derniers lignes du morceau de Henri 
Pourrat... 
avaient ete "echoppees". Paulhan a du faire une 
demarche 
aupres de Giraudoux pour obtenir qu'elles soient 
laissees, le 
numero etant tire... "; the Pourrat text in question 
is "Au 
fond du pays" in "fair du Mois", pp. 513-6. 
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192. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3820 (mid-September) 
. Cf. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25111,17/9/39, on the confusion reigning at 
this time: "J'ai appris hier: 1) que Petain disait de la 
guerre: "C'est une aventure malheureuse". 
2) que Laval, Flandt"n et autres etaient partisans d'une 
pair immediate; 
3) que dans le parti SFIO, Paul Faure, fort de l'appui des 
nouveaux adherents ex-communistes, avait desormais une 
majorite ecrasante; 
4) que Lindbergh faisait campagne pour la neutralite 
absolue; que d'ailleurs la guerre actuelle n'etait que 
la guerre du Comite des Forges, etc. (disent Benjamin Cremieux, 
Boris (de Schloezer), Franýois de Roux, Ct. Paleirac, etc. ). 
Vous me direz que je n' avais qu' ä ne pas aller trainer dans 
les services de la Propagande. Eh bien, j. e n'y retournerai 
pas ... Mais vraiment la France es tä ref aire de fond en 
comble, et ce n' est pas un hasard (mais, j. e pense, une 
sorte de contrainte sociale) si chaque civil se trouve si 
naturellement def aitiste". 
193. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25116 (late 1939). Commenting on 
texts he sent to le Figaro during this time, Schlumberger 
too notes "1' inefficacite ä l'. hOtel Continental. (... ) 
Giraudoux effusait chaque jour un bulletin plein de 
preciosites, inintelligibles ä qui n'a pas un frottis 
litteraire; il prodiguait des finesses que le gros public, 
toujours deroute par 11ironie, comprenait a rebours; 
(... ) Sentiment qu'on ne nous presentait pas la situation 
dans la verite, qu'on nous mentait par omission... 
", 
Oeuvres V, p. 404, Cf. also Roger Cardinne-Petit, Les Soirees 
du 'Continental' (ce que j'ai vu a la Censure de 1939 a 
1940), Jean Renard, 1942, and Leautaud, Journal XIII, p-12, 
26/2/40. 
194. See Leautaud, Journal XII, p. 312,4/10/39. "Blin m'apprend 
que la NRF ne paraitra que le 15 
(octobre), 1e nombre de 
pages reduit". Also ibid., p. 314,11/10/39, when 
the 
October number arrived. 
195. See above, Chapter One. Also Grover, 
NLN, p. 842, where 
Paulhan informed Gide of the whereabouts of 
Queneau, 
Petitjean, Arland, Leiris, Fernandez, Malraux and 
Giono. 
Giono was arrested in 18th September 
for "propos defaitistes"; 
see CPD 3, pp. 153ff, and Gide-Giono 
Correspondance cit., 
pp xviiiff. Giono was eventually released 
on November 18th; 
cf. CPD 3, p. 161. 
196. NRF October 1939, pp. 529-32. Cf. JP to 
Grenier, Correspondance 
cit., p. 118. 
197. NRF October 1939, pp. 529-30. 
198. ibid., p. 530. 
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199. ibid. 
200. ibid., p. 531. 
201. ibid., p. 532. 
202. Cited in Grover, MLN, p. 842. 
203. Lettres au Castor. I, p. 360. Sartre added: "Je trouve 
beaucoup plus juste les mots de Pourrat: "Une guerre qu' on 
va faire comme on faisait, tout petit, unepage d' ecriture. 
the chose embetante, mais qu'il faut faire". a c'est l- generale" (ibid., my italics) . 
204. JP to Suares, BD 4970/26,11/10/39. "J' irai ä Paris m' en 
assurer, vers le 20 octobre, et prier un peu, s' il le 
faut", he added. 
205. See NRF November 1939, pp. 774-79 (esp. p. 776, Suares), 
and pp. 780-1 (Petitjean). 
206. See NRF December 1939, p. 942: "Divers: Nos lecteurs ont 
trouve dans la NRF de novembre plus d'une ligne blanchie. 
Qu'ils veuillent bien nous excuser: les severites de la 
Censure etaient imprevisibles. Sitöt la guerre achevee, 
nous retablirons, dans in supplement de la revue, les 
textes tronques". 
207. NRF November 1939, p. 776. 
208. ibid., p. 778. 
209. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25114 
va bien: , 
250 abonnes de gain 
de la part faite a la guerre 
seulement les energumenes du 
purs, et leurs porte-paroles 
tres bien". 
(November 1939): "La NRF 
(... ). On me reproche beaucoup 
dans la NRF. Je ne dis pas 
pacifisme mais les litterateurs 
(... ) . Gaston nous 
defend 
210. JP to Suares, BD 4970/28,22/11/39: "Puis-je vous cacher ce 
que Von m'ecrit de toutes parts, ce que m'ecrivent en 
particulier tous, nos amis du front; et depuis hier 
seulement, trois nouvelles lettres me le disent: 1'on 
souhaite que vous parliez un peu moins de la guerre, et 
de Hitler. Von voudrait retrouver dans les 
"Chroniques 
de Ca9rdal" ces notes breves, les impressions, etc". 
Yet 
"on me reproche que la NRF de novembre n'est pas assez 
"de guerre". Et Suares, alors? 
" (JP to Grenier, Correspondance 
cit., p. 124. 
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211. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25114 (November 1939). Cf. Grover, 
MLN, pp. 845ff, on Paulhan's attitude to the Communists, 
equally shunned by such as Schlumberger and Drieu la Rochelle. 
Paulhan included several non-political texts by Aragon and Elsa Triolet, once the PCF had been suppressed on September 26th 1939 (see also Rossi-Landi, pp. 133-65). Cf. JP to 
Suares, BD 4970/26,11/10/39: "I1 ya cette enorme confuse 
masse a qui personne ne dit rien, que pour un peu Von 
confoildrait avec ses chefs: les communistes. Et pourquoi 
les abandonner ainsi? Its sont ceux qui ont entendu, 
depuis un an, le plus de vieilles chansons franjaises, les 
plus beaux recits de 1'Histoire de la France. Veut-on donc 
que le jour oü ce seront les Russes communistes, qui, des 
tranchees de la Saar, proposeront de fraterniser, ils n'aient 
rien ä repondre? Car je ne sais si Staline dirigera quelques 
jours la guerre. Mais je croirais volon. tiers que c'est lui 
qui d'ici un an la reglera. I1 a le petrole, qu'il laissera 
ou non couler, suivant l'obeissance des autres". 
212. NRF November 1939, p. 780. 
213. ibid., p. 808. 
214. ibid., pp. 782-9. 
215. ibid., pp. 788-9. 
216. See Richard, "Drieu la Rochelle et la NRF des annees noires", 
and Lottman, pp. 274f f. 
217. NRF November 1939, p. 789. Cf.. also Fernandez' "La Solitude 
de l'Allemagne", NRF January 1940, pp. 106-12, where he 
concluded: "L'histoire nous enseigne que les Allemagnes 
s' etaient naturellement ordonnees ä 1' Europe et ä son sens 
de l'universel. Mais ceci nous entralnerait trop loin, sur 
un chemin oü il ne faut avancer que pas ä pas" 
(p. 112). 
218. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25114 (November 1939). See Alain, 
"Les Contes de Nogl" (on Dickens), pp. 817-23, Alain, of 
course, was still an influential pacifist, and was recognised 
as such by the army, who interrogated him; see 
JP to 
Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 123,5/12/39. 
219. See NRF December 1939, pp. 858-62 (these poems were later 
collected in Le Creve-Coeur); cf. also 
his (literally 
interminable) Pierre Mercadier ou Les Voyageurs de 
l' I mperiale, NRF January to June 
1940 (cf . above, 
Chapter One). 
RF December 220. N 1939, pp. 913-20. This essay was 
based upon an 
. Anglo-French work edited by Paul Desjardins and 
H. E. Stewart. 
221. Rossi-Landi, p. 169. 
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222. Schlumberger, Oeuvres V, p. 401. 
223. See JP to Suares, BD 4970/32,21/12/39, and BD 4971/1, 
8/1/40; "On me promet, pour l'avenir, de l' indulgence 
(quelle indulgence? ). Et peu--etre meme la Censure 
va-t-elle faire retour a Paris... ". 
224. See NRF January 1940, pp. 5-7. 
225. ibid., p. 6. 
226. ibid., p. 7. 
227. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25116 (December 1939). 
228. This was not strictly true, given the reduction in the 
number of pages, and the absence of such as Arland, Caillois, 
Queneau, etc. 
229. NRF January 1940, leading publicity brochure, p. 11 (anon). 
230. NRF February 1940, pp. 145-9. 
231. NRF December 1939, pp. 908-12. 
232. NRF February 1940, p. 146. 
233. ibid., p. 149. 
234. ibid., pp. 150-61. 
235. ibid., p. 151. 
236. ibid., pp. 152ff. 
237. ibid., pp. 157-60. 
238. ibid., p. 160. 
239. ibid., pp. 162-73 (The text is dated 
October 1939; cf. 
also NRF May 1940, pp. 599-605). 
240. NRF February 1940, p. 163. 
241. ibid. 
242. ibid., p. 164. 
243. ibid., p. 166. 
244. ibid., p. 168. 
245. ibid., p. 170. 
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246. ibid. 
247. ibid. 
248. Cf. NRF September 1941, August and October 1942, February 
and April 1943; also Kohn-Etiemble, pp. 184,188-9. 
249. Chamson, I1 faut vivre vieux, Grasset, 1984, pp. 99 ff. Chamson was, for a time, also attached to the same units 
as Charles de Gaulle and De Lottre de Tassigny; see ibid., 
pp. 115ff, and Lacouture, Francois Mauriac, Seuil, 1980, 
p. 354. 
250. NRF February 1940, pp. 174-83. 
251. ibid., p. 174. 
252. ibid. 
253. ibid., p. 176 (my italics). 
254. ibid. , p. 178. 
255. ibid., p. 179. 
256. ibid., pp. 181 and 183. 
257. ibid., pp. 243-6, "Maurras ou Geneve" (p. 246). 
25 8. ibid., pp. 274-6 ("Airs du Mois"). 
259. See Rossi-Landi, p. 47. 
260. ibid. 
261. For details, see Azema, pp. 50ff, and Rossi-Landi, pp. 53-67. 
262. See JP to Schlumberger, BD 25116 (Winter 1939). 
263. "Pages di 'un Neutre", NRRF March 1940, pp. 289-306. This 
text was concluded in NRF April 1940, pp. 492-500. 
264. NRF March 1940, pp. 395-7. 
265. ibid., p. 395. Commenting on this text much later, 
Schlumberger wrote: "Deux tendances s'etaient opposees 
lors de la reprise de la NRF en 1919; elles avaient 
failli 
entrainer un schisme. I1 n'aurait pas 
ete surprenant qu'elles 
reappartAssent" ; Oeuvres V, p. 413. 
266. NRF March 1940, p. 397. 
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267. ibid. 
268. See above, note 265. 
269. i. e. "Pour saluer Melville", pp. 433-58; this long essay 
was concluded in May (pp. 606-32) and June (pp. 767-86). 
270. JP to RMG, BN Mss. Fonds RMG, Vol. 118, ff 282-3,4/4/40. 
271. See RMG's reply to JP, AP., 6/4/40: "La reaction de 
Jean ne m' etonne qu' ä demi. Un vieux sang alsacien lui 
travaille les veines et le deporte momentanement hors 
de la juste mesure. Je lui avais ecrit pour lui confier 
mon indignation devant le Mauriac du Figaro du 22 mars (oü 
il declare (... ) que daps un partie engagee avec les 
tricheurs, Von doit faire come eux, si Von n' es t pas 
un nigaud) et il m' a repondu que le papier Mauriac etait 
parfait, et qu'il eüt voulu l' avoir signe! " . On Mauriac's 
article in Le Figaro and his stance, see Lacouture, 
Franýois Mauriac, pp. 345-6. 
272. JP to Guehenno, AP., 8/4/40. 
273. JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 129 (April 1940). 
Chamson too (evacue pour choc nerveux", ibid., p. 131) 
believed the NRF for April 1940 had betrayed those at the 
front by not mentioning the war; see Gide-RMG Corr., II, 
pp. 201-2,19/4/40. 
Gide (who, it might be argued, proved Chamson's point) 
wrote to his friend: "Je m'entends fort bien avec lui, 
d' ordinaire . Par la tete et le coeur, Sa colle. Mais 
ne puis m'accorder ä ce qu'il dit du dernier numero de 
la NRF et non point pour la raison que vous donnez: 
rupture entre le front et 1' arriere. Non, c' es t entre 
eux, que les mobilises ne s' entendent pas. Et d'abord, comme 
vous le dites, ils sont effroyablement chatouilleux. Chamson 
sursaute d' indignation en ne voyant, dans la NRF, aucun ref let 
de la guerre". 
274. JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit. , pp. 129-31. 
275.3P to Suares, BD 4971/8,20/4/40. Once again, Suares had 
provoked his readers: "Je ret ois chaque ,j our", 
Paulhan 
told him, " (... ) une lettre qui s'emporte contre Ca9rdal: 
celle d'hier etait du Commandant Bissery 
(... ) : il paralt 
que vous aviez mal parle des Allemands" 
(ibid. ) . 
276. Azema, pp. 52-3. 
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277. NRF May 1940, pp. 577-98. These pages were the opening 
of what was eventually published as Les Enfants humilies 
in - 1949. Henri Michaux, returning to France in January 
1940, had brought the manuscript with him; see notes in 
Bernanos, Essais et Ecrits de combat, Gallimard, 
Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1971, esp. pp. 1592ff. 
278. For details of his break with L' Action f ran aise see 
Jean-Loup Bernanos' essay "Bernanos et Maur as" in 
Scandale de la yerite, Seuils/points, 1984, pp. 7-57. 
279. NRF May 1940, p. 577. 
280. ibid., p. 578. 
281. ibid., p. 584. 
282. ibid. , Cf .: 
"Nous demandons simplement que, destitues 
de la qualite des vainqueurs, 1'Arriere ne nous exploite 
pas, ä ses fins, comme tels" (ibid. ) . 
283. "Depuis des 
nous sommes 
moi un sens 
evenements, 
d'imbeciles 
rajeunit de 
mois les journaux repetent a l' envi (... ) que 
"revenus a 1914". Ce lieu commun a pris pour 
atroce... " (... ) "En face des derniers 
passee la surprise, je sais que beaucoup 
auront pense sans oser le dire: a nous 
vingt ans"' (ibid., pp. 588-9). 
284. ibid., p. 598. 
285. ibid. 
286. ibid. 
287. i. e. see above, note 285. 
288. NRF May 1940, pp. 599-605. 
289. For details, see Azema, pp. 54-9. 
290. Letter quoted in Andreu and Grover, Drieu 
la Rochelle, p. 457. 
291. NRF June 1940, pp. 721-2. It is this text which marks 
Paulhan as"un gaulliste de 1'avant-premiere 
heure"; 
Andreu and Grover, p. 457. 
292. NRF June 1940, p. 721. 
293. ibid. 
294. ibid., p. 722. 
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295. ibid. As late as 30th September 1940, Paulhan wrote 
to Leon Bopp that "les deux Franjais exemplaires de 
cette guerre ont ete deux aristocrates: Charles de Gaulle 
et Thierry de Martel... " (NRF February 1982, p. 181). 
For Paulhan de Gaulle represented "1'espoir", while de 
Martel, an eminent French surgeon who preferred suicide 
to life under the Occupation, represented a form of "le 
silence". 
296. NRF June-1940, pp. 723-43. 
297. ibid., p. 725. 
298. Cf. Assouline, p. 269, who reports that en route one of 
vans transporting Gallimard's archives was destroyed after 
a German air attack: the NRF had literally become a war- 
victim... 
299. JP to Suares, BD 4971/11,7/6/40. 
300. JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 135, Cf. also 
JP to Guehenno, AP. (Summer 1940), and CPD 3, p. 178. 
Among the authors and titles promised were: Andre Gide, 
Nouvelles Pages de Journal; Julien Benda, "Jacques Bainville 
et le Probleme de l'Allemagne"; Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Age de 
Raison; Leon Brunschwicg, "Le dur labeur de la Verite"; 
Raymond Queneau, "Apropos de Jules Romains", and 
Robert Musil, L' Homme sans, caracteres . 
(Publicity 
brochure, NRF June 1940, p. 150. ). 
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IN CONCLUSION - NOTES 
1. JP to Hellens, BD 7322,7323 (1940). 
2. See JP to Leon Bopp, NRF February 1982, p. 181,30/9/40. 
Cf. also Grover, MLN, pp. 846f f, and Kohn-Etimble, pp. 203-9. 
For an introduction to Drieu's NRF, see esp. Lionel Richard, 
"Drieu la Rochelle et La Nouvelle Revue Franýaise des annees 
noires", La Revue de 1'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale, 
XXV, 97,1975, pp 67-84. See also CPD 3, pp. 199-259; Lottman, 
pp. 274ff; Claude Martin, "La NRF de Drieu la Rochelle", in 
La NRF de 1940 ä 1943, Lyon, 1975, pp. ix-xliv, and the 
little-known article by Maurice Saillet, "La NRF va-t-elle 
disparaitre? ", in L'Effort, 29/9/40 (this newspaper was 
"pour la Reconstruction nationale"; ibid., 4/8/40). Finally, 
Assouline (pp. 270-362) relates the history of the publishing- 
house under the Occupation. 
3. JP to Guillaume de Tarde, NRF February 19 82 , p. 185; he added: 
"I1 s'est trouve que les All. non plus. Nous en sommes lä. 
La NRF reparaitra donc probablement d'ici trois mois, sous 
la direction de Drieu". 
4. Cf. Grover, MLN, p. 847: "Je ne-_pouvais demeurer dans une 
revue dont on chassait les collaborateurs juifs 
(Benda, 
Suares, Wahl) et les antinazis (Bernanos, Claudel, Romains) 
que j'y avais appeles". 
Paulhan witnessed at first hand the anti-Semitism of the 
French military in an incident concerning Benda, whilst they 
were dining in Carcassonne (see JP to Grenier, 
Correspondance 
cit., pp. 138-9, and Jean Guehenno, Journal 
des &nnees noires, 
Gallimard, 1947, pp. 35ff). 
5. Leautaud, Journal XIII, p. 195,16/10/401 
6. Paulhan, Oeuvres V, pp. 488-9. 
7. See Paulhan and Dominique Aury, editors of 
La Patrie se fait 
tous les j ours , textes 
f rancais , 
1939-194 5 les Editions de 
Minuit, 1947. The texts included were 
by Pierre Jean Jouve, 
Schlumberger, Suares, Ramuz, Bernanos, Mauriac, 
Aragon and 
Chams on)' esp. pp. 41-94. 
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Section I: Unpublished Correspondence 
a) The Archives Paulhan (AP). Much of the unpublished correspondence 
consulted is in the keeping of Mme Jacqueline F. Paulhan, 
3, rue des Reculettes, 75013 Paris, France. Among those series 
collected bilaterally with a view to eventual publication are: 
Paulhan-Jean Guehenno, 
Paulhan-Roger Caillois, 
Paulhan-Jean Grenier. 
A selection from the latter has been published; see below, 
Section II. 
Letters from the following correspondents to Jean Paulhan (JP) 
were also consulted: 
Julien Benda, Andre Chamson, Benjamin Cremieux, 
Ramon Fernandez, Andre Gide, Daniel Halevy, 
Roger Martin du Gard, Jean Prevost and 
Albert Thibaudet. 
Reference in the Notes is shown by the letters AP (Archives Paulhan) 
and date, where certain. Where dates are approximate, 
brackets are used. 
b) The Archives Riviere 
Jean Paulhan and Jac 
M Alain Riviere, 31, 
References are to AR 
(AR). The bilateral correspondence between 
ques Riviere is in the keeping of 
rue Arthur-Petit, 78220 Viroflay, France. 
(Archives Riviere) and date, where certain. 
c) The Bib liotheque Litteraire Jacques Doucet. The 
following letters 
of Paulhan are conserved at the Bibliotheque Litteraire 
Jacques 
Doucet, place du Pantheon, 75005 Paris, France, under the 
"cotes" 
shown (dates are indicated between parentheses) : 
- JP to Franz Hellens: Ms. 
7163 alpha (1921) to Ms. 7323 alpha (1941). 
- JP to Marcel Jouhandeau: 
Ms. JHDC 3366 (1921) to Ms. JHDC 3888 
(1940). 
- JP to Adrienne Monnier: 
Ms. 4375 (1920) to Ms. 4479 (16/5/37). 
- JP to Jean Schlumberger: 
Ms. -Ms. 25001 (1912) to 
Ms. -Ms. 25116 
(1939). 
- JP to Andre Suares: 
Ms. 4948 alpha (1928) to Ms. 4971 
/11 alpha 
(7/6/40). 
References to these are given as BD., with shortened 
"cote" and 
date. 
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d) The Departement des Manuscrits, Bibliothegue Nationale. 
Paulhan's letters to Lalou and Martin du Gard are conserved 
under the following "cotes": 
- JP to Rene Lalou: BN Mss. Nouvelles Acquisitions Franjaises 
14692. 
"Lettres adressees ä Rene Lalou: Vol. 4 (referred to as BN Mss. 
14692). 
- JP to Roger Martin du Gard: BN Mss. Fonds RMG, "Correspondance 
a RMG", Vols. CXIII to CXX (8 Vol. ), esp. Vol. CXVIII, for 
Paulhan's letters (referred to in Notes as BN Mss. Fonds RMG 118, 
and page number and date, where certain. 
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SECTION II: Published Correspondence 
-- "Cent Dix-Huit Lettres Inedites", NRF October 1976, 
esp. pp. 113-2 3. 
Cingria, Charles-Albert: Correspondance enerale. Tome 3, 
"Lettres aux amis de La Voile latine", Editions l'Age d'Homme, 
Lausanne, 19 77. 
Claudel, Paul, Milhaud, Darius: Correspondance, in Cahiers Paul Claudel 
3, Gallimard, 1961. 
Fernandez, Ramon, Riviere, Jacques: Correspondance, 
Amis de Jacques Riviere et d'Alain-Fournier, 
in Bulletin 
No. 14,1979. 
Gheon, Henri, Gide, Andre: Correspondance, (2 Vol), 1897-1903, and 
1904-1944, texte etabli par Jean Tipy. Introduction et notes 
par A-M. Moulenes et J. Tipy (pp. 9-127), Gallimard, 19 76 . 
Gide, Andre, Martin du Gard, Roger: Correspondance, 2 Vol., Vol. J., 
1913-1934; Vol. 2,1935-1951; introduction et notes par 
Jean Delay, Gallimard, 1968 (referred to as Gide-RMG Corr. 1 
or 2. 
Gide, Andre: "Correspondance avec Waldo Frank", in Bulletin des Amis 
d' Andre Gide, No, 33, January 1977. 
Gide, Andre, Giono, Jean: Correspondance 1929-1940, edition etablie, 
presentee et annotee par Roland Bourneuf et Jacques Cotnam, 
Centre d' Etudes Gidiennes, Lyon, 19 83 . 
Gide, Andre: Correspondance avec Jef Last, 1934-1950, edition etablie, 
presentee et annotee par C. J. Greshoff, Presses 
Universitaires 
de Lyon, Lyon, 1985. 
Gide, Andre, Suares, Andre: Correspondance 1908-1920, ed. Sidney 
D. Braun, Gallimard, 1963. 
Gide, Andre: "Lettres a Jean Paulhan", NRF January 19 70, pp. 
75-81. 
Grover, Frederic J.: "Les Annees 30 dans la Correspondance 
Gide-Paulhan", Modern Language Notes, 95,1980, pp. 
830-49. 
Kohn-Etiemble, Jeannine: 226 Lettres 
inedites de Jean Paulhan 
(contribution ä 1'etude du mouvement litteraire en France, 
1933-1967), Klincksieck, 1975. 
Leautaud, Paul: Correspondance generale de 
Paul Leautaud, recueillie 
par Marie Dormoy, Flammarion, 
1972. 
Paulhan, Jean, Tarde, Guillaume de: " Correspondance, 
1904-1920, 
Cahiers Jean Paulhan 1, Gallimard, 1980. 
(Referred to as 
CJP . 
des 
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Paulhan, Jean: Jean Paulhan et Madagascar, 1908-1910, (Correspondence), 
Cahiers Jean Paulhan 2, Gallimard, 1982. (Referred to as CJP 2. 
Paulhan, Jean: Choix de Lettres, 1917-1936, La Litterature est une fete, Gallimard, 1986. 
Paulhan, Jean, Grenier, Jean: Correspondance 1925-1968, preface de 
Roger Judrin, Calligrammes, Quimper, 1984. 
Paulhan, Jean: "Correspondance", in NRF May 1969, "Jean Paulhan, 
1884-1968", esp. pp. 988-1041. 
Paulhan, Jean, Valery, Paul: "Correspondance", NRF August 1971, 
pp"161-7. 
Paulhan, Jean: "Lettres de Jean Paulhan, 1918-1919", NRF June 1978, 
pp. 166-79. 
Paulhan, Jean: "Les Lettres de Jean Paulhan", NRF July 1979, 
pp. 170-92. 
Paulhan, Jean: "Lettres a quelques amis, 1940-1941", NRF February 1982, 
pp. 177-92. 
Paulhan, Jean: "Lettres a quelques amis", NRF March 1982, pp. 174-91. 
P aulhan, Jean: "Lettres ä quelques amis, 1954-1958", NRF April 1982, 
pp. 169-91. 
Paulhan, Jean: "Lettres a Marcel Jouhandeau", Cahiers de 1'Energumene, 
No. 3, Autumn-Winter 1983, pp. 203-15. 
-- "Jean Paulhan-Brice Parain: 
Correspondance", NRF November 1983, 
pp. 170-92; NRF December 1983, pp. 142-8. 
Proust, Marcel: Lettres a la "NRF", Cahiers Marcel Proust, VI, 
Gallimard, 1932. 
Ramuz, Charles-Ferdinand: Lettres, II (1914-1947), Grasset, 1959. 
Ramuz, Charles-Ferdinand: "Correspondance", NRF July 1967, pp. 
160-92. 
Riviere, Jacques, Schlumberger, Jean: Correspondance 
1909-1925, 
edition etablie, presentee, et annotee par Jean-Pierre 
Cap, 
Centre d'Etudes Gidiennes, Lyon, 1980. 
Rolland, Romain, Guehenno, Jean: "L'Independance 
de 1'Esprit, 
Correspondance 1919-1944", Cahiers Romain 
Rolland 23, 
Albin Michel, 1975. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul: Lettres au Castor, 2 Vol., 
Gallimard, 1983. 
(Vol. 1,1926-1939). 
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Section III: Books and Articles 
This bibliography is limited to directly-quoted sources. 
Place of publication is Paris unless stated otherwise. 
Almeras, Philippe: "Les Pamphlets", in "Dossier Celine", Magazine 
litteraire, September 1976. 
-- "Andre Gide et La NRF", anon. in Selection, January 1924, 
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